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ABSTRACT
Prior to land reform in Iran, there existed the articulation of 
capitalist and feudal modes of production. The relations of production 
of each mode reproduced/reinforced the relations of production of both. 
Thus, the relationship among the agents of production (producers and 
non-producers) were semi—feudal-semi-capitalist. The peasants, being
subjected to feudal exploitation, made attempts in two different periods 
to end this feudal relationship, but failed.
The fully-fledged development of capitalism was blocked by the 
articulated combination of the capitalist and feudal modes of production.
The failure of the peasants to remove feudal ties, made it clear that 
the peasantry on its own was unable to open the way for the development 
of capitalism (the "American" path). However, the economic and political 
crisis of 1959-1961 broke the alliance of the feudal landlords on the one 
hand and comprador bourgeoisie on the other. Thus the latter by mobilizing 
the peasantry, managed to launch a land reform programme.
This programme removed the set of feudal relations of production and 
therefore prepared the ground for the development of capitalism. Some 
peasants received land while the rest became part of the landless and 
urban proletariat. Some of the landlords began to employ machinery and 
wage-labour and thus became capitalist farmers. The "American" and 
"Prussian" paths of development of capitalism went on side by side. The 
articulation of these two paths of development has become the characteristic 
feature of rural Iran after the implementation of land reform.
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1INTRODUCTION
In 1962 a nation-wide land reform programme was launched by the 
central Government. This study is concerned to attempt to discover how 
the programme affected rural Iran. Thus this thesis sets out to analyse 
relations of production in rural Iran before and after the implementation 
of land reform, to examine the nature of this programme, and in so doing 
to establish the relationship between the land reform programme and the 
development of capitalism in rural Iran. In the first part of this 
study, we shall argue that prior to land reform, rural Iran was 
characterized by an articulated combination of feudal and capitalist 
modes of production. Our argument in the second part will reveal that 
the nation-wide land reform programme had a transitional function. And 
finally, in the third part we shall set out to explain that after land 
reform the two processes of development of capitalism, i.e. the "American" 
and "Prussian" ways, have gone on side by side.
Before outlining the structure of the thesis, we should briefly state 
our understanding of the major concepts of feudal and capitalist modes of 
production, and their articulation as these terms have been used throughout 
this study. The 'feudal mode of production' is understood as a mode of 
production in which the direct-producer owns or may own all means of 
production (e.g. oxen and tools) but land. He is assigned to a plot of 
land by the landlord. The latter is able to exploit the former (in 
different forms) because of his political dominance. The render of 
surplus takes place outside the labour-process, and therefore the political 
dominance provides the conditions of existence of exploitative relations 
of production within the structure of this mode of production. By the 
capitalist mode of production, we mean a mode of production in which the direct 
producer is completely separated from the objective conditions of production, 
so he has to sell his labour-power to the owner of means of production.
The capitalist, in this mode of production, organizes and conducts the
2labour-process. It is within this process that the direct-producer
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c renders surplus-value. That is, the exploitation takes place through an 
economic mechanism.
Any social formation contains more than one mode of production.
These modes of production are articulated in the sense that the elements 
of the modes of production are joined together in a structure in such a 
way that the whole is itself defined by relationships obtaining between 
the elements. Thus an articulated combination of capitalist and feudal 
modes of production refers to the existence within the relationships 
between agents of production (direct-producer and non-producer) of 
capitalist and feudal elements. Ambiguities of delineating feudal and 
capitalist relations in the transitional period clearly cause problems of 
identifying which elements are feudal and which capitalist. What is 
apparently a feudal economic relationship (e.g. share-cropping) may hide 
the emergence of underlying capitalist relations. However, such a mode 
of production may still be labelled ’feudal' because of the continued, 
though less enforced, existence of non-economic coercion outside the 
labour process (e.g. the obligations of labour service or dues in kind). 
These ambiguities of definition will be more clear by the concrete analysis 
of rural Iran.
It is very fluidity of the articulation process which leads to the 
conclusion that rural Iran should be categorized as a semi-feudal - semi­
capitalist social formation. By this we mean a social formation which is 
dominated neither by capitalism not by feudalism, and as such is in a 
transitional period. The transition from feudalism to capitalism may, 
following Kautsky and Lenin, be categorized as entailing two main processes, 
the "American" and the "Prussian". The former refers to a process by 
which capitalist relationships develop among the peasants, polarizing into 
a class of landowners and landless labourers. By the "Prussian" way is 
meant the process by which the feudal landlords become capitalist farmers, 
therefore employing the peasants as wage-labourers and produce for the
3market.
In the first part of this study, we deal with the relations of 
production during the period of 1940-1960. We shall distinguish two sets 
of relations of production in the Iranian rural social formation: one 
embracing the relationship between landlord and peasant, and the other 
encompassing the relationship between the peasants. Thus in the first 
six chapters, we examine different aspects of the relationships between 
landlord and peasants while in chapter seven we study the relationships 
between the peasants,
In the first chapter, we examine the property relations in the Iranian 
rural social formation. There were five elements of production, i.e. 
land, water, oxen, seeds and labour. Our examination of the property 
relations shows that land and water in almost all cases belonged to the 
landlords; whereas oxen and seed in most cases belonged to the peasantry. 
However, the peasants, as direct-producers, were assigned to the position 
of possession of land/water by landlords for reasons of economic 
calculation. Yet the landlords had the power to dismiss their subjects 
from this position, though they were faced with some restrictions. Our 
examples in this chapter reveal the struggle between landlords and 
peasants over the ownership/possession of land/water.
Having studied the property relations and the subordination of 
peasants to landlords, we move in the second and third chapters to examine 
the different forms of the extraction of surplus. Thus in the second 
chapter, we show that the share-cropping system was the dominant form of 
rent payment in almost all parts of Iran but the Caspian sea littoral.
The analysis of this form of rent payment reveals that it is neither a 
capitalist rent nor a feudal rent. In fact, the share-cropping system 
has the elements of both capitalist and feudal systems. However, we have 
distinguished two types of share-cropping, one is for the winter crops and 
the other for summer crops. The former type includes rent for land and 
water (irrigated cultivation), rent for land (unirrigated cultivation) and
4rent for water. In terms of the relations of production, the latter type 
of share cropping is very different from the former type. That is, our 
analysis of the share-cropping of the summer crops reveals that it is a 
type of capitalist rent payment. Another form of rent payment was the 
fixed rent system. In this system the direct-producers had to pay a 
certain amount of produce and/or money to their landlords. This form of 
rent payment was the dominant form in the Caspian sea littoral; whereas to 
a limited extent it was practised in the other parts of the country. In 
addition to these two types of rents, in some cases, the peasants paid the 
rent partially as fixed rent and partially as a portion of the produce.
In this chapter, we ^also discuss the question of the form of payment (in 
cash or in kind) in relation to the mode of production in order to find 
out whether or not it is scientific to identify a mode of production only 
on the basis of forms of payment.
In addition to the types of rents cited above, the Iranian peasants 
were subjected to other forms of rent, in particular labour service and 
dues. However, these latter were supplementary to the above mentioned 
rents. In chapter three, we examine labour-service and dues in detail.
We shall explain how the peasants had to perform labour service with no 
return. As we shall argue in this chapter, labour service and dues are 
forms of direct exploitation characteristic of the feudal mode of 
production.
Having concluded that the peasants were subordinated to their 
landlords and had to pay them rent in different forms, in the fourth 
chapter we shall examine whether or not the former were tied to the land. 
Thus we shall examine factors which prevented the peasants from migration 
as well as factors which were exogenous to the rural social formation and 
could indirectly affect the relationship between producer and non­
producer in the rural areas.
Having analysed the property relations and forms of exploitation in 
the first four chapters, we shall go on to examine the peasant's revolts
5during 1940s and 1950s. We shall argue that during these two decades, 
there were two types of peasants’ struggles. In some cases, the 
struggles of the peasants were restricted to the economic domain for 
example to demand a reduction of rents and dues. But in other cases, the 
peasants rose against the landlords and occupied the land on which they 
worked, thus making an attempt to overthrow the feudal system. However, 
all these revolts were suppressed by the State.
In order to impose their power upon the peasantry (for the extraction 
of surplus), the landed classes, which owned around 83% of all cultivable 
lands, had to either rent its lands to other agents or assign bailiffs to 
run its estates. As we shall show, this created a hierarchy on the top 
of the peasantry. In chapter six, we shall examine the different categories 
of landowners as well as the way in which each category ran its estates.
Thus far, we shall have treated the peasantry as a homogeneous social 
category. However, in chapter seven, we shall consider the relations of 
production among the peasantry. This includes property and labour 
relations as well as the relation of the direct producers to the produce. 
First, we set out to analyse the property relations of the peasantry.
This includes the ownership/possession of land/water and also ownership 
of other means of production such as seeds and oxen. As we shall show in 
this chapter, some peasants owned/possessed means of production. This 
uneven ownership/possession of the means of production reflected the 
complex set of relationships existing among the peasantry. Our analysis 
of the lending/borrowing of oxen, the labour process and also the division 
the produce among the peasants reveals different aspects of these 
relationships. In effect, our main concern in this chapter is to establish 
the extent of differentiation among the Iranian peasantry before the 
implementation of land reform.
Our argument in chapter eight on the social classes in rural Iran is 
based on the analysis, in the previous chapter, of the relations of 
production. Thus with regard to the peasant owner/possessors we shall
6distinguish three classes of peasantry: rich, middle and poor peasants.
We shall show the different positions which the peasants of different 
classes occupied within the relations of production, as well as positions 
of social groups without land, for example the agricultural wage-labourers, 
artisans and shopkeepers.
In the second part of the thesis, we deal with the activities 
pertinent to land reform in Iran during 1940-1970. In order to study 
the land reform movement we consider the different definitions of land 
reform. However, we shall give a definition of land reform, thus 
enabling us to analyse land reform in Iran.
Before the implementation of nation-wide land reform in 1962, 
different governments and local authorities had made partial attempts 
during 1940s and 1950s to change landed property in Iran. Thus we shall 
set out to explain the land distribution by the democrats in Azarbaijan 
and Qavam and Mossadeq’s bills in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 
addition, we shall deal with the distribution of Public Domain and Crown 
lands which took place in the 1950s. However, none of these attempts 
brought about any major change in landed property in the Iranian rural 
social formation.
In order to find out the causes of the implementation of such an 
important programme, in the third section of chapter nine, we shall set 
out to study the economic and political situation in Iran after 1953, i.e. 
when the coup government came to power and suppressed all types of 
partial movement. We also explain the opposition of different groups to 
the implementation of the L-R programme.
Finally, in the fourth section of this chapter, we shall examine the 
land reform laws. We shall classify the land reform laws into two sets: 
one technical and the other related to landed' property. We shall not 
discuss the former laws, because they have been explained in detail 
elsewhere, and shall therefore concentrate on the second set in order to 
discuss the nature and aims of the nation-wide L-R of 1962, as well as
7the detrimental effects of this programme on landed property.
In chapter ten, we shall set.out to analyse rural Iran after the 
implementation of land reform. In the first section, we shall deal with 
the different aspects of the relations of production among the peasantry. 
First we shall examine the property relations arid try to show the changes 
which took place due to the L-R programme in this aspect of the relations 
of production. We shall also examine the ownership of other means of 
production. We shall then analyse the relationship of the peasantry to 
the market for capital goods and thus the lending/borrowing of tractors 
and combines, the consumption of chemical fertilizers and also the use of 
motor-pumps. The second aspect of the relations of production is labour 
relations. We shall show how some two million proletarians and semi­
proletarians sell their labour power in the rural as well as urban labour 
markets. We shall also try to discover the reasons for an increase in 
the number of these two rural classes after the implementation of L-R.
The relation of the peasantry to the commodity market is the third aspect 
which is analysed in this chapter. Thus we shall examine the sale of 
produce by the different strata of the peasantry in the commodity market. 
However, in order to sell their produce on the market, the majority of 
the peasants, as we shall show, are connected to the money market. Thus 
we shall describe .how the majority of the peasants borrow from moneylenders 
as well as from the cooperatives and banks.
In the second section of chapter ten, we briefly study the economics 
of capitalist farming. Thus we examine farmers' land ownership and also 
their investment in machinery and fertilizers. We also analyse their 
employment of wage-labourers for a period of the year. We shall argue 
that these capitalist farmers usually have monopsony power in the village 
labour market, that the vendors of labour power have the opportunity to 
find jobs outside the village boundaries, and that this weakens the 
monopsony power of the capitalist farmers in the village labour market. 
Furthermore, we examine the relation of the capitalist farmers to the
8commodity and money markets.
The development of the CMP through the "American" and "Prussian" ways 
have gone on side by side. Both these forms of development of the CMP are, 
in effect, articulated. The process of development, however, has always 
been accompanied by the process of pauperization of the peasantry. This 
is examined in the third section of the tenth chapter. Thus we briefly 
explain different forms of the pauperization of the peasantry during the 
period of 1962-1976.
In the late 1960s, the State initiated two projects to "develop" the 
agricultural sector of Iran. They are corporation and agro-business 
projects. We shall therefore briefly examine these in the last chapter.
The first section of chapter eleven presents an argument formation of 
corporations and the election of board of directors and the manager. We 
shall show how the peasants could become share-holders and how they are 
supposed to control the corporations. Generally speaking, we shall 
concentrate on two questions: First the aims of the formation of corpor­
ations and whether or not these aims are achieved; secondly, the changes 
in the positions of peasant owner/possessors in relation to the means of 
production. In effect, our main concern is to find out whether or not 
ttis project has accelerated the process of proletarianization of the . 
peasantry. As our argument will show, the land reform programme increased 
the number of proletarians and semi-proletarians; hence by the early 1970s 
there were around two million of them seeking casual work in the urban and 
rural labour markets•
In the second section of this chapter, we shall examine the foundation 
of agro-business units, and in particular the role of the State in the 
formation of these units of Iran. We shall mainly concentrate on the 
impact of this project on the relations of production in the villages 
affected by the formation of these units and the State provision of 
various facilities in different forms for the agro-business companies.
Our analysis of rural Iran before land reform, the land reform
9programme and the process of the development of capitalism after land 
reform can be contrasted with earlier studies.^ Previous studies by
k
Denman, Shams-Zanjani and Lambton have considered pre-land reform rural 
Iran as a feudal social formation. Our analysis shows that rural Iran 
during 1940s and 1950s was a semi-feudal - semi-capitalist social formation. 
Russian writers on the subject, for example, Ivanov, Badi and Demin, have 
considered rural Iran as a semi-feudal - semi-capitalist social formation. 
For them this is because of the existence of the share-cropping system as 
the dominant form of extraction of surplus. But we shall argue that this 
is to oversimplify the complexity of what was in effect the articulation 
of capitalist and feudal modes of production. Secondly, the land reform 
programme was a bpurgeois reform programme which began to release the 
forces for the development of capitalism. Some studies (e.g. the G.O.P.F. 
and Mo'meni) have attributed the reason for the implementation of land 
reform to the contradiction between the capitalist mode of production 
(supported by the imperialist powers) and the moribund feudal mode of 
production. Other studies have attributed the reform to the personal 
desire of the Shah and other political leaders (see e.g. Lambton, Denman). 
In our analysis we shall argue against both of these positions and try to 
show that the implementation 6f this programme was the result of the 
struggles between the different social classes particularly, the struggle 
between landlords and peasants. We shall also show that the economic 
and political crisis in the late 1950s in Iran played a decisive role in 
the initiation of the land reform programme. Finally we place emphasis 
on the role played by the land reform programme in removing the last 
vestiges of feudalism from rural Iran, and allowing the more rapid 
development of capitalism through the "American" and "Prussian" ways. 
However, these two processes should not be considered as alternative and 
exclusive paths of development. In effect, they are articulated and
y
only by taking into consideration this articulation, can the development 
of capitalism in rural Iran be analysed.
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With regard to most definitions of ’development' we may generally
note that these writers have not taken into account the mode of production
for which "development" is defined, in spite of the fact that by development
they imply the development of the CMP. Phillips is right therefore when
she writes: 'the first development analysts had been attacked for their
uncritical acceptance of the term "development" as synonymous with "the
development of capitalist social relations". They had assumed that the
term was non-problematic, and failed to acknowledge that it inevitably
3referred to development under specific historical conditions.' In 
addition to this point, disregarding modes of production in a definition 
of "development" may imply that a process of social and economic development 
is something natural and asocial which has an existence independent of any 
specific mode of production. This will enable us to distinguish between those 
UDCs which are approaching capitalist mode of production on the one hand 
and those which are approaching "socialism" on the other.
In order to avoid the above cited errors, we may therefore define 
"development" of a certain mode of production as the expansion/reinforcement 
of social relationships pertinent to that mode of production at all levels, 
■i.e. economic, political as well as ideological. Obviously, with regard 
to the economic development of any specific mode of production, only the 
economic level is taken into consideration; and therefore we may define it 
as the expansion/reinforcement of relations/forces of production of that
4specific mode of production. In conjunction with our definition the 
following points should be made:
First, in an articulation combination of two modes of production, development 
is pertinent to one of the modes of production vis-a-vis the other one.
And when neither of these modes is in the absolute dominant position, we 
have a social formation in the transitional stage, i.e. transition from 
the dominance of one mode to that of the other. Secondly, with regard to 
the CMP in our model, there is no place for "underdevelopment" in the 
Frankian sense of the word, considering the point that we are concerned
2
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with a single country and not the world capitalist system. Instead we 
have "uneven development" within a capitalist country. That is to say, 
in a capitalist social formation (and also those which are approaching 
this mode) the expansion/reinforcement of capitalist relations/forces of 
production does not take place evenly in sectors and subsectors of the 
economy. The typical example of such an unevenness is the development of 
capitalism in agriculture and in industry.
The major sources for the discussion in the first part of this thesis 
are the surveys which were carried out by the research group of the 
Faculty of Economics (University of Tehran) in 1963-64 and the Ford 
Foundation’s reports in 1953, we have also relied to some extent on the 
major studies by Lambton (1953) and English (1966). For assessments at 
the national level, the Agricultural National Census I960 provided a mass 
of data and was an invaluable source. Various issues of journals, 
magazines and daily papers (in English and Persian) laid the basis for 
the analysis of the economic and political events in the 1950s. Two 
monographs incorporately work carried out by the G.O.P.F., some reports to 
the Cabinet (during 1973-75), four monographs containing the researched 
results of the scholars at the Institute of Social Research and Studies 
(university of Tehran) provided the basis for much of the analysis in the 
third part of the thesis. A.short field trip in particular to three 
villages in the Tarom area in the summer of 1977 enabled me to check on 
some of the source material and interview villagers affected by the land 
reform programme. A more systematic field trip was rendered impossible 
by the increasingly unstable political situation ruling in Iran at that 
time, already showing the strains which led to the Revolution of February, 
1979.
Finally we would like to draw attention to the following three points: 
First, we have considered only the economic relationships among the agents 
of production in rural Iran, because the study of the non-economic 
elements is out 6f the scope of this thesis. Secondly, we have not
10b
considered the economic system of tribes which exist in different parts 
of Iran. Thirdly, we have assumed that the land reform programme 
affected all villages, though the events in 1978-79 have revealed that in 
some villages affected by land reform, the pre-capitalist relations of 
production continue to exist; while in some areas (e.g. in some parts of 
Kurdistan) land reform did not affect landed property at all, because of 
political considerations.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION
1. See Lambton 1969, Warriner 1969, Nclachan 1968.
2. See for example Todaro, 1977, p.87$ Pleier, 1976, p.6j Dorner
1972, p.15; and Long, 1977, p,10.
3. Phillips, 1977, p.10, italics added,
4. Bradby, on the basis of Ray’s model, defines ’’development" as the
widening capitalist relations of production and increasing the 
labour-base from which surplus-value can be extracted. See 
Bradby, 1975, p,142.
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CHAPTER I
Property Relations in Rural Iran
The relations of production of any social formation embrace three 
dimensions, i.e. property relations, labour relations and the relation 
between agent of production and product. In the first chapter of this 
study, we shall examine property relations in the Iranian rural social 
formation before the implementation of L-R. We shall distinguish between 
two different sets of means of production: land and water on the one hand 
and implements and machinery on the other. We shall concentrate on the 
ownership and possession of land and water and the relationship which the 
agents of production established through these two elements of production.
As conceptualized by Marx, the feudal mode of production (FMP) has 
the direct producer in effective possession of all means of production 
but land, i.e. this factor of production ’confronts him as an alien 
property, independent of him and personified by the landlord.'^- Included 
in the category of 'means of production' in a semi-arid country like Iran 
are land, water, seeds, implements and draught animals. The immediate 
producer combines these factors with his labour and organizes the production 
process.
The Ownership and Possession of Land and Water: During the period under
study, the peasants owned seeds, draught animals and labour-power; while 
the non-producers owned land and water. In most cases, the ownership of 
land and water was vested in one person, but there were some variations 
which will be explained below. Land and water, therefore, 'confronted' 
the direct producers as alien and were personified in the landlord. The 
possession of water was important because of the semi-arid climatic 
conditions of most regions of Iran.
Conceptually possession can be defined as the ability to set into
2operation and govern the means of production. As regards ownership (in
12
fact property) as an economic relation, Bettleheim states that ’it is 
constituted by the "power to appropriate" the objects on which it acts for 
uses that are given, particularly the 'means of production' and the power 
to dispose of the products obtained with the help of these means of 
production*. But one may pose the question as to the nature of the 
relationship between ownership and possession of the means of production. 
Here Bettleheim states that the power to appropriate cannot be effective 
unless it be articulated on the basis of possession: 'either the agents of 
property also being the agents of possession, or the agents of possession 
being subordinated to the agents of property'.^
Following Bettleheim, we are now able to study, briefly,the structure 
of land/water ownership in Iran before L-R.^ Gharachedaghi, studying the 
land distribution in Varamin, states that in the late 1930s, i.e. just 
before the WW II, peasants held only 18% of the cultivable lands, the 
rest being owned by landlords of different categories, including Shah Reza, 
the State, religious institutions as well as private landlords.^ Seidov 
quotes a report in 1952 that 60% of peasant households had no land at all, 
23% owned less than one hectare, 10% owned between one to three hectares 
and 6% owned between three to twenty hectares of land. 99% of peasant 
households owned only 17% of the total cultivable lands, whereas 1% of 
the landlord families had the control of 70-75% of the total cultivable 
lands of the country.^ Finally a Ministry of Agriculture estimate, in 
January 1962, revealed that out of 49,000 villages about 10,000 belonged 
to the landlords who owned more than 7 villages each, and over 5000 
villages belonged to those who had ownership of 5 to 6 villages each. 
Before the implementation of L-R, 400 to 450 large landlords owned 57% of
Othe total villages in Iran.
The Ownership of Water: Broadly speaking, apart from the Caspian Sea
littoral which gets sufficient yearly rain, in the other regions of Iran, 
especially in the areas around the central deserts, the yearly amount of 
precipitation is very low. This fact makes water a scarce resource and
13
therefore an important factor in agricultural production. Hence it is 
quite conceivable that the monopoly ownership of water would play a crucial 
role in the social relationship between the agents of production. A 
Persian agronomist, for example, states that due to the great length of 
the ganat8^ and the heavy expenses involved in their digging, water is of 
foremost significance and has tipped the balance in favour of the owner or 
the holder.^ As we will see in the section below on the share-cropping,
water resources were monopolized by the owners of over 80% of the total 
cultivable lands, i.e. landlords.
In almost all cases, the owners of land in any village were also 
owners of water.^ But the ownership of the couple land/water was not an
absolute rule throughout the country, although it was dominant.
Exceptions to the rule occurred in Istahbanat in Fars province, in some 
areas in Yazd and also in Maymeh and some districts of Ardistan, where the 
ownership of land and water was separated, i.e. while the ownership of the 
latter was monopolized by the landlords, the former belonged to the 
immediate producers. For example, the qanat of Dohesaran, in Khorasan 
province, is owned jointly by the landlord (non-producers) and immediate 
producers, and consisted of 144 water shares in the qanat as follows:
a) Non-producers: 6.5 shares belonged to a religious endowment
14 shares belonged to the children of a landlord
4 shares belonged to the Sarayan school
50.5 shares belonged to the absentee landlord
13b) Immediate producers: 69 shares belonged to 20 peasant households
There are also cases landlords owning water and selling it to those
14landlords who did not possess this resource.
Possession of Land and Water: As already stated in the FMP, the direct
producer is ini the positicnof possession of land and water. But why and how does he 
come to this position? In order that land ownership may become 
effective, i.e. enabling the owner to appropriate the products obtained
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from the use of his property, the landlord will articulate his ownership 
of land/water on the basis of possession. That is to say, in this mode 
of production the direct producer is provided land/water by the landlord, 
in return for a portion of the produce and/or labour, i.e. feudal rent.
The assignment of the direct-producer to the position of the 
possession of land/water gives him, in fact, the right of use of the land.
In Persian, this right is called nasaq, and the one who owns this right 
is called sahib-nasaq or nasaq-dar. For present purposes, in discussing 
the relationship between landlord and direct producer, we shall assume 
the latter to be a nasaq holder. The category of peasants without nasaq 
included agricultural labourers, peasant landowners and those who were 
involved in non-agricultural activity.
However, while the direct producer has possession, i.e. by virtue 
of being a nasaq holder, the landlord has the power by virtue of ownership 
to appropriate a portion of the produce. The nasaq holder, on the other 
hand, is able to reproduce himself at the same time. But the security of 
this position, generally speaking, did not exist for most of the nasaq 
holders, although traditions and customs, to some extent, supported them.
This insecurity could occur in different forms, but these forms can be 
classified into three types: i.e. eviction from this position, redistribution 
and competition on the part of non-nasaq holders.
In Mahan and Jupar in Kirman province, for instance, in order to fix 
the share-cropping contract, the landlord visited the village twice a year: 
once in the mid-summer to reaffirm the contract, and the second time in 
autumn to collect his share of the harvest.*5 In this province, the nasaq 
holder could be turned out either in March (the beginning of spring) or in 
September/October. If he was turned out of the land in March, he was 
entitled to one-third of the harvest which have been given to him, if he 
had not been evicted.*^ The landlords (’urbanites'), by retaining control 
of the elements of production and then leasing them to the nasaq holders,
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kept themselves in a dominant position as the main decision makers: i.e. 
they could decide what were to be used as inputs and what were to be 
cultivated.^ However, eviction from the land was not always 
accompanied by compensation. The following two examples show how the 
landlords, politically, socially and economically dominated their subjects: 
they evicted the nasaq holders from the possession of land/water by force.
Two cases serve to illustrate this pressure. In Abdol-Tapeh, a village 
near 'Qazvin, the landlord, subjected the nasaq holders to various pressures 
and managed to dismiss the nasaq of 18 juft gav. Some of the nasaq holders 
left the village, and a few resisted and stayed in the village, while they 
lost their connection with cultivation. The second example shows how 
the landlord of Hossein-Abad, in Qazvin region, by force managed to get 
rid of nasaq holders in 1961: '...the owner demolished the villagers' 
houses with a bulldozer and turned the village fortress into a garden for 
himself
Despite the full power of the landlords on the ownership and the use
of land, their power was restricted by tradition. But it seems that as
long as the feudal landlords were prepared, within the framework of the
FMP, to make their properties, land and water, effective, they were bound
to raise the direct producers to the position of possession of land/water.
In effect, this economic calculation on the part of the landlords required
them to give to the direct producers some sort of security in their
possession of land/water. This 'security' appeared in different forms,
including selling and buying the nasaq and maintaining it through inheritance.
English states that nasacpwere handed down from father to son for generations
• 19in Mahan and Jupar in Kirman province. In the case of any disagreement,
20the landlord might redistribute nasaqs at will. Not only were nasaq 
holders insecure, because of the landlords, but also the shortage of water 
loosened their ties to certain plots of land. In Kuhi Jupar share-croppers 
did not work the same village or field from year to year, they worked a
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village or region.within one valley, as the fortunes of each village rose
or fell depending upon water rains and the condition of the ganat»
peasants migrated from place to place to maintain an equilibrium between
22population and water supply.
The nasaq holders were allowed to transfer their right either by
inheritance and/or by selling. The buyer could be a fellow villager or
outsider and/or the landlord himself. In Kurdistan, except in Agitit
peasants did not have any security. In Aqili in the late 1940s the land
was divided and distributed among the peasants. Thereafter, the peasants
23maintained the right to transfer the land by inheritance but not by sale.
Landlords could acquire nasaq by paying cash to its holder. The price for
it was set either by mutual agreement, or on the basis of compensation of
implements. In 1964, before the implementation of L-R in Bangin, a
village in Azarbaijan, the landlords had bought the farmers’ nasaq in 91
hectares of land and gave it to farmers known as nesfehkars who share crops
and/or fruits equally with the landlords. There were two reasons for
doing this: first to obtain an income in the landlords’ share and secondly
and more important by buying the right of nasaq holders, the landlords
25just by-passed the L-R.
Although the landlord, in the FMP, is in a position to deprive the 
direct-producers of the land, he does not necessarily do it to maintain 
his dominant economic and political position. Redistribution of land 
among the peasantry was one way in which the landlord could maintain his 
dominant position at the economic and political level. The exploitation 
of nasaq holders in the estates in which the periodical redistribution 
of allotments was carried out, was visibly higher than the exploitation of 
those who lived on the land with permanent fixed possession. A nasaq 
holder might have retained his nasaq (possession) in a certain village during 
his whole lifetime, but the land which he cultivated varied from time to 
time. Technically, the basis of this redistribution varied from place to
17
place: in some areas redistribution was based on the rotation of water-
supply /or the number of shares into which the water was divided, whereas
27in other areas it was based on the basis of plough-shares. But from 
the social point of view, there were two obvious reasons for the periodical 
redistribution, including increasing the rate of exploitation and 
reinforcing and maintaining the ownership of land/water. Any sort of 
periodical redistribution of land meant to the nasaq holders a kind of 
insecurity in the form of either eviction or competition from fellow 
villagers who did not have possession of land. Considering the point that 
the landlords were not concerned with the fragmentation of the land, but 
rather with an increase in their share, any redistribution could have been 
accompanied, although not necessarily, by an increase in the number of nasaq 
holders in a particular village. For example, the ex-landlord of Koleh- 
Jub Olya (a village in West Shahabad in Kirmanshah) raised a few peasant 
families to the position of nasaq holding against the payment of 400 rials
28per family. This resulted in an increase in the number of nasaq holders.
That the periodical redistribution of land prevailed throughout the 
country is supported by the following. In areas of Sistan owned by 
landlords, every six direct-producers teere grouped together in a work-team
under the leadership of one called salar. These solars tended to be
. 29permanent, but the area they cultivated, changed from year to year.
According to Bahrami, in the State land of the same province, peasants in
this region in addition to their absolute poverty, were subject to
30redistribution and/or eviction at the will of lessees.
In Khorasan, in the villages owned by landlords, the land in each 
village was divided into a number of areas of land, worked by a varying 
number of oxen, sahra. This sahra was run by a few peasants headed by one
called 8ar-salar. Redistribution in this province took the form of 
redistribution of land among sahras yearly and it was undertaken by the 
sar-ealar.
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In many places, redistribution took place annually. Pars, Nayriz, 
Darab and Bihbahan are mentioned as examples. In Kirman and Kurdistan 
redistribution of land entirely depended on the landlord's will. In the 
latter province, it varied from 5 to 15 years. For example, the land of 
Hassan-Abad in the neighbourhood of Sanandaj was redistributed in 1948
32after 5 years; whereas this period for Divan Dareh was 10 to 15 years.
The third phenomenon which seriously weakened the position of a nasaq
holder was the competition on the part of the non-nasaq-holders of the
village, for we shall see, not all agricultural producers had possession
of land. Such producers were to be found in almost all villages, and
obviously any struggle on the part of these producers in a certain village
could have weakened the position of nasaq holders vis-a-vis the landlord.
It is true that the landlords employed this competition for two different
aims: a) to make the nasaq holders feel insecure and therefore weakened
against the non-producers; and hence b) to increase the amount of surplus
in different ways, including increasing the rent (taken from the nasaq
holders), and accepting presents from the nasaq-holders as well as non-
nasaq-holders in the hope of granting them the right to use the land in
the succeeding year. Thus in Farak, a village near Kashmar in Khorasan
province, every year the nasaq holders had to go to the landlord at harvest
time and donate gifts for the opportunity to cultivate his land for the
next year. However, non-nasaq holders competed by saving what they could
from their earning during the year to buy some presents for the landlord
in the hope that they, instead of some other nasaq holders, would . get
33the chance to cultivate.
There were three ways in which nasaq holders could reduce the level of
34insecurity. First by invoking customary rights ; secondly by the
35opposition of the villagers itself provoked by the actions of landlords; 
thirdly by transferring their rights to other peasants by inheritance and 
or by sale. For example in the village of Shirang-Sofla (in Gorgan) the
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peasants possessed an unqualified perpetual right of use of the land they
worked. The land could be sold or mortgaged: 'The one instance of sale
the perpetual tenancy right recorded in the village for the year 1963
indicates a transaction value of some 20,000 rials/hectare (•••). In
the case of irrigated land, the sale price of the haqq-bumi (i.e. nasaq)
runs as high as 50,000 rials, almost on a pap with the value of the land 
37itself.' In addition, in almost all parts of the country, the possession 
of land by nasaq holders was not affected in the case of changes of 
ownership involving all or part of a village.
The struggle between landlords and direct-producers was carried out 
entirely within the framework of feudal relations of production: the 
struggle of nCisaq holders was an attempt to secure their possession of 
land/water; while the object of the landlords was some sort of subordination 
of their subjects. However, in spite of the domination of feudal 
relations, this overview of the relationship between landlords and peasants 
in rural Iran has shown that there were considerable variations in the 
degree of security of land tenure which the peasant-producers had. In 
the next two chapters we shall explain the forms of rent payment.
20
NOTES TO CHAPTER I
1. Marx, 1971, p.794
2. Carchedi, 1975, p.363j and Bett. iheim, 1976, p,69
3. Battleheim, 1976, p.69 .
4. Ibid, p.69
5. However, in doing so, uie have been forced to rely on fragmented 
studies. This is due to the fact that, there has, so far, been 
only one national agricultural census, carried out in I960. But 
in this Census, the categories 'ownership* and 'possession' are 
combined under the heading of 'holdings'. We are therefore 
unable to use this national census in our present discussion.
6. Gharachedaghi, 1967, pp.31-2
7. Seidov, 1963, p.51
8. U.S. Army Area Handbook for Iran, pp.398-99
9. The low level of yearly rainfall' inlran has led groundwater to be 
the main source of irrigation{'Throughout much of the country this 
water (ground water) is utilized by means of an unusual engineering 
construction known as a qanat. This consists of a gently sloping 
tunnel which conducts water from an infiltration section beneath 
the water table to the ground surface by gravity flow. In the 
initial construction of a qanat a shaft or a well is sunk to prove 
the presence of groundwater at depth. An outlet point for the 
tunnel is selected and then the tunnel is dug back into the hill­
side to link up with the original shaft or mother well. To aid
in construction a series of vertical shafts are sunk along the 
line of the tunnel. These permit the extraction of soil and 
provide a measure of air circulation to the workers below. Even-
* tually the tunnel will intersect the water'tablb.' , ' ' 
Beaumont, 1974, p.421
10. Atai, 1967, p*116
11. For example, the R.G. reported in July,5,'1964 from Bangin, a 
village in the East Azerbaijan, that large parts of the village and 
the sole water resource of the villagefa qanat) remained in the 
landlord's hands after the implementation of the first stage of 
L-R. (See T.E., Dan. 1968, p.166) Again, according to a report 
from Shokatabad, a village in Khorasan province, in 1965, the 
landlord provided the share croppers with land, seeds, means of
.* ploughing and water. (See T.E., Nov. 1969, p.187)
12. Lambton, 1953, pp.219-20
13. T.E., Nov. 1969, p.161
14. Ivanov, 1948, p.65
15. English, 1966, p.69
16. Lambton, 1953, p.295
17. English, 1966, p.66
18. T.E., Nos. 15 4 16, Vol. VI, p.218
19. Ibid, p.219
20. English, 1966, p.81
21. Ibid, p.90
22. Ibid
23. Lambton, 1953, p.297
24. T.E., Dan. 1968, p.170
25. Ibid, p.175
26. Demin, 1967, pp.56-7
27. Lambton 1953, p.298
28, T.E., Winter 1970, p.85
29, Lambton, 1953, p.298
38, Bahrami, 1954, p,380
31. Lambton, 1953, p.299
32. Ibid, p,301. But Bahrami has asserted that the period of redis­
tribution in this province was 2 to 3 years. That is why, 
according to him, the Kurdish peasants did not have any interest 
in the land. See Bahrami, 1954, p.517.
33. T.E., Nov. 1969, p.197
34. Vreeland, 1957, p.192
35. Demin, 1967, p.55
36. Ibid, p.l92j also see Dones, 1967, p.65.
37. Okazaki, 1969, p.268
22
Forms of Rent in the 1940s and 1950s
CHAPTER II
In this and the following chapteiswe shall set out to analyse the 
mechanism of extraction of surplus from the peasant producers by the 
landlords. This will entail an explanation of the different forms of 
rent existing in the Iranian rural social formation during the two decades. 
We shall distinguish between the following forms of rent in rural
Iran:
1) Share-cropping:
a) rent for land/water (irrigated)
Winter crops b) rent for land (unirrigated)
c) rent for water
Summer crops d) nesfeh-kari
2) Fixed Rent
3) Fixed and share-cropping combined
4) Labour-service
5) Dues and tributes
1) Share-cropping System: Winter crops
The dominant form of rent in rural Iran was the share-cropping system. 
54% of all cultivated land was based on the share-cropping system. It was 
widespread mainly in eastern and western Azarbai-jan and Kurdistan.1, In 
this traditional form of rent, the immediate producer supplies his labour 
plus a portion of the working capital necessary for production while on 
the other hand, the landowner supplies land (and water in our case study) 
and another portion of the working capital. In effect, in this form, 
rent is not in its classical feudal form, but is situated somewhere in 
between capitalist ground rent and feudal rent. This is because: 'The 
landlord claims a portion of the product not exclusively as the owner of
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land, but also as the lender of capital; and the fanner claims another
portion of the product not as the possessor of labour, but as possessor
2of a portion of the means of production.1
In order to develop an explanation for the role of rent in the share- 
cropping system, we shall compare the labour processes of the classical 
feudal and capitalist modes of production with that of the share-cropping 
system.
The labour-process, in its simple and abstract elements, is a
3purposeful activity aimed at the production of use-value. In this sense, 
it is, therefore, a process of interaction between man and nature. There 
are three element's involved in the labour-process which are common to all 
modes of production. They include: purposeful activity, the object on 
which that activity (work) is performed and finally the instruments of the 
work.^ The most essential factor in this process is the producer (his 
work) and in order to produce use-value (i.e. being purposeful) he consumes 
the objects and instruments of production. Consequently the labour process 
is the process of the appropriation of what exists in nature for the 
requirements of men.
The labour-process in the CMP, generally speaking, can be characterised 
by the following phenomena: 'First, the worker works under the control of 
the capitalist to whom his labour belongs; the capitalist takes good care 
that the work is done in a proper manner, and the means of production are 
applied directly to the purpose so that the raw material is not wasted, and 
the instruments of labour are spared.
Secondly, the product is the property of the capitalist and not that 
of the worker, its immediate producer.'^ It follows from the above 
statement that: first, the labour-process, in the CMP, is an operation 
between things which the capitalist has purchased; and secondly, during 
this process the capitalist,'s control is required, because the individual 
labourer does not set to work the means of production.^
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But, the labour-process in the FMP is very different from the labour- 
process in the CMP, although it involves the same three basic elements, 
i.e. purposeful activity (work), the object of work, and the instruments 
of work. In the FMP the direct-producer controls the labour process and 
therefore, he, and not the landlord, is concerned with the way of using 
the objects and instruments of work and has the resulting produce at his 
disposal.
There is no doubt that the basic elements involved in the labour 
processes of the CMP and FMP exist in the share-cropping system too. But 
the ownership of these elements is slightly different from that in the FMP. 
That is, as is shown in Table I, in some cases, the non-producer has 
instruments (oxen) or objects (seeds) in his disposal. In the extreme 
case, he may own all objective conditions 6f production, including land, 
water, oxen and seeds. Consequently, not only land, but also some other 
factors, such as water, seeds and oxen, may confront the direct-producer 
as alien properties. So, in the sense of the ownership of the means of 
production, the share-cropping system is closer to the CMP than the FMP.
Yet contrary to the CMP, in the share-cropping system, it is the direct- 
producer who conducts the labour-process. In addition the labour-power 
of the share-cropper (i.e. direct-producer) has not yet become a commodity 
i.e. the non-producer does not have it in his disposal during the labour- 
process. This holds good, even in the extreme case of share-cropping, 
i.e. when the direct-producer has nothing to supply but his labour-power.
It follows, therefore, that, the non-producer (landlord) has nothing to do 
with the labour-process. It is entirely the responsibility of the direct- 
producer (share-cropper) to take care of this process. However, one 
should note that, in the share-cropping system, the non-producer has a 
stake in the production. That is to say, it is he, who basically decides 
what is to be produced; despite the fact that the direct producer has the 
possibility to protest against/or counteract the decision of the landlord.
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Finally, the produce, before its division, is not the sole property 
of any one of the parties. In other words, the produce is neither the 
property of the non-producer, nor is it at the disposal of the direct- 
producer: but both parties take away their shares of produce when it is 
harvested, threshed and ready for division. Thus, in this sense, the 
share-cropping system differs from both the CMP and FMP.
Furthermore, there is a similarity between the FMP and share cropping 
system. That is, the rent may be paid in cash or in kind and/or both. 
However, the form of payment of the rent does not change the nature of 
the rent, which in all cases remains in its transitional stage. Thus, 
although the share-cropping system has so many similarities with the feudal 
mode of production, the rent paid in this system is moved away from its 
classic form. We are now in a position to explain the system of share- 
cropping in the Iranian rural social formation.
There were five elements of production in rural Iran to be taken into 
consideration for fixing the share of the non-producer on the one hand and 
that of direct-producer on the other. They include land, water, seeds, 
draught animals and lastly labour. Almost in all cases, the landlords 
were in the position of the ownership of the land and water. While these 
two elements had always belonged to the landlords and the last element, 
labour, to the nasaq-holders, the other two elements were under dispute.
Thus as Table I shows, while in some cases the landlords had furnished 
seeds or oxen and/or both, in other cases these elements were supplied by 
the na8aq holders. For example, in Fasa, Darab, etc., landlords supplied 
land, water, seeds and oxen; whereas in Torbat-e Jam and Hashtrud, nasaq 
holders supplied seeds and oxen as well as labour.
However, as one can see from Table I, there is not a strict correlation 
between the supply of the elements of production and the relative share of 
each party. For example, in Azarbaijan although in all cases given in 
Table I, the nasaq holders supplied in addition to labour, seeds and oxen,
26
TABLE I
Division of Wheat and Barley between Landlord and
Peasant : Irrigated Cultivation
Share of Share of Supplier of
Place
Azarbaijan:
Harshtrood ) 
)
Qarache Daq) 
)
Urjan ) 
)
Abbas ) 
)
Mehranrood )
Landlord Producer Seeds and Oxen
Seeds and Oxen
1/5 - 1/3 4/5 - 2/3
by Producer
Sarkham ) 
)
Khorramdash)
)
Maraqeh )
Seeds and Oxen
1/4 3/4
by Producer
Khoy ) 
)
Rezaieh )
Aimes ) 
)
Inja ) 
)
Qaraje ) 
Booloq )
1/3 2/3
Seeds and Oxen 
by Producer 
Seeds and Oxen
2/9 7/9
by Producer
Kurdistan:
Mahabad 1/2 1/2 Seeds and Oxen by Producer
Sanandaj 1/2 1/2 Seeds and Oxen by Producer
In most other 
places : 1/5 - 1/3 2/3 - 4/5
Seeds and Oxen 
by Producer
Sistan:
In most places 2/3 - 3/5 1/3 - 2/3
Note
Straw divided in 
same proportion 
but Korocce & 
grass belonged 
to the producer
Seeds by L/lrd 
Oxen by Prdcr
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TABLE I (continued)
Share of Share of Supplier of
Place Landlord Producer Seeds and Oxen Note
1/2 1/2 Half of seedsIn some places by landlord 
Oxen & half of
-
Khorasan:
Torok ) 
)
Khiaban )
seeds by prdcr
Seeds by
) Mediator
Shadegan ) 
)
Abkook ) 
)
Vakilabad )
1/2 1/2
Oxen by 
Producer
1/2 1/2 Seeds by L/lrd 
Oxen by Prdcer -
Torbate- 3/5 2/5 Seeds by L/lrd L/lrd also took
Haidarieh Oxen by Prdcer half of-straw
Torbate-Jam 1/2 1/2 Seeds & Oxen 
by Producer
Fars:
Mamasani )
) 1/4 3/4 Seeds & Oxen
Noorabad ) by producer
Fasa 4/5 1/5 Seeds & Oxen 
by Landlord
Darab ) 
)
3/4
1/3
1/4
2/3
Seeds & Oxen 
by Landlord 
Seeds & OxenDarab ) by peasant
Jahram ) Seeds by Landlord took
) 1/2 1/2 Landlord Oxen
Dobaram ) by peasant the straw
Qara-boolaq )
1/10
• Seeds & Oxen
) 9/10
Neiriz ) by Producer
Qora-boolaq )
3/4 1/4
Seeds & Oxen
) by Landlord
Estahbannat )
Kiraman:
1/2) 1/2 Seeds & Oxen
Rafsanjan )
3/4
by Producer
) 1/4 Seeds & Oxen
) by Landlord
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TABLE I (continued)
Share of Share of Supplier of
Landlord Peasant Seeds and Oxen Note
Akbarabad )
)
Mohammad- )
7/10 3/10 Seeds & Oxen 
by Peasant —
abad )
Isfahan Region:
Bara'an ) 
) 
)
3/4 1/4 Seeds & Oxen -
2/3 1/3 by Producer -
Bidrood ) 
) 
)
2/3 1/3 Seeds by L/lrd 
Oxen by Prdcr.
)
)
1/2 1/2 Seeds & Oxen 
by Producer
Baloochistan:
Bampoor 2/5 3/5 Oxen by peasant 
Seeds by L/lord -
Khash 3/5 2/5 Seeds by L/lrd, 
Oxen rented from 
Landlord
-
Arak :
In most Seeds & Oxen
villages: 1/3 2/3 by Producer —
Source: Seidov 1963, pp. 68-81.
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they collected different shares in different places. This is due to the 
fact that the division of produce was affected by the permanent struggle 
between the landlords and their agents on the one hand and nasaq holders 
on the other, as we shall see in Chapter Five.
More or less, the same variability of relative shares existed for 
unirrigated cultivation of barley and wheat, the main winter crops.
Generally speaking, the direct-producers collected a higher share than 
they had in irrigated cultivation. It is not an absolute rule, since in 
some cases, e.g. in Hashtrood, Urjan ... landlords obtained the same 
portion of the produce. Table II shows the division of wheat and barley 
(the main winter crops) between landlords and direct-producers on 
unirrigated land. The unirrigated cultivation of winter crops, from the 
point of view of social relations did not differ very much from the 
previous case, and in fact this sort of cultivation took place exactly 
within the same framework of social relations of production.
Ownership/Separation from the means of production other than land and water:
The FMP presupposes the non-separation of the direct-producer from the 
means of production. That is to say, the direct-producer being in a 
position of ownership of at least some means of production and in possession 
of land, is able to organize production and the reproduction of the means 
and conditions of production.
Almost in all of rural Iran, the peasants ploughed the land with a 
very simple ploughs equipped with an ironclad, wooden tongue. It was 
drawn by animal, mainly by oxen and sometimes by donkeys and camels.
Scythes and sickles were used for reaping and threshing was carried out by 
a wooden threshing device with circular knives or pieces of stone in its 
undercarriage. Tossing the grain into the air by a wooden pitchfork was 
the dominant method of winnowing.^ Tables I and II give an idea of the 
degree of separation of the peasantry from the means of production. As 
can be seen, in almost all cases, given in the tables, the direct-producers
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TABLE II
Division of Wheat and Barley between Landlord 
and Peasant ; Unirrigated
Place
Azerbaijan:
Hashtrood )
)
Urjan )
)
Abad )
)
Mehranrood )
)
Qare-che daq)
Tabriz )
)
Tabriz )
Khoy )
)
Arasbaran )
Kurdistan:
In most areas
Khorasan:
)
)
)
Torok )
) 
) 
) 
)
Torbate- 
Heidarieh )
)
Shadegan )
Vakiabad )
Abkook
Share of Share of Supplier of
Landlord Producer Seeds and Oxen Note
In addition to rents
1/5 - 1/3 4/5 - 2/3
Seeds and Oxen 
by Producer
landlord took an 
additional amount of 
grains around 2/9ths 
of total production
1/4
1/2
3/4
1/2
Seeds and Oxen 
by Producer 
Seeds by L/lrd 
Oxen by Prdcer.
2/3 1/3
Seeds and Oxen 
by Producer
1/5 4/5 Seeds and Oxen 
by Producer
1/10 9/10 Seeds and Oxen 
by Producer
In ordinary years
1/5 4/5 Seeds and Oxen 
by Producer
In rainy years field 
watered once
3/10 7/10 Seeds and Oxen 
by Producer
In rainy years field 
watered twice
1/10 9/10
Seeds and Oxen 
by Producer
1/2 1/2 Seeds by L/lrd 
Oxen by Peasant
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TABLE II (continued)
Share of Share of Supplier of
Place Landlord Producer Seeds and Oxen
Fars :
Mamasani ) \
Noorabad )1 1/5 4/5 Seeds and Oxen
) by Peasant
Kazeroon )
Fasa )
) Seeds and Oxen
Dobaran )' 1/10 9/10
) by Peasant
Darab )
Jahrurn 1/10-1/5 9/10-1/5 Seeds and Oxen
by Peasant
Kkwzistan:
) 1/2 1/2 Seeds by L/lrd
) Oxen by Peasant
Bavi )
) 3/4 1/4 Both elements
) by Landlord
Isfahan:
Shakrekurd 1/4 3/4 Seeds and Oxen
by Landlord
Faridan 1/5 4/5
Arak:
In most
villages 1/5 4/5
Note
Source: Seidov, 1963, pp. 68-81
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were the suppliers of seeds and oxen; in fact there are few cases in which 
the landlords supplied both seeds and oxen (e.g. Qara-boolaq, Estahbanat). 
The latter case may be considered as the last stage before the complete 
separation of peasant producers from the objective conditions of production.
c) Rent for water
In some arid areas, rent was collected on the basis of the ownership 
of the water supply, rather than of the ownership of land, which was left 
to the direct producers. In essence this sort of share-cropping system 
is not different from the 'original' form examined above. We shall 
therefore confine our examination of this form of share-cropping to the 
empirical level.
This variety of share-cropping seems to be bound to take place in
8arid areas such as Yazd.
Thus peasants owned land in most areas of the neighbourhood of Yazd
The rent, therefore, which peasants paid, represented a payment for water
rather than for land. Owing to the great length of the ganats and expense
involved in their building, water became of foremost significance and
shifted the balance in favour of the owner of the source.^ The amount of
rent paid for water, like that paid for land/water together, varied from
place to place, as well as with different qanats.. In Maybud, the amount
of rent was computed according to the water used: a peasant paid, in 1945,
one mcami tabriza (■ 6$ lb) of wheat and one manni tabriz of cotton per
jur'eh (8i minutes) of water; in Nain for per taq of water (i.e. 12 hours
water), the producer had to pay 120 manni tabriz (approx. 6 cwt., 103 lb)
wheat or cotton;and again, in Jinabad, in 1949, for per taq (12 hours)
of water, the direct-producer had to pay 75 manni tabriz wheat, 35 manni12tabriz barley and straw. The rent could be paid in cash as well as in 
kind. For example, in some villages near Yazd (i.e. Aliabad, Husainabad 
and Hassanabad), the average rent in 1945, which was around 7-10 manni 
tabriz (approx. 45-651b) of wheat or barley per sabu (10 minutes water)
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was usually converted into and paid in cash. In Zatach in the township 
of Yazd, where the fanners owned land and the landlord owned water, the 
farmer paid the latter an annual sum of 700 rails per " jur 'eh ” of water 
(equal to 10 minutes and 55 seconds per day).*^ Table IV illustrates
both cases: in some areas the rent was paid in cash, whereas in others it 
was paid in kind.
13
TABLE IV
Rent Paid for the Use of Water
Area Rent in Kind
Maybud
Na'in
Pu8hti-Kuh
Jinabad:
Yazd:
Aliabad
Dihabad
6j lb wheat )
)
6| lb cotton )
6 cwt, 103 lb wheat/cotton
A cwt, A3 lb, wheat )
)2 cwt, 5 lb. barley )
)2 cwt, 5 lb. straw )
A6-65 lb. grain
(for winter crop
(
(for summer crop
Hassanabad )
) A6-65 lb. grain
Husaiabad )
Sadrabad A6 lb. grain
Rent in Cash Unit of Water 
s. d.
- 8i minutes
- 12 hours
- 12 hours
- 10 minutes
2 . A
2.. A
- 10 minutes
5 .10 11 minutes
Source: Lambton 1953, p. 322.
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From a technical point of view, the actual amount of rent was fixed 
by a valuer, who visited the villages. He estimated the amount of 
production of the land, and on the basis of this estimation, fixed the 
amount which the direct-producer had to pay for the use of water.*"*
It can be said that these three varieties of share-cropping were all 
similar to each other, in the sense of the relations of production, 
including ownership/possession of land (and water), ownership of the means 
of production, and exploitation by non-economic coercion. We shall now 
go on to examine another variety of the share-cropping system which is 
very similar to the cases explained above, but has a fundamental 
difference: i.e. the direct-producer does not have ruxsaq i.e. he is not in 
'permanent' possession of land (and water), and therefore he is, to a 
lesser extent, subordinated to the landlord.
Share-cropping of the Summer Crops
In this form of share-cropping the direct producers were not at the 
same time holders of nasaq, but were assigned to the position of possession 
of land/water according to a written contract between them and the landlord, 
and only for a specific period, usually six months. When the time of 
contract expired, the direct producers could not claim possession of land/ 
water. This is the main reason why many landlords tried to turn their 
estates to this sort of share-cropping, before and during the implementation 
of L-R, because these producers were not covered by the L-R laws.***
The contracts for the production of summer crops were carried out 
mainly around the cities and towns where there was a vast market for the 
summer crops (including vegetables, beans, peas, melons, water melons and 
the like). The production of these products needed experience and know-how 
that is why, in many cases the producers were not local people. In some 
villages of Khuzistan, for example, the producers of summer crops were 
Yazdies and Isfahanies, some of whom were in permanent residence in that 
province. Also in the villages of the south and west of Tehran, producers
35
from Qum are recognized as experts in this business. Safinezhad explains 
that direct-producers (experts in cultivating vegetables) from Qum used to 
meet the landlords somewhere in the south of Tehran to make contracts with 
them. According to the contract, the landlord supplied land, water (during 
the summer and spring) and some money as credit, while the producers (or 
their representatives) agreed to supply labour and seed and to undertake 
the other expenses. The cost of marketing and other expenses were undertaken 
jointly.^ The basis of the division of crops is the same as explained for 
the winter crops, but the form of payment is cash. The procedure was as 
follows: first the produce was sold in the market, the expenses such as 
ploughing, marketing, etc. deducted from the total income; then the net 
income was divided into two equal portions, a portion going to both parties.
Under this form of share-cropping system, the direct-producers were 
not subordinated to the landlord through non-economic coercion. There was 
no question of eviction by force; if a landlord wanted to break the contract, 
he would have been obliged to pay all expenses. The amount of land and 
water and the type of products (to be cultivated) were already determined 
by mutual agreement of landlord and producers. After the contract and 
giving some money as credit to the producers the landlord did not interfere 
with the labour-process. And the direct producers, after being raised to 
the possession of land (and water), were themselves responsible for the 
running of the business. In Abdol-Tapeh (near Gazvin) one could see an 
example of this sort of share-cropping agreement: 'The landlord has rented 
the entire village to specialists in the raising of summer crops from Qum.
He supplies water, land and half of the cost of seeds, ploughing and pest 
control. The tenants in turn bring in labour to grow the summer crops for 
six months of the year, pay their wages undertake responsibility for working 
the lands and provide half the cost of seeds, ploughing and pest control.
The income earned from farming is divided equally between the landlord and,18tenants.
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TABLE V
Sharing Summer Crops
Supplier of
Share of Share of Elements of
Area Landlord Producer Production
Khuzistan:
Dizful 1/2 - 1/3 1/2 - 1/3
Ramhormoz 1/3 2/3
Bihbahan 1/4 3/4
Kirman:
Kirman 4/5 1/5 All costs undertaken 
by landlord
Rahmatabad 3/4 - 3/5 1/4 - 2/5 All costs undertaken 
by landlord
Babek 1/2 1/2 All costs undertaken 
by landlord
Other
Villages
3/4 1/4 All costs undertaken 
by landlord
Isfahan:
Isfahan 1/2 1/2
Borhar ) 
) 
) 
)
1/2
2/7
1/2
5/7
All costs undertaken 
by producer 
All costs undertaken 
by producer
Kohab 1/2 1/2 All costs undertaken 
by producer
Kerarej 1/2 1/2 All costs undertaken 
by producer
Rugesht 1/3 2/3
Shahreza 3/4 1/4
Sharkord 1/3 2/3
Marbin 1/2 1/2 All costs undertaken 
by producer
Jei 1/2 1/2 All costs undertaken 
by producer
Najafabad 1/3 2/3 Seeds undertaken by 
Landlord, rest by 
Producer
Notes
Peasant realizes 
the produce and 
pays rent in cas
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TABLE V (continued)
Share of 
Area Landlord
Kurdistan:
Sanandaj 1/3 1/3
Khorasan:
Torok )
)
Abkuh )
)
Shadegan )
)
Vakilabad )
Kashmar 
Fars :
Kazeroon
Mamasani )
)
Fediskan )
)
Jahrom )
)
Firozabad )
Ij )
)
Estahbanat )
Neiriz
Dar ab
Qora-bulaq )
)
Neiriz )
1/5 - 1/3
3/4
1/5 - 1/3
1/2
2/3
3/4
1/2 - 3/4
1/10
Supplier of 
Share of Elements of
Producer Production
2/3 All costs undertaken 
by producer
4/5 - 2/3
1/4
4/5 - 2/3
1/2
1/3
1/4
1/2 - 1/4
9/10 All costs for culti­
vation of land unde­
rtaken by direct- 
producer
Notes
Water 
supplied 
from well
Source Seidov 1963, pp. 68-81
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2) Fixed Rent as the Second Dominant Form of Feudal Rent
The second form of feudal rent which used to be paid to the non­
producers previous to L-R was fixed rent. By fixed rent, here, we 
understand the fixed amount of produce (or its equivalent value in cash) 
which the direct producer is compelled, by non-economic coercion, to pay 
to the owner of the land each year. It may be paid in kind, in cash, or 
both. This form of rent is very similar to capitalist absolute ground 
rent. The explanation of this form of ground rent and its comparison 
with fixed rent would, therefore, help to explain two points: the nature 
of this form of rent, and secondly, the degree to which it has approached 
capitalist ground rent.
Capitalist ground rent: Marxists distinguish two forms of ground rent:
differential and absolute. We are not, here, concerned with the former
but briefly we can describe it as a form of capitalist ground rent which
arises from the difference in the productivity of various investments of
capital, i.e. 'it is due to the greater relative fruitfulness of specific
separate capitals invested in a certain production sphere, as compared with
investments of capital which are excluded from these exceptional and
19natural conditions favouring productiveness.' It does not determine
20the production cost of commodities, but is bound to it. According to
Lenin, this form of ground rent is an inherent feature of every form of
capitalist agriculture; whereas absolute ground rent arises from the21monopoly private ownership of land. The mere legal ownership of land 
does not bring about any ground rent for the owner. 'But it does, indeed, 
give him the power to withdraw his land from exploitation until economic 
conditions permit him to utilize it in such a manner as to yield him a 
surplus, ...' In other words, monopoly ownership of land establishes 
a barrier to the investment of capital in land; and this power of blocking 
the free investment of capital, in effect, enables landed property to 
charge capital some money as rent. Absolute ground rent, therefore, 
presupposes the existence of landed property, and in fact, the former is
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the economic realization of the latter. In order for capital to be
invested in land, it is bound to pay rent to the landed property; i.e. the
latter '... acts as an absolute barrier only to the extent that the
landlord exacts a tribute for making land at all accessible to the
capitalist.' 'Landed property itself creates rent'
This landed property i.e. the monopoly of landed property, hinders
free competition and therefore hinders the formation of average profit in
agricultural and non-agricultural enterprises. In addition, there are
two other assumptions on which the formation of absolute rent is based,
this is the tendency of commodities to exchange at their values, and the
presence of low organic composition of capital, in those branches yielding 
25absolute rent. In fact, it is the combination of these three phenomena
which creates absolute rent. Only so long as the condition of the lower
organic composition of capital in agriculture holds good, is there an
absolute rent. But any tendency to level the organic composition of
capital in agricultural and non-agricultural branches on the part of
capital (due to attempts to make an average rate of profit) is faced with
26a barrier, i.e. landed property.
Capitalist ground rent, contrary to feudal rent, does not embrace the
whole of the surplus-value produced in agriculture. Considering the fact
that capital possesses the whole surplus-value produced by the immediate
producer capitalist ground rent is a portion of this surplus which landed
property manages to transfer to itself. It is the monopoly power of the
landed property in confrontation with capital's investments in land, which
can he considered as economic coercion.
To end this discussion, we should note that there are some limitations
on the imposition of absolute rent on the worst soil. They include;
1) additional investment in the old plots, 2) imports, 3) competition
among the landlords, and 4) needs of consumers and their ability to pay
27the price of the agricultural goods.
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Can fixed rent be considered as a capitalist ground rent? This is 
the question which we shall try to answer. However, in order to do this, 
we should first examine this form of rent in Iran.
In this form the direct-producer was assigned a plot of land in lieu 
of fixed amount of produce or its equivalent value in cash. The contract 
between landlord and direct-producer was merely a Verbal one and 'when a 
written contract is entered into some stipulation is usually made 
safeguarding the peasant in the event of natural calamity such as drought 
or pest.' The amount of rent varied from place to place, but from a 
technical point of view, generally speaking, it was a function of the size 
of the land (and/or the amount of water). The following examples throw 
light on the amount of fixed rent in Gilan and Mazandaran, the main regions 
in which this form of rent was dominant. In Ghaleh-garden (near Shahsavar) 
the amount and rate of rent for different crops were as follows:
for rice: 330 kg. per hectare;
for tea: 2500 rials per hectare;
29for citrus: 7000 rials per hectare
The rate of rent per hectare in Gigasar (in Gilan) for rice was about 30%
30of the gross produce and for tobacco was 1000 rials out of 18000. In
Langarud, the fixed rent ranged from 150 to 225 kg. per 2000 kg. per
312000 square metres.
In Gilan the amount of fixed rent for a paddy field was about 660 kg.
of threshed rice per ha., this was equal to one third of the total output
of one hectare. Exceptions to this were villages in the neighbourhood
of Talish and some villages in Siahkal in which this amount was increased
32to 740 to 1000 kg. per ha.
Table VI sets out the amount of fixed rent paid by the producers in 
the 40s. As one can see, it has examples of many regions but does not
include Gilan, i.e. the region in which fixed rent was the dominant form 
of rent. However, it is useful in the sense that it gives an idea about
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the amount of surplus that was taken away from the direct producer.
TABLE VI
Fixed Rent per Acre
Area Rent in Kind Rent in Cash 
£ s. d. £ s.
Barzuk 5 cwt, 98 lb. )
11 cwt, 84 lb.
) grain —
)
Havizeh 1 cwt, 71 lb. grain -
Isfahan - 19 0 0 28
Jangand 11 cwt. 10 lb. grain -
Khwurmiz 2 cwt. 39 lb. grain -
Mazandaran ( 5 cwt. 1101b. 
(
( 8 cwt. 1091b.
grain -
rice -
Mihriz 1 cwt. 46 lb. grain 7 2 8
Natanz 4 cwt. 78 lb. grain
Source: Lambton 1953, p. 323.
d.
0
Under the fixed-rent system, the contract between direct-producer 
and non-producer was often merely a verbal one.33 The period of contract 
was one year or more. In Talish for instance peasants had rented certain 
areas for a period of one to five years, though in some cases, the contract 
lasted as long as 10 years.34 In Glgasar (In Gilan) before L-R, the 
contract between producer and landowner was an official agreement for a 
period of three yeare. The fixed amount of rent (usually i„ kind) vas 
specified in the contract. In practice, however, the contract was not 
renewed and direct-producers carried on paying the sane amount of rent 
mentioned in their contracts after the expiry of the three years.35 
Furthermore, according to Okazaki, the actual contract between landlord and
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producer in Shirang-Sofla, a village in Gorgan, was negotiated by word of
mouth. Commenting on the verbal/written contract between two partners,
one may say that the landlords tried to have written and official contract
with the producers mainly for two reasons: to secure their ownership (of
land) and to secure the payment of rent by producers. On the other hand,
the producers were sufficiently subordinated to the landlords that the
latter did not really need to keep renewing the contract and/or to decline
to make any verbal contract with the former at all. However, the direct
producer was' free in the sense of being able to decide which crops he
would cultivate and by which method. According to Okazaki, the possession
of land by the direct producers was an unqualified perpetual right. They
could sell and/or mortgage it. In addition, their plots were not subject
37to redistribution and/or to confiscation at the will of the landlord.
On the other hand, the landlord did not provide the producer with any
working capital such as draught animals and the like, he just leased out
his land in lieu of which he received a certain amount of rent in kind or
in cash or both. This is precisely the role which a landlord plays in the
CMP, That is, in this mode of production, 'the landlord is reduced from
the manager and master of the process of production and of thé entire process
of social life to the position of mere lessor of land, usurer in land and
37mere collector of rent ...'.
To conclude, fixed rent (intheCaspian Sea littoral) can be considered 
as 'capitalist' ground rent, despite the fact that there was, to some 
extent, some sort of non-economic subordination of the producers to the 
landlords. This 'capitalist' ground rent might also have been coupled 
with labour service and some other dues and these will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
Rent in Kind/Cash
Can the form t>f payment of rent be the criterion for distinguishing „ 
rent as feudal or capitalist rent? This question arises from a 
consideration of a recent research on the forms of rent in the Iranian rural
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social formation before L-R. Five forms of rent are distinguished;
»the first and the least capitalistic, is payment in kind, usually 
constituting a portion of the crop, ... The second, and diametrically 
opposed to the first, is capitalist ground rent-free land, rented for a 
term of years, with cash payment.*39 There are three other forms, 
according to Khamsi, between these two opposed forms. The share-cropping 
system is the third form. * In this instance the farmer divides the crop
.... on the basis of share cropping (muzare’e), and pays the landlord
either a share of his income in kind, or a fixed sum in cash, the lease 
always being for a term of years.* The fourth form appears when a 
customary tenant becomes a free holder. That is, 'the fourth form to be 
the renting or purchasing of land by customary tenants. Here, two types 
of rent exist side by side. Strictly speaking, we should not couple 
purchased land with rented land, but because purchasing of land by 
customary tenants is a departure from the norms, and portends the weakening 
of customary tenure, its inclusion may be permissible. Lastly, the fifth 
form is the fixed rent paid in kind/ 0
As one can see, Khamsi*s argument is based on only one main criterion, 
i.e. the form in which the rent is paid. Thus if it is paid in cash it is 
capitalist ground rent; and if it is paid in kind, it is feudal rent. This 
ignores entirely the social relationship between the landlord and tenant. 
What is important is to see the way in which the rent is exacted from the 
direct-producer. In order to distinguish a type of rent (capitalist or 
feudal) the set of relationships established between the direct-producer 
and the non-producer through the means of production must be examined. If 
it is exacted by non-economic coercion, it is in fact, feudal rent no matter 
in what form it is paid. The forms of payment only show the forms of 
appropriation of the surplus. Hence, feudal rent is directly comparable 
to surplus-value in the CMP rather than capitalist ground rent. (We 
should note that feudal rent paid in cash presupposes a commodity production
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sector and the sale of a proportion of the produce as a commodity by the
direct-producer.) 'By money-rent as distinct from industrial and commercial
ground-rent based upon the capitalist mode of production, which is but an
excess over average profit - we here mean the ground rent which arises from
a mere change in form of rent in kind, ... The direct producer here turns
41over instead of the product, its price to the l a n d l o r d ' On the 
other hand, a rent can be a capitalist ground rent and be paid in kind.
That is, the capitalist farmer/producer may pay to the landlord a certain 
proportion of the produce instead of its price, without being subsumed to 
the latter by non-economic coercion. An example of this, though not a 
perfect one, is the rent paid in kind in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces.
This rent-in-kind (unfixed and fixed) which is considered by Khamsi as the 
least capitalistic and between the opposed forms of rent respectively, 
could be feudal as well as capitalist ground rent depending on the economic 
form in which it is alienated from the direct-producer in that particular 
rural social formation.
The share-cropping system is considered as a form of rent situated 
between capitalist and feudal rent. However, Khamsi never states the 
reasons why share-cropping is considered as a transitional form of rent.
The interesting point is that, he totally forgets his main criterion, 
i.e. the form of payment, when he places share-cropping in the transitional 
stage between the FMP and CMP. We have already discussed the share- 
cropping system and its position as a transitional form, so there is no 
point in repeating it here.
Furthermore, Khamsi considers a situation in which a nasat?-holder has 
already bought a plot of land. This is a departure from the norm and 
approaches the weakening of customary tenure. Although purchasing a plot 
of land on the part of a nasaq-holdert is in fact a departure.from the 
(feudal) norm, this movement does not necessarily raise him to the position 
of ownership of a sufficient amount of land nor does his position as an
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owner/possessor necessarily correspond to the form of rent which he pays. 
That is to say, as owner/possessor, he might be subject to feudal 
exploitation and/or be a commodity-producer who pays capitalist ground 
rent to the landlord. Hence, he should be classified into different 
categories according to his social relationship with the owner of land.
Lastly, Khamsi has not considered two other points pertinent to the 
question of rent, i.e. mixed-rent and labour-service. Both of these will 
be discussed below.
Share-cropping as the dominant form of payment of rent
So far we have referred to share-cropping as the dominant form of 
the payment of rent and fixed rent as secondary, without giving any data 
at the national level. However, at this stage, we are in a position to 
substantiate our statement by the data given in Table VII. As can be 
seen from the table, there were six types of operation of holdings in 
rural Iran: three origins and three combinations. Leaving aside the 
combined forms, since they are due to be discussed in the next section, 
one can see that the share-cropping system was the dominant form of rent 
payment in almost half of the provinces. The highest percentage of share- 
cropping belonged to East and West Azarbaijan (the third and fourth 
provinces) and Kurdistan, i.e. 70, 73 and 78 percentages of the holdings 
respectively. Next come the fifth and sixth provinces and then Tehran 
province. The high percentage of the share cropping type of operation 
vis-a-vis other forms in Azarbaijan (East and West) and Kurdistan, indicates 
one general point: the dominance of the so-called semi-feudal relationship 
between nasaq holders and landlords.
Classifying the provinces according to the type of holdings, we can 
distinguish a group of provinces in which a high percentage of the 
producers owned land, though the percentage of those who were share­
croppers was not relatively low. This group includes: Shiraz (7th 
province), Kirman (8th province) Sistan and Baluchestan, Khorasan (9th
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province and finally Isfahan (10th province). The percentage of 
leaseholders, i.e. those who paid fixed rent in this group, except in 
Isfahan and Fars, was very low.
Thus the relatively high percentage of producers who owned land 
indicates one main point, that is, that all other conditions being equal, 
the semi-feudal relations of production embraced a majority of the direct 
producers in these provinces. As far as the degree of feudal exploitation 
was concerned, we have in these provinces a different situation from that 
in Azarbaijan. That is to say, although in these provinces a minority 
of the direct producers were subject to semi-feudal exploitation, they were 
subject to a higher degree of exploitation than in Azarbaijan (compare 
Table VII with Table I).
Consequently, we see two opposite situations in these two groups of 
provincesf i.e. in one group (Azarbaijan) the semi-feudal relations of 
production embraced a high percentage of the direct-producers, but the 
degree of the exploitation was relatively low; whereas, in the other group 
(including 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th provinces and Sistan and Baluchestan) the 
semi-feudal relations of production covered a minority of the direct- 
producers, but this minority was subject to a high degree of exploitation.
In Kurdistan, the direct-producers were in a worse condition than 
those in the two above groups. That is to say, not only were a high 
percentage of the producers subordinated to semi-feudal exploitation (i.e. 
77.9%)* hut also the degree of feudal exploitation was high, i.e. although 
they furnished oxen and seeds in addition to labour, they had to hand 
over half of the produce to the landlords (see Table I).
The third distinct group includes provinces in which the fixed-rent 
system was dominant} i.e. the first and second provinces (Gilan and 
Mazandaran). In both provinces, as is shown in Table VII, fixed rent 
was the dominant form of rent payment. But the data for both provinces 
are misleading, since each one of these provinces, at the time of survey
TABLE VII Types of Holdings by Province (percentage)
Type of Operation Z Z Z
of Share 
Cropping
of Owner 
Operator
of Fixed 
Rent
Province (1) (2) (3)
Tehran 50.8 30.7 2.5
lst Province (Gilan) 28.2 17.3 41.4
2nd Province 
(Mazadaran) 26.6 27.7 33.7
3rd Province 70.0 18.1 3.2
4th Province 73.0 23.6 0.9
Kurdistan 77.9 10.8 2.4
5th Province 60.4 17.0 5.0
6th Province 51.7 33.8 9.5
Bakhtiari and 
Chaharmahalat 42.7 47.6 1.7
7th Province 43.2 33.4 11.7
8th Province 34.3 55.0 1.5
Sistan and 
Balnehestan 24.6 68.7 4.1
9th Province 25.3 67.8 1.8
lOth Province 29.8 38.6 11.9
Z of 
1 + 2
Z of 
1 + 3
Z of 
2 + 3
Total
Combined Combined Combined Z No.
10.3 2.8 1.6 100 139,829
2.4 6.5 4.2 100 212,144
2.2 4.3 5.4 100 210,324
2.7 5.8 0.2 100 220,141
2.2 0.3 0.0 100 55,456
3.0 5.9 0.0 100 55,559
1.5 15.9 0.2 100 138,374
3.5 1.2 0.3 100 165,689
2.5 4.6 0.9 100 53,276
5.0 5.2 1.5 100 149,982
5.9 2.3 1.0 100 71,569
2.0 0.6 - 100 46,988
3.1 - 2.0 100 216,772
7.3 0.1 12.3 100 141,198
1,877,299
Source 1960 Census, Voi. 15, Table 103
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(1960) comprised two or more heterogeneous agricultural regions. Here 
as an example, we shall try to sort out the forms of landholding in Gilan.
At the time of the survey (1959-60) Gilan, comprised three different 
agricultural regions. They included Gilan, Arak and Zanjan. From a 
social and agricultural point of view, the latter two regions are very 
different from the former one. That is to say, while in Arak and Zanjan 
the share-cropping system was dominant, in Gilan region fixed rent was 
the prevalent form of rent payment.
Table VIII illustrates the type of land operation for the regions of 
the first province, i.e. Arak and Zanjan on the one hand and Gilan on the 
other. Since there is nothing particular to say about the first two 
regions, Arak and Zanjan, where the share-cropping system was the dominant 
form of land operation, we leave them aside and concentrate on the Gilan 
region.
In Gilan region, the fixed-rent system covered the highest percentage 
of holdings (i.e. 61.3%) followed by owner/operator holdings (21.8%).
This means that only around 10% (columns 1, 3 and 4) of the total producers 
were subject to semi-feudal exploitation. In addition, about 21.8% of the 
producers were not attached to the land, which is equal to saying that they 
were not exploited through the share-cropping system. The majority i.e. 
67.2% (columns 3 and 6) operated the holdings without any intervention and 
subjugation on the part of the landlords. These operators (i.e. so-called 
capitalist farmers and/or commodity producers) had only to pay a portion 
of their produce, i.e. around one-third, as rent to the landlords. The 
table below, clearly, indicates the dominance of the so-called capitalist 
relationship between landlords and producers.
3) Mixed Rents
So far, we have explained the main forms of rent, i.e. fixed rent 
(in cash and in kind) and share-cropping (in cash and in kind). However, 
in some cases, throughout the country, the direct-producers were subject
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Types of Land Operation in the First Province
TABLE VIII
No. of 
Holdings
Share-
cropping
Owner/
Operator
Fixed
Rent
1 + 2
Combined
1 + 3 
Combined
2 + 3
Combined 'Total
Area (1) (2) (3)
Arak and 
Zanjan 49,705 6,696 3,743 1,952 11,850 900 74,846
% 66.4 9.0 5.0 2.6 15.8 1.2 100
Gilan 9,900 29,898 84,000 3,300 1,800 8,100 137,298
% 7.3 21.8 61.3 2.4 1.3 5.9 100
Source: 1960 Census Vol. II, Tables 101(1) and 101(2).
to a combination of these rents. Moreover, in some cases, where the
system was a combination of fixed rent and share-cropping, the latter was
paid in cash. This can be seen as an attempt on the part of the landowner
42to transfer the rental system from share-cropping to fixed rent, 
indicating a transitional stage from semi-feudal relationship (i.e. share- 
cropping) to a ’capitalist' relationship (fixed rent). However, fixed- 
rent had some advantages which the landowner at a certain point might prefer. 
From the economic point of view, these advantages were as follows: on the 
part of the landlord, he saw no need to keep a full-time overseer (himself 
or a bailiff) to check on the amount of produce; and on the part of the 
direct-producer, he knew that if he produced more (by working harder) the 
landlord would not receive more than the agreed amount of produce, in cash 
or in kind. Table VII shows that the mixed form of rent existed in 
almost all provinces except 9. However, these holdings with the mixed 
form of rent constituted a low percentage of the total.
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Generally speaking, the mixed rent form was a combination of fixed
rent and share-cropping. But as far as the form of payment was concerned,
rent was paid, in some cases, partially in kind and partially in cash.
For example, in some villages of Astara (the south western of Caspian Sea)
the system of sehkoot was applied i.e. the landlord collected one-third of
the produce. In addition, peasants had to submit 5 to 6 koots (- 800-960
43kgs.) of rice for each sown ha. of land. In some villages of Hamadan,
before the division of the crop between landlord and producers, the former
collected 150 to 300 kgs. of the crop per juft. In some other villages of
the same region, the landlord collected one fourth of the wheat, and in
addition the producers had to submit 30 to 60 kgs. per juft of wheat to
v  44 him.
Apparently, payment of mixed rent in cash and kind was more common
than payment in kind only. In Garmaseh, in the Isfahan
township, for instance, the farmers had to pay 120 kg. of wheat, 240 kg.
of oats, 240 kg. of paddy, 180 kg. of millet, 240 kg. of giant beans,
3600 kg. of onions, plus 4750 vials for the cultivation of melons and
3800 rials for cultivation of cucumbers, to the landlord as the rent of
one habbeh of land (-2.4 has.). In the Borzavan plantation in the above
village, the farmer submitted annually 60 kg. of wheat, 60 kg. of paddy,
240 kg. of onions, plus 250 rials cash for melon and cucumber cultivation
45to the landlord for the rent of one habbeh (- 0.3 ha.). In Hamadan 
township, for the cultivation of clover, the direct producers had to pay 
a given amount of money as the rent of 3600m of land. If the cultivation
exceeded more than this size, one third of the clover, produced in the
46extra lands, was taken by the landlord. In Bileh Savar, a village in 
MOghan plane, the land was measured by shoot (equal to 300,000 square
metres). The direct-producers gave one tenth of the produce plus 80 rials
47cash for the rent of one shoot of land. Furthermore, according to the 
daily paper Keyhant July 7, 1945, in Jamalabad, a village in Kurdistan,
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the landlord furnished land and water to 65 peasant households, for which 
he obtained from each peasant household one third of the produce plus 120 
rials in c a s h Finally, the R.G. gives an example which strongly 
supports Seidov's idea mentioned above, i.e. mixed rent signified an 
attempt, on the part of the landlords for a transition from the share- 
cropping system to fixed rent: Nasaq-holders in Bangin, in East Azarbaijan, 
paid the landlord ashare to farm wheat, barley alfalfa and cotton (if they 
planted it). Landlords had no share in the vegetable or, almond crop.
Until 195A the landlord’s share was one-third of the winter crops, then for 
whatever reasons they reduced it to one-fifth of the produce, but in return 
they collected a lump sum of an account of supplying water to the producers.
Thus in this chapter we explained various forms of rent payment in 
rural Iran. That is, we examined different varieties of the share- 
cropping system, and concluded that this system has similarities with the 
FMP, but the rent paid in this system is moved away from its classic form. 
We also examined the fixed rent system in the Caspian Sea littoral.
However, in the next chapter, we shall set out to analyse labour-service 
and dues in rural Iran.
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CHAPTER III 
Labour-Service and Dues
Labour service is one form of the extraction of surplus in pre-CMPs.
The payment of this surplus-labour, or rent, is in the form of direct
labour. It is in effect unpaid surplus-labour for the owner of the means
of production. In this form of rent, the direct producer, using instruments
of his own, cultivates a plot of land actually owned by him for a few days
of the week and works during the remaining days upon the estates of the
feudal lord. Labour-rent presupposes a direct separation of necessary and
surplus labour: the direct-producer reproduces his own labour-power by
working on his own land and produces a surplus-product by cultivating on
the landlord's land. Marx explains the situation in which a peasant is
forced to undertake labour service as follows: 'He (the peasant) works on
his own land with his own means of production for, say, three days a week.
The other three days are devoted to forced labour on the lord's domain.
He constantly reproduces his own labour-fund, which never, in his case,
takes the form of a money payment for his labour, advanced by another
person. But in return his unpaid and forced labour for the lord never
acquires the character of voluntary and paid labour.'* Comparing labour
service with surplus-labour in the CMP, Marx states that the value of the
wage which represents the paid portion of the working day in the CMP,
appears as the value of whole working day, i.e. paid as well as unpaid
portions. Hence, the wage form, contrary to labour-rent, conceals every
trace of the division of the working day into necessary labour and surplus- 
2labour.
What determines the amount of labour rent? In order to answer this 
question, one should take into account some other factors including the 
degree of the dominance of the FMP in a particular social formation, the 
level of development of productive forces and also the payment of other
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forms of rent on the part of the producers. But labour-rent, all other 
conditions remaining the same, '... will depend wholly upon the relative 
amount of surplus-labour, or enforced labour, to what extent the direct 
producer shall be enabled to impose his own conditions to acquire wealth 
to produce an excess over and above his indispensable means of subsistence, 
As far as the Iranian rural social formation is concerned, an 
attempt will be made here to show that the amount of labour-rent depended 
upon a number of factors, including the degrees to which the direct 
producers were subordinated to the landlords and also on the amount of 
the other forms of rent paid by the direct-producers.
Labour service, as a form of rent, existed in rural Iran, but it was 
not the main form of exploitation of the direct producers. In effect, 
it was usually supplementary to the other forms of rent and therefore it 
did not directly affect the sphere of production of the main crops. For 
these reasons, Demin states that labour service never played an important 
part in Iranian agriculture.^ However, despite its minor role in Iranian 
agriculture, it occurred throughout the country.
In rural Iran, labour service was mainly used for non-agricultural 
work rather than for the cultivation of the landlord's crops as in the 
classical feudal system. This was because the FMP was to a considerable 
extent articulated with the CMP (which will be discussed below) which is 
why by the 1950s labour service was no longer demanded in all parts of 
the country.^ And again, due to this articulation of these two modes of 
production, labour service was imposed, to a lesser extent, on the direct 
producers living in the villages near the towns and cities. Hence, the 
landlord's estates could not have been run on the basis of labour service.
Light is thrown on the subordination of the direct producers to the 
landlords by the following: Peasants in Varamin in addition to agricultural 
work, just like landlord's servants, were obliged to take care of the 
landlord's farmstead, construction works, transport of wheat and other
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crops. In the case of any protest on the part of the peasants, they would 
have been expelled from the village. In Koleh-jub'Olya, a village in west 
Shahabad, up to the first stage of L-R (Feb. 1961) the direct producers 
were obliged to undertake labour service. But the implementation of L-R, 
which was followed by weakening of the position of the feudal landlords 
vis-a-vis the peasants, made the landlord unable to impose labour-service 
any more. The R.G. reported that in this village '... the farmers were 
most dissatisfied because the landowner had managed to avoid the first 
stage of Land Reform, by purchasing the village in the name of his small 
children. The previous year he had collected his ownership share by 
force, and the villagers told us (R.G.) that this year they would refuse to 
hand it over whatever the consequences and that the landlord, too afraid to 
come himself, would send his brother. Nevertheless, despite the 
disappointment of the villagers, Land Reform has had some effect in 
Koleh-jab in that the landlord has been compelled to abolish personal 
taxes and labour-service. ^
Generally speaking, direct-producers were obliged to do the following 
without any reward from the landlords: . transport, participation in 
building of roads and buildings, construction, cleansing and repairing the 
irrigation systems, chopping wood , collecting firewood , and other 
agricultural work (working in the landlord’s lands). Here an attempt will 
be made to explain these varieties of labour-service.
One of the most common forms of labour-service throughout the country 
was the transportation of the landlord's grain from the field to the 
granary and market. The producers were required to carry the landlord's 
share, after the harvest, to the store room and/or market, using their 
own animals. 'Thus in Azarbaijan the transport both of the landlord's 
share from the fields to his granaries and of the grain which the landlord 
delivers to the state granaries by way of taxation was commonly a charge 
upon the peasant. This was also the case in Kurdistan, Kirman, and in 
vicinity 6f Kashmar.'7 But the interesting point is that, in some cases,
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e.g. Aderan in the neighbourhood of Tehran, this form of labour service, 
transportation, was levied on the producers in the form of cash. In 
Azarbaijan, this amount was about 500 rials for each Juft of land. In
Hamadan, also each peasant had to pay 70 rials and the landlord, in
8addition, collected 150 rials per ton of harvest. In Hamadan, the 
grain used to be carried to the nearby town by the peasants, but later the 
landlords changed the form of levy, i.e. they preferred to charge the 
producers a certain amount of money per 300 kg. of grain, depending on the
9distance of the village to the nearby town.
Participation in the construction of roads died out since the central 
government took over these public works. But other forms of construction 
services survived until the implementation of L-R. In Kirman, labour- 
service took the form of corvee levied for the performance of projects 
which the landlord wished to undertake.^ However, the main form of 
labour-service included in this category, was the construction and repair 
of the qanats. These were the principle duties of the producers in the 
central and arid areas, where, qanats were the most important source of 
water supply. In these areas, despite the fact that the qanats belonged 
to the landlords and they collected rent for water (as we saw above) the 
direct-producers were obliged to perform digging, cleaning and repairing 
of the wells and canals of the qanats. Thus according to Ono, whenever 
the landlord of Ibrahimabad, in the neighbourhood of Nishaboor in 
Khorasan province, needed labour-service for repairing his qanat, the 
nasaq holders had to undertake the job.^ In the Yazd area, also the
12peasants had a duty to look after the irrigation systems of the villages. 
The peasants in Sistan had exactly the same duties which were imposed on 
them by the central government, the owner of most of the lands in this 
province. The obligation to look after the irrigation system, in many 
places, was regarded as integral part of the villagers’ economic life, 
and consequently, one might expect that they were not reluctant to perform
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it. Indeed, as most unpaid labour was said to be for the common good of 
the public, the nasaq holders themselves did not seem to mind it very
v 14 much 9
Labour-service in the form of agricultural works existed throughout 
the country during these two decades. However, many scholars believe that 
all other varieties of labour service, including agricultural duty, had 
less significance than transportation duty. Agricultural duties might have 
eovered either the whole process of cultivation, including ploughing, 
sowing, winnowing, reaping, harvesting and threshing; or any one of these 
stages. Thus in certain areas of Khuzistan '... it is the practice for the 
holder of a plough-land to be required also to plant, reap, and thresh a 
certain amount of grain free in the land which the landowner reserved for 
himself,...' In Nurabad (in Fars Province) the nasaq-holder was required 
to sow and reap for the landlord without any r e w a r d s . I n  the Saqqiz 
area, if a landlord wanted his land ploughed, or the harvest reaped, or 
any other agricultural work performed, ttcrsaq-holders were obliged to 
furnish the labour r e q u i r e d . I n  Hamadan region, the direct producers, 
among other things, had to undertake the following agricultural works: 
threshing the landlord's grain (2 days), hay making (one day) and collecting 
grain (one day).*^ According to a study, carried out by the Institute of 
Social Research and Studies, aiaverage of 46% of the sampled households were 
subject to labour service. The study covered seven townships and the 
relevant percentages of direct-producers who were obliged to undertake 
labour service were as follows: Sanandaj (in Kurdistan) 95.1%, Qasreh- 
Shirin 60.4%, Birjand (in Khorasan) 43.4%, Hamadan 35.5%, Sari (in Caspian 
Sea littoral) 33.8%, Garmsar (near Tehran) 30.7%, and in Golpaigan 25%.
The study clearly shows the signficance of agricultural works vis-a-vis 
other works which were carried out by corvee in these areas, i.e. 45.9%
• 1 Qof the households had to carry out their labour service in the field.
There were some other varieties of labour service which had less 
significance than those explained above. They included: chopping firewood ,
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collecting grasses, spinning cotton and wool, removing snow from the roof cf tte
19landlord's house» taking out landlords' sheep and cows, acting as the
landlords' personal servants, and providing fuel.
Having reviewed all these forms of labour service, one may pose the
question of whether or not there was any basis on which labour service
was being imposed and by whom was it undertaken? If we were to compare
this with the Russian case, Lenin for instance argued in the Development
of Capitalism in Russia that labour service requires the middle-peasant,
that is a peasant who is not affluent, but is not proletarian either.
Labour service is not suitable for the well-to-do peasants, because 'it is
20dire need that compels the peasant to undertake the worst-paid jobs ...'
On the other hand, poor peasants are not suitable for labour service, 
because 'having no farm of his own, or possessing a miserable patch of 
land, the rural proletarian is not tied down to it to the extent that the 
"middle" peasant is, and, as a consequence, it is far easier for him to go 
elsewhere and hire himself out on "free" terms, i.e. for higher pay and
2iwithout bondage at all.'
At first sight it appears, looking at the pertinent studies, that
labour service was levied on the peasants without considering their social
status. But some evidence exists which suggests that there was some sort
of discrimination: i.e. the levying of labour service on all social strata
of the peasantry was not an absolute rule. For example in Ibrahimabad, a
village in the township of Nishabour in Khorasan, the landlord required
labour service for repairing the qanat. The Labour service then was
22levied on the ordinary peasants, members of sakras (work-teams)
Lambton is more precise on this point. In Turbati Haydari however a
township in the same province, labour service was levied on all share-
cropping peasants (nasaq holders) and landless peasants, but not on the
23
salar, the peasant in charge of the work-team. There were three types 
of work-team (Pa-gavi) cultivating the land: the first type called Pa-gavi
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Kalkin, belonged to the poor peasants. These peasants were allowed to
cultivate small pieces of land surrounding the village farms. These (poor)
peasants were not obliged to undertake any labour service. The second
stratum of peasants, who occupied 64% of farming lands in Sistan,
consisted of share-croppers who collected one-third or two-thirds of the
harvest, depending on who supplied the seeds. These share-croppers were
in the middle stratum and were obliged to carry out labour service. The
third group included peasants (called tuyal kars) who supplied only half of
the required seeds, and the rest was supplied by the landlord. This group
of peasant share-croppers were better off than the others and collected half
of the harvest, after deduction of all costs. These share-croppers were
24not bound to perform labour service.
25Lenin considered labour service as the worst-paid job in rural Russia. 
There were some economic reasons for which peasants, middle peasants in 
particular, undertook labour service. 'Sometimes peasants undertake * 
(labour service) for a money payment to cultivate with their own implements 
the field of landowner .... Sometimes the peasant borrows grain or money, 
undertaking to work off either the entire loan or the interest on it ...
In some cases the peasants work "for trespass" (...), or work simply "out of 
respect" (...), i.e. gratis, or just for a drink,... Lastly, labour service 
in return for land is very widespread in the shape of either of half-cropping 
or directly of work for land rented, for grounds used, etc.' However, 
this statement by no means can be considered as a situation in which, the 
peasants had the option to undertake and/or not to undertake labour service. 
They were bound to perform it. According to Lenin, peasants were obliged, 
by economic as well as non-economic coercion , to undertake labour service. 
That is to say, 'the peasants' farms were not entirely separated from those 
of the landlords, for the latter retained possession 6f very essential parts 
of the peasants' allotments: the "cut off" lands, the woods, meadows, 
watering places, pastures, etc. Without these lands (...) the peasants
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were absolutely unable to carry on independent farming, so that the
landlords were able to continue the old system of economy in the form of
labour-service. The possibility of exercising "extra-economic pressure"
also remained in the shape of the peasants' temporarily-bound status,
collective responsibility, corporal punishment, forced labour on public 
27works, etc.' Comparing this form of labour service with the form which 
existed in rural Iran during 40s and 50s, we should, first of all, say that, 
labour-service was by no means 'the worst •paid job' but was, in effect, an 
unpaid job which nasaq holders, and in some cases landless peasants, were 
bound to undertake. Consequently, the dire economic needs on the part of 
the poor nasaq-holders did not direct them to perform labour service. It 
holds good for the well-to-do nasaq holders, but in a different way. That 
is to say, they were driven off the performance of labour service, due to 
their prosperity. However, assuming that all strata of the peasantry had 
to undertake labour-service, the performance of this obligation could have 
originated from the following 'coercions':
In some cases, there were village-level public works whith peasants had 
to undertake, e.g. the cleaning and repairing of qanats in places where 
it was the sole source of water. On the one hand, the peasant had to 
perform this unpaid job, despite the fact that the qanat belonged to the 
landlord. He was, therefore, subject to the exercise of "extra economic 
pressure", which forced him to take this work without any reward. But on 
the other hand, his reproduction was almost impossible without being 
supplied with water by qanat. He was, therefore, under an economic 
pressure as well to construct, repair and clean the qanat. Thus it was 
this double pressure, which directed him to perform the job in the form of 
labour service. Although the qanat belonged to the landlord, since the 
supply of water was vital for all of the producers, in certain villages, 
affairs pertinent to the qanat were for the common good. That is why 
nasaq holders accepted the obligation of cleaning and repairing the qanat.28
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In some other cases, labour service was linked to being raised to 
the position of possession of land, i.e. nasaq, (see the cases below, 
according to which peasants were obliged to undertake labour service 
according to their ploughed land). We have already explained the 
conditions of security and insecurity surrounding the direct-producers.
It was further stated that the peasants (direct-producers) had all means 
of production other than land (and water). It follows that, these 
producers were unable to reproduce themselves without obtaining land.
This dire economic need put them into a position of subordination to the 
owners of land. This subordination, which stemmed from economic needs, 
plus subordination at the level of the political and ideological (existing 
in all feudal social formations) obliged the direct producers, not only to 
pay rent, but also to perform labour service. Labour service, in this 
case, had different forms such as carrying out the landlords personal 
affairs and transporting the landlords grain by his (producers) ass. Since 
these jobs would by no means be seen as being for the common good, the 
producers could directly feel the pressure on themselves and therefore, 
were more reluctant than in the former case to perform labour service.
Labour service was levied by household, male and/or female population, 
ploughed land, house, share of water, animals (asses and cows) and also on 
the granting of nasaq for the next year. In Farsinj, a village in 
Hamadan region, peasants had to undertake begari (labour service) for 
the landlord in the form of five days work for him per person per year 
(Rahb<zrtOct. 25, 1946). In Kurdistan, peasants were obliged to perform 
one to four days work per person per year (Navideh Ayandeh, June 4, 1952 
and Dezht August 12, 1932). Peasants in Mazan, in Kirman province, were 
bound to work during the summer for the landlords without any charge (Dezht 
August,1, 1952). Lastly, the peasants of Torbat-e Heydarieh, in Khorasan 
province, had to choose a person among themselves and send him to the 
landlord to work as a servant, while they had the responsibility of feeding
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O Qhim. Sometimes labour service was heavier than in the above cases.
In the village Sonqor-Kolai and Matar, peasants had to work 30 to 60 days
30a year for the landlords.
Apparently, the most common criterion for levying labour service was 
juft (plough-land). In Hassanabad, near Sanandaj in Kurdistan, the levy 
was made per juft and amounted to seven days' free labour of a peasant and 
four days’ free labour of an ass per year. In the Saqqiz area, in the 
same region, each juft had to provide the landlord with several free days' 
labour in men and asses. In Varzaqan, in Azarbaijan province, each
(plough-land) was bound to provide the landlord with four days' free labour 
in men and asses. In Nurabad, in Fars province, a member of each plough­
land had to sow and reap for the landlord a small quantity of rice with no
reward. Lastly, in some parts of Azarbaijan each holder of plough-lands
31had to provide a certain number of loads of firewood, or camel-thorn.
All the above include the cases in which the levy was made on animals 
and asses in particular. We should mention here that in these cases, 
asses were used for the transport of the landlords' produce from the 
fields to the nearby town and/or for carrying building materials for 
example.
In some cases, in arid areas, labour service was levied on the users
of water, based on their relative shares. For example, most of the land
in Sistan, belonged to the State, and therefore labour service was levied
by government officials for performance of various kinds of work, including
irrigation works and road-building. Thus 'men have to be provided for this
labour service by those who have the right to a share of the water, in
proportion to the number of their shares, whenever called upon to do so by
32the officials of the government.'
Finally, in some cases, labour service was undertaken by the nasaq 
holders to obtain nasaq for the next year. Peasants in some areas of 
Khuzistan, for instance, might have been required to work all over the
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summer on rice production without any reward, except that of obtaining
33nasaq during the balance of the year on favourable conditions.
Dues other than labour service
So far, we have explained the forms of rent and labour s ervice which 
were imposed on the direct producers during these two decades. However, 
they were subject to some other forms of direct exploitation which can 
generally be called dues. The direct subordination and servitude of the 
producers to the landlords not only had enabled the latter to exact 
surplus in the form of rent, but also had given the landlord the possibility 
of imposing one of the medieval types of levy on producers in the form of 
the presentation of different products such as chicken, eggs, butter, milk, 
and even in some cases cash. These dues were levied on the producers 
throughout the country during the period under study and during the early 
forties in particular. But due to the peasant revolts in the forties 
and early fifties, they disappeared and were almost all abolished on the 
eve of the implementation of L-R. They were effectively compulsory presents 
to be given to the landlords.
In certain areas, some dues were levied per ploughed land; for example 
in Distgird and Sulaymanabad, near Ramadan, the due comprised of two loads 
of lucerne and some money per year. The peasants of Asadabad, near 
Ramadan, had to pay 50-100 rials plus 32-39 lb. of clarified butter per 
annum, while in the Pushti Kuh area of Kangavar, the dues comprised of 6 lb 
of clarified butter, three hens and 200 rials.
In Haroadan region, the landlords collected the following dues yearly: 
a certain amount of cash per head of sheep, a certain amount of money per 
household as rent, 2 to 4 hens per peasant (nasaq holder or landless), 10 
to 25 eggs per household, a certain amount of wood and manure in some areas,
1.5 kg. clarified butter in some villages and in some others (remote areas)
354.5 kg. per pair of draught animals. A number of dues, including 
clarified butter, hens, eggs, lambs, kids and money, were levied per plough
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land, or per share of water in Azarbaijan. In Hashtrood, dues were
levied on nasaq-holders as well as landless peasants, but the latter had
to'.hand over more per head of livestock than the farmer. In Azarbaijan
(east and west) peasants were obliged to give 12 kaseh (vessel) grain for
the crop, 3 kaseh for the harvest and one kaseh for the fields and some
more for other things to the landlords. As a whole, landlords collected
around 280 kg. of grain, five toomans cash (10 rials ■ 1 tooman) per head
of livestock, one hen or cock, from each peasant household. In the cases
in which the peasant did not have any one of these items, it could be
substituted for grain. These dues had to be paid by the producers of
almost all areas of Azarbaijan including Arasbaran, Tabriz, Garmrood,
Reza’ieh, Hashtrood, Dehargan, Maragheh, Ardebil, Maku, Marand, Sarab,
37Khalkhal and Salmas. «
The Kurdish peasants were apparently subject to the heaviest rent as
well as the heaviest dues. E.g. in Hasanabad, near Sanandij, they had to
hand over to the landlords 3-4 hens, over 3 lb. clarified butter and 100
rials per plough-land; while in another village, i.e. Dabbagh, these dues
38comprised of 5 hens, 5 lb. clarified butter and 100 rials.
Kurdish peasants, in the neighbourhood of Marand, were subject to 
the following dues per annum: 30-100 rials cash, one mann clarified butter, 
some eggs, 4 to 10 hens. In Matar, a village in this province, the 
peasants who owned draught animals, in addition to the labour service, 
had to hand over 150 rials cash, J kg. clarified butter and some fodder, 
to the landlords; while some other peasants were subject to another set of
dues, including: one head of sheep, 3 hens (or cocks), 25 eggs, 16 kg.
39kerosene and five days’ yield of sheep’s milk.
In Gilan province, in addition to the fixed amount of rent, which was 
around one-third of the produce, landlords also collected every year 6 to 
12 chickens, one egg for every 33 kg. of rice plus some other products 
such as garlic, onions, grapes, walnuts, cooking oil, honey and some fruits.
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These dues died out in this province around 1945.^°
The collection of dues, just like that of rents, was undertaken by 
someone other than the landlord himself. As a matter of fact, although 
there was a direct relationship between landlord and peasant, this 
relationship was, in most places, mediated by an agent of the landlord,
i.e. village headman (kadkhcda) or bailiff. Thus 'collection is made on 
behalf of the landowner by the kadkhoda or by a collector (zabit). On a
given day a crier is sent out to announce that the holders of plough-lands 
should bring their clarified butter on such and such a day.'^
There is one further point in relation to dues to be mentioned here.
In almost all cases mentioned above, at least one item of dues was paid 
in cash. This meant that the peasants had connections with the market: 
i.e. there existed a commodity economy alongside the feudal economy.
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CHAPTER IV
Were the Peasants Tied to Land?
The social relationship between landlord and peasant has already been 
discussed. In short, we saw how the peasantry was exploited by the land­
owning class, and how the farmer had to hand over a great portion of surplus 
to the latter in different ways. There is no doubt that, this intensive 
feudal exploitation caused the peasantry to live in absolute poverty. Then, 
why did they remain in the land? Were they tied to it? Here we will try 
to answer this question.
The Iranian peasant was not tied to the land in the same way as a serf
under 'classical' feudalism. He could move from one village to another or
to the towns. He was not subsumed to the landlord to the extent that he
was unable to move away from the land. However, he was subject to some
other pressures which, as a matter of fact, forced him to stay on the land.
He was immobilized by the lack of alternative employment, an extremely low
standard of living, and also limited energy and initiative due to poor
health and illiteracy.1 However, it seems that migration to the urban
centres for whatever reasons accelerated in the late 50s. Khamsi writes:
'The high level of rural unemployment was already causing peasants to
migrate to the cities in large numbers, as is evident from the fact that
while rural population increased 18% between 1956 and 1966, urban
2
population increased 80% ‘
However, considering this situation, i.e. the existence of exploitation 
and oppression accompanied by absolute poverty in rural Iran, one may pose 
the question of which factors caused peasants to remain and which to move 
away from the rural areas, without getting deeply involved in the migration 
question during 1940-60, an attempt will be made to answer the above 
questions.
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In order to answer these question, we will classify all the 
contributing factors into two categories: i.e. disincentive factors and 
incentive factors. By the former, it is understood, all factors which, in 
one way or another, discouraged the villagers to move away from rural areas. 
By the latter, incentive factors, is meant the factors which encouraged 
them to move away from the rural social formation. The elements of both 
categories, in relation to the rural social formation, are either external 
or internal. We explain therefore, the elements of both categories one by 
one according to their relevance to rural Iran.
a) Disincentive factors
Frightened by the flight of the peasant due to super-exploitation, 
the landlord had, during 1940-60, already taken some initiatives to induce' 
the peasant to attach himself more to the land. These initiatives included 
giving him nasaq, encouraging him to get involved in gardening, giving him 
a house with its surrounding area, and finally keeping him permanently in 
debt.
We have already explained how the landlord raised the direct-producer 
to the position of possession of land, i.e. nczsaq—holding. Although the
latter could have been suspended from this position, the obtaining of 
nasaq was a strong factor which tied peasants to a particular village and 
discouraged migration.
The rights of gardening and also of possessing a house, were the 
privileges which the peasantry enjoyed during this period. The landlord 
usually owned all the land of a village, and it was not uncommon that a 
villager was given a house or a piece of land for building one. This 
’privilege* existed in almost all parts. However, the landlord, in the 
case of dismissal of the peasant from the village, was able to take the 
house away from him, even though the latter had built it. But in some 
cases, this foothold had become so strong that the peasants even had 
permission to register the houses in their names subject to the condition
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that they did not sell them to outsiders.
Generally speaking as far as the ownership of houses is concerned, 
there existed different practices in different places. Hence, in Aliabad, 
a village in southern part of Tehran, 90% of the houses belonged to the 
landlord.^ Also the houses in Sayyid Khalaf, near Ahvaz, were owned by 
the landlord. On the other hand, 'in various areas in Fars the peasants 
own their houses. This is so in Qara Belagh and Istahbanat, ... Most of 
the houses in Dizful formerly belonged to the landowner. In many cases 
these have been transferred to the peasants.... In Vays, Bandi Qir,
Agili, Ram Hurmuz, Khalafabad, and for the most parts in the Bihbahan area 
the houses belong to the peasants'.^
One of the most common initiatives, taken by the landlords, was to 
encourage the peasants to get involved in gardening. In this case, the 
lands owned by the landlord, was given to the direct-producer to plant trees, 
fruit-trees, vines, etc. The legal term for the ownership of that which is 
on the land, such as trees, fruit-trees, vines and houses, etc., is called 
a'yani; whereas, the legal term for the ownership of the land called arseh. 
The ownership of land (arseh) and a'yani of a garden might have been vested 
in two different persons. That is, the land was owned by the landlord, 
while the a'yani belonged to the peasant. In Nikpay, a village in Zanjan, 
for instance, the arseh of the 16 has. of tree-nurseries belonged to the 
landlords and the a'yani to the peasants.^ The separation of the ownership 
of arseh and that of a'yani was common, but it was not an absolute rule: 
e.g. in some places, the ownership of arseh and a'yani was vested in the 
landlord, such as in Sareh and Sahneh.^
This inducement was not provided by all landlords. Some landlords 
were frightened of any sort of peasant prosperity. They, therefore, 
tried to prevent the latter from getting involved in gardening which could
g
have made them prosperous. There is no doubt that the landlord, in 
this case, did not like to give an opportunity to the direct-producer to
3
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have any permanent stake in the land. Having a permanent stake in the 
land, could be meant as an approach towards effective possession of the land, 
and therefore autonomy on the part of the direct-producer. That is why, 
in some places, the landlords did not encourage their subjects to be 
engaged in gardening.
However, the ownership of a tiny plot of land (as a garden or farm) was
widespread in rural Iran: i.e. over 46% of these smallholdings belonged to
we considerthe direct-producers (see Table XII). The reason why/ the ownership of small 
plots of land, i.e. up to 2 has., as an inducement to attachment of the 
direct-producers to land, is due to the fact that, in most parts of Iran a
9plot of less than two has. is insufficient to feed a peasant family of six.
In some areas, where there was a shortage of labour, the landlords were
forced, in one way or another, to counteract any sort of flight on the part
of the direct-producers by allowing peasants to engage in gardening. Thus
’in Jahrum (in Fars province) neighbourhood there is a shortage of peasants
and they are encouraged to plant gardens so that they may become attached
to the soil.’10 In many villages of Arak, an area in which there was a
shortage of labour11, the producers had gardens for which they had to pay
rent.^ In some parts, this inducement took place in a different way.
In Birjand and Qa'inat, for example, when the peasant lost his draught
13animal, it was frequently replaced by the landlord.
However, one should notice that not always was there a correlation 
between the sparsity of population and the tendency of the landlords to 
give such concessions to the direct-producers. Thus in the sparsely 
populated areas, i.e. central Persia on the borders of the central desert 
stretching from Qum through Kashan to Yazd, there was no uniform practice 
concerning the ownership of gardens: in some cases the gardens belonged to 
the peasants, whereas in other cases they were owned by the landlords.1^
As a concluding remark concerning the ownership of gardens on the part 
of the direct-producers, one may say that it was highly dependent on the 
degree to which the direct-producers were subordinated to the landlords by
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other than economic mechanisms. Thus in places where the producers were 
highly subordinated to the landlords, the latter could see no reason for 
resorting to this policy to attach their subjects to the land; and vice 
versa% in places where the former were loosely subordinated to the latter, 
the landlords, in some cases, had to give some concessions to the direct- 
producers to tie them to the land.
The absolute poverty of the peasantry had brought about, among other 
things, permanent indebtedness. Lambton states that : ’it is not 
surprising that debt should be one of the curses of Persian rural life ...
(the peasant’s) reserves are almost always exhausted before the winter is 
over and he has to borrow merely to feed himself and his f a m i l y . ' H e  
had the following sources available to borrow from: the State institutions; 
brokers; moneylenders and other peasants; and lastly landlords. We shall 
be concerned here with the impact of these loans, granted to the peasantry, 
by different private sources, on the social relationship between landlord 
and direct-producer.
Table IX illustrates the contribution of private sources to the total 
loans granted to holding by size of holding in 1960. We shall assume that 
only the producers in the second category, i.e. holdings from under 0.5 
hectare to under 20 hectares were subject to this set of social relations 
of production. The other categories were either holdings without land 
(landless peasants, owners of cattle and sheep) or capitalist farmers, that 
is lessees who rented the holdings from the landlords.
As Table IX shows, a quite high percentage of the producers of the 
holdings from under 0.5 to under 20 has. borrowed money from different 
sources. The public sources (or in fact organized money market) had a 
negligible contribution, while the rest of the producers borrowed from the 
landlords and/or other sources including money-lenders, shop-keepers, 
brokers. The main characteristic feature of the loans from private 
sources was that they were raised on the security of the next year's harvest.
TABLE IX
Percentage of Holdings Borrowed Money from Private Sources During the 1960 Agricultural Year
Total No. 
of Holdings
% of Holdings 
borrowing from 
any source
% of Holdings 
borrowing from 
landlord
% of Holdings 
borrowing from 
other private 
sources
Holdings without land 507,600 25.3 2.8 22.2
Holdings from under 0.5 to 20has. 1,787,046 43.5 4.5 37.8
Holdings from 20 to 50 77,714 45.3 8.3 36.3
Holdings from 50 to 100 8,446 43.0 1.0 35.1
Holdings from 100 to 500 3,770 39.2 8.5 19.0
Holdings of 500 and over 316 48.4 - 46.8
Total 2,384,899 — -
Source : Table 202 of 1960 Census
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This form of security of loans and the indebtedness of over 42% of the 
direct producers to private sourcest obviously reinforced the peasants ’ 
ties to the land. Thus Keddie states: *in many cases the peasant borrows 
from his own landlord. This had led to the loss of the little remaining 
peasant land due to inability to repay, and to perpetual indebtedness 
which ties the peasant to a single area. Thus tenants are often in a 
state of p e o n a g e . H o w e v e r ,  one can consider debt as a binding tie, 
only when one takes into consideration some other social phenomena, 
including those explained above and the lack of opportunity of getting jobs 
in other places, lack of skills, poverty of the peasantry, and their 
ignorance.
We conclude this discussion with a quotation from Djamalzadeh’s 
account written in the mid-thirties, at a time when feudal relations of 
production were more dominant and widespread than in the 50s. He states:
’The peasant usually cannot avoid becoming, sooner or later, in the debt of 
his master, who is often the landowner himself. It is in the interest of 
the latter to induce the peasant attached to his land to ask for a loan. 
Having contracted such a loan, the peasant can no longer think of abandoning 
the ground which he is cultivating, his labour becomingt in factt a sort of 
surity for the debts which he has contracted to his master,’17
b) Incentive factors
By these factors we mean, the factors which are exogenous to the rural 
social formation. These factors could affect the relationship between 
direct producer/non-producer in the rural area indirectly, i.e. by opening 
opportunities of some other jobs to the direct-producer and therefore 
loosening his ties to the land. During these two decades, a low percentage 
of the labour-force was involved in the services and industry sectors and 
also the growth of these two sectors were very slow. This ’stagnation' in 
these two sectors meant, to the direct-producers in the rural areas, a lack 
of opportunity to find jobs in the urban centres. However one should notice
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that, this lack of opportunity was accompanied by a lack of skills on the 
part of the (agricultural) direct-producers. Thus peasants generally 
remained in the villages because finding alternative employment was 
difficult... Because of the lack of opportunity elsewhere for his 
unskilled service, the agricultural labourer was tied to the villages
18where he worked by the day for a tiny cash wage or part of the harvest.'
The conditions of life of the peasantry will be analysed below, however,
some scholars refer to the low standard of living and absolute poverty of
the Iranian peasantry in the 1940s and 1950s, as one of the factors which
had impelled peasants to migrate in search of employment in the urban
centres. It is quite right to argue in this way, but one should note that
only in some extreme cases did absolute poverty force the peasants to
abandon their villages. Thus in.Shahi (in Mazandaran province) they
suffered crop failure due to severe drought for three consecutive years,
i,e. 1947-49, losing three-quarters of their produce. They had to sell
even their draught animals to feed themselves and their families. This
disaster, later resulted in the reduction of the population of this area
by 50%.^ In Isfahan, the peasant's share (of the harvest) was so low
and grain prices were so high that the peasants in crop failure years
either died or moved out from their villages. Lambton noted that in
Qarajeh Dagh and other areas of Azerbaijan in 1949 the peasants, who had
no reserves to tide them over bad times were being forced by poverty to
sell up their belongings, including their draught animals. Already it
21would appear that poverty has forced many to abandon their villages.'
Price estimated the number of these Azarbaijani peasants to be
several thousands. According to him, many of these peasants worked on
22the project of the completion of the railway in the North to Tabriz.
Generally speaking, different factors had different effects on the 
relationship between the direct-producers and the landlord. However, on 
the basis of their impact on the feudal social relationship, these factors
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can be classified into two groups: i.e. those which reinforced the 
reproduction of the semi-feudal relationship between the two agents of 
production, and secondly, those which loosened this social relationship.
The first group is mainly comprised of the right of 'a’yani', 
loans and also the degree of development of the CMP in the urban centres.
The impact of the latter factor is straightforward, and is already 
explained. But the impact of the former two factors is interesting in 
the sense that, while they are categories at the level of capitalist 
relations of production, they reinforced the semi-feudal relations of 
production. This is explained by English as follows: ’in debt is not 
viewed as a totally negative condition by the share-cropper in Kirman.
Some measure of security is derived from the fact that the landlord will 
lend him grain, and it is clearly understood that the landlord will not 
take so much of the next harvest that the share-cropper cannot feed his 
family. But debt keeps the share-cropper at the subsistence level; he 
works his way from harvest to harvest with little prospect of bettering 
his condition
The second group, which is diametrically opposed to the first, affected 
extremely poor peasants, due to feudal exploitation. In some cases shown 
above, we saw that, the peasants left their villages, because of absolute 
poverty. In these cases, capitalist relations developed out of feudal 
relations through separating the direct producers from their conditions of 
production. As a result of the super-exploitation of the feudal landlord, 
the direct-producer was no longer able to reproduce himself within the 
feudal relations of production. He had to sell his means of production 
to feed his family and himself. In this specific conjuncture, therefore, 
the feudal relations of production forced the direct-producer to be divorced 
from his objective conditions of production. Thereafter, he owned nothing 
but his labour-power; hence he became a labourer, separated from all the 
means of production. He moved out of the village social formation. This
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was because there was no demand for his commodity, labour-power, in that 
'feudal' social formation. Hence, he had to find a demand for his 
commodity in another social formation with different relations of 
production, i.e. a capitalist social formation (e.g. urban centres). 
Consequently the feudal relations of production, at one point, partially 
stopped reproducing themselves and by separation of the direct-producer 
from the conditions of production, in effect, reinforced the reproduction 
of capitalist relations of production within or outside the village 
social formation.
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CHAPTER V
Peasant Revolts in Rural Iran
So far, we have analysed the relations of production in rural Iran. 
Relations of production in the sense of the specific economic form in 
which surplus was pumped out of the direct-producers, i.e. share-croppings 
fixed rent, and labour service as well as dues. It has been asserted that 
these forms of appropriation/expropriation of surplus presuppose a specific 
form of subordination: the direct-producer is subject to other than economic 
pressure to hand over a portion of his produce to the non-producer.
However, what we are concerned with here, is the struggle between 
landlords and peasants during these two decades. First we shall give 
some examples of the peasant struggles and secondly, we shall try to 
present a theoretical explanation for the causes, purposes and direction of 
all these struggles.
After the Second World War, parallel with the anti-inperialist movements 
in the urban centres, anti-feudal (landlords) movements were formed by 
the peasantry throughout the country. In almost all provinces, including 
Azarbaijan, Kurdistan, Hamadan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Isfahan, Kirman, Fars, 
there were peasant revolts. However, there were two peaks in these 
revolts: 1945-46 and 1952. Generally speaking, the peasants'demands 
included, an increase in their share of the total produce, new arrangements 
in the relationship between themselves and the landlords and also the 
abolition of all obligations. Below we shall try to give a general view 
of the features of these movements together with specific examples. In 
addition, we shall examine the attitude of the landlords and that of the 
central government towards these movements.
The greatest agrarian revolts developed (in 1945-46) in Azarbaijan, 
where survivals of the feudal mode of production were combined with national 
suppression. Although all peasants in Azarbaijan are of Turkish origin,
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most of the landlords of this region were Persian and those of the latter
who were of Turkish origin were persianized and had lost their own national
culture and traditions. The Iranian ruling class not only ruthlessly
exploited the peasants of this region, but also denied their national
feelings, did not recognize their mother tongue, customs, traditions and
refused them education in their own language. National suppression
coupled with feudal exploitation, resulted in the peasants' participation
in the democratic movement which emerged in Azarbaijan in 1945.1 Indeed
56,000 out of 75,000 members of the Democratic party were peasants.^ The
Democratic government of Azarbaijan took some measures against the
landlords, including increases in the share of the direct-producers and
abolition of all forms of obligations. However, the peasants, who were
looking for effective possession of land, demanded fundamental changes in
their relationship with the landlords. In many places the peasants refused
to hand over the landlords' share and distributed some lands among
themselves, which, according to the law of the democratic government, should
3not have been distributed.
But this state of affairs did not last very long. The Democratic
government of Azarbaijan collapsed and the Army of the central government
occupied this province. Douglas states that 'when the Persian Army
returned to Azarbaijan it came with a roar. Soldiers ran riot, looting
and plundering, taking what they wanted... The Persian Army - the army
of emancipation was an army of occupation. It left a brutal mark on the
people. The beards of peasants were burned, their wives and daughters
raped. Houses were plundered; livestock was stolen... On the heels of
the Army came the absentee landlords.'4 The landlords, who were strongly
supported by the central government this time, once again managed to
re-establish the rules; they not only reimposed obligations and rents but
also laid claim to the rent which had not been paid while the Democrats 
5were in power.
The suppression of the Democrats of Azarbaijan brought political as
81
well as economic setbacks for the peasantry of this region. After the « 
suppression, the peasants once again lost the effective possession of land 
and the minimized rates of rent. At the political level, this suppression 
so demoralized the peasantry that it was unable later on to raise 
itself against feudal exploitation even during 1952 when the peasantry * 
of almost all areas revolted against the feudal landlords.
Apart from Azarbaijan, in the first half of 1946 the scale of the 
peasants’ revolts reach an unprecedented level. In almost all provinces 
peasants revolted against the landlords. They mainly demanded the 
following: reconsideration of the division of the crop, an increase in the 
share of peasants at the cost of the landlords and the abolition of all 
dues. Having been frightened by such upheavals, the government deemed it 
necessary to manoeuvre and show that it wanted to take some measures on 
behalf of the peasants, in order to make their conditions of life better.
In the spring of 1946, the general-governors were ordered by decree to 
establish commissions, comprised of the representatives of the State, 
landlords and peasants, to reconsider the division of the harvest between
landlords and peasants. At the same time, the government ordered a 15% 
increase in the peasants*share.
However, the reaction of the landlords to the new orders of the central 
government was different in different places. m  some areas the landlords 
refused to carry out their agreements with the peasants, as well as the 
government's order for an increase in the producers' share. Yet, 
according to Ivanov, in many other places, the landlords, frightened by 
the uprisings, agreed to reduce their share. Thus in the spring of 1946, 
in Gilan, the representatives of landlords and peasants arrived at an 
agreement, which foresaw a decrease in the landlords' share by 25% and 
the abolition of dues. In Rafsanjan (province of Kirman) in May 1946, 
the representatives of the peasants and landlords arrived at an agreement 
to raise the peasants' share from 25% to 35% of the produce. In Gevard 
(province of Isfahan) the land and water belonged to the landlord. in
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addition, in some cases he furnished seeds and draught animals. He 
collected an average two-thirds and the peasants one-third of the harvest. 
Due to the protest on the part of the peasants in this area against the 
order of division of the harvest, the landlord was obliged to arrive at 
an agreement in the beginning of June 1946. According to this agreement, 
the share of the peasants increased to two-thirds and that of the landlord 
was reduced to one-third. However, the peasants, who were trying to 
become independent producers and to have a secure position, went further
than that, i.e. after the agreement they refused to submit even the reduced 
share to the landlord.^
The peasants in many other places rose up against the landlords and 
refused to pay rent to them. That is why groups of soldiers and policemen, 
ready to support the landlord, were sent to the rural areas to force the 
peasants to pay feudal rent at the previous rate. In the majority of 
regions, a state of war existed: soldiers and policemen destroyed
gpeasants' unions, beat up, arrested and killed activists in these revolts. 
Once again at the end of 1946, the medieval form of relationship between 
the landlords and peasants was restored. Therefore the landlords had 
managed to subordinate the peasants, separate them from land and water, 
and consequently keep them from controlling the conditions of their own 
reproduction. In short, due to the democratic movement during 1945-46, 
the central government was bound to give some concessions to the peasantry, 
e.g. increase their share out of the total produce. However after the 
suppression of this movement in December 1946 (in Azarbaijan), these 
concessions no longer existed.
The suppression of the peasants did not last very long. That is to 
say, a few years later, i.e. 1952, parallel with the anti-imperialist 
movement throughout the country, once again the peasants revolted against 
subordination by the landlords. Generally speaking, they demanded the
execution of the law of 1946, an increase in their shares, and the abolition 
of dues and other obligations.
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The anti-landlord riots on the part of the peasants took place in 
almost all rural areas: in Takistan (in Qazvin region) peasants took over 
the control of lands.(Besooyeh Aiandeh, May 12, 1952); in the same region 
the peasants revolted against the landlords (Akharin Ndbavd, May 29, 1952); 
the cultivators of Foomenat (in Gilan) demonstrated and took *bast’ (the 
traditional taking of sanctuary in a holy place) and sent a telegram to 
the centre (Asreh Now, June 30, 1952); the peasants of Salehabad and some 
other villages of Hamadan region revolted against the landlords and ousted 
the police (Besooyeh Aiandeh, January 1, 1953); peasants' struggle in 
Bihbahan (Besooyeh Aiandeh, May 15, 1952); peasants of Kirman were 
reported as determined to fight for their legal rights (Dezh, August 1,
1952); peasants of Gorgan continued to fight to rescue themselves from 
their unbearable life (Asreh Now, June 16, 1952); peasants of the township 
of Mashhad struggled to rescue themselves from the yoke of big feudals ... 
(Asreh Now, June 18, 1952); and finally, 'peasants of Isfahan rose to
Qfight for land' (Akharin Ndbavd, June 1, 1952).
The above examples show how widespread the peasant movements were. 
However, in order to understand the direction, aims and other features of 
these upheavals, they should be reviewed in more detail. The examples 
below, will help us to understand the main features of the peasants 
upheavals in 1952.
Thus at the end of April 1952, the peasants of Takistan occupied the 
fields and started working on them. They declared that as long as their 
demands were not considered and arbitrary rule did not cease, they would 
not release the harvest (Besooyeh Aiandeh, May 12, 1952). They revolted 
against the landlords and proposed the following demands; 1) returning to 
the peasants, gardens appropriated by the landlords; 2) reviving the qanati 
3) reducing rent by one-third in irrigated land and one-fifth in irrigated 
fields; 4) giving to the peasants 15% increase in the share of the 
harvest which was their legal right (Akharin Ndbard, May 29, 1952).
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In Gilan a unified uprising took place against a state monopoly: the 
tobacco cultivators of Foomenat sent a statement to the tobacco administr­
ation (a state monopoly) according to which they demanded an increase in 
the price of the produce of one ha. from 6500 rials to 10,000 rials. They 
took %bast\ sent a telegram to the centre and demonstrated by chanting 
slogans: "Tobacco Administration has to agree with tobacco cultivators and 
increase the price 1, 2 and 3 times", "Tobacco Administration is bound to 
increase the price from 6500 to 10,000 rials for one hectare".*0
The peasant riots took place mainly in the western part of Iran, 
where the power of the feudal landlords was greatest. Thus, skirmishes 
occurred in many villages of Hamadan region between peasants on the one 
hand and landlords and police on the other. In some cases, peasants ousted 
landlords and the police; while in some other cases police arrested 
representatives of the peasants. However, the peasants were struggling 
for land and a minimal rent. Thus in Salehabad, they independently 
abolished obligations and did not; hand over the landlord’s share until they 
collected their own legal shares (legal share refers to the law of 1946).
In another village, they forced the landlord to supply them with water 
without any change thereafter.**
But the struggle in Kurdistan, where the peasants, more than anywhere 
else, were subject to feudal exploitation, was harsher. The cases below, 
not only show the skirmishes between landlords and peasants, but also 
reveal how the State through the army and police supported the dominant 
classes in this province. Thus, the peasants of Gorooman (near Sanandag) 
refused to pay the landlord’s share. The peasants occupied the village.
As a result of a collision between the rival groups i.e. peasants on the 
one side and landlords and police on the other side, the landlord and one 
policeman was wounded while two peasants were killed. The peasants of 
Zavieh in the Zarand region of Kurdistan, demonstrated in front of the 
landlord’s house. In order to intimidate them, the landlord (Colonel 
Mirgoli) fired a few shots in the air. Despite this, peasants continued
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to insist on their demands and did not go away. Then Colonel Mirgoli 
opened fire on the peasants and killed three of them. However, later on, 
as a result of collisions between the rival groups, two brothers of the 
colonel and one peasant got killed. The fight ended with the arrest of 
the majority of the village inhabitants by some policemen who had come
, 12from the nearby police station. Finally the commander of a division 
of the army in Mahabad (provincial capital of Kurdistan) collected 80,000 
tomans from the landlords to arm them. The armed landlords, their men and
some policemen invaded the villages in the neighbourhood of Mahabad 
township and committed an outrage against the peasants and confiscated 
their belongings.13
Here, in passing, we should state that the above cases among other 
things, clearly reveal the role that the nationalist government played 
against the peasants in their struggle against the landlords. However, 
due to the pressure on the part of the peasants, the government was forced 
in August 13th, 1953, to issue a decree: ’ordering landlords to turn over 
an additional 20% of the return from their agricultural lands. This amount 
would be divided equally between a rural development and cooperative 
organization created by the decree and the individual peasants working on 
the lands... The Prime Minister Mosaddeq also issued a'decree which would 
abolish feudal dues and forced labour.'1^
Seidov states the enforcement of this decree caused more conflicts 
between landlords and peasants. This was because the latter, after the 
decree, were insisting more and more on their legal rights; while the 
former were resisting and did not want to give any concessions to the 
peasants. Thus, for example, Khans, landlords of Songor-Koliai region 
(in Kurdistan), refused to carry out the new law which announced . an 
increase in the share of the peasants of the total harvest. Police and 
officials helped them in this business preventing the harvest from being 
collected, and stated that anyone who wanted to get a share, had to walk 
out of the peasants' union, and secondly to submit a receipt showing that he
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had received 20% increase in his share as well.
The peasant revolts did not carry on at this level in the years after 
1953. This was mainly due to the fact that, in that year, the nationalist 
government was overthrown by a coup and the 'democratic’ atmosphere faded 
away from the country. The succeeding government, which was strongly 
supported by the comparador bourgeoisie and landlords, succeeded in 
suppressing all movements including that of the peasants. There is no 
doubt that after the coup, the feudal landlords managed to reimpose, to 
some extent, feudal rents and other obligations. However, on the eve of 
the L-R (1962) many obligations, for one reason or another, were already 
abolished.
After 1953, the Coup Government enabled the landlords to suppress and 
subordinate the peasantry to a certain extent. Nevertheless, the revolts on 
the part of the peasants became more widespread from the late 1950s up to 
the first stage of L-R.*^ By Hay 1961, the Iranian prime minister addressed 
the landlords and stated that: "You are bound to agree with the distribution 
of your estates, otherwise you would lose both your estates and your lives.
This statement indicates one point, that is, the pressure on the part of 
the peasantry @inn the bottom) had reached the extent that the Iranian politicians 
could clearly feel the danger threatening the dominant classes. And as a 
matter of fact, it was one of the main reasons why they resorted to L-R.
Having surveyed the peasant movement between 1940 and 1960, we shall 
try to relate the main features of these movements to the dominant relations 
of production, and examine the purposes and limitations of these upheavals. 
Thus, the following questions need to be answered: What was the purpose of 
those struggles, were they anti-feudal movements, and were the peasants 
conscious of themselves as a class?
In the classical FMP, the direct-producer owns all means of production 
but land (and water). The latter belong to the non-producer. The non­
producer, while he makes no contribution to the process of production, 
raises the direct producer to the position of possession of land (and
15
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water) but appropriates a portion of produce produced by the producer.
By the same token this makes it possible for the direct-producer to 
reproduce himself. This conjuncture brings about, for the direct producer, 
a specific form of subordination to the owner of land (and water). Thus, 
the direct producer is subordinated, because he is unable to reproduce 
himself on his own; and the non-producer subordinates, because this is the 
only way of giving his property the power to appropriate surplus.
According to Hindess and Hirst, the basic form of the economic class
18struggle in the FMP is the struggle for and against subsumption. The 
direct-producer struggles against subsumption, but this struggle is not 
necessarily an attempt to overthrow feudal relations of production.
However, his objectives are: autonomy as a producer, to hand over no or a 
limited amount of surplus (in different forms) to the non-producer and 
consequently to take control of his own reproduction. In order to realize 
these objectives and in fact to get rid of subordination, the direct- 
producer is forced to obtain (in the sense of ownership) those means of 
production which do not belong to him i.e. land (and water). He, 
therefore struggles for effective possession of land (and water). Thus if
we saw that in the majority of cases cited above, the producers ousted the 
landlords by force, and took control of the fields, it was an attempt on 
their part to eliminate their subsumption to the landlords, i.e. to become 
independent producers. But on the other hand, the only way in which a 
non-producer can keep a producer in the state of subsumption, is by keeping 
him away from effective possession of land (and water). That is why, in 
our examples, the landlords maintained their ownership by force: through 
their own men or police and army. This holds good especially for the 
period-1946-52, and 1953 onwards, i.e. the periods in which the central 
government strongly supported the landlords. In effect, the landlords 
knew that this was the only way of subordinating and therefore exploiting 
the direct producers.
The other subject of dispute between landlords and peasants, was the
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amount of rent to be paid to the former. The producers were trying to 
hand over a limited amount of surplus (in any form) to the non-producers.
That is why they mainly demanded the elimination of labour-service and some
other dues on the one hand, and a decrease in the amount of ownership shown
✓
on the other. They were mainly insisting on paying the rent on the basis
of new rates fixed by the central government (both in 1946 and 1952);
whereas, the landlords aimed at an increase in the amount of rents. They,
therefore, imposed heavy obligations on the producers and in the cases in
which they were faced with an uprising on the part of the producers, the
use of force was the only way to challenge the latter. This can be seen
in almost all the cases. As a matter of fact, force and also the State's
support played a very important role for the landowning class. The mass
arrests of peasant demonstrators, fighting on the side of the landlords and
also attempts to arm them, clearly show the significance of the role played
by the State. In Gigasar (a village in Gilan) during 1954-64, the producers
and landlords had had frequent disagreement over the amount of the ownership
share, which resulted in the imprisonment of several peasants. However in
the year 1964 (prior to L-R) the landlord hoped to collect the entire
19ownership share with the help of government agencies.
In all examples cited so far, the conflict between the landlord and 
peasants was crystalized in the form of armed fighting. However, the 
contradiction between these could not have been always as antagonistic as in 
the above cases. It is reasonable to say that, in a conjuncture in which 
the direct producer is suppressed strongly and is therefore unable to stand 
against his landlord openly (as in the above cases), he may resort to other 
ways in which to struggle against him. There is obviously a certain 
limited aim, i.e. an attempt to obtain some more out of the total harvest.
It seems that rural Iran during 1953-60 (the period in which all movements 
including the peasant movement, were ruthlessly suppressed) witnessed many 
varieties of this type of struggle on the part of the peasants. Thus 
Safinjad, who has explained the landlord-peasant relationship of some
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villages in the south of Tehran, reveals some of the techniques used by
the peasants to increase their share. In Hosseinabad, peasants used to
dig tiny holes in the floor of the field which was the place where the
wheat was threshed. At the time of the division of wheat between landlord
and peasants, therefore some wheat had already collected in the holes,
which would later on be emptied by the peasants. In Firoozabad, a state-
owned village, the peasants used to resort to another stratagem: Every year
the amount of produce on the threshing floor was estimated by an agent of
the State and on the basis of this estimation the share of the landlord
(State) was taken away from the producers. But the peasants in the process
of cultivation watered most part of the field properly, but watered the
remainder insufficiently. Consequently, wheat of the latter part was
underdeveloped, i.e. the wheat seeds were poorer and smaller than ordinary
ones. Then to mislead the valuer, they put good seeds first and covered
them by poor seeds in the threshing floor. This gave to the value: the
impression, at the time of estimation, that this year the produce was not
20good, which resulted in under-estimation of the amount of produce.
Gharachedaghi gives us an example (which happened before 1949) which 
clearly shows how the producers resisted the landlord who forced them to 
shift from the cultivation of wheat to that of sugar beet. He writes: 
'Kurdian landlords in the region of Mianduab, who had to cultivate and 
deliver sugar beets to the Government-owned sugar factory and who had 
obtained advance payments for this cultivation, ordered their share 
croppers to cultivate sugar-beets instead of wheat which had been customary
so far.
N Although normally loyal to their landlords, the Kurdian peasants 
secretly boiled the sugar beet seeds and sowed the seeds without 
germinating capacity, in order to convince their landlords that sugar beets 
would not grow on the fields. Landlords gave in, when the two years' 
attempt failed.' Baasants did so because: ' a) according to the tenancy 
regulations in Azarbaijan and Kurdistan, the share of peasants would have
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decreased from four-fifths to two-thirds of the harvest by shifting from 
the "winter crop" (wheat) to the "summer crop" (sugar beets), b) ... 
peasants would have had to share their portion with the pump-owner, ...
c) peasants did not benefit from the advance payments of the factory made 
to landlords.' These examples clearly indicate that the producers were 
quite aware of their own interests and since they were not able to stand 
against their landlords, they had to resort to trickery to obtain some more 
of the harvest.
There is no doubt that the purpose of the struggle, for land (and 
water) and minimization of rent, on the part of the producer, is for the 
producer to take control of his own reproduction. On the other hand, 
the landlord knows that if he enables his subject to take the control of 
his (producer's) reproduction, he would be unable to subordinate and 
therefore exploit him (producer) any more. That is, he will lose his 
position as an exploiter. Both sides, therefore, fight for effective 
possession of land (and water). This state of affairs was very obvious 
in all cases in 1945-46 and 1952. Thus the peasants were quite aware of 
their own class-interests. They expressed their hatred for the 
exploiting class (landlords) by fighting, ousting and occasionally killing 
the landlords. Their demands for land (and water), minimized rent and 
also for the elimination of obligations, show that they had a sufficient 
level of class-consciousness.
However, in some cases, the peasants went far beyond the feudal 
structure: in some villages of Azarbaijan (in 1945-46), the peasants 
distributed land among themselves and claimed that they would not pay 
rent anymore. It was an attempt to curtail feudal property and feudal 
relations of production. That is why their struggle was directed against 
the varied forms of feudal exploitation. Here, the peasantry was looking 
for its urgent demand, borne from the suffering and hatred of long years 
of oppression: i.e. a demand for the survival, strengthening, consolidation
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and expansion of small farming. The peasantry in these cases, possessed
a class-conscious and full understanding of the system exploiting them.
This is the reason why the peasantry made an attempt to end the feudal
relations of production and replace them with a social formation of free
23proprietor-commodity producers enjoying equal rights.
In some other cases, the peasantry did not oppose feudal relations 
or try to destroy them. Instead, the peasants tried to reduce the rent 
and abolish some other obligations. Examples are the peasants of Takistan 
and those in the villages in the neighbourhood of Hamadan during 1952, and 
peasants of Gilan and Rafsanjan (in 1946) whose representatives in meetings 
with the landlords, fixed the amount of rent to be paid by the peasants.
It can be stated that the peasantry of these regions possessed a class- 
consciousness in the sense of defending their own interests vis-a-vis the 
landlords within the framework of feudal relations of production. But one 
should notice that the peasants did not possess a sufficiently developed 
class-consciousness to have a full understanding of the feudal social 
formation. This is the main reason why, they did not go further and 
attack the property relations of their social formations: they did not 
demand the strengthening, consolidation and expansion of small-farming.
However, in conclusion, it seems that the struggles during these two 
decades brought about positive as well as negative consequences for the 
peasantry. In other words, the possible outcome of the peasant nerolts wied from 
place to place and there is some evidence of changes in the relationship 
between landlord and peasant. Thus, Black wrote in 1948 (two years after 
1945-46 revolts) that the peasant ., in addition to his farming, was bound 
to perform some work for the landlord (i.e. labour-service). 'He may be 
paid wages for those tasks (building and the like) or the work may be 
considered merely as a part of the whole village economic organization and 
not entitled to additional wages. In recent years more landlords have 
begun to pay for these extra services, primarily because there has been a 
tendency for peasants to leave the villages for the urban centres.'^
22
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Lambton wrote in 1953 'in Azarbaijan a number of dues were, and to
a lesser extent still are, levied per plough-land or per share of water
and 'A poll tax was formerly levied in most areas. It has now largely
25died out, but is still found in Azarbaijan.' All these obligations were 
abolished due to the peasant uprisings. However after the suppression of 
the democratic movement in this region, many of these obligations were 
reimposed once again.
The same author gives an example which shows clearly how the revolt
on the part of the peasantry forced the landlord to reduce the rent. Thus
'formerly in the neighbourhood of Rafsanjan the division (of crop) was 75%
to the landowner, except for straw, which was nisfi i.e. half going to
either party. About the year 1946, when agitation by the Tudeh Party was
26active the landowner’s share in many villages was reduced to 70%'.
Finally, in Kurdistan, which as shown above, witnessed many peasant
revolts during 1952, peasants had demanded, among other things, the
abolition of labour service. However the peasants of Doshan (near
Sanandaj) had no success: i.e. tributes and labour service were in effect
27up to 1964, to be removed only in the first stage of L-R.
There are many other examples of the negative or positive effects of
the peasant revolts on the relationship between landlords and peasants.
In general, the pressure on the part of the democratic movement and the
development of capitalist forms of production«in rural Iran resulted in
the disappearance of a gritat many duties and requirements, and those which
28remained diminished remarkably throughout the country.
Thus in this chapter we surveyed the peasant movements during 1940-1960, 
In some cases, the peasants opposed the feudal landlords within the dominant 
social relationships and therefore did not try to curtail the feudal 
relations of production. But in some other cases, the peasants opposed 
their landlords and tried to remove the dominant forms of exploitation. 
However, all these movements were suppressed, though in some cases the 
peasants managed to reduce the amount of rent and obligations.
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CHAPTER VI
The Landowning Class
Having discussed the relations of production and the forms of 
exploitation, in this section we will analyse the class of non-producers, 
to which the direct-producers were subordinated. First, we shall try to 
distinguish different groups of non-producers, and then examine the forms 
of social connection between the producers and non-producers. By the 
latter we mean the forms of administering the production process and as 
we shall see, there was in fact a hierarchy of non-producers above the 
direct-producers.
As stated earlier, around 83% of the cultivated lands belonged to the 
big landowners including the State, Royal family, holy shrines and 
absentee landlords. Many of these lands were run either by bailiffs 
(jnubaehiry or by sub-renting. Thus the majority of peasants, in rural 
Iran, were subsumed to the owners of land (and water) through the mediation 
of agents of the latter. In order to explain this relationship, we 
classify the landowning class into three different groups, i.e. State (and 
Royal family), religious institutions and private landlords, starting with 
sub-renting of the State lands. However, before explaining these forms 
of mediated renting systems, one should notice that any form, of 
mediation by a third party , does not make any difference to the nature of 
the feudal or semi-feudal exploitative relationship between the peasants 
and landowning classes.
1) The State Lands
According to the 1956 Census, the State owned around 10% of the total
lands of the country.1 These lands were run in different regions in
various ways, according to the local land tenure system. There were three
2forms of practice in the public domain. The first form was to rent out
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the land to a middleman for a period of three to five years. This form
of sub-renting had a ruinous effect on the village economy, because, the
leaseholder did not have any interest in the development of the village
economy, and tried to exhaust the peasants during this period of time.
The second form was some sort of one-year rent i.e. the middleman, or
leaseholder obtained permission to collect the State's share. But in the
third form, the State had direct participation, i.e. one of the officials
3
collected the rent on behalf of the government. It appears that the 
first form was dominant.
As far as the management of the State lands was concerned, these
lands were poorly managed relatively to the lands which belonged to the 
4landlords. No one knew how much land belonged to the State, who was 
occupying it, what, if anything, was being paid for its use or how it was 
being used. Considerable rent was collected from the peasants, but in 
some cases little or none was paid to the State.^
The most important concentration of public domains was to be found 
in Sistan. Tor whatever historical reasons, most of the lands in this 
region belonged to the State. The lands in this region were mainly 
rented out to local influential people, including Khanst Sardars and 
KxModas (village headman). Around 172 villages existed, in this 
province, which were rented by 120 persons. The majority of these 
leaseholders had no business other than renting State lands, and this 
they had been doing generation after generation.7 The social condition 
of producers who worked the Public Domain lands was very bad; ’their 
relations of production are those of landlord and peasant, and they are 
compelled to turn over two-fifths of their produce to the Public Domain
Administration. Although...... they used to migrate to find work,
because of the possibility that their land will soon be ceded to them,
they are unable to make the journey and must remain in the village
. • «8waiting.
The second most important province that the Public Domain lands were
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situated in was Khuzistan. State ownership originated mainly in the 
confiscations of the previous general-governor of this province in the 
1920s. However, during the 1940s and 1950s, the relationship between the 
State and peasantry was mediated by the heads of local tribes, Sheikha and. 
Khans. In fact, they were the main beneficiaries of State lands in this 
province.
Why did heads of tribes perform this mediating role? As in many
other pre-capitalist formation, the direct-producers in this province were
subordinated to the local khans and sheikhs other than by economic
mechanisms. In effect, this form of subordination had enabled the latter
to obtain a portion of the produce of the direct-producers. However, the
local sheikhs and khans in 1949 took one step farther and in some villages
such as Wayce, they obtained permission from the State by initiating
9
irrigation companies, to instal water-pumps over the Karun river. These 
companies had two forms of farmings share-cropping and employing 
agricultural workers and machinery. In the latter cases, we are faced 
with a form of capitalist farming, i.e. some companies (as capitalist 
farmers) which have rented land from the landlord (the State), employ 
wage-labour. Here, a portion of surplus-value goes to the State, as 
landlord, which has the monopoly ownership of lands while another portion 
goes to the companies in return for their investment. E.g. the irrigation 
company directly cultivated 3200 has. of the irrigated lands in Wayce.10 
But in the former case, the share-croppers were of two types (in Wayce, 
one of the villages studied by the R.G.): those who rented land and water 
from the companies and paid one-third of the winter crop and one-half of 
the summer crop as share to the companies; and secondly, those who 
obtained ploughs and seeds as well as land and water from the companies 
and paid one-half of the winter crop to them.11 Here, the mediator (the 
company) claims a portion of the produce, partially for its investment 
(water pump as well as ploughs and seeds) and partially for its (share 
holders') dominance over the direct-producers. There is no need to say
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anything about the companies’ claim to a portion of the produce as far
as it concerned their investment. However, the following throws some
light on the non-economic subordination of the direct-producers to the
local sheikhs and khans (i.e. the share holders of companies): These
influential men 'either rent the farmlands directly from the Public Domains
Dept, and put them at the disposal of their -people from whom they collect
shares as landlords dot or they get a share from those who have obtained12lands from the Public Domains Dept, for cultivation. '
2. Vaqf Lands (
These lands, bequeathed to such bodies as the religious groups, 
mosques, shrines and religious schools by religious believers were called 
Vaqf lands. The largest concentration was to be found in Khorasan, 
where numerous villages and other properties were endowed to the shrine of 
Imam Reza. However, in almost all other parts of the country vaqf lands 
existed. According to an official estimate, there were around 600013>villages endowed to the holy shrines. The office of administration of
some of the most important vaqf properties, such as the properties of
Imam Reza in Khorasan, Sipahsalar and the Shah Cheraq mosques in Tehran,
were vested in the reigning monarch. These properties were exempted from
tax, because the income of the monarch was not taxable. The other Vaqf
14lands paid tax m  the same way as other landed properties do. The 
administration of all vaqf properties was undertaken by the Ministry of 
Education which collected revenues through its provincial departments^
These revenues were divided by law as fbllows: 25% for repair of land and 
irrigation works, 10% to the manager, 5% reserve fund, 9% to the
Education office for administrative costs, and 46% for the declared
_  ^ 15purpose of the trust.
Generally speaking, there are two types of endowments: 
a) Private endowments, whose revenues are collected to be used by certain
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individuals such as sons or daughters, or Other relatives. These 
properties refer to the lands endowed, therefore, for the personal benefit 
of the benefactor's successors.
b) Public endowments, whose revenues are collected for public charities 
rather than for particular individuals. They, therefore, refer to the 
properties endowed for the public charities.
According to the Islamic Law each vaqf must have an administrator.
In the case of having no administrator, in Iran, the judge appoints someone 
as administrator. This administrator (mutavalli) could be anyone including 
the donor himself, the tenant and or a third party. According to article 
75 of Civil Code, 'the settlor can designate himself during his lifetime 
or for a stipulated period as the mutavalli, or we can appoint another 
person as mutavalli to act as administrator jointly with himself, or 
appoint a person or persons to act as administrators severally or jointly.
He can stipulate that he himself or the mutavalli, whom he has designated 
shall appoint the (succeeding) mutavalli or make any other conditions, 
which he considers fit.'*^
On the other hand, vaqf lands in most cases are rented out to some 
other person, rather than being administered by the government and/or by 
the organization pertinent to vaqf properties. The lessee, in this case, 
pays a fixed sum to the State or the foundation and pockets the rest.
The latter person could be anyone including wealthy landlords, mutavalli 
(administrator) and/or the donor. This state of affairs has enabled the 
donor, in the case of private endowments, to become the mutavalli/tenant 
of the property endowed by him; whereas in the case of public endowments, 
the landlords as well as mutavalli have been enabled to lease those 
properties in lieu of the payment of fixed sums to the vaqf organization.
As far as it concerned the latter case the land leased to wealthy 
individuals might have been subleased to tenants or directly cultivated 
by themselves.^ However, 'the general tendency is for vaqf property to
be let on terms advantageous to the lessee; this is especially the case
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when the lessee is the mutavalli himself. There are many instances of
18lessees of vaqp property who have succeeded in making large profits.'
This form of administration of vaqf lands i.e. leasing and sub-renting, 
especially in cases where they were leased for a short term, resulted in 
disaster for some of the properties, because the lessee had no interest 
in the long term improvement of the property. For example, Lambton 
records a visit to a village in the south of Tehran in 1945: 'the garden 
of which had been allowed to fall into complete disorder, though it had 
formally been in production. The reason alleged for this was that the 
lease had come to an end: the Dept, of Ouqaf wanted to raise the rent, 
but the lessee was not prepared to accept the new figure and, being
19uncertain of this tenure, had allowed the garden to fall into decay.'
That is why vaqf lands were managed worse than other forms of landholdings,
20i.e. those of State and private landlords.
The above discussion reveals the distribution of surplus exacted from 
the direct-producers in Vaqf lands, between the non-producers including 
vaqf administration as the landlords and the mediator (mutavalli /sub­
lessee) . As far as relations between non-producers and peasants were 
concerned, the share-cropping system was the dominant form of exactracdon of 
surplus in the vaqf estates throughout the country. Subordination of the 
direct-producers to the non-producers was further reinforced by religious 
belief.
3) Subrenting the Private Lands and the Social Relationship Between 
the Landlords and Peasants
According to 1956 Census, private landholdings constituted around2176% of the total lands. This includes the small landowners as well 
as absentee landlords. However, the latter had absolute dominance in 
the ownership of land. Thus the "power of appropriation" of the produce 
of 57% of the total villages was vested in 400 to 450 landlord families. 
This high concentration of landownership in the hands of a few landlords
raises the following questions:Who were these absentee landlords? and 
how did these landlords administer their villages?
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The absentee landlords were mainly in important government and
military posts, parliament and to .a lesser extent private commercial jobs.
These landlords often supervised their estates in absentia through bailiffs
and village headmen (kadkhoda), meanwhile spending most of the time in 
22Tehran or abroad. As regards relations between the direct-producers
and big landlords, there was a wide gulf between landlords and direct-
producers, and no co-operation or feeling of being engaged in a mutual
23enterprise existed. An absentee landlord might have a residence that
he occupied part of the time in his village. However, he had a residence
in one of the larger cities where he spent most of his time. In some
cases the landlords never visited their own villages in their life-time,
whereas in some other cases, they actually visited their villages once or 
24twice a year.
In some extreme, but not rare cases, the landlords did not have any 
idea about their subjects: ’In Khuzistan when a landlord was asked how 
many farmers were cultivating his land, his answer was invariably in terms 
of the middle-men to whom he contracted parts of his hectarage. The 
landowner or operator, and this includes operators of government lands, 
knew his "labour contractors" but had no idea how many families each 
contractor had placed on the land, nor did he know what the wages or 
living conditions of these families were.' On the other hand, the 
direct-producer in some cases had never seen their landlords: 'Time 
after time during the course of this survey when the subject of ownership 
was approached in absentee landlord-owned villages, one or more of the 
villagers would say: "I've lived here all my life (or so many years) and 
I've never seen our landlord. He doesn't know we exist." At the 
village of Mamadel, seven kilometers north of Miandoab, we again heard the 
same story. "We have never seen our landlord", the people said. "His 
son came here the year after a flood when one of the C[ocnat8 was ruined
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and stayed about an hour, but we have never heard whether the qanat wi n  
be repaired."
This absence of landlords in the vast majority of villages obviously 
directed them to administer their land through some other agents, i.e. 
bailiffs, village-headmen and/or lessees. Any two of these functions 
might have been vested in one person, e.g. a bailiff could have been 
lessee or village headman. So, the relationship between an absentee 
landlord and a direct-producer was interposed by a third party. Obviously, 
the function which this agent could have performed depended upon the social 
conditions of the landlords. For example, in some cases the landlords 
preferred to free themselves from the trouble of administering their 
villages and only collected their dues. They therefore rented their 
estates out to a third party. In some other cases, the landlord had 
preferred to keep control over their properties, and therefore they 
employed bailiffs. , According to the 1960 Census, the latter case
was the dominant form of administration of the estates, whereas subleasing 
was the least favoured way of administration. Direct contact with the 
producers, i.e. the case of non-existence of any interposed agent, had a 
place somewhere in between the above cases. Table X illustrates this 
point.
This social relationship might have been interposed by more than one 
agent. That is, in the cases in which a landlord owned many villages in 
a given area, he appointed an agent as a bailiff for all of these villages, 
who in turn appointed some others (such as village headman) at the 
village level to run affairs.
As far as peasants were concerned, the hierarchy of non-producers 
made their conditions of life worse: 'where the landowner is an absentee 
his affairs are entrusted to a bailiff who often practices extortion on 
the peasants. The reasons for this are many. On the one hand, the 
bailiff is tempted to feather his own nest. That he is often able to do 
so is shown by the frequency with which bailiffs become themselves petty
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Administration of Private Estates
TABLE X
Size of Estate Direct
Control
Estates each of which 
is a village 22.2
Estates each of which is 
i and under 1 village 23.6
Estates each of which is 
1/12 and under i village 35.1
Source: 1960 Census
Through
Agent
Sub-
Leasing Z
Total
65.9 11.9 100 185
63.3 13.1 100 • A 14
53.3 11.6 100 2315
landownersf.. On the other hand, where the bailiff watches closely over 
the interests of his masters, there is a tendency to consider him, ..., a 
hard task master. Clearly, moreover, since in such a case his main 
concern is to raise the income of his master and thereby render his 
services the more valuable, he is reluctant to make concessions which the 
owner of the land himself might make. Nor has he the same permanent 
interest in the land as the owner.'22
Thus in this chapter, we explained that the owners of land and water 
included the State, the Vaqf Organization, the Royal family and private 
landlords. They ran their estates through bailiffs/village headmen, 
though sub-renting the estates was not uncommon. This created a hierarchy 
of non-producers which extracted surplus from the peasants. However, the 
latter established very complicated relationships among themselves which 
will be analysed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VII
Relations of Production Among the Peasantry
The first set of relations of production i.e. the relationship 
between the peasants and feudal landlords, has been examined in the first 
five chapters. In this chapter, we are concerned with relations of 
production among the peasants.
It has already been stated that relations of production encompass 
three aspects, property relations^ labour relatione and distribution 
relations. In this section, an attempt is to be made to study these 
three aspects of the peasant-peasant relationship.
The Property Relations of the Peasantry
As we have already argued, in the FMP, the direct-producer owns all 
conditions of production but land (and water). He is raised to the 
position of possession of land by the landlord in order to enable the 
latter to dispose a portion of produce produced by the direct-producer.
In the first section for the sake of simplicity, we assumed that 
first, all direct-producers were in a position of possession of land (and 
water), i.e. they were nasaq-holders; and secondly that they owned means 
of production. We assumed these two conditions because we wanted to 
show the semi-feudal relationship between the feudal-landlord and direct- 
producer . However, here an attempt is to be made to show that, a) all 
direct-producers were not necessarily rcasaq-holders at the same time; and 
b) some of them had already been separated from all other means of 
production.
In order to discuss possession/ownership on the part of the direct- 
producers, one may make a distinction between those means of production 
(land and water) which were owned by the landlord but possessed by the 
direct-producer, and those means of production which virtually belonged to
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the direct-producers. On the basis of this classification, we shall 
review the relations of direct-producers to both of these groups of means 
of production. At the same time, these means of production will be 
described. This description will give an idea of the level of development 
of the relations and forces of production in rural Iran during these two 
decades.
Possession of Land: the question of nasaq-holding
In the first section, we mentioned the direct producer and/or nasaq- 
-holder. By doing this, we firstly did not take into account other 
agents of production which were not involved in agricultural production 
(e.g. blacksmiths); secondly we assumed that all agricultural direct- 
producers were in the position of possession of land; and finally we 
ignored the differences between different agents who had naeaq. However, 
an attempt is to be made in this section to make a distinction between 
different agents of production in relation to land and then to the other 
means of production. Thus, as far as the agents of production in 
relation to the land are concerned, we distinguish only two groups of 
agents, those who were involved in agricultural production as the main 
source of their income; and those who were indirectly connected with 
agricultural production.
Table XI illustrates the population in rural Iran according to 
their ages and occupations. It also shows the percentage of the 
economically active population in 1960. As one can see, around half of 
the population were active. Table XI shows the occupations which these 
active agents of production had by age. It is evident from the table 
that a high percentage of the active rural population in different 
categories were only engaged in agriculture, a minority in non-agricultural 
activity and a tiny percentage in agricultural and non-agricultural
occupations.
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With regard to the agricultural producers, 68% of the total active 
population, how they were related to the land? Did they all have the 
right in use of land? And finally, did they possess equal sizes of plots 
of land? It seems that there were three alternative ways in which direct 
producers could be related to the land in the process of production in 
the Iranian rural social formation. They included: being in the position 
of ownership of the land, being in the position of possession of land, and 
finally working on the land as a wage-labourer (not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, as we shall show). The existence of these alternatives, in 
effect, stems from the fact that, in the Iranian rural social formation 
there existed an articulated combination of at least three different modes 
of production, i.e. FMP, CMP, and also simple commodity production. We 
have already explained this point in the previous section. However, here 
one can see the effect of this articulation on the structure of landholding 
in rural Iran. Table XII shows the structure of land holding (possession/ 
ownership) on the eve of the implementation of L-R. There were, in fact, 
four forms of operating the holdings, i.e. share-cropping (possession), 
fixed-rent (so-called capitalist ground rent), owner-operator, and finally 
a mixture of any two or three of these forms. The latter category 
constituted 10.6% of total holdings (and 11.1% of total area). In this 
sense it had less significance than the other categories. But on the other 
hand, this category is interesting in the sense that the agents of production 
were related to the means of production and therefore other agents of 
production, by more than one set of relations of production. For example, 
an agent, who owned a plot of land and at the same time was a share-cropper 
in another plot, was related to the land as an owner and possessor 
simultaneously, and so on. In this category, in short, we have an 
articulation of different modes of production. Apart from this category 
which had the least share of the total holdings, the shares of the other 
categories, i.e. possession, fixed-rent and ownership, in the total holdings
TABLE XII
Number and Area of Holdings by Types of Operating
Size of Holding Total
Share-
Cropping
Owner-
Operator
Fixed Rent
A Mixture of 
Two or More 
of These Types
No.* Area^ No.* Area^ No.* Area^ No.* Area^ No.* Area^
Holdings under 0.5 ha. 313 69 60 15 179 36 52 12 22 6
Holdings 0.5 ha. and under 1 179 130 43 32 79 57 34 24 23 66
Holdings 1 ha. and under 2 256 372 83 122 89 128 55 79 29 43
Holdings 2 ha. and under 3 209 512 87 216 66 161 35 84 21 51
Holdings 3 ha. and under 4 144 501 72 251 40 139 14 46 18 65
Holdings 4 ha. and under 5 122 541 61 275 32 141 14 62 15 63
Holdings 5 ha. and under 10 340 2,413 202 1,447 77 541 17 115 44 310
Holdings 10 ha. and under 20 224 3,054 148 2,037 41 561 10 129 25 317
Holdings 20 ha. and under 50 78 2,209 51 1,428 16 479 3 71 8 331
Holdings 50 ha. and under 100 8 564 5 310 2 166 0.4 29 0.6 59
Holdings 100 ha. and under 500 4 684 0.6 87 2 386 11 185 1.4 26
Holdings 500 ha. and over 0.3 307 .003 1.0 0.2 179 - 1 - 126
* Thousand t Thousand hectares
Source: 1960 Census. 108
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were 43.3 (54.7% of total area), 12.5% (7.5% of total area) and 33.2%
(26.2% of total area) respectively. The table, therefore, verifies the 
relative significance of each one of these categories at the national level.
In order to analyse the differentiation of the peasantry in rural Iran, 
for the time being, we will consider only land holding. ' Since
the relationship between land and the agents of production, as a relation 
of production, took three different forms, we will, therefore, study 
differentiation of the peasantry within each one of the forms of this 
relation of production.
According to the 1960 Census (Table 323), 776700 out of the total of 
3218460 households (i.e. 24.1%) were considered as landless households.
But due to the fact that the category of landless embraces different 
agents of production (including non-agricultural producers other than 
cattle breeders) this group cannot be considered as the rural proletariat. 
The holdings possessed by the nasaq-holders varied greatly from under 0.5 
ha. to over 500 has. (see Table XII). Table XII shows the number and the 
area of the plots by size of the holding. In order to make the position 
of each class of holdings more clear on the basis of Table XII, we have 
computed Table XIII. The latter shows the share of each class of 
holdings as a percentage of the total holdings of the same category. As 
can be seen in this table over 12% of the nasaq-holders possessed only 0.7% 
of the total area under the share-cropping system. The next set of 
holders were slightly better off in terms of possession. That is, 29.8% 
of those who possessed plots varying from 1 to 4 has., held 9.5% of the 
total area under share cropping system. However, another set of nasaq- 
holders, i.e. those who possessed plots between 5 and 50 has., were much 
better off than the other groups. These nasaq-holders who constituted 
almost 50% of the plots, occupied nearly 80% of the area under the share- 
cropping system.
With regard to the direct-producers who were under the fixed-rent 
system, the differentiation was more or less the same. The second column
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of Table XIII illustrates this point. At the bottom there existed the 
poor peasants. They constituted around 27% of the total holdings and 
occupied only 13.7% of the area under this rental system. They can be 
considered the poorest stratum of the peasantry, due to the fact that 
their farms never yielded enough for subsistence,. Hence, all other 
conditions remaining the same, the peasants in this group were bound to 
seek some other sources of income, including lending their draught animals, 
and selling their labour power (this is a factor to be analysed when we 
take into account the ownership of some other means of production). The 
next stratum of the peasantry in this category seems to be better off than 
the previous group. This stratum of peasants, who rented plots between 
2 to 5 has., constituted around 26% of the total holdings and occupied 
22.3% of the area under the fixed rent system. With regard to the direct- 
producers of this stratum in the Caspian sea littoral, the main centre of 
the fixed-rent system, one can say that they were more or less able to 
obtain their livelihood from agriculture. This is because in this region, 
a 2 has. plot of land can provide the livelihood for a family of six. So, 
all other conditions remaining the same, one may say that the peasants in 
this stratum did not need to seek some other job.
The direct-producers/leaseholders who held holdings between 5 to 20 
has. were much better off than the previous strata. They constituted 
11.4% of the total leaseholders and occupied 28.9% of the area in this 
rental system. Finally, this stratum embraced the capitalist farmers. 
They leased 34.4% of the total area, while in terms of the number of 
holdings they possessed a tiny percentage of the total holdings, i.e.
1.9%. There are three reasons why this stratum of leaseholders can be 
considered as capitalist farmers, First, as has already been explained, 
the leaseholders in the fixed-rent system were not, in the real sense, 
subject to feudal subordination; secondly, the produce of a plot of 20-500 
has. is much more than the livelihood of a family, hence the produce was
TABLE XIII
Number and Area of Holdings (percentage)
Possession Fixed Rent Ownership Average No
No. Area No. Area No. Area of Parcels
Holdings under 0.5 ha. 7.4 0.2 22.3 1.4 28.8 1.2 2.5
Holdings 0.5 and under 1 ha. 5.3 0.5 1.4 2.9 12.6 1.9 3.7
Holdings 1 and under 2 has. 10.2 1.9 3.5 9.4 14.3 4.3 4.2
Holdings 2 and under 3 has. 10.7 3.5 15.0 10.0 10.6 5.5 4.6
Holdings 3 and under 4 has. 8.9 4.1 5.8 5.5 7.3 4.7 5.6
Holdings 4 and under 5 has. 7.6 4.5 5.9 7.3 5.1 4.8 6.2
Holdings 5 and under 10 has. 24.7 23.2 7.2 13.6 12.3 18.2 7.8
Holdings 10 and under 20 has. 18.3 32.8 4.2 15.3 6.6 18.9 10.8
Holdings 20 and under 50 has. 6.2 22.9 1.3 9.1 2.5 16.1 13.3
Holdings 50 and under 100 has. 0.5 5.0 0.2 3.4 0.4 5.6 15.9
Holdings 100 and under 500 has. 0.07 1.4 0.4 21.9 0.3 13.0 24.3
Holdings 500 and over - - - 0.4 - 6.0 26.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 6.0
Source Table XII
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for the market; and thirdly, a farm of this size cannot be exploited without 
employing wage-labourers at least for part of the year.
The differentiation of the owners of land was greater than in the 
other two categories (see column 3 of Table XIII). At the bottom, there 
existed a high percentage of owner/producers who owned plots 
under 3 has. That is, over 66% of the owners owned less than 13% of 
the total lands owned by all owner/operators. There is no doubt that the 
owner/operators in this stratum were unable to obtain their livelihood from 
the land that belonged to them. This argument holds good especially in 
the central areas of the country, where there exists a shortage of water 
and the land must be left fallow regularly. The next stratum of the
owners comprised those who owned 5 to 50 has. of land. Although they 
constituted around 20% of the owner/operators, they owned over 53% of the 
total land owned by this category. These can be considered as capitalist 
farmers who controlled the process of production directly. Finally the 
last stratum of owners comprised those owner/operators whose holdings were 
over 50 hectares. They constituted less than one percent of the total 
holdings and owned over 24% of the lands operated by the owners.
The above argument and tables provide us with an illustration of the 
differentiation of the peasantry in rural Iran before L-R. However, the 
foregoing does not show the relations of production among the peasants.
With regard to the small landholders (owner/operators as well as possessors), 
one may only state that the high percentage of small landholders indicates 
the existence of semi-proletarian peasants in this social formation. Such 
landholders were unable to obtain a livelihood from agriculture alone, 
they had to work for wages as well. On the other hand, with regard to the 
large landholdings (owners and leaseholders in the fixed-rent category), 
one may also state that, they were capitalist farmers who employed wage- 
labourers to produce cash crops for the market. We shall . consider 
other factors such as the ownership of other means of production and the 
labour process in order to establish more about relations of production and
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differentiation of the peasantry.
The means of production in rural Iran were composed of primitive tools 
including different varieties of spades, simple plough, harrows, scythes 
(or sickles) and wooden threshing devices. Tractors were introduced to 
a limited extent. The main sources of power, therefore, were animals 
and human beings. Ploughing, harrowing, threshing and pounding the 
grain were mainly performed with the help of animals. The draught animal 
was the most important and valuable element of the means of production.
That is why its owner always collected a portion of the produce for his 
ownership; whereas the ownership of other means of production such as 
scythes, harrows and so on did not have such an influence on the distribution 
of produce. Hence we shall only consider the ownership of draught animals.
Draught animals were mainly employed as sources of power. However, 
there were two other sources of power, human power and tractors both of 
which were less important than draught animals. Table XIV shows the share 
of each one of these sources by size of holding. As Table XIV indicates, 
human power was the main source of power in small holdings, especially 
holdings under 0.5 hectare. This was because it was not really economical 
to use any other source. For example, Atai states that, in all sample 
villages in Isfahan province, when the farmers were asked why they used 
their own labour as the source of power, the answer was generally the 
same: ’With the limited area of land we have at our disposal, it does not 
pay to keep oxen. Besides, it is extremely difficult to plough a small 
piece of land with oxen, what money we have we use on ourselves instead of 
using oxen.'* In other cases, it may have been impossible, from-a 
technical point of view, to use any other source of power. For example, 
cultivation of some luxury vegetables which involves intensive care in a 
small piece of land, renders the use of any tools other than simple ones 
activated by the farmer's labour power impossible.
In the majority of holdings, i.e. holdings over 0.5 ha. up to 100 has., 
animal power was the main source of power. The use of this source
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increases with the increase in the size of holdings i.e. it increases from 
66.3% in the holdings between 0.5 and 1 ha. and reaches to 88.3% in 
holdings between 5 and 10 has. However, after this point the share of 
animal power decreases as the size of holdings increases. Thus only 19% 
of power was supplied by animals in the largest holdings, 500 has. and 
over. On the other hand the main source of power in the latter holdings 
was machinery. As Table XIV indicates mechanical power was used in 
almost all holdings of different sizes, but only in the largest farms was 
it the main source of power.
Table XIV indicates the significant role which draught animals played 
in the labour process in rural Iran. Oxen, donkeys, horses, mules and 
also camels were mainly used for agricultural production. In some areas, 
donkeys and mules, and also horses and camels were used for ploughing and 
not for transport. For example, Lambton states, 'In the dry-farming belt 
round Ahvaz and Bandi Qir in Khuzistan, the Arabs use a donkey, mule, horse 
or mare for ploughing. In Bandi Qir donkeys are most commonly used...
In certain parts of Fars mules are used as draught animals, but mainly on 
unirrigated land. Buffaloes are also used in various areas including the 
northern littoral of the Persian Gulf, Miandoab in Azarbaijan, and Mahabad 
in Kurdistan... In some areas in Baluchistan the camel is used as a 
draught animal.' But these animals were mainly used for transportation, 
despite the fact that in later years they were replaced by trucks for long 
distances: 'Farmers, weavers and labourers use them (donkeys) for short 
distance hauling and transportation. Larger transport animals (camels, 
horses and mules) have to a great extent been replaced by trucks.
Donkeys carry fertilizers, tools, and seed to the fields in the sowing 
season and haul grain and straw back to the village at harvest time. 
Donkeys are important to maintain dwellers, because no roads exist in that 
region; they haul brush, charcoal, wool, and produce to the plains and 
carry tea, sugar, cloth and other essentials back.'3 However, generally 
speaking, in the functions pertinent to the labour—process oxen played a
TABLE XIV
Use and Sources of Power on Agricultural Holdings by Size of Holding (Percentage)
Ho. of
No. of Holdings Reporting Use of:
Size of Holdings Animal Mechanical Mechanical & Human
Holdings Power only Power only Animal Power Power only
All Holdings 100 74.9 3.7 5.9 15.5
Holdings under 0.5 ha. 100 38.7 0.5 0.5 60.3
Holdings 0.5 & under 1 ha. 100 66.3 3.7 2.0 28.0
Holdings 1 & under 2 has. 100 77.7 5.9 3.7 12.7
Holdings 2 & under 3 has. 100 85.7 4.7 6.0 3.6
Holdings 3 & under 4 has. 100 85.8 4.2 6.8 3.2
Holdings 4 & under 5 has. 100 86.0 5.0 7.0 2.0
Holdings 5 & under 10 has. 100 88.3 2.9 8.0 0.8
Holdings 10 & under 20 has. 100 86.1 4.3 8.9 0.7
Holdings 20 & under 50 has. 100 75.1 5.6 19.0 0.3
Holdings 50 & under 100 has. 100 71.6 4.2 24.2 -
Holdings 100 & under 500 has. 100 36.7 33.7 29.6 -
Holdings 500 and over
Source: 1960 Census, Table 129.
100 19.0 43.0 38.0
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more important role than all other animals: i.e. out of 2166515 animals, 
1860618 were oxen (see Table XV).
Table XV verifies the ownership of draught animals by size of 
holding in 1960. The first point to be noticed in this table is the high 
percentage of the owner/possessors (i.e. on average 48%) who owned no 
draught animals. However, the percentages of non-owners varies by size 
of holding: and as the table illustrates, the percentage of non-owners 
increases as the size of holdings decreases. That is to say, only 2.2% 
of households with no land, 18.8% of direct-producers holding under 0.5 ha., 
and 40.3% of direct-producers holding between 0.5 and 1 ha. owned any 
draught animals. On the other hand, 82.8% of direct-producers
holding 4 to 5 has., 87.8% of those holding 5 to 10 has., and 92% of those 
holding 10 to 20 has., owned draught animals. The high'percentage of 
owner/possessors with no animals indicates the following two points: a 
vast market for the hiring of draught animals, and the differentiation of 
the peasantry in relation to the ownership of draught animals and the 
possession of land.
Secondly, with regard to the owners of draught animals, Table XV does 
not illustrate the differences existing in the ownership of these animals 
for different groups of holdings. In order to make this point clear, we 
have computed the average ownership of different draught animals for each 
holding in the different groups. Table XVI illustrates the average 
ownership of different draught animals by size of holding. As one can 
see, the average ownership of draught animals differs in different size 
categories of holding. To analyse this point, we take into account only 
the ownership of oxen, since oxen constituted around 86% of the total 
number of draught animals in Iran in 1960. As Table XVI verifies, the 
trend of the amount of ownership of oxen is surprisingly even in all 
holdings; as the size of holdings increases the average mni»er of oxen 
owned by the owner/possessors also increases. However, there are two
TABLE XV
Number of Draught Animals by Size of Holding (Thousands)
Size of Holding No. of Holdings
No. of 
Oxen
No. of 
Buffaloes
No. of 
Asses Others
Holdings without land 508 13 0.2 0.4 -
Holdings under 0.5 ha 313 56 0.2 9.1 0.1
Holdings 0.5 ha. and under 1 179 76 - 12.9 0.6
Holdings 1 ha. and under 2 256 174 1.0 22.7 3.3
Holdings 2 ha. and under 3 208 175 1.2 26.6 4.9
Holdings 3 ha. and under A 144 152 2.1 21.2 4.4
Holdings 4 ha. and under 5 122 135 3.1 20.7 5.1
Holdings 5 ha. and under 10 340 145 13.2 42.0 11.7
Holdings 10 ha. and under 20 224 402 16.3 32.8 13.4
Holdings 20 ha. and under 50 78 170 4.2 13.3 7.3
Holdings 50 ha. and under 100 8 31 4.8 3.7 2.9
Holdings 100 ha. and under 500 9 17 0.7 0.9 0.8
Holdings 500 ha. and over 0.3 3 0.7 - 0.2
Source: 1960 Census, Table 125.
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TABLE XVI
Average Ownership and Percentage of Borrowing of Draught Animals 1960
Oxen Buffaloes Asses Other
Animals
Percentage
Borrowing
% of Holdings 
Owned Draught 
Animals
Holdings without land 0.02 - - - - 2.2
Holdings under 0.5 ha. 0.17 - 0.29 - 29.9 18.8
Holdings 0.5 ha. to 1 ha. 0.42 - 0.07 - 47.7 40.3
Holdings 1 ha. to 2 ha. 0.67 - 0.09 0.01 51.0 57.7
Holdings 2 ha. to 3 ha. 0.84 - 0.13 0.02 52.4 70.7
Holdings 3 ha. to 4 ha. 1.06 0.01 0.14 0.03 49.1 80.1
Holdings 4 ha. to 5 ha. 1.11 0.02 0.17 0.04 44.7 82.8
Holdings 5 ha. to 10 ha. 1.31 0.04 0.12 0.03 36.3 87.9
Holdings 10 ha. to 20 ha. 1.79 0.07 0.15 0.06 21.0 92.1
Holdings 20 ha. to 50 ha. 2.31 0.04 0.17 0.09 23.3 88.5
Holdings 50 ha. to 100 ha. 3.73 0.15 0.44 0.35 29.5 88.9
Holdings 100 ha. to 500 ha. 4.52 0.20 0.24 0.23 14.8 58.7
Holdings 500 ha and over 8.59 2.37 - 0.83 21.5 47.5
Source: 1960 Census Table 125.
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points to be made on the first and last categories. With regard to 
holdings of over 500 hectares, the high average ownership by the capitalist 
farmers^ was due to the fact that they were engaged in fanning as well as 
cattle breeding. In other words, their cattle were not raised to be 
used mainly in the labour-process of farming. This is because animals 
supplied only 19% of the power required by these holdings, whereas 
machinery supplied 43.0% (see Table XIV).
With regard to holders without land, one should notice that this 
category comprised piggeries, poultry batteries, city dairies with live­
stock • kept by nomadic tribes, and apiaries. According to the 1960 
Census, only 2% of these holdings kept oxen, and on average each one of them 
owned 0.02 oxen (see Table XVI). The main business of these oxen owners was 
to rent out their animals in lieu of a portion of produce. For example, 
in Kirman province ’cattle renters are found in the larger centres (e.g. 
Mahan and Jupar), who rent out animals at lower rates than an ordinary 
farmer would. These men own cattle of various ages and strengths and 
constantly buy and sell, and exchange animals for profit.'^ 'In Sistan 
oxen are let out by the cattle breeders for ploughing, a payment being made 
at harvest time at the rate of one mann per manni zabol of seed sown, one 
pair of oxen sowing 4-7 manni-zabol per day.'^
Thus, despite the fact that Table XVI has combined ownership with 
possession of land, it illustrates clearly the differentiation of the 
peasantry. That is to say, those who owned/possessed small plots of land, 
owned fewer draught animals than those who owned/possessed larger plots of 
land. However, what reinforced this differentiation, was the renting out 
of draught animals by rich peasants and cattle breeders, to the poor 
peasants. It was one of the commonest aspects of the relationship existing 
among the peasantry of all provinces of Iran (see Table XVI).
This aspect of relations of production has two dimensions: one is the 
formal aspect, while the other is the nature of this relation of production.
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By the latter dimension, we mean whether or not that aspect of 
relationship is exploitative, aid if exploitative, at the level of which 
mode of production? We shall deal with these questions below in a study 
of the labour-process. Here we concentrate on the first dimension of 
this relation of production, i.e. the formal aspect of borrowing/lending 
draught animals in relation to the size of holdings.
Only 29.9% of the owner/possessors of less than 0.5% ha. borrowed 
draught animals in spite of the fact that their average ownership of 
draught animals was the lowest of all the categories holding land (Table 
XVI). The reason for this is to be found in the fact that, the direct- 
producers in this category used mainly their own energy as a source of 
power, and only 38% of them employed draught animals (see Table XIV).
The reason for using human energy as the main source of power was simply 
explained by the direct-producer in all sample villages in Isfahan province 
as follows: 'With the limited area of land we have at our disposal, it 
does not pay to keep oxen. Besides, it is extremely difficult to plough 
a small piece of land with oxen, what money we have we use on ourselves 
instead of buying oxen.'7 There is one further point related to this 
worth noting. That is, the low percentage of borrowing plus the 
relatively low percentage of animal power-use (Table XIV) parallel with a 
low average ownership of oxen (Table XVI) are indicators of an uneven 
distribution of oxen between the members of this category. Hence, one 
may state that in this category there were some producers who did not 
own any draught animals and therefore borrowed them, while others let out 
their animals to other producers in lieu of money or a portion of the 
produce.
Looking at those owner/possessors holding from 0.5 to 5 hectares, the 
main source of power for this group was draught animals (see Table XIV).
The average amount of ownership of oxen by different categories of this 
stratum ranged, from 0.42 to 1.11 oxen per holding. The last column of
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Table XVI shows the percentage of holdings owning any draught animals in 
each category. As the size of allotment increases, the distribution of 
draught animals becomes more even. However, a high percentage of 
ownership accompanied by a relatively high percentage of borrowing by the 
owner/possessors of each category in this stratum, indicates that a good 
deal of them owned insufficient draught animals to plough their allotments. 
It follows also that the owner/possessors of these categories were highly 
integrated within and between each category.
The next group comprised owner/possessors holding between 5 to 100 
hectares. The condition of this group is remarkably different from the 
two previous groups. The production in these holdings relied heavily on 
draught animals as a source of power (see Table XIV). However, the oxen 
were mainly supplied by the owner/possessors themselves, due to the 
following facts: a) the average ownership of oxen by the categories in this 
group is quite high; b) the percentage of holdings owning draught animals 
in this group is much higher than that of all other categories. This 
directed the producers to borrow to a lesser extent than the previous 
mentioned groups (see Table XVI). By a comparison between the ownership 
of oxen and the percentage of borrowing by this group, one may state that 
the owner/possessors of this group, generally speakingt were the lenders 
rather than borrowers of draught animals. This is one of the main 
differences between this group and the previous ones.
Finally, the situation for the last two categories, i.e. owners 
holding 100 hectares and over, is quite different from all other categories. 
The percentage of borrowing by these owners reaches the lowest of all the 
groups. This is for two reasons. First, the average amount of ownership 
of oxen (and also other draught animals) was much higher than the previous 
groups (see Table XVI), and secondly, in any case, these farms were highly 
mechanized. Thus these owners were largely lenders of draught animals. 
However, because of their ownership of the agricultural machinery, the
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owners in these two groups had some connection with the others. Table 
XVII shows the situation of ownership/renting of tractors. As one can 
see, around 80% of the total tractors belonged to the owner/(possessors) 
of the holdings of 10 has. and over. On the other hand, these owner/ 
(possessors) were the main lenders of tractors to almost all holdings of 
various sizes. In short, over 94% of the holdings, which used tractors, 
borrowed tractors from the owner/(possessors) of large holdings 10 has. 
and over.
In conclusion, the direct producers were related to land in three 
different respects, i.e. as possessors, as leaseholders and finally as 
owner/operators. Within each one of these forms, the agents of production 
were differentiated by the size of holdings at their disposal: some of 
these agents were landless peasants, the majority of direct-producers 
possessed/owned small plots of land, while a minority had large holdings 
at its disposal. On the other hand, with regard to the ownership of 
draught animals and tractors, the trend was more or less the same. That 
is to say, the owner/possessors of larger plots owned more draught animals/ 
tractors than those who had smaller plots at their disposal and due to this 
fact, the former managed to lend their oxen/tractors, to a considerable 
extent, to the latter. However, this so-called differentiation does not 
express the nature of the relations of production existing among the 
peasantry. To discover this set of relations of production, it is 
necessary to review the labour-process in the Iranian rural social formation.
The Labour-Process: A Review
In the first section, we explained the labour-processes of the CMP,
FMP and then that of the share-cropping system at the theoretical level.
The explanation of the labour-process in the share-cropping system showed 
why the expropriation of surplus in this system can be considered as a 
transitional form of rent. However, our argument was carried out at the
TABLE XVII
Number of
Size of Holding
Holding under 0.5 ha.
Holding 0.5 ha. and under 1 
Holding 1 ha. and under 2 
Holding 2 ha. and under 3 
Holding 3 ha. and under 4 
Holding 4 ha. and under 5 
Holding 5 ha. and under 10 
Holding 10 ha. and under 20 
Holding 20 ha. and under 50 
Holding 50 ha. and under 100 
Holding 100 ha. and under 500 
Holding 500 and over
Source: 1960 Census, Table 127.
Holdings Using Tractors According to the Ownership
Owned by the
Owned by Owned by the Owned by the Landlord
Holder Government Cooperative or Others
- - - 3,375
- 1,350 - 8,025
- 150 - 24,806
450 300 - 21,704
- - - 15,936
- 300 150 14,237
685 - 450 36,091
1,366 1,200 150 26,805
1,276 - 600 17,254
240 - - 2,157
1,371 - - 1,014
256 — - —
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abstract level for the following reasons: a) means of production and also 
the process of expropriation of nature were not considered; b) the direct- 
producers were taken as a homogeneous social class. Here, therefore, an
attempt will be made to consider these two phenomena in* the labour-process 
of the share-cropping system.
Like any other feudal social formation, the means of production and 
also the method of cultivation were very primitive in Iran. Draught 
animals were the main source of power, tools were very primitive and the 
use of fertilizer was rare. Ploughing in most areas was carried out by a 
traditional iron or wooden nail-plough drawn by an ox: 'the plough-share 
merely scratches the soil and does not invert the furrow slice. In the 
dry-farming belt around Ahvaz and Bandi Qir in Khuzistan the Arabs use a 
donkey, mule, horse or mare for ploughing... The speed at which a mare 
or mule ploughs is considerably greater than that of an ox or donkey.
In certain parts of Fars mules are used as draught animals... Buffaloes 
are also used in various areas including the northern littoral of the 
Persian Gulf, Miandoab in Azabaijan and Mahabad in Kurdistan... In some 
areas in Baluchestan the camel is used as a draught animal.'8 Although the 
animal-drawn plough was generally used in rural Iran, digging by spade was 
not uncommon even in large orchards and in vegetable cultivation. Thus 
the same author states that in some villages in Isfahan and Yazd districts 
the land was being dug by spade. 'It is customary for several men to dig 
together. A long-handled spade is used; above the blade is a wooden 
cross-piece upon which the man who wields it places his foot, and drives 
the space into the earth with a jump or lunge forward, three or more men 
usually working together in unison side by side.'9
Manure was not widely used. Animal manure was mainly used as fuel, 
however, sheep and goats were often allowed to graze on stubble in order 
to fertilize the land by their droppings. Wulff states that for fruits 
and vegetable growing, manure was widely used: 'Since orchards and market 
gardens are always near villages and towns, sufficient animal dung and
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human faeces are available... Towers to obtain pigeon manure are a 
peculiar feature of an area of about 100 miles around Isfahan, ...'10
Reaping, threshing and also winnowing were done by hand. Reaping
was done by a scythe or in some areas by a sickle. 'The grain and straw
are gathered together and carried in loose bundles to temporary threshing 
floors, where the bundles are piled into large round heaps...' 11 Then 
the grain was threshed by a wooden threshing machine: 'Drawn by an ox, 
donkey, or mule, the o h m  (threshing machine) is driven round and round 
the heap, the unthreshed grain being strewn in the path of the threshing 
machine which gradually cuts it up into small pieces. When the grain 
was separated from the straw, the winnowing could begin. It was mainly 
carried out by tossing the grain in the wind with a wooden fork. Wulff 
states that there was usually a fair wind in the early morning and 
especially in the late afternoon. The direct-producers threw the 
threshed material about six feet high into the air with winnowing forks so
that the wind carried the chaff and husks . away while the grains dropped
. 12 down.
Finally, the process of grinding the grains was as primitive as the 
previous processes. Thus the same author points out that the mill for 
the grinding of wheat barley, millet, maize, pulse and the like was 
essentially the same whether it was hand operated, animal-driven, and/or 
worked by a power source such as wind and water.^
The direct-producers in almost all parts of the country had to leave 
a portion of their plots fallow and/or to cultivate different grains in 
alternating years. According to the 1960 Census, on the average, between 
30 to 40% of cultivable land was left fallow every year. From a 
technical point of view, there were two main reasons for this. First, 
the amount of land under cultivation was a function of the water avail­
ability and since there was a shortage of water in almost all regions, 
the direct-producers, with the limited amount of water at their disposal, 
were not able to cultivate all their plot. Secondly, permanent
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cultivation of a piece of land without using fertilizer sufficiently, 
sooner or later would exhaust the productivity of the land. The direct- 
producers, therefore, had to leave part of their plots fallow.
There is no doubt that this factor potentially reduced the amount of 
land at the disposal of the direct-producers. Thus, with regard to 
Table XII which shows the size of holdings in 1960, one should notice that 
the actual amount of land available to the owner/possessors was on the 
average 30 to 40% less than that shown in the table. Note that this 
statement concerns mainly the lands under the cultivation of grains, 
including wheat barley, rice, and maize. In addition to this (technical) 
factor, there was a social factor which strongly counteracted the 
development of productive forces in rural Iran, namely division of lands 
into small pieces, Table XIII clearly shows that the majority of holdings 
comprised small holdings under 5 has., i.e. around 65% of the holders 
possessed/owned plots smaller than 5 hectares. However, the factor which 
made this situation even worse, was the fact that each holding, although 
very small, was divided into fragmented pieces. As the same table 
illustrates, the number of parcels in each class of holdings is much more 
than the number of holdings: on the average, each, holding was comprised 
of around six parcels of land. The last column of the table shows the 
average size of each parcel. As can be seen, even holdings up to 20 
hectares were extremely fragmented. This fragmented form of landholding 
brought about two important consequences for the rural social formation. 
First, with regard to the possessors, this form of landholding made them 
(possessors) vulnerable to partially lose or gain land. Secondly, the 
fragmented landholding, as a specific form of property relation, strongly 
counteracted any sort of development of productive forces in rural Iran.
The above argument considered the labour-process from a technical 
point of view. However, in order to understand the relation/forces of 
production, one should study the relationships established among the agents 
of production through the means of production in the labour-process. With
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regard to the fact that there were three inodes of production, i.e. share- 
cropping, fixed-rent and owner/operators, we shall discuss the labour- 
process in relation to each one of these inodes.
The Labour-Process of Share-Cropping System
Broadly speaking, the share-croppers either worked individually or 
jointly in work teams. In some areas, the landlords directly assigned 
each nasaq-holder to a plot of land. In this case, the nasaq-holder with 
his family worked on'the land and shared the produce with the landlord.
In the peak seasons an extra labourer was employed by the nasaq-holder.
The employed labourer was paid either in cash or in kind. Moreover, 
the nasaq-holders who did not have draught animals borrowed them from 
other nasaq~holders and/or cattle breeders. Apparently, Arak was the 
only area in which this form of individual operation was dominant. Thus, 
Lambton states that in this area a plough land is usually run as a family 
concern; Jthe amount of grain (wheat and barley) harvested averages 10 
kharvar (approx. 58 cwt.) of which the peasant keeps on irrigated land 
two-thirds, less various small deductions. This, unless supplemented in 
various other ways, as for example by gardening produce, the produce of 
flocks or weaving, is not enough to support the holder and his family.
The capital required by the holder of a plough-land in 1945 was some 
30,000 rs. (approx. £176). Among the items making up this total were 
the following: a pair of oxen... A minimum of 1 donkey... 2-3 spades.
141 threshing machine. 2 ploughs. 1 ox-shaft. 1 ox-yoke. 1 harrow.'
Hence, with regard to the other agents of production, a nasaq-holder 
in this form of operation was involved in two sets of relationships: i.e. 
employing wage-labourers and borrowing oxen. Employing wage-labourers 
can be considered as a form of relationship at the level of the CMP.
This is because, the objective conditions of production were possessed/ 
owned by the nasaq-holder, and also it was he who conducted the labour-
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process; whereas, the labourer was employed for a certain period of time 
in lieu of some money or a portion of the produce. Here, the nasaq- 
holder appeared as "capitalist" exploiter, who exploited other agents by 
an economic mechanism in the process of production. On the other hand, 
if our nasaq-holder borrowed oxen (according to the 1960 Census, 31.7% of 
the rasaq-holders borrowed draught animals in Arak and Zanjan areas), it 
cannot be considered as an exploitative relationship. This is due to 
the fact that, while he conducted the labour-process, he only partially 
owned/possessed the objective conditions of production and borrowed the 
rest in return for a portion of produce and/or cash. However, borrowing 
draught animals exhausted the nasaq-holder’s capacity for accumulating 
capital. Thus, with regard to the nasaq-holders who worked individually, 
on the one hand, they were subject to semi-feudal subordination, while on 
the other hand, they had established relationships with other agents of 
production at the level of the CMP: i.e. employed wage-labourers and 
borrowed means of production from others.
However, the dominant form of expropriation of nature was working in 
plough-teams comprising two to eight nasaq-holders. The work-teams had
different names in different areas, e.g. Haraseh in Kirman, Sahra in 
Khorasan, PagaV in Sistan, Juft in Kirman, and Boneh around Tehran. For 
the sake of simplicity, we use boneh to symbolise a work-team. Evidently, 
from a technical point of view, working in boneh increases productivity. 
Hence Gharachedaghi states that 'by founding boneh, tilling the soil and 
irrigating the field together, the peasants of the villages had always 
aimed at deriving the utmost advantage from the available water supply.'^
But the foundation of boneh had brought about the reinforcement in 
one way or another of the differentiation of the peasantry. The land 
of each village was divided into a number of plots, each of which was 
cultivated by a group of nasaq-h.old.6TS under a leader. The work-team or 
boneh was comprised, therefore, of these nasaq-holders, a pair of oxen, a
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plot of land plus some other necessary means of production. Here, one 
may pose the question as to the nature of the property relation in boneh. 
As a matter of fact this is the core of the relations of production among 
the peasantry. In order to answer the above question, we shall 
distinguish two sets of means of production i.e. land and water on the one 
hand and oxen on the other. First, we shall examine the possession 
relationship established between the members of boneh and the land and 
(water); and secondly the ownership of oxen.
In the first section of this part, concerning the ownership/ 
possession of land, we assumed that the direct-producers were assigned to 
position of possession of land by the feudal landlords, thus leaving aside 
the issue of peasant differentiation. Here, we revise the relationship 
between direct-producers and feudal landlords with reference to the 
different strata of the peasantry. In the FMP, the direct-producers 
are subordinated to and also are raised to the position of possession of 
land by the feudal landlord. But in rural Iran, despite the fact that 
almost all direct-producers (share-croppers) were subordinated to the 
landlord and/or his agent, not all these share-croppers were raised to 
the position of possession of land directly by the feudal landlord/or his 
agent. In other words, the feudal landlords did not have a direct 
relationship with all of the share-croppers.
The labour-force of each boneh comprised two or more nasa^-holders.
The number of members varied from place to place. However, the group 
had one leader who had different names in different areas, e.g. Sar-Salar 
in Kirman, Salar in Sistan and Torbat-i Heydarieh, Sar-Za'im in Kirman, 
and also gavband in the neighbourhood of Tehran. In almost all areas the 
leader of the work-team was assigned to a plot of land directly by the 
feudal landlord/or his agent. In each village, therefore, the landlord 
was in direct contact with the heads of bonehs, while all other producers 
were subsumed to him. By doing this, the landlords managed to control 
their subjects easily. Thus, »the control of landlords and their agents
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over the villages is reinforced by the existence of a relatively privileged 
stratum of tenants in almost every village which has a stake in the 
status quo. There are so-called gavband heads who typically control a 
work-team of two to four men and two oxen... Landlords encourage in each 
village the existence of a group which has a stake in the present tenure 
system and which has the power to grant or withhold favours from the 
poorer tenants and labourers, thus keeping the latter under control.’^
The head of the boneh (hereafter, we shall use gavband to refer to
the head of boneh) conducted the labour-process of the work-team. Thus
the gavband was in charge of: furnishing seeds and oxen, organizing the
ordinary members for production arrangements of an extra-labour force in
the peak seasons, making contracts with the landlord and boneh, provision
of extra water if required and so forth. In many cases, like the ordinary
direct-producer, the gavband worked in addition to his duties as the head
of the team. In some other cases, he had only managerial duties. Dr.
Hayden for example states that in Aliabad, in the neighbourhood of Tehran,
'most of the oxen are in the possession of a few prosperous villagers who
"hire out" their oxen and ploughs to the working farmers. Such individuals
are called gavband, "ox-owners" and this title signifies their higher
prestige in social rank. When a villager becomes a gavband he wears hat,
ooattcarries a cane and quits work. ,17 Furthermore, Gharachedaghi
explains the contribution of gavbands to the labour-process in villages
around Varamin. According to him, gavbands put the necessary means of
production, such as draught animals, tools, seeds, and a portion of
fertilizer, at the disposal of ordinary direct-producers. The latter
18received one fourth of the produce from the gavbands.
What was the relationship between the gavband and other ordinary 
members of the bonehl The above argument did not tell us anything about 
the nature of this relationship. It only revealed the relationship 
between the gavbands and feudal landlords. In order to answer the above 
question, one should consider the ownership (as a property relation) of
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oxen by the members of boneh.
As already explained, there were some peasants who owned draught 
animals (as the main means of production owned by nasaq-holders), and 
the rest had either to borrow and/or to work without draught animals.
In order to study the property relation (pertinent to oxen), therefore, 
we classify work-teams according to the supplier of oxen. Thus we can 
distinguish the following types of work-teams: those which were supplied 
with oxen by a member of the boneh, those which were supplied with oxen 
by all members of boneh, work-teams which were supplied oxen by a third 
person other than landlord, and finally those work-teams which were 
supplied with oxen (and seeds) by the landlords.
a) Work Teams Supplied by Gavband
In these work-teams, the gavband (head of the team), in addition to 
duties at the managerial level, supplied his men with oxen and sometimes 
seeds. In effect, he was appointed as the head of boneh mainly because 
he owned oxen. He was richer than ordinary members and therefore, had 
a stake in the status quo. As the examples below show, the gavbands 
supplied the work-teams with oxen (and seeds) in return for a portion of 
the produce:
’In the Mamasani (in Fars province) there are two men attached to a 
plough-land, the owner of the oxen (the gavband) and a peasant known as 
the bazyar. In some areas the latter receives one quarter of wheat 
remains after the landownerfs share of one-fifth on daym crops, one-fourth 
on abi, and one-half on eayfi has been deducted.
In Jahrum (in Fars province) the division between the men attached to 
the plough-land is as follows: ’if they are two each owns one of the oxen 
the share is equally divided bwtween them. Ift on the other hand, one 
man owns both oxen and is helped by two men, the share of the oxen, ..., 
is half, and the remaining half is divided between the other two men. ,19 
The following example shows that the situation was more or less the
132
same in some areas of Khorasan province. According to the Ford 
Foundation, in 1954, in Farak, a village in the neighbourhood of 
Kashmar, for the full employment the work-team should have had a maximum 
of two members and four oxen. It had four men and two oxen. The share 
within the work-team was divided into six parts, 9405 rials per share.
One share, or 9405 rials, went to each of four men, two shares went to 
the owner of oxen. Thus three men received 9405 rials each and the 
gaobccnd who owned the oxen received 18810 rials. Lambton points out 
that in the State's lands of Bampur, in Baluchestan, the work-team was 
comprised of three men, one of whom owned an ox. The seed was supplied 
by both landlord and producers jointly. After the deduction of the share 
of the landlord, blacksmith, carpenter and ..., one-fifth of the rest 
went to the owner of the oxen. Then the rest of grain was divided
21equally between the owner of the ox and the other two nasaq-holders.
Contrary to the State lands in the estates which belonged to private 
landlords, in this region, the oxen were supplied by agents other than 
the cultivators. Generally speaking, in this form of boneh, the owner 
of an ox collected one share for his animal in addition to his own share 
as a member of the work-team. Put it in a simple way, the grain after 
all deductions (the shares of landlord, blacksmith, ...) was divided by 
the number of members plus the number of oxen. Each share was collected 
by one member, and the shares of oxen were collected by their owners.
With regard to the above variety of boneh, what was the relationship 
between the members of the bonehl Can this form of relationship, which 
is mediated by oxen, be considered as an exploitative relation of capitalist 
type? It was indeed some sort of capitalist exploitative relationship from 
its very early period. This is because, one member of the boneh 
conducted the labour-process and he himself either did not work at all, 
or undertook lighter productive work. In addition, he owned an objective 
condition of production, oxen, which was used m  the labour—process in 
lieu of a portion of the produce. That is to say, he collected a portion
133
of produce produced by other members of boneh for the use of his oxen; 
hence the oxen were not just an absolute form of means of production, 
rather they expressed a specific social relationship between the owner 
on the one hand and the direct-producers on the other. That is, these 
means of production, oxen, tended to become capital.
But why cannot these relations be considered as fully capitalist, 
but merely exhibiting tendencies towards capitalist relations? There 
are three reasons for this statement. First, the direct-producer, who 
conducted the labour-process, was not in the position of effective 
possession of all objective conditions of production, he only owned oxen 
(and in some cases seeds). Rather, he was, like all other members, 
subject to feudal subordination. Secondly, and more important,
’capital presupposes wage-labourer, wage-labourer presupposes capital.
They reciprocally condition each other’s existence; they reciprocally 
bring forth each other.’22 in other words, the existence of the free 
labourer is the prerequisite for the existence of capital. However, in 
our specific conjuncture, we had two distinguished groups of direct- 
producers; nasaq-holders and free labourers. The former, naea^-holders, 
could not be considered as free labourers, because they were not completely 
separated from the objective conditions of production. That is, they had 
the possession of an objective condition of production at their disposal,
i.e. land. However, the second group of direct-producers were, in the 
real sense of the word, free labourers, because they had nothing at their 
disposal to contribute to the labour process, but their labour-power. 
Although, they got paid in kind, one can consider them as a prerequisite 
condition for the existence of capitalist relations of production. Thus 
the process of production was not entirely based on the wage-labour system. 
The third reason why we did not consider the production by boneh as fully 
capitalist production is the fact that the production did not take place 
mainly for the market. But one should notice that, some direct-producers, 
including many of the rich oxen-owner peasants, sold at least a portion of
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their share of grain in the market.
There is one further point to be made in relation to the borrowing 
of draught animals. We have already shown how widespread the lending/ 
borrowing of draught animals was throughout the country. Neither 
officials nor the scholars have so far explained the variety of forms of 
borrowing draught animals. We do not, therefore, know whether or not 
the ordinary nasa^-holders, in the above case, were considered as 
borrowers of draught animals. However, our discussion shows that the 
relationship between the members of boneh with regard to the draught 
animals cannot be considered as a simple lending/borrowing relationship.
Thus in the boneha in which draught animals were supplied by a 
member (usually the leader), we see an articulated combination of two sets 
of feudal and capitalist relations of production. On the one hand all 
members were subject to feudal subordination, and there was some sort of 
collaboration between all members of the work-team. Moreover shares and 
wages were paid mainly in kind and the production was not mainly for the 
market. But on the other hand, a member of the boneh, who conducted the 
labour-process, owned oxen which were used in this process. He collected 
a portion of produce for his oxen. The boneh also employed wage- 
labourers in the peak seasons.
b) Boneh Oxen Supplied by all Members of the Work-team
In some rare cases, each one of the members of the boneh owned an 
ox, and there was no difference between them in terms of ownership of the 
means of production. The direct consequence of this equal ownership of 
means of production was equal distribution of produce between the members 
of the boneh after deducting the owner's share. Furthermore, the boneh 
in the peak seasons employed wage-labourers and wages were paid either in 
cash or in kind. Two cases illustrates this. in Zeidanlu, a village in 
the neighbourhood of Guchan (in Khorasan province) there were, in 1954, 
sixty work units each of which comprised of two or more families. The
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boneh is made up of two family heads, each of whom own oxen, so the 
production is divided equally between these two families, i.e. 13877 
rials per family unless labour outside these two families is hired, in 
which case one man is hired for forty days during the ploughing season 
at 1500 rials. If labour is needed for the spring barley and the summer 
crop, the labour receive one fifth of the crop. Village boys are hired 
for the harvest at 600 rials. The cost of labour is not deducted from 
the family income, as the elders of the village asserted that most of
the two family joft(work unit) were sufficient within themselves as to 
23labour.
The above report does not make it clear, if there were any privileges 
for any one of the member of the boneh in this village. However, it seems 
that the relationship between the two members were some sort of 
collaboration rather than any form of hierarchy. On the other hand, 
member families employed labourers, which is a sign of the extraction of 
surplus by economic mechanisms. Safinejad asserts that in the villages 
in the neighbourhood of Torbat-a Jam (in Khoresan), the aahra (i.e. boneh) 
usually comprised of men and six oxen. The members owned all objective 
conditions of production other than land and water which belonged to the 
landlord. According to him, the ownership of an ox was the necessary 
condition for becoming a member of the sahra, This equal ownership of 
means of production, oxen in particular, naturally led to the equal 
distribution of the grain between the sahra members. But in effect, 
there was some sort of hierarchy within the sahra which resulted in a 
differentiation of the members.
The labour-process in the sahra was conducted by a leader called sar- 
ealar. In addition to his managerial job, he occasionally helped other 
members in light work. As a tfhole, all the productive work was undertaken 
by the ordinary members of the sahra. Furthermore, sar-salar enjoyed 
another distinguished privilege, that is, a separate piece of land was 
granted (in the sense of possession) to him, which was exploited by the
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Ubouv and means of production of the sdhra. He also enjoyed some other 
privileges granted by the landlord, which did not have anything to do with 
the relationship between the members. We shall, therefore, ignore them.24
In the first of these two cases the relationship between the two 
agents of production {honeh members) was based on co-operation and 
collaboration. In so far as the direct-producers in Zeidanlu village 
owned their own lands, one can consider them as capitalist farmers or 
commodity producers who jointly cultivated their plots, first, because 
employing hired-labourers was quite common; and secondly, some of their 
products (e.g. grapes and poppy) were produced for the market.
However, the second case is different. On the one hand, all members 
of the honeh were subject to feudal subordination while on the other hand, 
the labour-process had a so-called capitalist character. That is to say, 
although all members possessed/owned the objective conditions of 
production and the employment of wage-labourers was uncommon, the labour- 
process was conducted by a leader, ear-salar, and the productive work was 
undertaken by the ordinary members. in addition, sav-salav possessed a 
piece of land which was cultivated by the members with the sahra’s means 
of production. In short, one may say that the extraction of surplus 
which took place in the labour-process was transferred to the head of the 
work-team.
c) Oxen Supplied by a Third Party
In the third type of work-team (honeh) the property relation had a 
peculiar character which distinguishes it from all other types. Here 
the oxen (and in some cases seeds and tools) were supplied neither by the 
direct-producers (nasaq-holders) nor by the landlords, but by a third 
person who in some areas called gavband. These lenders of oxen can be 
classified into two groups, first, cattle breeders who were not concerned 
with the labour-process and had no connection with the landlords- and 
secondly, those who acted, in effect, as mediators between landlords and
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naeaq-holdera.
Cattle Breeders as Suppliers of Draught Animals
There were, in some areas, groups of people who were engaged in
cattle breeding. The poverty of the nasaq-holders, in these areas,
had provided the opportunity for the cattle breeders to rent out their
oxen to the direct-producers in lieu of a portion of the produce and or
some money. For example the nasac^^olders of Nukjub, a village in the
neighbourhood of Bampur in Baluchestan, were divided into 12 pa-gav
(work-team). Of these work-teams, eight had one head and eight members
each, and the other four had one head and nine members each. ’The
division of the jofts (plough-lands) between the farmers is uneven and
the ritfsa<7“holders told us (the R.G.) that only forty-five of them own
oxen. Thus the majority (63 families) have to rent animals from the
gavbands against a payment of one-tenth of their product.’25 Generally
speaking, all surveys carried out by the R.G. on the villages in this
region show more or less the same state of affairs. Nevertheless, in
none of these surveys does the R.G. go further to reveal the nature of
this dimension of relations of production. However, Safinejad specifies
that these cattle breeders performed ploughing as well as threshing by
26their own buffaloes. This means that these cattle breeders not only 
provided an objective condition of production, oxen, but also performed 
some productive vork in the labour-process.
The cattle breeders live around Hamoon Lake, and not only sell all
products of the cattle, but also undertake ploughing and threshing. The
cattle breeders perform this work in return for a portion of the produce,
hence one can see that the payment for ploughing and threshing and the
like was another heavy burden on the shoulders of the owner/possessors of 
27this province. According to the 1960 Census, around 46Z of the owner/ 
possessors in this province borrowed draught animals. On the other 
hand, out of 3750 heads of buffaloes, 2850 (i.e. 76Z) belonged to a group
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of 19650 households which owned/possessed no land. The rest belonged 
to the owner/possessors of plots over five hectares.28
To sum up this argument, one may state that, as far as the labour- 
process is concerned, the cattle breeders did not conduct it, but only 
contributed to this process by provision of buffaloes and performance 
of some productive work. On the other hand, they were under no contract 
(verbal or written) to the landlords of this province. It follows, 
therefore, that the relationship between cattle breeders and agricultural 
direct-producers cannot be considered as an exploitative relationship.
Gavband as a Supplier of Oxen and Other Means of Production
There was a specific form of property relations, in the neighbourhood 
of Tehran, which was very different from the previous case in spite of 
the fact that, the oxen (and occasionally other conditions of production) 
were supplied by a third party. In this region, like many other regions, 
the relationship between the direct-producer and the landlord was 
interposed by a third person called gavband. But unlike the other 
regions, the gavband was not necessarily a prosperous nasaq-holder working 
as a direct-producer. As a matter of fact, he might have been engaged in 
many other businesses, such as cattle breeding, local trade, transport 
activities, running the village shop, and money lending. In any case, he 
had a stake in the labour-process.
In any village in this area, few gavbanda held a direct lease agreement 
with the landlord and/or his lessee. The contract between these two was 
a kind of share-cropping agreement, i.e. the gavbands had to hand over 
around 50Z of the produce to the landlord as the ownership share. As a 
result of this agreement, each gmbmd was in a position of possession of 
a piece of land and a certain amount of water. According to Charachedaghi. 
the gaobtmds around Varamin cultivated the land in two different ways: 
•either by utilizing family labour or daily paid workers and farm hand, or
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they had one or more share croppers without means (...) to work the land.*29
However, he points out that the latter form of cultivation, i.e. share- 
, . 30cropping, was dominant.
In the latter case, a group of naaaq-holders, working in a work-team 
(boneh), assumed full responsibility for production on the apportioned 
land. These naaaq-holders had nothing to contribute to the labour-process 
but labour-power. Instead, the gavbcmd, as the leader of the boneh, 
undertook the following responsibilities: furnishing seeds and draught 
animals provision of an extra-labour, granting loans to the boneh members, 
making contracts with the blacksmith, carpenter and the like, marketing 
the summer and winter produce, supervising the division of produce between 
the boneh and the landlord and so on. In other words, the boneh was 
organized by the gavband ; while the naso^-holders had to cultivate the 
land. That is, 'after having reached an oral agreement of.at most one 
year's duration with the individual gavbanda who leased the land from the 
Amlak Administration (the Administration in charge of Crown lands), 
raiyyats (ordinary nasaq-holders) assumed full responsibility of the 
apportioned land. They disposed of the right to decide how and when the 
land should be tilled, sowed, irrigated and harvested.'31
Before explaining the division of produce according to the ownership/ 
possession of the objective conditions of production, there is one point 
to be stated briefly about the social relationships in the villages run 
by gavbanda. That is, not only were the direct-producers in the position 
of possession of land (i.e. naaaq-holding), but also the gaobanda enjoyed 
a special right called the right of gavbondi. The gavbanda were allowed 
to buy and sell their right on the one hand; while on the other, it was 
not so easy for a landlord to dismiss a gavband.
As a result of the specific form of property relations that existed 
in the btmehe around Tehran, the produce was divided at two different 
levels: first, between the landlords on the one hand and ionehs on the 
other: and then between the gavbmds and other members of the boneks.
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the division of produce between landlord and boneh (producers) has 
already been discussed in the second chapter of this part. However, 
that explanation could not illustrate the real share of the direct- 
producers, due to the subdivision of produce within the boneh. The 
following quotation clearly shows how meagre the share of an individual
nasaq-holder was: 'In Khwar and Varamin the land which he (the gavband), 
manages consists of four plough lands known as btmeh, each worked by four 
peasants and an ox; the grain harvest of such a unit comes to some 100 
kharvar (approx. 584 cwt.) on an average. From this 2 kharvar (approx.
12 cwt.) or 50 manni tabriz (approx. 3 cwt.) per boneh are deducted from 
the total harvest for the religious classes. The payment of the dashtban 
amounting to 3 kharvar (approx. 17* cwt.) per gaoband or 25-30 manni 
tabriz (approx, one and.one-third cwt. - one and two-thirds cwt.) per 
b m e h  is also deducted from the total harvest. Some 95 kharvar (approx.
555 cwt.) remains. This is divided between the landowner and the gavband. 
The latter then deducts from his share of 47* kharvar (approx. 278 cwt.) 
the seed, leaving some 37*-40 kharvar (approx. 219 cwt. - 234 cwt.). He 
then deducts the dues for the blacksmith, carpenter and the bathkeeper, 
amounting to some 3 kharvar (approx. 17* cwt.). The remainder is then 
divided in equal shares between him, on the one hand, and the four peasants, 
on the other. In Saoj Bulagh, however, the gaoband usually get three- 
fifths instead of half the crop; the reason for his receiving a higher 
share is that the land in this area has to be ploughed three times.'32
The specific form of property relations and also labour-process 
pertinent to the form of the boneh (share-cropping) system, lead us to 
consider it as a transitional mode of production with the CMP in dominance; 
The reasons for which the CMP is considered as dominant in this 
articulation are as follows: almost all objective conditions of production 
are owned/possessed by the gavband who conducts the labour-process* 
production, and summer crops in particular, are to a considerable extent 
market-oriented; some of the direct-producers, nasaq-holders, are almost
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entirely separated from the conditions of production, while some others, 
i.e. casual labourers, are completely separated from the objective 
conditions of production. However, one should notice the feudal charact­
eristics of the property relation and labour-process in this system.
That is, some of the direct-producers, i.e. ««^holders, possessed land, 
and therefore their labour power cannot be considered as a commodity; 
production is not entirely market oriented; nasar hoiders and gaoband are 
subordinated to the owner of land, the feudal landlord. By and large, this
form of boneh system is closer to capitalist production than the previous 
cases.
There is one further point to be made about this form of boneh in 
relation to the lending/borrowing of draught animals. As already stated, 
almost all studies and official documents on the borrowing of draught 
animals in relation to the labour-process of different forms of share- 
cropping, are unclear. One cannot, therefore, discover whether the nasaq- 
holders in the above mentioned form of boneh were considered as the 
borrowers of draught animals.
d) Oxen Supplied by the Landlord
Finally, in some cases, the landlords not only supplied land and 
water, but also furnished, partially or wholly, the other means of 
production mainly seeds and draught animals. From the property relation 
point of view, this conjuncture is more or less similar to the CMP, i.e 
the direct-producer was almost separated from the objective conditions of 
production. But his specific relation to the land, i.e. naeaq, 
distinguishes him from an agricultural wage-labourer. However, from the 
point of view of the labour-process, the direct-producers conducted the 
whole process, and in effect, the landlord had nothing to do with this 
process. Considering this argument and also the fact that the landlords 
furnished oxen in lieu of a portion of produce, it follows that this 
category of nasaq-holders can be considered in the list of borrowers of
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draught animals in rural Iran.
e) Boneh in Relation to the Tractorization of Agriculture
We have analyzed the labour-process in the different forms of share- 
cropping system in rural Iran in terms of property relations and the 
forms of extraction of surplus. However, in the late fifties with the 
introduction of tractors, the labour-process and also property relations 
in these social formations (at the village level) changed to a considerable 
extent, despite the fact that share-cropping remained as it was. The 
following case supports this.
The Ford Foundation, in 1954, reported from Shokat Abad, a village
in the neighbourhood of Birjan in the province of Khorasan, that there
were 24 nasaq-holders working in 12 work-teams (here called gavband) i.e.
each team was comprised of two nasaq-holders. They supplied labour and
draught animals, while the landlord furnished land, water, and seeds in
lieu of half of the produce. The other half was divided equally between
33the members of the work-teams. However, in later years some changes 
took place. The land in this village was ploughed by a tractor which 
belonged to the landlord, and the oxen were used very rarely. Although 
share-cropping remained as the form of distribution relation in the 
agricultural sphere, the.Share of the landlord.increased due to the 
provision of means of ploughing. That is, 'the nasaq-holders give two- 
thirds of their produce to the landowner in return for the provision of
A  /
water, land, seeds and the means of ploughing.' Furthermore, by 
introducing tractors, the boneh system, i.e. working in the work teams, 
disappeared.^^
However, employing tractors did not have the same effects on all 
areas. For example, in villages of southern Tehran, the gavbanda were 
among the first persons who started employing tractors for ploughing.
This was mainly due to the fact that, they realized that the cost of 
hiring tractors was cheaper than keeping draught animals.^6 However, it
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appears that the boneh system remained as it was, and also no changes in 
property relations took place following on the gavbanda' taking of the 
initiative by using tractors. Furthermore, the share of the direct- 
producers did not change, because their contribution of means of production 
to the labour process did not change.
Labour-Process in Fixed Rent System
In the first section of this part, we discussed the relationship 
between the direct-producer and non-producer in this mode of production. 
Here the exactxactim ¿surplus took the form of the payment of a fixed amount 
of produce (or its value) as rent. However, as regards the labour- 
process, there was a great difference between this system and the share- 
cropping system. That is, in the region in which this form of payment 
of rent was dominant the direct-producers worked individually on the lands 
to which they were assigned. It follows, therefore, that the relationships 
between the agents of production were not so complicated as they were in 
the case of work-teams. We shall briefly explain this point with specific 
reference to the province of Gilan.
According to the 1960 Census, out of 165498 households, 137298 owned/ 
possessed land, 17400 did not have any land and the rest were engaged in 
animal breeding and the like. The land was extremely fragmented into 
small plots: i.e. slightly less than 502 of the total area was owned/ 
possessed by 83% of the direct-producers who held plots of less than 3 has. 
Holding from three to less than four hectares covered 112 of the total 
cultivated areas, and the rest was covered by holdings of over 4 hectares.
The means of production in Gilan, as in almost all other areas, were 
very primitive. For example, in 1960 around 882 of the owner/possessors 
used animal power exclusively in cultivation, while only 0.5% of them - 
empioyed machinery, 2% mixed mechanical and animal power and the remaining 
9% used manpower only. The data on the use of draught animals as a
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source of power, in fact shows two different points: the primitive 
method of production, and also the crucial role which the ownership of 
these animals could play in the relationships between the direct-producers, 
We have already explained the first point at the national level, therefore, 
we shall discuss only the latter point.
The distribution of draught animals was, like that of the land, 
uneven in Gilan. Hence, on the average, the owner/possessors of smaller 
plots owned fewer animals than the holders of larger plots. That is, 
owner/possessors of plots under three hectares, i.e. 83% of total holdings, 
owned 72% of the total draught animals. However, the number of draught 
animals owned by these owner^ossessors was far less than they needed.
That is why 87% of the borrowers of draught animals comprised holders 
with less than 3 hectares. In other words, 42.5% of the holders with 
less than one hectare, 40% of holders holding between 1 and 2 hectares
and also 38.5% of those holding between 2 and 3 hectares, hired draught
. - 37animals.
With regard to the fact that the small land owner/possessors were 
the main borrowers, the borrowing/lending of draught animals in this 
province, can be considered as a specific form of exploitation which took 
place outside the labour-process. It was an exploitative relationship, 
because it involved a transfer of surplus from the direct-producer to 
other agents of production. And it took place outside the labour- 
process, due to the fact that, the direct-producer was in the position of
ownership/possession of other conditions of production and also conducted 
the labour-process.
The other main characteristic of the relations of production in the 
province of Gilan, was the widespread employment of wage-labourers by the 
owner/possessors. According to the 1960 Census, around 12% of the 
households did not own/possess any land. However, one should notice 
that this group of households was not the main source of the labour force.
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In effect, there were two main sources of labour force in this province, 
that is, women and children on the one hand and the owner/possessors of 
small plots on the other. According to the R.G. a plot of land up to 3 
hectares was hardly enough to supply a family’s income.38 it follows, 
therefore, that the owner/possessors holding less than 3 hectares (i e.
83% of the total holdings) were connected, to a considerable extent, to 
the labour market. In addition, contrary to the other regions of the 
country, women in Gilan (and also the other two regions in Caspian sea 
littoral) were widely engaged in agricultural work, especially in paddy 
fields and tea plantations. According to the 1960 Census, out of 282110 
women (10 years and over) only 72110, i.e. 25%, were economically inactive 
and 205500, i.e. over 72%, were mainly engaged in the agricultural work. 
However, one should notice that, not all of these women worked as wage 
labourers, but a percentage of them worked on their own plots.
Thus, in Gilan province, as one of the regions in which the fixed 
rent system was dominant, the direct-producers were assigned to plots of 
land. They worked on these plots individually and therefore, they were 
directly related to the landlords and/or their bailiffs. They had to 
hand over a fixed portion of the produce, or its equivalent value, to 
the landlords. In addition, a high percentage of the direct-producers 
had to borrow draught animals from others, while hired labour was widely 
used.
Labour-Process in the Owner/Operator Plots
The third and last form of the labour-process, was that pertinent 
to the plots operated by their owners. From a technical point of view, 
the majority of these holdings, small ones, were operated in the same 
way as other plots. From the point of view of social relations a tiny 
percentage of them resorted to the employment of wage labourers.
However, in order to discuss this point, one must distinguish two
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different categories of owner/operator holdings: small holdings, up to 
10 hectares, where animals were the main source of power, and large
holdings which were highly mechanized and were based on the wage-labour 
system (see Tables XIII and XIV).
The small owner/operator holdings constituted around 70% of the 
total of holdings in this category (see Table XIII). As with other 
categories of smallholdings, the owner/operators of holdings under 5 
hectares used draught animals as the source of power. The exception is 
the case of holdings under 0.5 hectare .where human labour was the main 
source of power. With regard to the employment of primitive means of 
production and to the fact that in the majority of cases owners of the 
small holdings conducted the production, one may consider the process of 
labour of this category similar to that of the fixed rent system, and/or 
the share-cropping system in the case, in which the possessor worked 
individually. In addition, there is no doubt that, some of these owner/ 
operators in the peak seasons resorted to the employment of wage labourers 
The second group of owner/operator holdings comprised mechanized 
(fully or partially) large farms. m  these farms, the production was for 
the market, and the direct-producers had already been separated from the 
objective conditions of production. The mechanized large-scale farms, 
beftire L-R, were mainly to be found in Gorgan region. Okazaki states 
’Although the scale of the farms ranges from 50 to 6000 hectares they are 
operated on the basis of mechanization and .hired labour for profit. Each 
farm has a central office located on the farm itself; houses for the farm 
operator or custodian, technical and clerical employees and supervisors 
of the agricultural labourers, a service station for farm machinery, a 
generation plant, pump station and garages around the office.'39
The study of mechanized farming is beyond the scope of this part of 
our study. However, we should note that this form of farming, which is 
based on the employment of wage-labour, the use of machinery and the 
production of cash crops, started as early as the late 1940s
Mechanized
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farming started in Gorgan region, and became the dominant form of 
operation in the 1950a. Aa far aa the other regions were concerned, 
large scale, mechanised capitalist farming was negligible in comparison 
with other forms of operation as late as 1960.
In conclusion, we may summarize our argument on the labour-process 
with respect to relationships among the peasantry as follows. First, 
the labour-process was reviewed from a technical point of view in order to 
show how backward the means of production were. Then we discussed the 
labour-process of the share-cropping system: a minority of the share­
croppers worked individually on their possessed lands, whereas the majority 
worked in work-teams. We explained that these work-teams had different 
forms m  different areas: in some of them the capitalist relations of 
production were, to some extent, established among the «^-holders, 
while in others the relationship was based on collaboration. Moreover, 
most of the bonehs resorted to the employment of wage labourers in the 
peak seasons. In relation to the lending/borrowing of draught animals, 
we explained that, in some cases it was a form of exploitation that took 
place within the labour-process, while in some other cases it was an 
exploitation outside this process. Then we discussed the labour-process 
in the fixed rent system. In this system, naeaq-holders worked individually 
on their possessed lands, they were therefore directly connected to the 
landlords. With regard to the lending/borrowing of draught animals, it 
was asserted that this relationship could be considered as an exploitative 
relationship outside the labour-process. Also, we considered that many
of the nasaq-holders resorted to the employment of wage labourers at least 
for a period of the year.
Our analysis in this chapter revealed the relationships established 
among the peasants prior to L-R. This now enables us to describe the 
social clase structure in rural Iran before the implementation of L-R, 
which we shall do in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER Vili
Social Classes in Rural Iran
We have examined the relations of production in rural Iran at two 
different levels: between the owner/possessors and landlords on the one 
hand, and among the owner/possessors on the other. We can now move on 
to examine social classes in rural Iran.
In order to define social classes in any social formation, first of 
all, one should note that they are not sums of individuals. There are 
four economic factors to be taken as the main criteria for identifying 
social classes. They include: the position in the process of production, 
property relations (ownership/non-ownership of the means of production), 
the role in the social organization of labour, and the mode of acquisition 
of part of the social wealth (expropriation of surplus).1 However, social 
classes are defined principally, but not exclusively, by economic criteria: 
'The economic place of the social agents has a principal role in 
determining social classes. But from that we must conclude that this 
economic place is sufficient to determine social classes. Marxism states 
that the economy does indeed have the determinant role in a mode of 
production or a social formation, but the political and the ideological 
(the superstructure) also have a very important role.'2
Considering that the political and ideological levels are out of the 
scope of this study, we start our inquiry on the social-classes in rural 
Iran at the level of relations of production. Thus an attempt is to be 
made, here, to classify different agents of production by taking into 
consideration three aspects of the relations of production, property 
relations, labour-relations and distribution relations.
For rural Iran between 1940 and 1960 we can do more or less the 
following classification of the agents of production: well-to-do peasants 
middle peasants, poor peasants, and landless peasants and khoehneshins.
150
Given that there were two different modes of production in rural Iran, we 
shall consider each one of the above-mentioned classes in relation to 
these different modes of production. Thus in the first group of owner/ 
possessors, i.e. well-to-do, we have three different categories: 
capitalist farmers, rich farmers who paid fixed-rent and rich ^ s^-holders.
The category of capitalist farmers includes those owner/lessees who 
resorted to the employment of wage-labourers and machinery. They produced 
cash crops, such as cotton, for the market. They accumulated sufficiently 
to invest in production through the purchase of superior means of production 
and labour power. They maintained an extended reproduction based on 
accumulation. In this case, one can see three distinct social classes: 
the landowner, who through his monopoly power over the land, obtained a 
portion of surplus-value as capitalist (absolute/differential) ground- 
rent; the capitalist farmer, who purchased advanced means of production 
and labour-power, rented land and conducted the labour-process; and finally 
wage-labourers. In many cases, the capitalist-farmers had the ownership 
of plants under their control. Obviously the latter form does not 
refute the above statement of the social classes in this type' of social- 
formation. In fact, in this form the position of the landowner (the 
collector of capitalist ground-rent), and that of the capitalist-farmer 
(the collector of profit) were vested in the latter agent; hence the 
capitalist farmer collected profit as well as ground-rent.
Capitalist-farmers of this type were mainly to be found in the Gorgan 
plain. The capitalist farmers in this area in addition to their main 
agricultural business, also resorted to renting out agricultural machinery.
If one considers 20 ha. as the minimum size of this form of 
operation, the share of capitalist farmers (leaseholders and owners) can
be seen in Table XIII. That is, 1.9Z of leaseholders and 3.2Z of owner/
/
operators had occupied 34.8Z and 40.7Z of the total areas of these 
categories respectively.
The above mentioned capitalist farmers should not be considered as a
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part of the rural population. This is because these farmers were 
different from the peasantry at an economic as well as at the other levels. 
For example, in the late 1940s to mid 1950s, politicians, agricultural 
engineers, landowners, retired army officers, high and middle ranking 
government officials, merchants, university professors and others like
# Othem starting operating farms m  the Gorgan plain. A further case is
that of the irrigation companies, which were established by some local
khans and sheikhs and Sugar Cane Project (a State owned company in Haft
Tapeh) in Khuzistan province. These companies were, to some extent,
mechanized and employed daily wage-labourers. They also produced only 
4for the market.
However, as far as the differentiation of the peasantry is concerned, 
one cannot classify the peasantry according to size of allotment. This 
classification conceals the differentiation of the peasants. As a 
matter of fact, there are some other factors which contribute to the 
differentiation of the peasantry. They include the ownership of means 
of production (other than land/water), type of crops, labour conditions 
(fertility of land and availability of water). Thus we shall try to 
classify the peasantry by considering the above factors in addition to 
the ownership/possession of land/water.
The owner/possessors can be classified into three different groups: 
well-to-do (rich) peasants, middle-peasants and poor peasants.
X  Rich Peasants
a) Rich peasants who worked individually
This category included those who owned/possessed land/water, seeds, 
draught animals and other necessary tools more than the average quantity 
of their needs. With regard to those owner/possessors who worked 
individually , Seidov states that they cultivated 10 or more hectares of 
land and owned more than they needed of draught animals, seeds, tools.
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They therefore Unt thee, to the othere to return for a portion of produee. 
They operated their plots directly, however their income mainly sprang from 
the exploitation of the hired agricultural labourers, and was supplemented 
by lending money to the other peasants.5 i„ th. gaspisn sea littoral: 
'There is one peasant who owns 15 cows, six oxen.and 12 beehives. His 
income is £150 a year. Also he earns from the other peasants by lending 
them his oxen to till their fields and seed to plant their land, and he 
tales a part of the produce in payment.’6 A second case is of a farmer 
in Hamidieh, a village in Khuzistan, who owned 10 acres of land. He 
produced lettuce, water-melon, cucumber, tomato, egg-plant for the market.
In addition he devoted one acre of his land to the cultivation of wheat 
to meet the food requirement of his family. He employed two permanent 
and five seasonal wage-labourers.7 A third case is of a village headman 
in Ghaleh-garden, in Mazandaran, who had around 2 ha. of land. He 
produced rice, tea and citrus fruits. He was not engaged in livestock 
breeding, but had some income from poultry-raising. He also employed 
a wage-labourer and paid him in cash. But considering the point that 
an agent of production must be regarded not only from the point of view 
of the ownership of the means of production and the expropriation of 
labour, but also from the point of view of the social function he performs 
within the process of production* we should look at other functions which 
were performed by this farmer: He was engaged in forage sellingt and 
purchase and sale of oranges as well as administration works of the 
Village. In effect, the performance of these functions distinguished 
this headman from ordinary owner/possessors and placed him in the category 
of the village bourgeoisie.
However, one should note thst, there were some cases, in which 
labour-relations were disguised in the family relationship, for example in 
the case of a farmer who had two sons. The household owned 15 ha. of land,
A ha. of which were left fallow every year. The family produced wheat, 
barley lentiles, oilseeds, millet, pears and summer crops. The work
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mainly performed by the father, while the sons worked nine months of 
the year as wage-labourers in Tehran. They worked the rest of the year 
for their father. The family owned 15 head of Bheep, 2 head of cattle
and one head of buffalo. The income from the livestock constituted around 
one sixth of the total income of the family.*®
In some other cases, the work was performed entirely by the family 
members, while the production was, to a considerable extent, for the 
market. Thus a ytasaq-holder who had a family of 5 in Mamedel, in East 
Azarbaijan, possessed 30 ha. of land and produced wheat, barley, summer 
crops, sugar-beet and grapes mainly for the market. The head of the 
family stated that he had no labour cost, because the family members 
supplied the field with labour-power. In addition, the family owned
70 sheep, 6 buffaloes, 7 head of cattle and 30 poultry, which brought in
. . , 1 1a fair amount.
b) Well-to-do nasaq-holders whoworked in work teams
These peasants U.e. gavbande) were distinguished from the ordinary 
nasaq-boliets by property relations, functions performed by them in the 
process of production, and to a lesser extent by labour-relations. with 
regard to the property relations, they not only possessed Lnd/water, but 
they also usually owned seeds and draught animals. The, either undertook 
light productive work or performed managerial functions. They lent 
money and seeds to the others. Also in some cases marketing of the 
produce was performed by leaders of the bonehs. a.' g m b m d a  e8t8bU8„ed
two different sets of labour-relations! a) as leaders of the bonehe 
they employed seasonal workers; b) they had some sort of 'exploitative 
relationship' with the ordinary members of the bonehs. a .  latter wa,
the main distinguishing difference between gabbands on the one hand, and 
ordinary members on the other.
There is one further point to be made in relation to the well-to-do 
nasaq-boUets (leaders of bonehs as well as those who worked individually).
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That is, although they had, to some extent, a prosperous economy, they 
were subject to feudal subordination. They had a stake in the status quo 
because they constituted a privileged stratum of the rural population and 
had some support from landlords vis-a-vis the others. On the other hand, 
they were faced with some attempt by the feudal landlords, to limit the 
expansion of their economy and become independent producers.
II Middle Peasants
Generally speaking, this category of the peasantry is characterized 
as those who live exclusively on the returns of the land they own/possess. 
They own means of production and do not resort to hiring wage-labourers for 
cultivation. Neither do they sell their labour-power.
On the basis of the above definition, Seidov described an Iranian 
middle peasant as follows: His plot of land was around 3 ha. He always 
owned agricultural tools and the necessary amount of draught animals for 
the cultivation of his land. The peasants of this category did not 
exploit agricultural labour. Some exceptions existed in the top stratum, 
where they resorted to auxiliary labour and paid them a portion of the 
produce. Moreover, a middle peasant who had an often unsteady economy 
resorted to loans and was caught by over-borrowing at high interest rates. 
The peasants of this category did not sell their labour-power.12
The above explanation suffers from some inadequacies. Firstly, 
considering 3 ha. of land as the average amount of land required by a 
middle peasant household seems to be arbitrary. This is because, ceteris 
paribus, not only does the fertility of land differ from area to area, 
in Iran, but also the type of crops can play an important role in the amount 
of income earned by a peasant family. Secondly, Seidov has disregarded 
the question of ownership/possession of this category of the peasantry. 
Finally, in relation to the nasaq-holders, the above explanation does not 
consider the position of the middle peasants who worked in the bonehs.
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However, on the basis of Seidov's explanation, we shall try to characterize 
this category of the peasantry.
Generally speaking, there were two different groups of middle peasants: 
those who owned plots of land, and those who possessed allotments. The 
latter category comprised those who worked individually and those who worked 
in bonehs. However, to simplify, we classify the middle peasants into 
two groups: owner/possessors who worked individually, and possessors who 
worked in bonehs.
a) Owner/possessors who worked individually.
These agents of production owned/possessed a sufficient amount of 
land to satisfy their needs. They also owned tools, draught animals, 
cattle, sheep and the like. They did not usually employ wage-labour, 
their income deriving mainly from their own labour. The cases below show
the point.
The first case was of a peasant in Dohesaran in Khorasan province, 
who owned 1.2 ha. of land. He did not own any oxen, instead he shared 
in the village qanat and the pail-operated well. He had to pay for 
ploughing, but he obtained some money from his shares in the well and 
qanat. He produced wheat, barley, millet and summer crops. The small 
size of his holding and also the cultivation of products such as wheat, 
barley and millet, lead us to say that production was, to a considerable 
extent, not market oriented. The second is of a farmer who operated 20 ha. 
of which 5 ha. was rented. He owned a pair of oxen and produced wheat, 
barley and grapes. He did not employ any wage-labourer, because six 
members of his family helped him in the field. This peasant family was 
engaged in livestock raising activities as well.13
The second group of middle peasants comprised nasaq-holders who 
worked in bonehs. Here, we are faced with a more complicated case. This 
is because, labour-relations cannot be considered as the main criterion 
to characterize this group of middle peasants. That is, since the boneh 
as a production organization, employed seasonal labourers, all members,
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including the middle peasants* at one time could be considered as the 
expropriator of the labour-power of the labourers. On the other
hand, his labour, to a limited extent, was expropriated by the leader of 
the boneh. However, it is possible to characterize this group of middle 
peasants by criteria other than those of labour-relations.
Thus a middle peasant who worked in a boneh Can be characterized by 
the following criteria: as a member of the boneh he possessed land/water; 
he contributed, labour power, seeds, oxen or some combination of these, 
to the labour-process; he did not take any off-farm jobs but his family 
members might have some other non-agricultural jobs, and he owned some 
head of sheep or cattle to supplement his income.
In addition to the above characteristics of the middle peasants of 
both groups, it can be said that: first, the na**Hiolders of this class 
were subject to feudal exploitation i.e. they had to pay rent for land/ 
water, and also many of them were in debt, and therefore had to pay high 
interest rates to the landlord/usurerfgavband. Secondly, the owner/ 
operator in this class could be considered as a simple commodity producer:
i.e. family members were the sole source of their labour-force; a portion 
of produce was sent to the market; the family used simple tools, therefore 
it was not connected to the market through capital goods. Furthermore, 
with regard to both owners and possessors of this class, one should notice 
that, generally speaking, the minimum amount of land owned/possessed by 
each family should have been more than 2 ha., the reason for which will be 
explained below. Il
Ill Poor Peasants
Contrary to the previous case, it is not impossible to classify the 
poor peasants by sire of allotment.14 That is, one may consider, in the 
Iranian content, owner/possessors of plots under 2 ha. as poor peasants. 
This is for the following reasons: a) two hectares of land, in the most
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fertile area of the country (i.e. the Caspian sea littoral), is the 
minimum amount of land which can feed a family of six;15 b) the majority 
of owner/possessors holding allotments under 2 ha. owned an insufficient 
amount of draught animals (see Table XVI). Considering these two points, 
we shall try to discuss the owner/possessors of allotments under 2 ha.
Households owning/possessing less than two hectares, constituted 
22.9% of the total rural households. And in terms of the population aged 
10 years and over, 22.5% of the rural population belonged to this 
category.16 However, in order to understand the class position of these 
owner/possessors, one should study their labour-relations. This is our 
concern in this section.
Tables XVIIIa and XVIIIb show the working status of the owner/ 
possessor by size of holding. With regard to the male population holding 
less than two ha., Table XVIIta verifies that a high percentage of them,
i.e. on average 73.2%, were engaged mainly in agriculture. However, in 
comparison with owner/possessors.holding between 2 and 20 ha. they were 
less involved in agriculture. On the other hand, the agents of this 
category were more involved in non-agricultural jobs than the next 
categories. That is to say, on average, 9.4% of them were mainly engaged 
in non-agricultural jobs, while the pertinent average percentage for the 
owner/possessors holding between 2 and 20 ha., is only 1.8%. Despite 
the small size of the allotments, the male population of this stratum was 
mainly engaged in working their own allotments, i.e. on average 54.4% and 
3.2% worked on their own account in agriculture and non-agriculture, this is 
much lower than for the owner/possessors of larger allotments. That is, 
16.4% of the agents worked as family workers in agriculture, whereas the 
average for the next stratum is 26.6%. It follows, therefore, that 
family labour did not play a very important role in the economy of this 
group.17 On average 9.4% of the work-force of the male population was 
engaged in jobs other than agricultural work. This percentage is much 
higher than the percentage of the work-force engaged in the off-farm jobs
TABLE XVIIIa
Occupation of Male Population (10 years and over) (percentage)
Mainly Engaged in Agriculture Mainly Engaged in Non-Agriculture Inactive TotalSize of Holdings
Total OwnAccount
Hired
Worker
Unpaid
Family Total
Own
Account
Hired
Worker
Unpaid
Family
Population
Non-holders 13.0 — 13.0 - 57.8 22.9 32.6 2.3 29.2 1,136,100
Under 0.5 ha. 63.7 48.3 4.3 11.1 17.3 7.1 8.5 1.7 19.0 469,712
0.5 to 1 ha. 77.3 58.4 1.4 17.5 6.5 1.7 3.6 1.2 16.2 288,246
1 to 2 ha. 78.7 56.7 1.2 20.8 4.4 0.8 2.8 0.8 16.9 435,953
2 to 3 ha. 81.1 57.1 1.0 23.0 2.0 0.4 1.2 0.4 16.9 365,167
3 to 4 ha. 82.6 56.6 1.2 24.8 1.5 0.1 1.1 0.3 15.9 258,842
4 to 5 ha. 83.4 55.8 1.6 26.0 1.9 0.2 1.2 0.5 14.7 223,174
5 to 10 ha. 82.7 54.6 1.7 26.4 1.8 - 1.1 0.7 15.5 640,412
10 to 20 ha. 83.2 50.0 2.1 31.1 2.0 0.1 1.0 0.9 14.8 481,268
20 to 50 ha. 78.2 45.7 3.1 29.2 2.7 - 1.1 1.6 19.1 210,454
50 to 100 ha. 76.4 46.1 3.4 26.9 2.6 - 0.3 2.3 9.0 32,438
100 and over 65.0 50.4 - 15.0 14.5 1.8 2.6 10.1 20.5 14,952
Source: The 1960 Census, Table 322.
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TABLE XVIIIb
Occupation of Female Population (10 years & over) (percentage)
Size of Holdings
Mainly Engaged
„ , Own Total .Account
in Agriculture
Hired Unpaid 
Worker Family
Mainly Engaged in
_ , Own Total .Account
Non-Agriculture
Hired Unpaid 
VJorker Family
Inactive
Population Total
Non-holders 1.8 - 1.7 - 8.1 1.1 3.2 3.8 90.1 1,077,150
Under 0.5 ha. 10.0 1.2 0.5 8.3 9.0 0.2 1.9 6.9 80.0 420,859
0.5 to 1 ha. 18.3 0.4 0.2 17.6 6.3 0.2 0.9 5.2 75.4 263,161
1 to 2 ha. 25.8 0.4 0.1 25.2 5.4 - 1.1 4.3 68.8 401,074
2 to 3 ha. 23.7 0.1 - 23.4 6.7 0.5 1.4 4.8 69.6 323,403
3 to 4 ha. 15.5 0.2 0.3 15.0 5.6 0.2 1.4 4.0 78.9 235,686
4 to 5 ha. 8.3 - 0.1 8.1 7.6 0.2 2.4 5.0 84.1 193,579
5 to 10 ha. 7.1 0.2 - 6.8 6.7 0.5 1.8 4.4 86.2 566,604
10 to 20 ha. 4.0 0.2 - 3.7 6.7 0.5 1.9 4.3 89.3 410,619
20 to 50 ha. 3.6 - - 3.6 7.9 0.5 1.6 5.8 88.5 170,684
50 to 100 ha. 1.4 - - 1.3 10.1 - 3.0 7.1 88.5 28,471
100 and over 1 . 0 - - 0.3 15.2 - 9.6 5.8 83.8 13,243
Source: The 1960 Census, Table 323.
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in the larger allotments. Furthermore, both tables cleatly show that a 
tiny percentage of the work-force (male and female) worked as hired 
workers in agricultural as well as non-agricultural fields. Table XVIIlb 
also shows that on average 79% of the female population had no economic 
activity.
The following cases may make the economic situation of these owner/ 
possessors clearer. A nasaq-holder, in Koleh-jub, in Kermanshah, who 
possessed jointly with his father and his brother, 7.4 ha. of land under 
cultivation each year had a share of the total produce of the allotment of 
180 kgs. of wheat and 60 kgs. of barley. However, he stated that he 
spent four months of the year working as a reaper for one of the nasaq- 
holders, for which he received 450 kgs. of wheat and 150 kgs. of barley. 
For another four months of the year, he worked as a grocer.
According to Okazaki, in a small village called Shirang-Sofla in 
Gorgan region, there were 8 out of 23 household families each of which 
held less than 2 ha. under cultivation each year. These households did 
not employ any wage-labourers. In effect, almost all of them provided 
other household families with labour-power. In other words, these 
families found it necessary to supplement their income from farming by 
selling a good portion of their family labour-power.
Thus the owner/possessors in this stratum can be characterized mainly 
by their occupation of more than one position in relation to the means of 
production. The extra-position could be a productive as well as a non­
productive job. However, the majority of those who had off-farm jobs, 
worked as wage-labourers in different fields. That is why Lenin, in his 
work on the development of capitalism in Russia, considered the class 
position of these agents of production somewhere between the petty 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but closer to the latter.^
Landless peasants and the question of Khoshneshins
The Iranian peasants use a general concept, i.e. Khoshneshin20, for
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all agents of production who have no position in the ownership/possession
of land. Obviously this term embraces different agents:of production
with different positions. As Hooglund states this situation poses21some difficulties. However, in order to eliminate this confusion, we 
shall categorize these agents of production according to their relationship 
with the means of production and also their positions in social relations.
A group of the khoehneskin population was related to the means of 
production without being in the position of ownership/possession of them. 
That is, they were entirely separated from all objective conditions of 
production and had nothing to sell but their labour-power. These wage- 
labourers constituted 26.2% of the Khoshneshin population, and only 5.7% 
of the total rural population of Iran in 1960 (see Table XIX). They 
worked in the farms as well as rural industries. The wage-labourers in 
Ali_Abad in the neighbourhood of Bojnurd in Khorasan, worked on the farms, 
mainly because no handicraft industry existed in this village. Contrary 
to the above case, in Dohesaran, near Ferdows in the same province, the 
majority of khoshneshin population were engaged in carpet weaving. The
working day was as long as 14 hours and the labourers received 15 rials per 
23working day.
In the Caspian sea littoral women participated to a considerable
extent in agricultural production. Thus Seidov states that tea plantations
mainly employed women and children. In Gilan young women worked in tea
plantations belonging to the landlords from 6 o'clock in the morning until
8 o'clock in the afternoon. They collected tea leaves during the working-
24day and obtained 8 to 10 rials per day. However, in other parts of the
country, women and children were mainly engaged in industries. For
instance, in Mahan and Jupar in Kirman province, 'They weave carpets, rugs
and loosely woven woollen mats (...). Carpet weavers earn a high wage
(by local standards). Less talented women work at lesser crafts,
spinning wool into yarn, cleaning hair from the down of Kashamir goats,
25and making woollen hats, stockings and fields.' The use of child
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Statua of Khoshneshin Population (1960)
TABLE XIX
Job Status
Khoshneeh'in Population
Total Male Female
Wage-workers 580,050 521,250 58,800
% 26.2% 45.8% 5.8%
Owner/operators 330,300 283,200 47,100
% 14.9% 24.9% 4.3%
Inactives 1,302,150 331,200 970,950
% 58.8% 29.1% 90.1%
Kho8hne8hin 
Population as 
% of Total 
Population
5.7
3.2
12.8
Source: The 1960 Census, Tables 321, 322 and 323.
labour was not uncommon, and in fact it played a very important role in 
the economies of peasant households. In Farak, a village in the 
neighbourhood of Kashmar in Khorasan province, the poverty of the villagers 
was such that they were forced to send their children to work on the 
carpet looms or in the fields. For example, in 1963, a school was 
founded xn Farak, a village in Khorasan, but it soon closed down due to
the lack of pupils, because all children had to work in the field or
_ . 26 carpet looms.
The second group of the khoahneshin population comprised the agents 
who were in the position of ownership of (non-agricultural) means of 
production "capital" and ran their own businesses. They constituted 
14.9% of the total khoehneshin population and 3.2% of the total ruril 
population. These owner/operators can be classified into two groups: 
those who were engaged in the services, and those who produced different 
products. The latter category included blacksmiths, carpenters and 
coppersmiths. These producers supplied the omer/possessors vith different
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"industrial" products in return for which they received portions of 
agricultural products each year. The former group included shopkeepers, 
bath caretakers and barbers. Apart from shopkeepers, the other agents 
performed their pertinent services in return for a fixed amount of 
agricultural produce per year. However, the shopkeepers had a different 
position in relation to the owner/possessors. They were engaged in 
selling and buying and also exchanging different products with the 
owner/possessors. In some cases, they provided credit to the latter 
and in this way as moneylenders they obtained a certain amount of interest.
To summarise, we may say that apart from the landlords and capitalist 
farmers, we had a differentiated peasantry in rural Iran: rich peasants 
who owned means of production, possessed/owned land/water, and also were 
leaders of the bonehe\ middle peasants who owned means of production 
sufficient for their own economies, and owned/possessed land/water, but 
- were members of the bonehs', and finally poor peasants who had no 
means of production, possessed/owned land, and had to get off-farm jobs.
In addition to these owner/possessors of land/water, there was a group of 
peasants who had no positions in the ownership/possession of land, i.e. 
khoshneshins. A certain percentage of them worked as agricultural wage- 
labourers; while the others were involved in non-agricultural production.
The main purpose of chapters seven and eight was to argue that the 
Iranian peasantry was already differentiated before the implementation of 
L-R in 1962. Our main concern in the next chapter will be to examine 
the immediate impact of the land reform programme (hereafter L-R) on the 
relations of production and social classes in rural Iran.
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PART II 
CHAPTER IX
Land Reform Implementation and Its Immediate Impact on 
the Relations of Production in Iran
In January 1962, the Iranian Government launched a form of L-R to 
emancipate the peasant from feudal ties and prepare the ground for full- 
fledged development. * In this chapter, an attempt will be made to
examine the causes, implementation and laws of L-R. We shall argue 
that the L-R was precipitated by the economic and political crisis of 
the late 1950s. In our examination of the L-R itself, we shall be 
concerned in this chapter with the immediate socio-economic effects on 
rural Iran of its implementation and legal structure. Our objective 
will be to show in which ways the L-R removed the barriers to the 
development of rural capitalism. We shall begin, however, with a 
brief discussion of the various conceptions of L-R which have appeared 
in the literature on this subject. For example, according to Warriner,
«... land reform means the redistribution of property or rights in land 
for the benefit of small farmers and agricultural labourers. This is a 
narrow definition; it reduces land reform to its simplest element, common 
to all land reform policies in whatever conditions they may be carried 
out.’ Dorner defines L-R as follows: 'Land reform has an essential 
core meaning which concerns significant and purposeful changes in land
3tenure, changes in ownership and control of land and water resources.' 
Laporte, Petras and Rinehart argue that L-R implies a set of public 
policies designed to readjust land-tenure arrangements so as to limit 
landholdings through expropriation or consolidation of landholdings or 
both; and impose or maximise land utilization, facilitating the application 
of efficient farming methods to increase productivity.* According to 
these writers conceptions of L-R can be classified into three groups:
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1. "mild" reforms involving limited government intervention 
through some public regulation and assistance;
2. "stronger" reforms short of expropriation, such as rent 
control or rent reduction etc.;
3. "strongest"reforms that include expropriation programmes
either with or without compensation to land-holders and the
5redistribution of this land to the tillers.
Shanin refers to Warriner’s definition of L-R (as a redistribution of 
land for the benefit of small farmers and agricultural labourers) and 
states that the scope of L-R is much broader than that of egalitarian 
land redistribution: L-R '... is on the whole supplemented by corrective 
measures aimed at improving the efficiency of land allocation, e.g. 
consolidating some holdings etc. It is also often complemented by the 
settlement and colonisation of virgin lands.’^
Lipton presents his own definition: Land Reform comprises the 
compulsory take-over of land, usually by the State and from the biggest 
landowners, and with partial compensation; and the farming of that land 
in such a way as to spread the benefits of the man-land relationship more 
widely than before the take-over. He, furthermore, adds that the 
primary motivation of L-R is to reduce poverty by reducing inequality.^ 
Generally speaking, all the above cited definitions suffer from one 
common shortcoming: i.e. insufficient attention has been paid to the social 
relationship, established through land/water between direct-producers on 
the one hand and non-producers on the other. However, it would appear 
that this relationship is the crux of the matter in any rural soc ial 
formation.
g
There is no doubt that land is the chief means of production in 
any rural social formation. Further, the agents of production (direct- 
producers as well as non-producers) dependent upon the dominant mode of 
production, enter into a specific set of relations of production. It 
follows that the set of relations of production established through the
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Un d  (i.e. landed property) can be considered core icportant than other 
types of relations of production established through other means of 
production. Thus we would define L-R as follows: Any act at the 
folitical level, on the part of the State, which can bring about changes 
in the relationship (established through land) between direct-producer, 
on the one hand and non-producera on the other.
Any changes in the relations of production (established through land) 
necessarily involve the manipulation of the ownership/possess in of land 
such as redistribution and consolidation. Thus, our definition excludes 
sets of relations to other means of production ouch as ploughs and seeds. 
The relationship between direct-producer and non-producer is the core 
point in our definition of L-R. thus not all changes in the ownership ,„d 
control of land/water resources are considered as a form of L-R. as in 
Horner's definition above. Contrary to Warriner, the manipulation of the 
ownership/possession of land does not necessarily take place for the 
benefit of poor farmers and agricultural labourers. However, since 
distribution relations are produced by the relat fens of product in9, .ny 
changes in the landed property (as a relation of production) will bring 
about changes in the distribution relation. It follows that, only if 
poor farmers and agricultural labourers acquire any land, will they be 
benefited by the L-R. Our analysis of the first and second stages of 
the Iranian L-R below will show that while some naeoq-holders (including 
poor ones) obtained land in the first stage, the agricultural labourers 
and some other iwsaq-holders were denied land in both stages of L-R.
It is always the direct relationship of the owners of means of
production to the direct-producers which reveals the basis of any social
formation.10 Thus in relation to a given rural social formation, the
question at issue is the impact of L-R on the relations among the agents
of production, and not that on the man-land relaf-i„wu iflt on as Lipton argues.
In some cases, the implementation of L-R can k. . „^ «. be considered as an act,
on the part of the state, to remove a set of « 1,.,-relations of production
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(pertinent to a mode of production, e.g. the PIP). In such a case, the 
state tries, at all levels, to stop the reproduction of the previous set 
of relations of production and provide the ground for development and 
reproduction of the new set of relations of production. As will be 
shown below, L-R in Iran is a remarkable example of this type of reform.
Unlike Lipton, we have dropped the process of implementation of L-R 
from our definition. This is for the following reasons. First, the 
technical practices of the implementation of L-R cannot be considered in 
its core meaning. Secondly, to consider these technical aspects in the 
definit im makes the latter confusing, due to the fact that there have 
been different practices in different countries.
Unlike some of the above cited studies, we have excluded the 
supplementary measures (such as provision of credit, fertilizers, improved 
seeds, market facilities, etc.) from our definition. These measures 
have usually been taken by governments, after L-R, to reinforce the new 
set of relations of production. It is within the scope of economic 
developnent however, to study the impact of these measures on the relations 
of production in any given social formation. We shall deal with this 
point, therefore, when we are examining different aspects of development in 
the Iranian rural social formation.
Land Reforms: Partial Attempts During the 1940s and 1950s
It would appear that after the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, the 
Tudeh party was the first organization to advocate the reform of the 
landowning system. In the autumn 1943, the party in its programme 
recomnereted the following reform in landed property:
- buying the lands of large landlords and distribution of these 
lands and Crown and State lands among the poor and landless 
peasants, the peasants in return paying the price of lands to 
the government;
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- increasing the shares of those peasants who did not own any land;
- abolishing all forms of labour service and other obligations 
other than rent.^*
During the period 1949-53, the party gradually became more radicalized
and changed its programmes and slogans. Zabih states that: 'the Party's
attitude toward private ownership was also fully revised. The old
slogans of land distribution through state compensation to large landlords
were dropped in favour of outright confiscation of land and means of
agricultural production owned by the royal family, feudal lords, and12owners of large properties.'
However, with the exception of some regions in the northern part of
the country, the Tudeh party did not have any influence in the rural areas
during the 1940s and 1950s. In addition, the party did not pay
sufficient attention to a full-fledged L-R programme. Thus Gharachedaghi
rightly states that 'the agrarian reform, although regarded by the Tudeh
Party as the most important economic and social project, was unlike its
13oil policies hardly propagated in public during the oil dispute.'
Democratic Government of Azarbaijan
After the second W.W. an autonomous government led by the Democratic
Party came to power in Azarbaijan region for a short period of time, i.e.
1945-46. The government of Democrats was strongly supported by the
peasants. According to Ivanov, thousands of Azarbaijani peasants
14participated in this democratic movement. According to another scholar, 
'... the peasants - armed, with Soviet help, in Nov. 1945 - by turning 
against the gendarmerie and by fighting for the banishment of these 
landlords who were opposed to the autonomists, confirmed the seizure of 
power by an urban group that had not yet promised - for tactical reasons - 
to support a land reform. *
During the one-year term of the autonomous rule,^the Democrat regime 
launched a form of L-R which changed the rent system in favour of the
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peasantry. With regard to landed property, the autonomous government 
expropriated state and crown lands and the estates of those landlords 
who opposed the government. These lands were distributed among the 
peasants without any compensation. It seems that the distribution was 
carried out without being passed through the bureaucratic channels of the 
state apparatus, that is, these estates ’...were given to the peasants 
without surveying or distributing the land and without notarizing the 
transfer of title deeds.'^ However, the majority of landlords of this 
region, on the presupposition of their loyalty to the autonomous government, 
remained in their positions as landlords. The land distribution covered
only 687 out of the total 7050 villages in the region under the control
of Democrats.^ The latter landlords, i.e. those who opposed the regime,
were affected by the L-R policy of the Democrats. Labour service and all
other obligations were abolished and also the share-cropping system for
irrigated as well as unirrigated cultivation was modified in favour of
the peasants. However, in many areas of this region, the peasants,
contrary to the wishes of the Democrat government, declined to hand over
the landlords' shares, while in some other areas they proceeded to divide
18the land among themselves.
The Democrat regime remained in power no more than a year. Never­
theless, its land reform policy had some consequences. Gharachdaghi 
states that L-R measures were not sufficiently effective to change at a 
basic level the legal position of landless peasants in this region.19’ 
Nevertheless, if this movement did not change the position of landless 
peasants it weakened the position of the landowning class in Azarbaijan. 
Thus Lambton writes, '... the position of the landowners vis-a-vis the 
peasants had been severely weakened by the events which had taken place 
during the Democrat regime of Pishevari. For some years the payment by 
the peasants of the landowners' share of the crop had been irregular.
A high proportion of landowners were absentee, living outside the region. 
Many of them were rich and enjoyed considerable incomes from their
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estates, but their influence was of an economic rather than a political
. .20nature.
L-R measures of Qavam
As already described (see Chapter 5), during 1945-1946, peasants of
many areas revolted against their landlords. The riots throughout the
country drove the Qavam Cabinet to make some social concessions and
issue a government communique on L-R. The Prime Minister ordered the
governor of each province to set up committees comprised of representatives
of landlords, peasants and the state. The committees were to rearrange
share tenancy. In the summer of 1946, the Cabinet announced that the
Shah’s estates and public domains would be distributed among the peasants.
Furthermore in August of the same year a bill was approved, according to
21which the share of peasants increased by 15%.
The bill was enforced only in some areas. However, it was strongly
opposed by the landlords who held a conference in Tehran in the next year.
However, the landlords expressed their political power mainly through the
Mafli» where two-thirds of the seats were occupied by their representatives.
On the other hand, according to Ivanov, the government sent soldiers and
22gendarmes to the rural areas to suppress the peasants. Generally 
speaking, this bill did not bring about any changes in landed property in 
rural Iran.
Mossadeq’s Bill
As already examined, in 1952, once again the Iranian rural social
formation witnessed peasants' revolts and the latter drove Dr. Mossadeq's
23Cabinet to take some measures on behalf of the peasantry. In this 
part we examine these measures and the effects on rural Iran.
The "L-R" policy of the Mossadeq Cabinet was started by the government 
communique of May 12, 1952 on distribution of the public domains.
Just a few months later, on August 3, 1952, 'the Majlis (...) 
passed Prime Minister Mossadeq's bill granting him full dictatorial power
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for six months.' This bill empowered the Prime Minister to issue two 
decrees on sixth and eleventh of October of the same year. According to 
the first decree the landlords had to turn over 20% of the return from 
their cultivated properties, grasslands, pastures, forests and also from 
the rent of flour mills, rice mills, shops, ice-house etc. (Article I). 
Article XVI of the decree provided that Councils at village, District, 
County and Province levels be set up to enforce collection of the 20% 
levy. The peasants were to obtain half of the 20% levy imposed on the 
landlords' shares, while the other half was to go to the development and 
co-operative funds which were supposed to be set up under the decree , 
(Article I, No. I).25
The second decree, dated October 11, 1952, abolished all feudal 
obligations including dues in the form of sheep, goats, lambs, clarified 
butter, fuel and the like. In addition, the decree abolished labour 
service: Article 2 forbade the landlords to force the cultivators to 
work on his private affairs or to use the peasants' agricultural 
implements or possessions except with the consent of the peasant or in 
return for the payment of a just price and wage.'26
In theory, the above decrees cannot be considered as full-fledged 
anti-feudal measures, in spite of the fact that they tried to abolish 
labour service and other obligations. This is because they (the decrees) 
did not give any security of tenure to the peasants, and therefore, kept 
the latter in the subordinated position of having to hand over a portion 
of produce to the landlords. In addition, no attempt was made to 
raise the peasants to the position of ownership of land. However, in 
practice the government did not even launch the above decrees; and in 
many areas where it had to face peasants' riots, resorted to force to 
maintain law and order (see Chapter 5).
Generally speaking, the above decrees did not make any change in 
the relations o£ production in rural Iran, but brought about the following 
consequences for Mossadeq’s Cabinet: Firstly, it did not manage to get
24
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any support from the peasants. Secondly, the landowning class, frightened 
by decrees, tightened its alliance with the comprador bourgeoisie. Later 
on, in August 1953, a Coup, which was strongly supported by these two 
classes, toppled the nationalist government of Dr. Mossadeq. And as we 
will explain below, the Coup government provided the ground for the feudal 
landlords to reinpose obligations, labour service and feudal rents.
Distribution of Crown Lands
As already stated, Reza Shah during his reign (1925-41) acquired 
some 2152 villages in different ways. A few days before he abdicated, 
he transferred them to the new Shah. However, the ownership of these 
villages was under dispute during the years 1941-53. Thus in June 1942, 
the new Shah transferred these lands to the State. A few years later in 
1949, in accordance with the Shah's desire, the Majlis passed a bill to 
return the Crown lands to the Shah.
However the distribution (i.e. sale) of Crown lands was proclaimed
in January, 1951, i.e. a year after the Shah's return from the United 
27States. In order to carry out the distribution and sale of Crown lands
a special body was set up called the "Council for the Distribution and
Sale of the Pahlavi Crown Lands". This organization had a more or less
free hand in the devolution policy and the technical methods to be
28employed in this process. The distribution actually started on March 
16, 1951 in the Crown estates in Varamin in the south of Tehran.
According to the law of distribution of these lands, the available 
land was to be divided according to the number of eligible peasants in 
that village. All peasants who cultivated the land in a given village 
were eligible to obtain land. However, the peasants of neighbouring 
villages who were prepared to undertake any cultivation, could obtain 
plots of land. Nevertheless the former group had priority over all other 
groups. The acquirers of land had to pay off the price of the land in 
25 annual interest-free instalments.
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The process of distribution of Crown lands took almost eleven years 
(1951-62), and during these years around 517 villages were distributed 
among 42,000 peasants. With regard to the relations of production, 
there is no doubt that the position of these farmers changed, i.e. they 
were raised to the position of the ownership of land. Apparently, one 
of the main purposes of undertaking such a limited reform was to create 
a stratum of peasantry which would support the Court. That is, 'the 
land distribution programme meant more to the Shah than a mere manifestation 
of progressiveness. It was a social measure designed to secure his 
popularity among the rural population, but especially with the politically 
active urban middle-class that was gathered.around the nationalist 
Mossadeq, the clerical Kashani, and the Tudeh-Party.'30 However, this 
attempt embraced only a limited number of Crown estates. 'All had been 
done except for the distribution of the royal estates in Jiroft, •>., 
certain forest and pasture tracts without habitation on cultivation were * 
also excluded. Other lands which had not been distributed were those 
registered in the name of the King and held jointly by the royal land and 
the public in Mazandaran, Gorgan and Bojnurd.'31 To sum up, one may 
state that the distribution of some of the Crown lands had a negligible 
impact on rural Iran, due to the fact that it embraced only 0.01% of the 
villages in the country.
Distribution of Public Domain
As already stated, around 2,000 villages throughout the country, 
belonged to the State. In the late 1940s, an attempt was made to 
distribute some of these villages, with the aim of fostering peasant 
proprietorship. This attempt failed, mainly due to the fact that a part 
of the distributed lands was acquired by merchants and landowners.32 
However, the distribution of Public Domain really started in 1959 In 
the previous year a bill was passed by the Mac lie (the lower house) and 
Senate without being opposed by the landlords’ representatives. It
175
envisaged the distribution of these estates among the peasants cultivating 
them.
The distribution of the Public Domain, when it was finally finished
in 1971, took almost 14 years to complete. In the earlier years, the
distribution took place under a special law stated in the bill of 1958.
However, when the nation-wide L-R was started in 1962, the law gave the
Ministry of Agriculture authority to sell the Public Domain land to
villagers not under the special law for the State lands but under the
33sanction of the later law governing the private lands. We shall
examine these laws and regulations below. However, it is worth noting
that, by 1971, around 536 wholly and 263 partially-owned villages had
34been distributed among 90,413 peasant families.
The Nation-Wide Land Reform of 1962: Iran in the Second Half of the 1950s
The above cited attenpts at L-R were never nation-wide. Nevertheless, 
they provided the basis for the nation-wide L-R in 1962. As we shall 
show below, the latter L-R brought about considerable changes in the 
relations of production in rural Iran. As the L-R was in part a response 
to economic and political crises in Iran during the second half of the 
1950s, we shall first attempt to explain the nature of the latter crises.
The Economic Situation in Iran after the Coup of 1953
In the late 1950s, Iran still had an economic system in which 
agriculture was the major sector. Non-oil exports were almost exclusively 
conposed of agricultural products. Of the total population of 18,954,704, 
in 1956, 54.8% were involved in the agricultural sector, while 19.6% and 
23.0% were engaged in industrial and services sectors respectively.
This period witnessed a rapid expansion of the industrial sector: the 
number of factories and repair shops increased more than threefold from 
2305 in 1955 to 8234 in 1960. But the number of employees employed by 
these factories was less than doubled from 82409 in 1955 to 133874 in 
1960.^ There did not exist any form of heavy industry. Apart from
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the construction industry, the other factories were solely engaged in
producing simple consumer goods such as sugar, vegetable oil, glass, soap,
textiles, matches and cigarettes. Textiles, food processing and
construction were the main industries in terms of production as well as
employment. Although there are no data available to illustrate the share
of industrial sector (other than oil) in the GNP,it has been reported that
by the end of the Second plan, September 1962, industrial production
. 37accounted for 13-14 per cent of domestic production.
The agricultural sector, as the main sector of the economy, embraced 
around 10.1 million people aged 10 years and over. However, around four 
million of them were engaged in agricultural production, while five million
were economically inactive, and the rest were engaged in non-agricultural
38production in the rural areas. The main products were wheat, barley, 
rice, different spices and different varieties of beans. Cash crops such 
as cotton, tobacco, sugar beet and oil seeds were produced for domestic 
consumption as well as for exports. Generally speaking, bearing in mind 
the relations/forcesof production in rural Iran and also the types of 
products one may state that the supply of these products was to a considerable 
extent inelastic in relation to the quantitative changes in demand. This 
inelasticity brought about some problems for the country during these years.
The Coup government had two immediate tasks to perform: at the 
political level the suppression of all opposition groups, and at the 
economic level restoration of the economy to benefit its supporters, the 
landlords, comprador bourgeoisie (mainly merchants) and also the new 
"middle class". The new government totally ignored all anti-feudal 
decrees issued by Dr. Mossadeq for almost two years. In the
summer 1955, a new law was promulgated which favoured the landlords; 
practically nullifying a 10% increase in the peasants* share of the total 
produce. In addition, according to Mossadeq's decrees, landlords had to 
hand over 10% of their income (from agriculture) to the rural councils for 
development purposes; but the new law reduced this share to 5%. Moreover,
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the new law reaffirmed the two main aspects of the feudal relations of 
production in rural Iran, labour service and insecurity of tenancy.
That is to say, the law of 1955, not only ignored the abolition of labour 
service but also provided the peasantry with no security of tenure.
One year later, in August 1956, the "Law of Social Welfare and 
Development of Villages" was ratified by the Majlis. Like the preceding 
law, that of 1956 did not make any change in the relations of production. 
Furthermore, Gharachedaghi, states that, ’no attempt was made here to 
change the peasant's or the landlord! share of the harvest as stipulated 
in Article 3 of the law of July 1955. It provided for a small change in 
Mossadeq's planned communal administration.' Apart from the above cited 
laws, the government did not take any measures to change landed property 
until 1959. In this year a L-R bill was presented to the Majlis and 
Senate. As will be explained below, the bill was eventually passed by 
the houses although it was ill-conceived and badly drafted.
In spite of the backwardness of the agricultural and industrial 
sectors, the government's activities were mainly oriented towards the 
expansion of foreign trade, of the services sector and the infrastructure 
network of the country. The rapid expansion of the services sector and 
the infrastructure was possible only after 1954, that is, s iece the time 
the government received oil revenues and substantial amounts of domestic 
and foreign borrowing on a growing scale.
During 1954-60 the government had a form of "open door" import policy.
40Apparently, consumer goods constituted the m a m  item in the import bill.
Due to the inelasticity of the supply of consumer goods, the country had 
to import all varieties of foodstuffs as well as luxury goods to satisfy 
domestic demands. Capital and intermediate goods were imported but on 
a considerably smaller scale than were consumer goods.
Agricultural *. exports consisted of raisins, dried apricot, dried 
prunes, dates, walnuts, almonds, pistachios, cotton and carpets. However,
j
the main export item was oil. On the question of the limited potential
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of the Iranian non-oil exports Baldwin writes: ’the quality of Iran's
citrus is too low to find a place in international markets... High
internal transport costs combined with high production costs (reflecting
low yields) make it unrealistic to look for any significant widening of
fresh fruits exports for many years... For dried fruits the main problem
is not production but proper processing, grinding, packaging and market- 
. ,41promotion.
Despite the fact that oil production and therefore its export were 
growing rapidly during the second half of the 1950s, imports expanded 
much faster than the total exports. Obviously the gap had to be filled 
in one way or another. Baldwin distinguished three ways of covering 
the deficits in the balance of payments (due to trade deficits and 
repayments of foreign loans). They include: a) drawing on reserves of 
foreign exchange or gold which were accumulated in earlier years, b) 
obtaining gifts of foreign exchange, and c) going into debt. He adds 
that, 'since Iran began the post-Mossadeq period with no reserves of 
exchange or gold, it has had to rely heavily on foreign aid and foreign 
loans.' In short, liberal trade policy and also needs for funds for 
development projects drove the country into debt. The Table XX below 
clearly supports this.
During the second seven-year Plan (1955-62) the governnsnt mainly 
concentrated on the construction of roads, dams, airports and railways. 
Obviously these projects significantly increased the purchasing power of 
the economy without simultaneously resulting in a proportionate increase 
in domestic production. The expansion of the banking system was also 
strongly encouraged by the government. Thus between 1956 and 1960, 
fifteen new banks were established. In addition to the above
developnental projects and current expenditures, defence expenditures 
were a heavy burden on the shoulder of the government. On average, 
defence and police expenditures constituted around 40% of tte budget. 
These expenditures appeared to be main cause of deficit in the budget,
TABLE XX
Iran*3 Balance of Payments for Eight Years, Beginning in 1954 (million $)
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
A. Imports 138.2 206.7 229.6 280.2 370.7 440.5 473.7 484.1
B. Exports (non-oil) 108.3 82.1 89.6 98.4 86.3 96.8 95.7 106.0
Trade deficit 29.9 124.6 140.0 181.8 284.4 343.7« 378.0 378.1
C. Other foreign
exchange payments 7.5 43.3 70.1 84.4 88.1 89.9 79.5 70.6
D. Trade deficit plus
other nondebt payments 37.4 167.9 210. o 266.2 372.5 433.6 457.5 448.7
E. Oil earnings 30.4 126.5 180.7 256.0 340.0 319.1 335.5 355.7
F. Foreign exchange deficit 
from earnings (D-E) 7.0 41.4 29.4 10.2 32.5 114.5 122.0 93.0
G. Debt repayments
(Govt, loans only) - 8.8 3.2 - 77.2 39.8 53.3 29.6
H. "Earned" exchange deficit 
plus debt repayments (F+G) 7.0 50.2 32.6 10.2 109.7 154.3 175.3 132.6
I. Foreign aid and loans 50.0 71.8 86.8 116.5 57.2 80.0 91.8 76.2
J. Increase (-decrease) in 
reserves 43.0 21.6 54.2 106.3 -52.5 -74.3 -83.5 -66.4
Source: Balwin, 1967
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especially after the Coup in Iraq in 1958, which caused the government
to feel more insecure internally than before. Thus, according to the
Economist, '... after the Iraq revolution in 1958, it was decided to
spend a lot more money on the army and the security forces, ... The
army and internal security, have been costing -about £65 million a year -
excluding the military hardware given by the Americans - and the Plan has
been costing about £50 million a year.' It is noteworthy that American
military aid to Iran did not help to cover the budget deficits: 'the
greatly expanded Army is costly and so a serious drain on the budget,
but American aid is not designed to bridge the budget deficit. American
44advisors are numerous and highly paid, ...'
There were three sources to cover the budget deficits. They included:
diverting certain amounts of oil revenues from the Plan Organization
budget to the government's ordinary budget; borrowing from the banks within
the country; and finally, borrowing from other countries, international
banks etc. Monetization of earned foreign exchange and oil revenues,
liberal credit policy and also spending on non-productive projects caused
an increase of 88% in the money supply. The real annual rate of growth
45of GNP was around 6% during 1956-1960.
The economic policy of the Iranian government brought about a form 
of "prosperity" for over two years, i.e. 1957-1959. Thus, thanks to the 
massive inports of foodstuffs and luxury goods, the general index of 
wholesale prices rose by only 9%; however, the wholesale price index of 
home-produced and also services increased at a much higher rate than the 
general index.^ In addition, the state's policy did not induce the
private sector to invest in productive activities, rather it diverted 
private investors into land and real estate speculation, trade and banking.
However, the "prosperous economy" turned into an "inflationary 
economy" after 1959. The cost of living index rose by 26.5% during 
1959-60.^ For the salaried and wage-earner groups in the urban centres 
(especially in Tehran), skyrocketing land values and exorbitant rents
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constituted the largest b u r d e n . S h o r t a g e  of foodstuffs became severe 
during these years due to abnormally sparse rainfall. This crisis in 
the rural areas caused a mass migration of peasants to the urban centres. 
According to a report ’... substantial numbers of peasants leave their
villages for the main towns where there are more jobs and higher wages.
• • AQBut the young industries cannot absorb so much unskilled labour.
The young industries were affected by the government's trade and 
credit policies in two different ways: On the one hand, these policies 
did not create any motivation for investing in industries (other than the 
construction industry), while on the other hand, many domestic producers 
could not compete with the imported goods. In effect, the latter factor 
brought about stagnation and in some cases bankruptcy for the young 
industries. For example in January 1960, owners of the Iranian textile 
industries, in a letter to the Prime Minister, wrote how "the Iranian 
textile factories were in a bad condition and situated in the border of 
bankruptcy". They demanded some measures to be taken to protect home 
industries, to ban the exports of cotton and imports of cloths.^
Finally the government was faced with another serious problem: 
shortage of foreign exchange. On the one hand, in the previous years, 
different ministries and government agencies borrowed directly without 
any co-ordination at the national level. It created, therefore, 
repayment problems, when ’it became clear that much of the uncontrolled 
borrowing consisted of medium-term suppliers’ credits that would require 
heavily bunched debt repayments over the next few y e a r s . O n  the other 
hand, the IMF and World Bank supported by the United States, refused to 
provide further loans, More loans would be provided if the Iranian 
government adopted a program of economic stabilization.
Being faced with these problems, Dr. Eqbal, the Prime Minister, 
attempt to make some reforms and at the same time stabilize his own 
government. In connection with the anti-corruption Bill, in late 1959, 
the government sent a L-R bill to the Majlis. The L-R bill was ill-
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conceived and badly drafted, and remained a dead letter. Meanwhile, 
riots began to appear in Tehran and some other cities.
In the summer of 1960 the general elections to the Majlis were held
which could have saved Eqbal's cabinet. All members of different groups
and parties affiliated to the National Front were banned from standing as
candidates. Nevertheless, the elections were to be fought on a party
basis. There were a few independent candidates but the contestants
52 53belonged in the main to either the Milliyun Party or to the Mardum Party. 
The elections were so flagrantly dishonest, that at his monthly press 
conference, the Shah'admitted that he was disappointed with conduct of the 
recent elections to the Majlis, ... They had not, he affirmed, been truly 
free or democratic, . ..'5^ The Prime Minister, Dr. Eqbal, had to resign 
on August 28, 1960, due to the Shah's charges as well as the continuing 
demonstrations and protests of the opposition groups. The day after, Dr. 
Sharif-Emami was appointed Prime Minister.
The new Prime Minister more or less continued the policy of Dr.
Eqbal, hence he did not manage to sort out the economic and political 
crisis. In February, 1961, the elections to the Majlis were reheld. 
Comparing the new elections to the previous attempts, the correspondent 
of "The Economist" reported: 'The first elections, in August (1960), 
were so fragrantly dishonest and so loudly criticised that a second 
attempt was made early this year (i.e. 1961); this time there was less 
criticism but, apparently, not much less cheating.'55 The Prime Minister 
tried to enforce a mild austerity programme, but he failed. Finally, 
after nine months in office, he had to resign on May 5, 1961, because 
'in its (Sharif-Emami's government) last weeks it was harassed by strikes, 
first of university students and then of teachers. When a teacher was 
killed during a clash with the police on May 2nd, the rumbling against 
the government became dangerous, and the Shah, ... has acted with the cool 
initiative that he has shown in previous crises.'56 On the same day, the 
Shah, despite his reluctance, appointed Dr. Ali Amini as Prime Minister.
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The economic and monetary crisis absorbed much of the new Prime 
Minister's effort in the first two months. Three days after his 
appointment in a broadcast to the nation, he disclosed that 'the treasury 
is facing a shortage of money, mainly because of "past excess and large 
scale corruption in Government expenditures". He spoke of measures to 
fight corruption and the need for austerity as the answer.»57 On May 
11, he announced a 15-point Government programme, including land reform, 
cuts in state spending, a lowering of the cost of l i v i n g  and anti-corruption 
measures. 'Under the new programme, prices will be lowered and imports 
and exports balanced. Unnecessary and luxury imports will be stopped.
The Government will be decentralized, and provinces will be given greater 
autonomy. Land ownership will be limited and big estates split among the 
peasants. Farming methods and the tax collecting system will be improved.’5® 
The Majlis and Senate were dominated by the representatives of the 
feudal landlords, who blocked any form of L-R. The remarkable example is 
the nullification of the L-R bill of 1960. The bill was presented to 
both houses on December 5, 1959 by the Eqbal Cabinet. After six months' 
struggle in the Moolis and Senate between representatives of the 
Government and the proper committees, the bill was eventually passed 
although it was ill-conceived and badly drafted.59 Having been aware of 
this obstacle Dr. Amini made the dissolution of both houses a pre­
condition to any reform.60 Thus, on May 9, 1961, the Shah dissolved both 
the Majlis and Senate by special decree on the grounds that 'no obstacle 
should hinder the strong Government appointed to institute fundamental 
reforms and ... without amendment of the electoral law a properly elected 
Majlis is impossible.'61 During the absence of the houses, the country 
was to be ruled by decree. This move gave Amini's Cabinet a free hand 
among other things, to make amendments to the laws of L-R of 1960 In 
the meantime, the Cabinet started preparing the technical foundations for 
launching L-R. Hence on October 5, 1961, a small and carefully chosen 
team of officials were sent to the Maragheh area to carry out a land
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survey.
However, the dissolution of both houses did not mean that the 
opposition groups gave in. In fact the opposition was composed of 
different groups, each with a different social status. Generally 
speaking, one can distinguish the following three opposition groups: 
the Tudeh Party, the National Front, and the most important of all, 
the landowning class. Here we shall explain the disputes each of them 
had with the Government.
With regard to the Tudeh Party, the land programme of 1952 (see
above) was reaffirmed in October 1960 by the first plenum of the Central
63Committee. However, the government's general orientation, after the 
Coup t was to ensure internal security for the regime. In order to do 
this, all organizations, affiliated to this party, were suppressed and 
many of its leaders and militant cadres imprisoned or executed.^ The 
execution or imprisonment of many Tudeh Party members and the flight of 
some others resulted in the almost total annihilation of the party within 
the country. The party's slogans and propaganda, therefore, could not 
have been effective in mobilizing the peasantry against the regime. Yet 
the party feared that the success of L-R program would strengthen the 
regime and make the peasantry less receptive to its propaganda.
According to the party, the L-R program was '...a trick of the Shah, 
backed by the Western imperialists to fool the Iranian public and to 
postpone the day of reckoning.
The National Front was a loose composition of various "nationalist
parties". The latter were supported mainly by merchants, the petty
bourgeoisie (producers and non-producers), the intelligentsia, students
and also state employees. After the Coup in 1953, all National Front
parties were suppressed and banned from having any form of political
activities. However, by 1959-60, the National Front restarted its
political activities, mainly due to the economic and political instability 
66of the regime.
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The National Front's protests during 1959-62, appeared mainly in the 
form of demonstrations on the part of teachers and university students.
During this whole period, the front insisted on the holding of general elections. 
The Economist's correspondent, in February, 1962, reported that, 'a policy 
of economic austerity and the dragging of government feet in bringing the 
corrupt to justice (...) sharpen the quarrel, but the real issue is over 
e l e c t i o n s The front hoped to gain power by winning Majlis seats.
The Amini government was considered by the front to be unconstitutional.
The leaders of the front declared that 'although the Shah's decree 
dissolving the chamber waiver this clause in the constitution, ... (they) 
do not recognise the validity of the waiver, and that from June 19th they
• g g
will regard Dr. Amini's government as being a breach of the law.'
Furthermore, the front in one statement strongly protested against running
the country's affairs by decree: 'Warning is given that the instructions
issued from His Imperial Majesty's Bureau concerning the enactment and
modification of laws without Parliamentary approval cannot be considered
in the best interests of the Throne and must be deemed contrary to the
clear purport of the Fundamental Law...'^
Generally speaking, the National Front kept demanding general
elections, without proposing any program for social reforms. This made
the front not only vulnerable to the manoeuvre of Dr. Amini in the
political scene, but also resulted in their losing some of their supporters.
The Prime Minister first promised to hold general elections in six months
time. He also promised the front leaders that they would be allowed to
participate in the next elections. Thus on May 18, 1961, Dr. Amini
allowed the opposition National Front Party to assemble to register their
demands for immediate elections.^0 In his meeting with the front leaders
in June 1961, the Prime Minister managed to convince the leaders that if
his government was brought down by their agitations, it would inevitably
lead to a military dictatorship with the Shah at the head of the Army,
71helped by a strong body of military advisors. On the other hand, the
Government, while fighting on the other fronts, managed to lessen the
pressure from the National Front. However, later on, i.e. when the
Government was more or less stabilized, the Prime Minister attacked the
front leaders and ordered the suppression of demonstrations and arrested
front members. He declined to hold elections and justified this by
saying that elections held at the wrong time and in the wrong circumstances
were a source of trouble. It was essential first to create the right
atmosphere. This might take another six months or even longer. By the
right atmosphere, Dr. Amini explained, he meant a situation wherein
corruption had been further discouraged, the country's economy had further
72improved, and a fresh start had been made in L-R. It is worth saying 
that the Amini Cabinet, by announcing some other social reforms, such as 
a campaign against ; illiteracy, managed to obtain some support from
the intelligentsia (especially teachers and students). This obviously 
made the position of the front vis-a-vis the Prime Minister weaker.
Broadly speaking, the opposition of the National Front could not 
pose a serious problem for the reform Cabinet due to the following reasons. 
The front was not a solid and organized party; being threatened by a 
right-wing coup, they had to some extent to support Dr. Amini; and finally 
the front did not have any program for social reforms and therefore it 
not only lost some of its supporters, but also failed to get the support 
of the peasants and workers.
The opposition mainly came from the landowning class which had 
influence in the Parliament, Army and the Clergy. The landowning class 
opposed the L-R programme simply because it would undermine its politico- 
economic position as one of the dominant classes. The landlords tried 
to block the programme in one way or another during the whole of the 
period from 1959 (in the Majlis) up to 1963 (the second stage of L-R).
As the Majlis and Senate were dominated by the representatives of the 
landowning class, any attempt at any form of L-R would not have been 
ratified by both houses. Bearing in mind this obstacle, the Cabinets
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of Dr. Eqbal and Sharif-Emami, by holding two general elections, tried to
have selected representatives of their own in both houses. However, both
of these attempts, as we saw, failed. Having been aware-of these attempts,
Dr. Amini accepted the premiership, provided the Majlis and Senate be
dissolved. As a matter of fact, the dissolution of the houses was the
first attempt to block the power of the landowning class.
The second major step was to dismiss the anti-government elements
within the Army. Although the Shah was in control, of the Army by that
time, there were some top rank generals who, explicitly or tacitly,
disagreed with the reforms of the Government. Dr. Amini's anti corruption
decree was, in effect, used mainly to remove these generals from their
posts. The cprrespondent of the Economist reported that 'there was
considerable effervescence in the Army because five generals were arrested
73without similar action being taken against civilian or equivalent rank.'
74During 1961-62, as many as 33 generals and 270 colonels were retired. 
However, a few of these generals were arrested on a charge of corruption. 
The dismissal of generals, naturally, created some restlessness within the 
Army, and increased rumours of a possible coup against the Government.
Hence when the Shah returned home -on May 31, 1961 from his European tour, 
the Prime Minister had a three-hour talk with him '... during which, it is 
understood, he gave a full account of recent rumours alleging a plot 
against the Government or a possible Coup d'etat. I t  is worth stating 
that the rumours of a coup were mainly against Amini's government rather 
than against the Shah. However, they died out ’after Dr. Amini said 
that there was no need for a military coup in order to oust him from the
office. "I shall go any time His Imperial Majesty relieves me," he
.. ,76 said.
The dismissal of the opposition element was carried out during Amini's 
premiership. However, the Shah-Amini clique took full control of the 
army, only when General Bakhtiar, the former chief of SAVAK who had close
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links with the landlords and Bakhtiari tribes, was sacked and sent out 
of the country in January, 1962.
With dissolution of the houses of Parliament and also dismissal of 
generals, the opposition of the landowning class, was reduced practically 
to a few isolated cases of individual attempts. But they were shortlived. 
Some major landlords proposed different forms of resistance to the work of 
the L-R officials. When the land distribution started, for the first time 
in Maragheh, 'a landlord expelled peasants from their houses in his 
village and destroyed the houses ... In another village, four squatters 
who had received many favours from the landlords, started an anti-lfcnd 
reform demonstration on his behest... In a third village, the son of the 
landlord threw peasants out of the village and sexually attacked their 
wives and d a u g h t e r s . I n  some other cases, some landlords tried to 
bribe the L-R officials/or threatened them not to come in their villages. 
Generally speaking, the landlords as a class never rebelled against the 
Government, and their attempts at the political level failed. That is 
to say, ’an attempt to re-establish the landlords’ Association, which had 
so effectively blocked the reforms of 1946 and 1960, was countered by a 
warning to its leadership that prompt action would be taken against it if
78there were any attempt to interfere in the operation of the land reform.' 
Dr. Arsanjani, Minister of Agriculture, threatened that he would persuade 
the peasants to rebel against their landlords, if the latter tried to 
block the activities of land distribution. Later on, i.e. in Summer 
1963, the Minister of Agriculture arranged the "Farmers’ Congress" in 
Tehran to demonstrate the solidarity of the peasants behind his programme. 
Having failed to block the progress of the L-R implementation, the 
landlords mainly resorted to evade the L-R laws in different ways. As 
will be explained below, each landlord could hold one village. Hence, a 
common method of evading the laws, was to hold up the choice of the 
'•chosen" village in the hope of obtaining revenue from two villages for a 
short period of time. The second method was to antedate the transfer of
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estates to family members. Finally, since the mechanized lands were
exempted from the distribution, some other landlords forced the peasants
to sell their right of use of land, i.e. nasaq% and declared that their
79estates were mechanized and worked by agricultural wage-labourers.
If the feudal landlords did not undertake any form of armed 
resistance, some tribal leaders in the province of Fars, unsuccessfully, 
tried to block the land distribution by armed resistance. The Qashqai, 
Mamasani, Sorkhi, and the Boyer Ahmadi tribes were involved in the 
clashes. Their opposition began to appear in the late 1962, when a land 
reform official was killed allegedly in the course of his work for the 
L-R Organization. The incident provided the Government with an 
opportunity to take some stronger measures against these rebellion leaders. 
Martial law was declared and a hard .line general was appointed as Governor- 
General of the province. In early 1963, the Gendarmerie was reinforced 
by the Army. The rebellious tribes were encircled by the armed forces 
and attacked from the air. On the other hand, the L-R law was made 
applicable to the whole of the Fars province and the Government announced 
that the estates of the rebellious tribal leaders would be distributed 
among the peasants without any compensation.
During 1963, some clashes occurred between the Army and armed tribes, 
and some '... casualties occurred on both sides but most tribal leaders
were finally brought to terms and agreed to go along with the government's
©0 # programme.' However, the backbone of the armed resistance by the above tribes
was broken when in June 1963, the leader of the Mamasani tribe was 
fitkilled. 1
The other group which strongly opposed to the L-R programme (and also 
other reform programmes of the Government) was the clergy. As already 
shown, there were around 6,000 villages endowed to the holy shrines and 
mosques. The organization in charge of running these estates (and some 
other properties), the Vaqf Organization, was under the control of the 
religious leaders. Obviously, any programme for L-R and secularization
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of the populace meant to them the loss of their economic as well as
political influence. That is why, during 1959-63, they strongly opposed
any reform by the government. The religious leaders, backed by the
landlords and merchants and the petty bourgeoisie (in the bazaar),
n e u t r a l iz e d  th e  L -R  b i l l  o f  1960 .
Having been aware of the anti-reform tendencies of the religious
leaders, the Government decided, for time being, to exclude the Vaqf lands
from the distribution in the first stage of L-R of 1962. This policy
silenced the religious leaders, more or less, during the implementation of
the first stage and the announcement of the second stage.
On December 11, 1962, in the holy city of Mashhad, the Shah for the
first time disclosed that the Vaqf lands were due to be let to the
peasants. On January 22, 1963, the Prime Minister, Mr. Alam, informed
one of the influential religious leaders, the Government's intention to
rent out on long term leases Vaqf lands to the peasants working on them.
'On the same day, after a number of the religious classes had gone to
Ayatyllah Bihbahani’s house, apparently to protest against the inclusion
82of Vaqf land in the land reform law, the Tehran bazaar was closed...'
In the same month, Ayatyllah Bihbahani replied to the Prime Minister that
83he could not remain silent over the question of vaqf lands.
The religious leaders protested about the L-R, on the ground that 
L-R was contrary to Islam, which guaranteed the santity of private 
property. On the other hand, the officials referred to Article 90 of 
Civil code under which "endowed lands can always be changed for the 
better", i.e. sold for cash. By resorting to the article, the Minister 
of Agriculture appointed teams for collecting information and working on 
an experimental basis in one or two religious endowed villages.
Following the Government's announcement on distributing Vaqf lands 
riots broke out in the first months of 1963 in some of the cities, 
including Qum, Shiraz, Mashhad, Tabriz and Tehran. The main incident 
were three-day riots in Tehran, Qum and Shiraz. The followers of
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ayatullahs took to the streets and protested against the L-R and the right 
for the women to vote. These riots were ruthlessly suppressed by the 
security forces.
The Government, determined to carry on with its programmes, showed 
its strength not only by the security forces, but also by its supporters 
(peasants in«particular). Thus the Economist correspondent reported that 
'peasants and workers were solidly behind the referendum ... peasants, 
bent on becoming owners of their own landt were unimpressed by Koran 
quotations dug up to prove that land reform violated the tenets of Islam. 
The Mullahs made no headway, and the Shah drove the point home by appearing 
in the religious city of Qum two days before the referendum to distribute 
land to peasants in the area.' In spite of this sort of manoeuvre and 
the Government's announcement on distributing vaq/-lands, the Government 
was too cautious to touch these lands. Thus nine months after the 
beginning of the second stage of L-R, the Correspondent of the Times 
reported from the holy city of Mashhad that '... a state of watchfulness 
has set in between Government and Clergy. The properties and revenues of 
the Church (i.e. Vaqf Organization) have not been touched yet by land 
reform, and the decision whether or when they will be is being tacitly 
put off by both sides. Lieutenant-General Amir Azizi, the Governor- 
General of Khorasan, ..., says Church property will in the end be affected, 
Ayatullah Kafai Khorasani, who at present leads the mullahs there, says it 
will not.'^
Finally, on the power struggle between the Government (supported by 
some urban groups) and the opposition (including all groups mentioned 
above) we should draw the reader's attention to the enthusiasm of the 
peasants for land which heartened the officials during the first years of 
the implementation of L-R. In accordance with the massive propaganda 
done by the Government, the peasants of different regions started buying 
transistor radio sets. This helped the peasants to grow, more restless.
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Thus after the L-R began in some villages, the landlords, fearing getting
killed, did not dare go to their villages. For example, the peasants of
K o le h -J u b ' Olya, at the first withheld payment of rent, but the owner managed
to get his share by force. However, in the following year, i.e. 1964, the
landlord, afraid to go himself, sent his brother to the village to collect
the rent. ' In many other villages (especially in Azarbaijan region),
the peasants simply refused to hand over the landlords' share. When the
land reform officials remonstrated with them, they merely answered "the Shah
says that the land is ours and that we should not pay the landowners' share",
87and refused to listen to anything to the contrary.
In spite of the fact that in some provinces, such as Kirman, Fars, in
which peasants did not show their anti-landlord feelings (e.g. see Lambton
1969, pp. 147-49), the peasants generally showed their hatred of the
landlords to such an extent that on one occasion the Minister of Agriculture,
Dr. Arsanjani, said: 'When we started, landlords would not allow our officials
in their villages, but most of the landlords have to be protected by our
0fficial8 when entering their own villages against possible peasnat attacks. 1
Having been heartened by such a mass support, Dr. Arsanjani replied to the
opposition within the Cabinet (i.e. Ministers of War and the Interior), by
stating that: 'I don't need the landlords. I don't need the Ministry of the
Interior. I don't need the gendarmerie. It is the peasants that will make
89land-reform successful.' However, as we shall discuss below, the peasants' 
enthusiasm for land caused a headache for the Government which wanted a 
limited L-R.
What were the causes of L-R in Iran? According to one study the main 
cause of the reform in Iran, was the contradiction between feudal landlords 
(as one of the dominant classes) and imperialism (and its internal ally the 
comprador bourgeoisie): 'the land reform can only be adequately analysed 
within the context of changes which were taking place in the system of world 
imperialism as a whole.' In order to expand the interests of neo-colonialism 
in Iran and also to enable Iran toplay its role in world imperialism, it was
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necessary to get rid of feudalism in the country. The contradiction 
between world imperialism and feudalism (in Iran) arose mainly for the 
following reasons:
a) in a feudal social formation, the overwhelming majority of the 
labour force is engaged in agriculture, whereas imperialism requires more 
and more the labour force for work on assembly lines;
b) consumption in a feudal social formation is confined to 
localized production and also money transactions are limited, therefore 
imperialist products have no place in the markets of this system;
c) the feudal system is not market-oriented and produces mainly for 
local (village) consumption, hence the system is not able to provide 
imperialism with raw materials;
d) with the dominance of the FMP in the rural social formation, 
it is extremely difficult for imperialism to invest in agriculture.5)1
The above argument suffers from one major inadequacy, i.e. the 
economic reasons for L-R are explained at a highly abstract level. In 
addition, while in this "abstract model" imperialism, as an external 
factor plays the major role, the internal factors play no role at all.
However, with regard to Iran, the following comments should be made. 
First, the FMP was not the only mode of production in rural Iran (as 
implied in the above model); in effect we have argued that an articulated 
combination of different modes of production was dominant in rural Iran. 
The peasants were not tied to the land, and hence the industrial and 
service sectors could have been supplied with cheap labour. (As a matter 
of fact, rural-urban migrations took place during the second half of the 
1950s.) Secondly, commodities (and not necessarily inperialists' 
products) had already penetrated into the rural markets. Hence, the 
fact that the market for consumer commodities was extremely limited, was 
something mainly due to the abject poverty of the masses of the peasantry 
and not to the feudal system as considered in the model. Furthermore, 
in the model it is implied that the implementat ion of L-R (and therefore
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the removal of the feudal system) would automatically expand the market 
for consumer commodities (or using their own terms: imperialists' 
products). Bearing in mind however that the masses of the peasantry 
lived under/or at the subsistence level, one cannot expect that L-R 
would cause the demands of these masses for "Imperialist's products" to 
be increased. Finally, our argument, quite clearly, showed that the 
Iranian rural social formation was open to the "Prussian way of capitalist 
development". This means that not only indigeneous capitalists and 
feudal landlords, but also foreign investors could invest in the 
agricultural sector. In effect this process had already started, but 
L-R only accelerated it. In short, although the contradiction between 
the feudal landlords and comprador bourgeoisie ("imperialism") was one of 
the main causes of the implementation of L-R in Iran, the economic reasons 
for this contradiction given by the G.O.P.F. seem unrealistic.
For Ivanov the struggle between the peasants on the one hand and
feudal landlords on the other, drove the Government to take some anti-
feudal measures. A few years after the suppression of all democratic
movements by the Coup government in 1953, peasants' revolts took place
sporadically. However, by 1960, these "anti-feudal" revolts occurred
to a larger extent (for the examples see Ivanov 1977, pp. 209-10).
Ivanov refers to a statement of Dr. Amini, who addressed the landlords
and said: "You should yourselves agree with the distribution of your
estates, otherwise you would lose your lands as well as your lives”,
and states that the L-R of 1962 was mainly to block the expansion of 
92these revolts.
Although the peasants' revolts can be considered as the main reason 
for undertaking a L-R, Ivanov's argument suffers from the following 
inadequacies. First, in spite of the fact that Ivanov provides us with 
some examples of revolts in different parts of the country, these 
examples do not mirror the scale of these revolts. in addition, Ivanov 
does not explain whether or not these movements were organized. It
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appears that these revolts were far from being a national peasant 
uprising, that is, they took place at the village or local level.
Moreover, these movements were spontaneous and inspired by no (left-wing) 
political organization. * • . We believe that the above
cited statements by the officials cannot be considered as firm evidence 
for showing the scale and nature of these movements.
In order to find reasons for the nation-wide L-R of 1962, it appears 
that one should look for a combination of different contradictions 
existing between different social classes and strata in the Iranian 
social formation. The economic crisis of 1959-61 affected all subsectors 
of the economy: trade, industry agriculture as well as the state budget.
The economic crisis brought about a political instability in the country. 
Thus demonstrations, riots, strikes and peasants revolts occurred now and 
again throughout the country. In addition there were signs of restlessness 
within the Army, upon which the ruling clique (the Court - the Cab iiet) was 
dependent. At the same time, the Kennedy Administration urged the 
Iranian government to carry out necessary reforms in order to stave off 
popular unrest.^ This conjuncture weakened the position of the ruling 
clique. It made an attempt to take some measures (e.g. L-R of 1960), but 
failed due to the opposition of landowning class within the Majlis and 
Senate. While the economic and political crisis continued to become 
worse, the Court-Government tried to remove the opposition within the 
houses of Parliament (general elections of 1960) but once again it fa Red. 
At this conjuncture, we witnessed a split in the clique: thus the Shah, for 
the time being, dismissed the Cabinet, and despite his reluctance asked 
Dr. Amini and Dr. Arsanjani to undertake some social reforms. This 
shortlived alliance between the Court and Amini/Arsanjani made the 
position of both cliques stronger vis-a-vis the heterogeneous opposition 
groups. The alliance of Court-Amini/Arsanjani prepared the ground for 
reforms: at the political level by the dissolution of the Majlis and 
Senate and the removal of powerful generals in the Army, and at the
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economic level by controlling imports and state expenditures, borrowing 
loans from abroad and preparing the ground for the Third Development Plan.
But why did they undertake (anti-feudal) L-R measures? The 
combination of the following factors may be considered as the reasons for 
the implementation of L-R in Iran: discouragement of rural-urban mass 
migration; the staving off of peasant's unrest (although it was as yet 
limited); removal of obstacles to the development of CMP in the agricultural 
sector; hence encouragement of investment in this sector; reinforcing 
the social base of the ruling clique by obtaining the support of the 
peasantry and petty bourgeouisie.
In such an economic and political crisis and after preparing
the necessary regulations for the execution of L-R, the council of L-R was
formed, under the chairmanship of the ministry of agriculture, to supervise
the implementation of L-R. It was put into operation in Maragheh, an
area in Azarbaijan, allegedly on the ground that '... it is the worst area
in the country, because its landlords are of the type who flogged their
peasants... If we can prove that land reform will work in Maragheh, then
95we have proved that it will work anywhere else...'
T.and Reform Laws : An Interpretation
In the previous part, we briefly examined the economic and political 
situation in Iran before the implementation of L-R of 1962. Then we 
discussed the opposition of different groups to the nation-wide L-R. In 
this part we shall examine the L-R laws in order to discover the nature 
of this L-R.
In Iran the nation-wide L-R was carried out in three main stages, 
each of which had different content and aims. In this part an attempt 
is to be made to analyse the main items of the L-R laws of the first and 
second stages. The purpose of this form of analysis is to discover the 
effect of L-R on the social formation and in particular whether or not 
it had transitional purposes.
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Generally speaking, it appears that the laws of L-R can be classified 
into two different sets. While one set is pertinent to the technical 
aspects of the implementation of the laws, such as condensation or the 
expropriation of land, the assessment of the lands, and the financing of 
the L-R program«, the other set is related to landed property, such as 
laws concerning the redistribution of land and water. The former aspects 
of the L-R have already been examined by many scholars in detail (see for
J?example Lawton 1969, Shams-Zanjani 1973, T.E. Vol. II, Nos. 7 and 8,
U.N. 1966, and Denman 1973)?here we are concerned with the social aspects 
of the L-R.
Land Reform : The first stage
The first stage was, generally speaking, an anti-feudal landlord L-R.
It reduced the maximum land ownership thus:
The maximum landownership allowed to a person in any part 
of the country is an entire (six-dang)^6 village.
Landlords with more than one village may choose one of 
their villages to keep themselves. The remainder will 
be distributed in accordance with the provisions of this 
act. (Article 2)
Obviously, the option to choose a six-dang village (or its equivalent of
six dang8) gave the opportunity to the landlords to choose the best and
97most fertile villages/or parts for themselves. Furthermore, the 
political pressure from the landlords forced the government to give 
another concession to them (see below).
Under Article 6 of the 1962 Laws, the following lands were subject 
to distribution:
a ) Village lands which become surplus as a result of 
enforcement of Articles 2 and 3 of this Act, whether 
or not such lands have been the subject of 
application for registration by the landlord.
b) Barren lands.
c) Uncultivated lands.
Thus, the enforcement of Articles 2, 3 and 6, caused the landlords, owning
more than eix-dangs of the above lands, to lose their posit ims of 
ownership.
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The above lands were to be transferred to the qualified direct- 
producers. That is to say:
The lands of a village will be divided according to the 
agricultural order and farming pattern of the village-, 
and w ill be jointly transferred to the farmers. Should 
the Land Reform Organization deem it necessary, the land 
of the village will be surveyed and will be allocated to 
the farmers in accordance with the agricultural pattern 
and farming order that already exist. (Article 17)
This article, in fact, sanctioned and reinforced the agricultural pattern
and farming order in any village social formation subject to distribution.
Therefore not all direct-producers were eligible to obtain land. The
following priority was given in the distribution of lands:
a) The peasants of the village who worked on the same land 
and who live in the same village.®®
b) The heirs of peasants who have worked on the same land, 
but who died within twelve months prior to the 
distribution of the land.
00 ic) Share-croppers who farm in the same village.
d) Agricultural workers living in the area.
e) Persons volunteering for agricultural work.
Through the above article the differentiation of the peasantry was 
sanctioned and reinforced. That is to say, the fuzsoq-holders with 
means of production (i.e. rich peasants) had the top priority to obtain 
land, while the nasaq~holders without means of production (poor peasants) 
came next, and the agricultural-workers retained their position.*00 
Thus, while the peasants of different strata retained the "old relation­
ship" among themselves, they managed to get rid of the feudal subordinat x>n.
Lambton states that there were practical reasons for transferring 
the land to the naeaq-holders. First, 'to have included agricultural
labourers in the distribution would have involved a change in the field 
lay-out of the village lands, and some degree of survey and neasurenent.
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This would have involved delay and imposed an additional burden on the 
officials of the land reform organization;... A second reason militating 
against transfer to the agricultural labourers was that they did not have 
the means to cultivate the land; and to have required the co-operative 
societies at the outset of the reform to provide them with draught oxen, 
agricultural implements, and seeds would have placed an additional 
burden upon these societies.*101 It appears however that the above 
practical reasons are not as important as the economic and political 
reasons. The L-R law of 1962, included, in fact, a set of anti-feudal 
measures, while at the same time it tried to sanction and reinforce the 
bourgeois relations of production already developed among the peasantry.
It was an act, at the political level, to develop the peasant bourgeoisie. 
That is why the law not only excluded the agricultural labourers, but also 
gave small plots to the masses of the poor peasants (i.e. naso^-holders 
with no means of production) to tie them to the land as the main source 
of labour-power for the rich peasants. Neither was the law an attempt to 
equalize the landovnership among the peasantry; hence the rich peasants 
obtained more land than the poor peasants, while the agricultural 
labourers acquired no land at all.
The Act, furthermore, took some strong measures to protect peasants 
against the landlords. Thus at the economic level, according to Article 
17, Note 1, irrigated land was to be transferred to the nasaq-holders 
together with the water right from qanat and river belonging to it 
according to local custom. According to Article 20, also the landlords 
were responsible for the supply of water; hence it was their duty to pay 
for the maintenance, repair cleaning, and all such work necessary to 
ensure the continued and uninterrupted flow of water in the qanata or water 
well. In addition, in places where water-pumps existed, they had the duty 
to pay the cost of the irrigation motor-pumps. However, it was not 
uncommon to see landlords/or leaseholders declining to perform their 
duties: for example, in Ahvaz-i Qadim (near Ahvaz in Khuzistan), where a
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pump unit had been installed, 'the peasants alleged that water was 
scarce, because after land reform, the pump owner ceased to clean the
u  i  .l02channels•
At the political level, the law prohibited the landlords to dismiss
the nasaq-holAers from the position of possession of land:
All farmers who have been farming on their own land on 
the date of approval of this law, shall be considered 
as inhabitants of the village where the land is 
situated. No landlord, under any circumstances or 
excuse, can expel a peasant from his village or land 
or prevent him from farming on the said land.
(Article 22)
However, in a note to this article, the law permitted the landlords to 
purchase peasant's possession of land, provided they obtain written 
official consent of the peasant. In spite of the fact that this article 
brought about some sort of security for the naso^-holders, the landlords 
were able to evade it. In effect the note to this article can be 
considered a loophole for the landlords, because in practice it was not 
difficult for them to 'persuade' peasants to give their consent to sale of 
land. In some cases, the landlords ignored the law and expelled their 
subjects from their villages.
The law, furthermore, strenghtened the rights of the raao^-holders 
by giving them the permission to register their ownership of a'ycavi 
properties:
Everything that is built or grown on the land by the 
peasant, shall belong to him. The peasant is entitled 
to register them in his own name and obtain title deed 
for them. But the construction of new buildings shall 
henceforth be subject to the written consent of the 
landlord.
Note: In villages which are not subject to land 
distribution, if the peasants wish to build houses for 
themselves, the landlord is required to give each of 
them 500 square meters to build his dwelling place, 
storeroom, and shed as well as to house his cattle.
(Article 25)
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At the juridicial level, the law made an attempt to protect the
nasaq-holders vis-a-vis the landlords. Thus:
Disputes arising between landlord and peasant in 
connection with agricultural work will be settled by 
a Dispute Settlement Board which will be composed in 
every district of the commissioner, judge of the 
district court (...), the representative of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (...). The decision of the 
said board will be final and will be enforced by courts 
of justice. (Article 33)
With regard to this article (and also some of the above cited ones) we 
should draw the reader's attention to the following point. The issue of 
this article did not necessarily bring about its full-scale enforcement. 
Bearing in mind the widespread corruption in the Iranian state departments 
and landlords' ties with these departments and also the political dominance 
of the landlords over the rwsoij-holders, one cannot expect this article to 
be fully enforced. The enforcement of this article, in effect, depended 
to a large extent upon landlord-peasant relationships at the political 
level. Thus, according to Lambton (1969), during the implementation of 
L-R in Azarbaijan, where the peasants were to a lesser extent subordinated 
to their landlords, many disputes had to be settled by the officials, 
because the peasants did not tolerate any evasion of their rights; whereas 
in some other provinces, such as Fars, where the peasants were highly 
subordinated to their landlords and tribal chiefs, peasants did not dare 
complain to the officials.
In our first chapter (on the landlord-peasant relationship) we
explained how landlords, by periodical redistribution of land, kept their
subjects in an insecure position. However, the law of January, 1962,
abolished any form of annual or periodical allotments:
Effective the date of approval of this Law, it is prohibited 
to change the farming procedures of a land. Peasants will 
be recognized as farmers on the same land whether under 
cultivation or fallow as they used to be on the date of 
approval of this Law. (The note to Article 20)
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In spite of this prohibition, in some cases, the peasants continued to 
redistribute the land among themselves after the land distribution.104
With regard to the relations of production the L-R brought about 
two side effects: i.e. the abolition of labour-service and dues, and 
the discouragement of boneh organization. Although in the law of 1962, 
there is no reference to the abolition of labour service and dues, it is 
reasonable to suppose that by removing landlords from the social formations 
of the distributed villages (wholly or partially), labour-service and dues 
ceased to exist there, because there was no longer any agent, at the non­
economic level, to impose these "pre-CMP" obligations. The other side- 
effect of the L-R was the disappearance of "boneh" as a form of production 
organization in rural Iran. Generally speaking, in many villages, boneh 
ceased to exist after the distribution of land.10^ This was mainly 
because the new landowners preferred to work individually. However, in 
some cases, they decided to work under the old production organization.10^
So far we have considered the impact of L-R on the Landlord-peasant 
relationship in villages (wholly or partially) subject to distribution. 
Nevertheless, the first stage of L—R did not cover four groups of 
villages. They included: vaqf villages; villages belonging to landlords 
who held less than six-dange of a village each; villages belonging to 
landlords and their family members (each owning one village); and finally 
mechanized farms. The first two categories became subject to reform in 
the second stage of L-R and shall consider them later in this chapter.
With regard to the villages remaining in the hands of big landlords, 
this was a concession which the reform government had to give to the 
feudal landlords. Later on, under the pressure on the part of
the landlords, the L-R Council gave some more concessions. Thus on 
August 25, 1963, it 'decided that children under the care of the head of 
the family could also hold up to the maximum permitted by Article 2 of 
the law of 9 January 1962. A further modification was made on Feburary 
7, 1967, when the Land Reform council decided that a woman, without regard
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to her family's position, might hold as an independent person up to the
maximum permitted.'*0  ^ In the villages subject to partial or no
redistribution, the position of landlords became weaker at the economic
and political level. In Deylam Ulya (a village in Khuzistan which in
February, 1964 was partially redistributed) for example, the L-R has
had no noticeable effect. The peasants do not yet consider themselves
to be the landowners and constantly talk of the government having become
the landowner. They are, on the other hand, a little apprehensive of
the possible action of the landlord; (who was one of the influential
landlords of this province). Yet they all agreed that the landlords
influence has been greatly reduced and that he or the government official
108cannot be as oppressive as they used to be. It may, however, be
considered as a side-effect of L-R on the semi-feudal social formation 
of these villages.
The last group of villages/farms exempted from distribution were 
those which were mechanized and run on the basis of the wage-labour 
system. The law of 1962 not only tried to induce the reproduction of 
capitalist relations of production in distributed villages, but also 
exempted capitalist farms from distribution. Thus under Article 3, the 
exemptions are mentioned as follows:
a) Orchards, tea plantations and woodlots whose land 
and crop, as well as all buildings, instalments 
and water rights on the land belong to one land­
lord, will remain the property of the landlord.
b) All lands which, at the date of approval of this 
Law, are farmed by mechanized methods, but with the 
employment of agricultural workers and without the 
use of peasants (i.e. nasaq-holders), will remain 
such as long as the above mentioned arrangement is 
operating.
Article 3 not only maintained the capitalist order in the 
agricultural units cited above, but also induced some other landowners to 
shift quickly to this mode of production. No attempt was made, in the
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law, to define "mechanization". Nevertheless in practice the L-R
officials used a quantification formula to distinguish whether or not a
certain farm was mechanized: 'The formula was essentially a code of marks:
a tractor was 10; discs 10; land-levelling machinery 5; combine 15; drill
15; use of chemical fertilizers scored 5; pesticides 10; making of
ditches 5 and irrigation works 15 - and there was a make-weight of 5
109marks to be used with discretion.' A landlord who scored 51 points
or more was declared execpt from distribution.
This method obviously enabled some landlords to evade the law.
That is to say, by purchasing some machinery and or bribing the L-R 
officials, in many cases, landlords managed to declare that their lands 
were mechanized, when in fact they had not been so worked when the law 
came into operation. Furthermore, in some cases, this way of "quick 
mechanization" caused no real change in the landlord-peasant relationship. 
E.g. some village women expressed their image of "mechanization" by 
stating: 'motorization means that they (landlords) give you 8 pounds of 
wheat and one tooman (10 rials) a day; and mechanization means that you 
should sign the wage-slip at the end of the month.'
Generally speaking, the article induced the development of the CMP 
in two different categories of farms. First, the capitalist farmers, 
who owned true mechanized farms based on the wage-labour system, were 
persuaded to expand their farms and secondly, the "late comer" landlords 
who quickly shifted to this form of "mechanization" and the "wage-labour" 
system for farming. The obvious consequence of both cases (the 
latter in particular), was the separation of the direct-producers 
(including noeaq-holders) from the objective conditions of production.
The implementation of the first stage of L-R took almost ten years 
to be conpleted. This stage affected as many as 14,000 villages.
Table XXI illustrates the numbers of distributed villages and that of 
acquirers of land by provinces. As the table shows, the first stage of 
L-R covered 709,000 of the rural households, only 22Z of the total
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TABLE XXI
First Stage ; Purchased by Province
Six dang
Province Village Farm
Tehran 220 O
Khorasan 222 0
Isfahan 60 0
East Azarbaijan 510 0
Khuzistan 256 4
Mazandaran 175 70
Fars 247 0
Gilan 57 0
West Azarbaijan 422 0
Kirman 97 0
Kirmanshah 487 0
Sabeli 3 0
Sistan & 
Buluchestan 1 0
Kurdistan 166 0
Ramadan 189 0
Luristan 99 0
Zanjan 169 3
Yazd 0 0
Bushire 49 0
Bakhtiari 6 0
Semnan 10 0
Il am 210 0
Boir Ahmadi 335 26
Total 3,990 103
Less than six 
dang
No. of 
Households 
receiving
No. of 
Benefi­
Village Farm land ciaries
618 432 50,000 277,000
1,069 0 26,000 132,000
338 0 22,000 111,000
1,307 0 123,000 615,000
452 0 22,000 112,000
546 297 75,000 386,000
1,405 38 63,000 317,000
690 0 41,000 212,000
435 0 35,000 173,000
454 0 6,000 23,000
1,214 0 59,000 295,000
13 0 + 1,000
3 0 + +
495 0 32,000 158,000
648 0 81,000 405,000
447 0 17,000 83,000
429 0 20,000 101,000
15 0 + ♦
132 0 6,000 30,000
102 0 6,000 30,000
59 0 1,000 3,000
89 0 10,000 48,000
43 0 12,000 62,000
11,003 767 709,000 3,575,000
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1976
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households living in rural Iran.
The Second Stage of L-R
Although the first stage of L-R affected a limited number of
villages it broke the backbone of the "feudal type" of landholding in
rural Iran. The first stage covered a limited number of villages
because in the later years the Government gave some concess ions to the
landlords. In addition to these concessions (added to the laws of the
first stage) in January, 1963, the Government announced the beginning
of the second stage of the nation-wide L-R. The second stage had two
characteristics. First,it affected Vaqf lands, so it embraced some anti-
feudal measures. Secondly, it opened the way for the development of
capitalism from above (the 'Prussian' path) and therefore embraced some
anti-peasant measures. Furthermore, the laws of the second stage, just
like the previous ones, did not touch capitalist farming which had
developed prior to L-R. Below we shall study these aspects.
The character of laws of the second stage, may be shown first of
all, by the farms exenpted from the distribution. Thus:
Any mechanized land situated in the same village will 
not come within the provisions of this law, if it does 
not exceed 500 hectares. (Note to Article 1)
Mechanized land is defined as land which is worked by wage-labourers
and the ploughing of whifch is done by mechanical means. The law
excluded even mechanized farms operated by agents other than the
landowners:
In the case of the mechanized farms not directly farmed 
by the landlords, but which were farmed mechanically by 
a tenant or farmer according to official leases signed 
before the conclusion of the said Supplement, the 
official lease will continue in force until expiration 
... (Article 15)
However, this provision was the occasion for much abuse. Likewise under 
the provisions of the first stage, many landlords made attempts to claim
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that their lands were mechanized when in fact they were not or had only
been mechanized after L-R b e g a n . B u t  not all landlords managed to
use such an occasion. Thus, Lambton writes that, 'one complaint made
against the land reform by some of the khans was that the exemption of
mechanized land from its provisions was of no benefit to landowners in
such areas as the Kuhqiluyeh, where mechanization had not been possible
112because there had been no roads along which to bring tractors'
The second type of farms exempted from the distribution, were farms 
whose direct-producers did not have nasaq in spite of the fact that they
worked under the share-cropping system: i.e. share-croppers of summer 
113crops. Thus under Article 28:
Vegetable growers and summer-croppers who are not domiciled 
in the village and who engage in summer-cropping every year 
under special agreement
were excluded, hence they did not obtain any land.
In the previous chapters, we explained the vaqf lands were operated
according to the local customs, i.e. share-cropping and fixed rent.
Despite this fact, the first stage did not cover these lands, because of
the political considerations. However, vaqf lands became subject to
the second stage. Under Article 2 of the law, the nasaq-holders
occupying the private vaqf lands were to be raised to the position of
ownership, whereas those occupying public vaqf lands were to be raised to
the position of leaseholders of the capitalist type.**^ Thus:
villages endowed to the public will be leased with 
consideration for the best of the endowment - on a long 
term basis, i.e. 99 years to the peasants of the same 
village for a cash rental which can be revised every 
five years. If necessary, privately endowed villages 
will be purchased by the Government, according to the 
provisions of the Civil Code, for the purpose of 
exchanging them for the better, and distribute . them 
among the peasants. (Article 2)
With regard to the villages and farms which did not qualify for
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distribution and remained in private ownership under the first stage, 
the landlords were required to choose one of the following three options:
a) Landlords will lease their village to the peasants 
of the same village for a cash rental and on the 
basis of its revenues obtained during the past 
three years, not continuing the levies and in 
accordance with legal customary practices.
b) From this date (Jan. 17, 1963), landlords may sell 
their lands to the peasants by mutual agreement...
c) Irrigated or dry land may be divided between the 
local peasants and the owner or owners according 
to the customary ratios of landlord-peasant 
shares... (Article 1)
However, later on two other ways of settlement were offered to the 
landlords. They were as follows: either to form a joint-stock 
agricultural unit, in which landlord and peasants would become partners, 
according to their respective shares of the produce; or to buy out 
peasants’ naeaq with the latter’s consent and farm the land by employing 
wage-labourers. All contracts and transactions would have to be 
approved by the officials. In the case of land transactions, water 
was to be transferred to the new owner. (Article 31 and 32).
Under Article 8 of the law, the landlords were required to cede the 
land (up to 500 meters) under farmers' houses to the farmers. Articles 
9 and 10 of the law recognized and sanctioned the a'yarvi right of 
peasants:
Landlords will assess the value of the lands of orchards 
whose fruit trees are totally owned by farmers, and the 
land of other buildings or trees, in a manner mutually 
satisfactory to both sides, taking into consideration 
the water-right to sell the same to the farmers on ten 
year instalments. (Article 9)
And in respect of orchards, palm-groves, tea fields and the like in 
which both the owners and farmers had shares,
landlords may with the consent of farmers buy their shares
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or separate their own (landowners') shares. (Article 10)
The laws of the second stage, like those of the first stage, affected 
the positions of some other nasaq-holders in relation to the landlords as 
well as the means of production. Some of them were raised to the 
position of ownership of land, some became leaseholders, while others 
were separated from the means of production (particularly land) and 
became wage-labourers. In short, the nasaq-holders ceased to be subject 
to the (semi) feudal subordination. Table XXII below illustrates the 
impact of the second stage of L-R on rural Iran by province.
As Table XXII verifies, over 80% of the landlords preferred to lease 
their lands to the n<zsa<j-holders on the basis of new regulations, while 
the least favourite option was the sale of nasaq, only in 0.86% of the 
cases, did the landlords buy the nasaq of the nasaq-holders. The nasaq- 
holders strongly opposed the purchase of their right, while the landlords 
tried and to a considerable extent managed to retain their ownership (only 
3.67% of them sold their lands to the nasaqr-holders). However, since 
they were engaged in jobs other than agricultural ones, they were unable 
to get involved in agricultural production directly. That is why only a 
minority chose the options of forming joint enterprises and dividing land 
on the basis of division of produce (see Table XXII). Thus the majority 
preferred to rent out their lands to the raso^-holders.
To summarize the iranediate consequences of the first and second 
stages of L-R: Table XXI and XXII verify that around 1.005 million house­
holds were raised to the position of ownership of land. It means that, 
of 3.2 million peasant households, only 31.4% acquired land. Around 
39% of the peasant households (1.24 million) became leaseholders of the 
new type, and the rest, i.e. 29% were not affected by the implementation 
of L-R. Katouzian believes that peasants in the latter group still 
cultivate under the old system. But, not all the agents of production
in this group can be considered as agricultural producers. In effect, 
this group may have comprised different strata of khoshneshins. Our
TABLE XXII
Distribution of Transaction in Second Stage Options by Regions and Provinces, October 1972
O p tra tia n i o f  u c o n J  p lu m T t  nancy
a
S a lt Tenant right a h Jo in t enterprise D ivision
u n til  i  I l 6 l j t N o . « % « % N o . « % « % N o . a t  % a t  " i, N o . o f a t  % a t  % N o . a t % 01 % H orizon ta l
o f o f , o f o f o f o f cillti- o f o f o f o f tota l {H . T .)
H .T . V . T . H .T . V .T . H .T . V .T . varors H .T . V .T . H .T . V .T .
T e h r l n 8 5 .10 3 83  79 6 8 3 6 ,10 1 6 0 0 10-67 1 4 4 « 1 2 2 9  28 — — 9 .136 8-98 5-84 10 1,68 1
G i l l n 18 8 ,536 9 6 4 8 1 5 1 2 6 ,3 13 3 * 3 II-0 4 564 0-29 4 2 * — — — — — — 195,413
M i i a t u l a r i n 1 3 a ,604 9 9  51 1 0 6 3 3 *7 0-24 0 5 7 — — — — - — — 330 0-25 0 2 1 * 33 .2 6 *
E . A i a r b l y j l n I 7 9 . * i 4 8 8 6 5 14 42 >3 .449 6 6 3 23  53 44 0 0 1 0 3 3 1 ,9 7 5 0-97 2-37 7 .559 3 7 3 4 8 4 202,841
W . A z a r b ly j in 48,007 78  72 3 8 5 5.963 9 7 8 «0-43 «5 9 0 2 6 1 1 9 3.89 1 6-38 4-67 2 ,963 4 8 6 1-89 60,983
K e r m in s h lh ln 48/192 8 1 1 5 3-90 3 9 * 0 6 5 0 6 8 185 0 3 1 *•3 8 33 0 0 9 0 0 6 10,679 17-80 6 8 3 60,001
K h u z c s t ln 7 9 .1 6 2 9 6 4 1 6 3 6 24 0 0 3 0 0 4 — — — • 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 2,908 3 54 1-86 82,205
F ir * 7 7 .815 44  33 6-24 3.422 1 95 6-69 1,18 8 0 6 8 8 88 15,988 9 1 1 19-20 7 7 .* * * 43  93 4 9 3 5 175.544
K c r m l n 3 .702 2 7  86 0  30 22 o - |6 0 0 4 1.921 *4-45 *4-36 5,778 4 3 4 8 6 9 4 1,86 5 1 4 0 3 1 1 9 13,288
K h o t l i l a 17.428 23 11 1-40 1,238 1 64 2 1 6 6 ,779 9 0 0 5 0 6 9 4 6,974 62-30 5 6 4 1 2.983 3 9 6 1 9 1 7 5 ,40*
F s fu h ln 51 .343 6 8 2 7 4 12 4 .252 5 6 5 7 4 4 464 0-62 3 4 7 613 o -8 i 0 7 4 18 ,5 3 * 2 4 6 4 11-86 7 5 .*04
S is t3n a n d  B a lu c h e s tln 254 16-37 0-02 * * 3 «4 * 3 0-37 525 3 5 0 7 3 9 2 22 *•4 7 0 0 2 483 32-26 0 3 1 1,497
K o r J c u J n 56 ,6 9 1 9 2 8 9 4 5 5 2 , H 3 3 4 6 3-70 97 0 -16 0 7 * — — 2 ,12 6 3-48 1 3 6 6 1,0 2 7
L o r c s t ln 49.66 0 8 7 0 8 \ 3 -9 » I/)JO 1-84 1-84 104 0-18 0 7 8 3,850 6-75 4 6 2 2.363 4 * 4 *•5 * 57 ,0 * 7
1 Iiim aiM n • 5 2 ,«9 7 72-53 4 -19 2,300 3-20 4 02 4 n c g l. 0 0 3 1,668 2 3 2 2 0 0 *5,795 21-95 to -11 7 * .9 6 4
S c n in ln 2 .294 9 4 4 4 0-18 102 4-20 0 -l8 33 1 3 6 0-25 — —  , — — — — 2 ,4 *9
G o r u ln  a n d  D a sh t 4 3 .«3 5 90-06 3  46 4 .7 6 1 9 9 4 8 33 4 7 .986
C o a s ta l a n d  Isla n d s o f  O m a n
S e a  (B a n d a r ‘ A b b is ) 299 5 5 0 6 6 0 2 — — — 4 4 8 1 0 0-33 — — — 200
°o«n 0 1 3 543
P e r s ia n  G u l f  (B u sh ch r) « .9 3 3 7 4 0 7 0-56 2 ,425 2 5 9 * 4 2 4 — — — — — — — — — 9 ,358
I 13m 2 4 ,2 18 100-00 * •9 4 24,2*8
C h a h J r  M a h a l B a k h tia r i 22 ,4 9 6 9 5 1 6 l-8 o 128 0-54 0-22 22 0 0 9 0 1 6 — — — • 994 4-20 0-64 23.640
Y a z d 18 ,6 14 100-00 1-49 18 ,6 14
K o h k ilo u y e h  a n d  B o u y e r
0 0 8A h m a d i 3 2 ,4 9 7 99-60 2 -6 l — — — — — — — — — •127 0-40 32,624 ,
Z a n d iir i 2 4 .9 4 8 82-97 2 0 0 2 ,569 8 5 4 4 4 9 . — — 2 .4 4 4 , 8 * 3 2-93 1 *5 0-38 0 0 7 30,076
V e r t ic a l to ta l ( V . T . ) 1 ,2 4 6 ,6 5 2 100 57 ,164 100 *3 ,374 100 83,267 100 15 6 ,2 7 9 100 1 , 556 ,736
G ra n d  to ta l
* * ( G .T .)
V . T .  a t  %  o f  G . T . 8 0 0 8 3 6 7 • 0-86 5-35 1 0 0 4
Source; Denman, 1973.
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discussion in the previous chapter (on social classes) showed that only 
26.21 of khoshneshins were agricultural wage-labourers (they constituted 
5.7Z of the total rural population). The position of these agents of 
production was reaffirmed and sanctioned by the laws of L-R. Nor did 
L-R affect the position of khoshneshins who were involved in non- 
agricultural production. But this does not mean that they became rural 
proletarians as Keddie believes.
The first and second stages of L-R were followed by another set of 
provisions which was inaugurated as the third stage of L-R. The bill 
which was passed through the Majlis in 1968, aimed at the distribution 
and sale of rented allotments and joint-stock units to the leaseholders 
and shareholders respectively. With regard to the allotments rented to 
the leaseholders, the landlords were provided two options:
a) to sell their land and water right to the leaseholders;
b) to share their allotments with the peasants on the basis of the 
division of produce. The public vaqf lands were exempted from the 
provisions of this law. Denman states that the law was specifically 
limited to village lands and fields which had been let to tenants on the 
thirty-year leases included among the options given to the landowners 
under the second s t a g e . T h e  landlords also had the following options:
a) to sell the lands to the tenants;
b) to divide the lands with the tenants on the basis of the 
division of produce.
However, we shall not discuss the provisions of the "third stage" of 
L-R, mainly for the following reasons:
a) these provisions had no impact on the remnants of "semi-feudal" 
relations of production in rural Iran.
b) The provisions were to cover a limited number of peasant families.
c) Finally, the provisions in practice do not seem to have had any 
effect on rural Iran, because although the laws of this stage were 
ratified in March 1968, they have still not been put fully into effect
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11 ftand only a few villages have been affected by these laws.'
Social classes in the aftermath of land reform7
We examined the provisions of different stages of L-R in Iran. We
saw that the implementation of L-R provisions had major effects on the
relations of production in rural Iran. Thus the provisions changed the
positions of many direct-producers in relation to the means of production
as well as to the landlords. Here, we shall briefly analyse
the formal aspects of the social classes before and after L-R. Table
XXIII below illustrates the stratification of rural households in 1960 
119and 1912.
TABLE XXIII
Rural Households by Strata 1960 and 1972
1960 1972 Rate of Growth
Households
No. Z No. Z
of each group 
during 1960-72
Total Households* 2710 100 3323 100 22.0Z
Landless Householdst 777 28.5 790 23.8 0.1Z
Households holding under 2 ha. 737 27.2 1143 34.5 55.0Z
Households holding 2 to 5 ha. 484 17.8 545 16.4 12.6Z
Households holding 5 to 10 ha. 352 13.0 434 13.1 23.3Z
Households holding 10 to 50 ha. 339 12.5 394 11.9 16.2Z
Households holding 50 and over 21 - 17 - -
* Excluding cattle breeders and the like 
t Including all strata of khoshneshins
Sources: 1) i960 Census
2) Avesvik 1977, Table 6.1
Although the number of khoshneshin households increased from 777,000 
to 790,000, its share as a percentage of the total rural population
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dropped from 28.5 to 23.8Z. Nevertheless, since data for the wage-
labourers for the year 1972 are not available, one cannot say whether or
not the number of them has increased during this period. But their
numbers might have ’ . increased because of the following: almost none
of the khoshneshins acquired any land during the process of land
distribution; some of the nasaqr-holders were dropped, by force or other
means, from their positions of possession of land before L-R began;
others sold their right to the landlords in the second stage of L-R; and
finally, the rural population increased by 1.5Z in this period. However,
there is no doubt that L-R accelerated the process of complete separation
120of some ruzsa^-holders from the objective conditions of production, 
particularly land.
It appears that the remarkable consequence of land re-distribution 
was a sharp increase in the number of semi-proletarians. As Table XXIII 
illustrates the number of households holding less than 2 ha. increased 
by 55Z, that is, it increased from 737 thousands in 1960 to 1.143 million 
in 1972. Also the share of this stratum as a percentage of the total 
holdings increased from 27.2Z in 1960 to 34.5Z in 1972. This sharp 
increase in the number of semi-proletarians means a vast expansion in 
the (casual) labour market during these years. The demand for the 
labour-power of these casual labourers came mainly from the following 
sources: in the rural areas, rich peasants and capitalist farmers; and 
in the urban centres, the construction industry. The obvious result
of the expansion of the labour market by casual vendors of labour-power 
was that while some industries and farms were supplied with labour- 
power required by them, the rural-urban mass migration did not take 
place. However, it is reasonable to believe that this permanent 
wandering between country and town and search for casual jobs, caused 
some undereap loyment as well as hidden unemployment in various forms.
The partial separation of the small land holders has been recognised 
as a phenomenon characteristic of all capitalist countries. One may
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therefore consider the expansion of such a labour market as an indication 
of the development of capitalism in Iran during the 1960s. Nevertheless, 
bearing in mind that a conplete separation of direct-producers from the 
objective conditions of production is the pre-condition for a full-fledged 
development of the CMP, one may consider this vast number of semi­
proletarians, who were partially separated from the objective conditions 
of production, as an obstacle to the further development of capitalism 
in the agricultural as well as industrial sectors of Iran.
The inpact of L-R on the other rural strata was moderate. As can 
be seen in Table XXIII, the percentage of each stratum in the total 
holdings remained almost the same during this period. However, in 
absolute terms, the number of these households increased, but their rates 
of growth were lower than the growth rate of total rural households.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the partial and relatively unsuccessful 
attempts which were made on the part of the different government to reform 
land tenure during the 1940s add 1950s. We then attempted to discover 
the reasons for the nation-wide L-R of 1962 which became a turning-point in 
the history of Iran. Thus we examined the economic and political crisis 
of 1959"61 and conducted that because of this crisis and some revolts on 
the part of the peasantry the government was driven to undertake some 
economic and social reforms, including L-R. In order to find out the 
aims and nature of the nation-wide L-R, we analysed the laws of the first 
and second stages of L-R. We then came to the conclusion that it was a 
L-R which tried to remove semi-feudal relations of production, thus 
removing barriers to the development of rural capitalism. In order to 
demonstrate the impact of L-R on the structure of landholding, we compared 
this structure before and after L-R. The results were a sharp increase 
in the number of small landholders and a moderate increase in the number 
of members of other strata.
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If, as is argued,pre-capitalist relations of production are the 
main obstacles to economic development, then the implementation of 
L-R should have supposedly opened the way for agricultural as well as 
industrial development. Thus we shall go on to examine the development 
of agriculture in Iran after the L-R.
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PART III 
CHAPTER X
The Iranian Rural Social Formation After Land Reform
A. The Economics of the Peasantry
In this chapter, we shall examine some aspects of capitalist 
development among the peasantry in rural Iran after L-R. These aspects 
include property and labour relations, marketing, processes of production, 
cooperatives and the credit system, and also the economics of capitalist 
farmers. In the third section, we shall examine the process of the 
pauperization of the peasantry. For the sake of simplicity, we shall 
consider holders of up to 50 hectares as peasants and holders of over 50 
hectares as capitalist farmers. However, this is an arbitrary 
assumption, as it does not allow for differences in the productivity of 
land and in particular differences in the productivity of irrigated and 
unirrigated land. Secondly, as we shall explain below, the poor peasants 
as well as the agricultural labourers are involved at least in two 
different processes of production, one of which is agricultural. We 
shall consider the agricultural process of production first, and then 
examine the others. Thirdly, we shall assume that all villages were 
not affected by this programme for different reasons.1
Relations of production within the peasantry
In order to study the relations of production in rural Iran, we 
distinguished two sets of relations of production: the relationship 
between landlords on the one hand and the peasantry on the other; and 
relationships among the peasantry. We dist iiguished, therefore, two 
sets of property relation: ownership/possession of land/water, and 
ownership of other oesns of production. However, after the L-R. changes 
in property reistion. ne.nt that the direct-producers occupied one or two 
of the following position, in relation to the land: a, owner/operators.
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as leaseholder/operators, and finally as wage-labourers. Table XXV shows
the structure of landholding in rural Iran during the post L-R period.
As one can see, the ownership cf laid is dominant, i.e. over 90% of peasant
holders operated plots which belonged to themselves. The leaseholder/
operators constitute a tiny percentage in each category, while the
combination of leaseholding and ownership occupies more or less the same
position as the category of leaseholding. Any simple comparison between
2
this table and Table XII shows the inpact of L-R on landed property in 
rural Iran* i.e. the majority of Yic.scic[—holders became either landowners or 
leaseholders. However, as far as the ownership of land is concerned, 
the land reform programme maintained the differentiation of the peasantry.
TABLE XXV
Forms of Land Holdings (1974)
Z No. of 
Ownership
Lease­
holders
%
Ownership/ 
Lease­
holding %
Others
%
Total
Holding
(000)
Total of Holdings 92.0 2.2 2.5 3.2 2479
Less than 1 ha. 92.3 2.4 2.3 2.9 734
1 to 2 ha. 90.5 1.7 3.6 4.1 322
2 to 5 ha. 91.4 2.0 2.6 3.9 542
5 to 10 ha. 93.4 1.8 1.8 3.0 428
10 to 50 ha. 92.5 2.4 2.7 2.4 428
50 to 100 ha. 87.6 4.9 4.2 3.1 16.2
100 and over 80.3 7.8 5.2 6.5 9.5
Sources The Agricultural Census of Iran, 1974, Table 00 00 •
The peasantry va. differentiated not only b, the size of ownership 
of land, but also by the ownership of other «ans of production. As is 
illustrated in Table i m ,  the average .nd percentage of
cow,, ozen. sheep and goats increased in accordance with the increase in
222
the size of land (up to 50 hectares). This uneven distribution of land 
and means of production obviously shows two different dimensions to the 
peasantry's economic life: an uneven distribution of income, and some 
relationships amongst the peasantry which have been established around 
the means of production and which existed before L-R. The main aspects 
of these relationships are lending/borrowing oxen and machinery, selling/ 
buying labour-power, and also lending/borrowing money. We shall examine 
the first two aspects below, and the third aspect later in our 
consideration of the functions of cooperatives.
In order to study lending/borrowing of oxen and tractors and also 
labour relations, for the sake of simplicity, we should make a distinction 
between the verities of labour process in rural Iran. Thus we distinguish 
two types of labour process: traditional and modern. By the traditional 
process of labour, we mean the process in which traditional means of 
production such as oxen, the old type of seeds, and also animal manure 
constitute the input; whereas by the modern process of production we 
understand the process in which, to some extent at least, tractors and 
other machines, chemical fertilizers and also new seeds are used as 
inputs. The reason why we make a distinction between these processes of 
labour, is mainly because of an ever increasing consumption of modern 
inputs in the agricultural sector of Iran. This process is clearly 
illustrated in Table XXVIIbelow. However, with regard to relations of 
production, we should note one point: although an increase in demand for 
modern inputs is a consequence of changes in the relations of production, 
one may expect that the use of these inputs in turn affects the relations 
of production. The introduction of tractors and chemical fertilizers 
for instance, reduces the function of oxen as the source of energy and 
supply of manure to nil. The reduction of these functions in turn 
suppresses the differentiation of the peasantry.
However, the traditional labour process is the dominant form of 
expropriation of nature in the holdings under 5 hectares (see Table XXVI,
TABLE XXVI
Percentage and Average Ownership of Cows, Oxen, Sheep and Coats and the Use of Tractor 1974
Size of Holdings
Z of Total 
Owned 
Cows
Average 
Ownership 
of Cows
Average 
Ownership 
of Oxen
Z of Total 
Owned 
Sheep
Average 
Ownership 
of Sheep
Z of Total 
Owned 
Goats
Average 
Ownership 
o£ Goats
Z Using 
Tractors
Less than 1 ha 33.8 0.6 0.07 29.3 3.2 31.2 2.4 14.9
1 to 2 has. 55.6 1.2 0.27 30.7 3.9 28.6 2.9 32.4
2 to 5 has. 58.4 1.3 0.42 42.0 6.0 39.1 4.0 47.0
5 to 10 has. 59.0 1.4 0.51 55.5 10.4 50.4 5.4 63.9
10 to 50 has. 58.7 1.7 0.64 63.4 18.6 55.9 6.3 71.9
50 to 100 has. 46.8 2.2 0.62 52.0 53.5 40.6 6.9 91.5
100 and over 34.9 6.4 0.53 40.0 234.8 32.9 12.9 96.2
Source: The Agricultural Census of Iran, 1974.
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last column). With regard to this type, one may not expect the
techniques of production to be changed drastically. As Connel noted in
describing the situation in 1969 in Mamood-Abad, a village near Samnan,
as follows: 'Mechanization is not well advanced. A tractor is occasionally
hired by the cooperative for the whole village, is used for ploughing and
threshing and occasional transport... Nevertheless the wooden roller
thresher or sledge (garjin) is more often used as is the woodennail
plough, pulled by donkeys, plus a number of hand tools, such as the long
handled spade (...) and the sickle. Scythes have not yet appeared.
The land is not deep ploughed but simply furrowed at planting time to
loosen the soil. Fertilizer application is usually simply by the
3application of manure, which necessitates less water use, ...' The 
process of threshing and winnowing has remained as it used to be before 
L-R. Thus , Miller wrote that, in Hossein-Abad a village in the
region of Zanjan, each family piled up the harvested grains in heaps: 
the process of threshing being done by two methods. In the first method, 
oxen and donkeys are walked in endless circles on the cut grain. The 
action of the animals' hooves separates the wheat from the straw. The 
second method is done by a primitive threshing mechanism called a chun 
It is drawn by oxen or horses or donkeys which have wooden or metal spokes 
or discs that break up the grain. After this stage, men use wooden 
winnowing forks and throw the grain in the wind to separate the wheat 
from the chaff. Following winnowing the straw is gathered up and put in 
large bundles for use as fodder and in the making of mud brick. The
4grain is cleaned by sifting through a sieve (ghzrbal)'.
With regard to the traditional labour process, the position of 
suppliers of oxen, analysed in Chapter VII, was maintained after the L-R.^ 
However, with the modernization of the agricultural sector, the peasantry 
has gradually shifted to the enployment of tractors, improved seeds and 
also chemical fertilizers. With regard to the enployment of tractors 
as Table XXVI shows, a minority of holdings under 5 hectares use them as a
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source of energy; whereas 63.9% of rich peasants (holders of 5 to 10 ha.) 
use a tractor for ploughing and the like. Although there are no 
systematic data available to illustrate the ownership of tractor according 
to the size of holding, the available evidence suggests that the 
peasantry is mainly the borrower rather than lender (or owner) of tractors.6
The (reasons for shifting to the employment of tractors on the part 
of some peasants are to be found in the higher efficiency of machinery over 
draught animals. The amount of land a tractor can plough depends on 
several factors such as horsepower, depth of ploughing, cropping pattern, 
size of plots and the type of soil. Nevertheless all other conditions 
being equal, a tractor can plough the same amount of land in less than 
two hours as a pair of oxen can do in a full working day. Moreover, 
tractor ploughing is much deeper than oxen ploughing which usually only 
scratches the surface of the land. However, the higher efficiency of 
machinery does not necessarily mean that all peasants shift to the use 
of tractors, combines, etc. As a matter of fact, they are faced with 
social as well as technical problems. As examples of technical problems, 
we may mention the type of cultivation. That is to say, there are 
some crops which cannot only be cultivated by machinery. For example, 
the cultivation of summer crops which is a labour-intensive labour- 
process, demands almost no machinery. In some other cases, the type of 
soil may block the use of machinery. For exanple, the peasants of 
Manioun, a village near Jahrum in Fars province, allegedly stated that 
they could not employ tractors for ploughing, due to the fact that the 
land which they had obtained was uneven.7 Of the social problems, we 
may mention the absolute poverty of some peasants and the backwardness of 
the villages. The lack of roads and communications with tte urban 
centres have virtually blocked the introduction of machinery to many 
villages in rural Iran.8 In some other cases, although the peasants 
vant to hire tractors, only occasionally do they maeage to obtain any.
For exaople, according to Connell, peasants of Mahnood-Abad occasionally
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TABLE XXVII
Consumption of Fertilizers and Seeds and Sale of Tractors
Year
Consumption of 
Fertilizers 
000 Tons
Tractors Sold 
by the 
O.D.A.M.
Seeds
Wheat
(tons)
Cotton
1966 124 - 7625 1700
1967 215 2382 5600 2000
1968 184 2967 6500 2567
1969 208 3369 - 2505
1970 243 1894 12789 3398
1971 328 2458 32980 3121
1972 379 5787 34000 9327
1973 482 4781 35500 11178
1974 616 7561 64620 11000
1975 624 9038 - -
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1976.
manage to hire a tractor, through their cooperative, to plough their 
9plots. Or some.-.peasants of Tang-e Karam, a village near Gasa in Fars 
province, stated that they could not hire any tractors, because it was 
not economical for the tractor owner to plough their small plots.10
The hiring of machinery takes place both within and across village 
boundaries. There are three sources from which peasants can
hire machinery: tractor-owners, rich peasants and capitalist farmers 
(including ex-landlords).
In some rare case., machinery vae supplied by agents vho had no
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position in relation to the land. For example according to Okazaki,
during the late 1950s and early 1960s the level- of demand for tractors
and combines induced some individuals to buy machinery and do custom work.
Accordingly, in some cases even some peasants sold their plots and bought
combines and tractors for renting out to the other peasants. However,
this case is relatively rare, since we have come across it in none of
the other studies.** In some other cases, rich peasants supplied their
fellow villagers with machinery. For example, three peasants in Qasr-
Abad, a village around Shiraz in Fars province, jointly bought a tractor
to cultivate their own lands. However, they rented their tractor to the
12other peasants for cash. In Hossein-Abad, in Khuzistan province, a 
rich peasant who was at the same time the village headman, had managed to 
accumulate some wealth even before L-R. During the post L-R period he 
owned the only tractor in the village and rented it to the other peasants.'
Finally, in the majority of cases, machinery was supplied by some 
capitalist farmers (including ex-landlords). We have already stated that 
the L-R progranane induced many landlords to change their method of 
expropriation of surplus-labour; hence they bought farm machinery and 
employed wage-labourers. However, they rent out their machinery to the 
peasants within or outside their villages. As an example, we mention the 
capitalist-farmer (ex-landlord) of Kushk, a village near Shiraz in Fars 
province, who owns one tractor and a combine and undertakes the ploughing 
and threshing for the small landowners of the village in return for some
cash. 1A
The custom fees for ploughing are usually paid in cash, and in this 
sense it is contrary to the traditional form of payment for the custom 
work of oxen. According to one study, the data on the rates for custom 
ploughing varies from less than 500 rials per ha. in 39% of the cases 
,„d between 500 tn 1000 riel, in 58Z of the cases and over 1000 rials for 
the remainder.15 It appear, that in some cases, the performance of 
custom work is a profitable job. For sometime, the contract work is
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performed over distances of more than 1000 kms. for combines.16
The use of tractors increases productivity and the rate of accumulation 
and at the same time saves the peasant some time during which he may 
find an off-farm job. This process of mechanization further reinforces 
the peasantry's involvement in the market by for example necessitating 
increased production for the market in order to cover the cost of renting 
tractors and by the increased demand for machinery.
In addition to the use of machinery, the peasantry is linked to the 
market through investment in motor-pumps and also chemical fertilizers.
The production and use of fertilizers in Iran began in 1945. However, 
up to 1963, the amount of consumption was very low. With the opening of 
a modern fertilizer factory at Shiraz, the country entered a new phase 
of fertilizer production and consumption.17 The distribution of 
fertilizers in Iran is almost exclusively undertaken by a state agency 
known as Fertilizer Distribution Company. The agency's main concern is 
the marketing of domestically produced fertilizers within the country.
The agency has also handled all fertilizer imports. In order to induce 
all groups of agricultural producers to use fertilizers, the agency has 
provided some facilities. Thus the agency 'distributes fertilizers 
through private dealers, farm cooperatives, sugar beet factories and 
direct sale to consumers. It also provides credit through a nine-month 
allowance on payment at approximately 10 percent interest. If necessary, 
this limit can be extended by six months.'16
With regard to the fertilizer consumption of the peasantry, Table 
XXVIII shows the percentage consumption of each category and also the 
share of each category in the total consumed chemical fertilizers in the 
year 1975. As the first column illustrates, a minority of holders in 
each category consume fertilizers. This may be as a result of the 
existence of a high percentage of dry farming in each category, as in 
this type of traditional cultivation (ciaym kari) the whole process of 
labour includes only ploughing, sowing and finally harvesting. Despite
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this however, the peasantry consumed 49Z of the total chemical fertilizer 
consumption in the agricultural sector of Iran in 1975, while it holds 
only one-third of the total area under cultivation. The owner/lease- 
holders, holding 1.6Z of the area under cultivation, consumed 14.5Z of 
the total fertilizers. This is an indication of a high degree of 
integration 6f these owner/leaseholders into the market economy. With 
regard to the owner/leaseholders, holding between 2 to 10 ha., around one- 
third of them consumed 26Z of the total consumed fertilizers. Considering 
the fact that these holders occupied 28.5Z of the area under cultivation, 
one may state that as far as the consumption of chemical fertilizers is 
concerned, these holders are less integrated into the market economy.
This may be due to the fact that almost half of these holdings have been 
subject to dry-farming cultivation. Finally, with regard to the owner/ 
leaseholders, holding between 1 and 2 ha., the table shows that the 
percentage of these holdings using chemical fertilizers is higher than all 
other categories. But the share of these fertilizer users in the total 
consumed is lower than the other categories^
In addition to the investment in chemical fertilizers and hiring 
machinery, attempts have been made to instal motor-pumps to use the 
water of rivers and wells. It appears from different studies that this 
form of investment is common in the southern part of Iran including
Kirman, Fars, regions in the northern part of the Persian Gulf and also 
19Khuzistan. Generally speaking, the investment has been performed 
either by agents who play no production function in the labour-process 
or by the peasant-cultivators (owner/leaseholders). With regard to the 
former, there is the case of the pump-owners in Qara-Bolagh, a village 
near Darab in Fars province. 120 motor-pumps belong to some 600 
persons, i.e. every group of 3 to 5 of these persons owns a motor—pump 
which can water up to 35 ha. of land. These pump-*owners have rented the 
land from the landlord and his bailiff (according to the laws of the 
second stage of L—R). Their role in the labour—process is purely
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TABLE XXVIII
Fertilizer Consumption According to the Size of Holding 1975
Size of 
Holdings
Z of Holdings 
Using Chemical 
Fertilizers
Share of 
each
Category Z
Z of Dry 
Farming in 
Each Category
Share of 
Area Under 
Control
Total 33.1 100 44.0 100
Less than 1 ha. 33.9 14.5 27.8 1.6
1 to 2 ha. 57.0 8.5 41.0 2.7
2 to 5 has. 34.1 13.5 48.7 10.5
5 to 10 has. 28.3 12.5 51.4 18.0
10 to 50 has. 23.3 27.8 53.7 45.7
50 to 100 has. 43.0 5.6 48.2 6.5
100 and over 56.2 17.6 41.3 14.9
Source: The Agricultural Census of Iran, 1975.
managerial. Every year they make contracts with the peasants to produce
different grains and vegetables. The contracts are of the share-cropping
type and therefore the peasants collect a portion of produce for performing
all productive functions in the labour process.20
On the other hand, motor-pump owners, i.e. the peasant-cultivators,
are distinguished by the role they play in the labour-process. After the
L-R many peasant landowners made attempts to instal motor-pumps on the
shallow wells; sunk in their holdings. In some cases every two or more
peasants have jointly bought water-pumps. For example, in Qotb-Abad, a
village near Jahrom in Fars province, after the L-R. everv ■> r» y j to 5 peasant
landowners jointly bought a water-pump to water their allotments. There 
are all together 16 water-pumps in this village which belong to a group 
of peasants who directly cultivate their allotments.21 But in other 
cases, rich peasants have installed pumps for themselves individually.
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In Sheshdangi, a village near Shiraz, rich peasants started installing
motor pumps individually on shallow wells a few years before L-R. However,
by 1966—67, there existed around 13 motor-pumps which watered 340 ha. of
the village land. Accordingly, these motor—pump owners directly
contributed to the labour-process of their holdings and cultivated mainly
22wheat and beetroot.
Unfortunately, there are no data available to show the extent to which 
the peasants undertook such an investment. Yet, it appears that in some 
areas, especially in the southern part of Iran, many peasants have sunk 
wells and installed motor-pumps.
There is one further point pertinent to the borrowing/lending of 
means of production on the part of the peasantry. So far we have talked 
about lending/borrowing of all means of production but land and water.
With regard to water, from a technical point of view, lending/borrowing 
is impossible; nonetheless it has not been uncommon to see some peasants 
selling their water-right to each other. But venting-out land has always 
been wicomon among the peasantry before and after the L-R. however since 
the ,rboomn started in the urban centres in the early 1970s, some peasants 
unofficially have rented out their allotments to their fellow villagers 
and moved to the town and cities.23 it should be borne in mind that not 
all peasants have managed to rent out their allotments; as a matter of
fact, in many cases, they preferred to leave the land fallow and go to
. v . 24the urban centres.
We have already explored labour-relations within the agricultural 
process of production in rural Iran before L-R. We saw that many 
peasants, including those who worked in the boneh system, in the peak 
seasons employed wage-labourers and paid them in cash or a portion of 
the produce. However, after the implementation of L-R and the break 
down of the boneh system, labour-relations became capitalistic Before 
L-R, within a boneh, while a poor peasant was exploited by the gavband 
(head of the team) he exploited labourers who were employed during the
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peak season by the boneh. After the L-R and the break down of the bcrneh 
system, obviously only rich peasants were in a position to employ wage- 
labourers for a period of the year. We shall consider this point below 
when we discuss the auxiliary labour-process in which peasant owner/ 
leaseholders are involved. However, we should note the following points: 
First, the labour, which is hired by the rich peasants (as well as 
capitalist farmers), is supplied by poor peasants holding small plots of 
land. Secondly, the labour also may be supplied by agricultural labourers. 
That is the khoshneshins who own/possess no means of production are one of 
the main sources of labour-power for the rich peasants as well as 
capitalist farmers. In some villages, these wage-labourers manage to 
get jobs in their home villages for the whole year. However, this is a 
rare case. In most villages, these wage-labourers work for only a short 
period of the year in their villages. For the rest of the year, they 
have either to go to some other places (rural areas as well as urban 
centres) or to stay in their home villages and remain unemployed. After 
the L-R, these wage-labourers have been faced with competition from the 
semi-proletariat, whose number increased by 55Z after the L-R programme 
began (see Table XXIII). Thirdly, labour-relations have not been paid 
sufficient attention by . scholars. For example, Ajami, studying the 
economies of eight rich peasants {tolombekcanxn) t emphasizes the role of 
family labour in these economies. He not only overlooks the role of 
the employed wage-labourers in the rich peasants' economies, but also does 
not examine the labour-relations pertinent to the economics of the other 
peasants. With regard to this point, however, we believe that in 
social formations such as rural Iran attention should be paid to labour-
relations, mainly because of their significant role in the peasantry's 
economy. Thus we shall examine this aspect of relations of production 
with regard to the different labour-processes in which peasants, land 
holders as well as agricultural wage-labourers, are involved, In doing 
so, we shall make a distinction between land holders on the one hand and
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agricultural workers on the other.
Generally speaking, in agriculture, the labour-process has two main 
characteristics. First, a particular labour-process is not continuous 
over a period of one year. That is, owing to natural conditions, the 
production time of many grains covers a part of the year, and renewing 
the process involves some time until the natural conditions provide the 
basis for the process to be started once again. In places where double 
cropping is possible, this period between two processes is shorter than 
in those places where only single cropping is possible. Secondly, in 
each agricultural labour-process, the amount of labour required during 
production time varies from stage to stage. In some stages such as 
harvesting and threshing in the production of wheat, for instance, more 
work is required than at others.
These two characteristics cause the demand for labour to fluctuate 
over a period of one year. However, the fluctuations in the demand for 
labour are, at the same time, dependent upon the level of the development 
of relations and forces of production. Although in accordance with the 
process of mechanization, the demand for labour decreases, this decrease 
is accompanied by less fluctuation in the demand for labour within a 
production time and/or over one year.
These technical aspects of the agricultural labour-process have 
different effects on different classes of the peasantry. We shall 
therefore examine some of these effects in relation to classes in rural 
Iran.
Agricultural wage-labourers
The khoehheshin population of rural Iran, by 1972 was around 790 
thousands (see Table XXIII), of which a proportion should be considered 
as wage-labourers. However, it appears that the number of agricultural 
workers is underestimated. According to a World Bank estimate, there 
were, in the late 1960s, around 0.9 million agricultural labourers who
234
constituted 25% of the total agricultural labour force in rural Iran.
Hooglund states that over 80% of the khoshneshina are agricultural
labourers, who with their families number around 6 million, i.e. one-third
28of the agricultural population.
These agricultural labourers do not own land or any other means of 
production, and therefore must earn their living by selling their labour- 
power. As permanent vendors of labour-power, they do not have fixed 
jobs. In effect, this is one of the main characteristics of labour 
relations in rural Iran.
The permanent vendors of labour-power contribute, by their labour,
to different agricultural as well as non-agricultural labour-processes.
With regard to the agricultural labour-process, the demand for their
labour comes from capitalist-farmers and rich peasants, who employ them
during the peak seasons i.e. from about mid-May through mid-September in
the most parts of the country. Obviously, by working for such a short
period of time, they cannot maintain themselves and their families. The
alternatives are either to find jobs in the rural areas or in the urban
centres. Both cases involve temporary migration from their home villages
to some other labour-markets in the rural or urban centres. For the
period of the 1960s and the early 1970s, Hooglund writes that, 'migration
of agricultural labourers from one village to another still seems to be
more prevalent than their migration to urban areas. One possible reason
is the familiarity of village life and agricultural work. However, a
far more important reason must be the lack of employment opportunities
29in the urban centres.' Migrations usually take place when the 
labourers have no opportunities in their home villages. Considering 
the above cited characteristics of the agricultural labour-process and 
also the low level of the development of relations and forces of production, 
it is reasonable to conceive that in every year, agricultural wage- 
labourers leave their home villages in the hope of finding jobs in some 
other place. The following are examples of this process.
27
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In Qasr-Abad, a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, 85 out of
181 peasant families hold no land at all; and there are almost no
opportunities for them to work in their village. They go to Shiraz for 
30work. Unlike Qasr-Abad, in Manioun, a village near Jahrum, all wage-
labourers (24 out of 60 peasant families) work in the field or the nearby
mine which belongs to the (ex) landlord. These examples show two
extreme, but not rare, cases. However, the most prevalent situation
is that the agricultural wage-labourers work at least for a period of
time in their own villages. For example, Jones writes, that there are
in Hossein-Abad, a village near Haft-Tapeh in Khuzistan, some seasonal
residents, who live in the village at the planting and harvesting seasons,
and at other times of the year, migrate to other cities of the province,
32where they seek non-farm employment.
In the above examples, the khoshneshin wage-labourers occupy only 
one particular position in relation to the means of production, i.e. as 
direct-producers who produce value and therefore surplus-value. However, 
in some cases, khoshneshins do not have a position in relation to the 
means of production. Thus according to Auroi, there are four grocers' 
shops which sell commodities such as tea, sugar, washing powder, stationary 
requirements, spices and the like in Shah-Abad, a village in the neighbour­
hood of Tehran. Their sales are small because some villagers do some
shopping in Tehran. Three of these shops belong to three khoshneskins
33who work for other peasants as wage-labourers.
The khoehneshin wage-labourers constitute the poorest class of the 
Iranian rural social formation. According to Hooglund, while they 
sustain themselves through casual jobs within and outside their home 
villages, they live below what would normally be considered subsistence 
level. Yet, since the L-R programme began, the job opportunities for 
these labourers have been declining in the rural areas. This may be as 
a result of a combination of the following factors.
An increase in their number due to different factors such as a high1.
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rate of birth in rural areas, dismissal of some nasaq-holders and the 
like.
2. The L-R programme, as we saw above, increased the number of small 
landholders. These small landholders, being capable of running their 
holdings by the help of family labour, only occasionally demand the 
labour of the khoshneshm wage-labourers.3^
3. The small landholders, have not only reduced demand for wage- 
labourers, but also in many cases they compete with the latter in getting 
jobs in their home villages.
4. The mechanization of agriculture (in the sense of using capital-
intensive technology) by capitalist farmers, has sharply reduced the 
37demand for labour.
Small landholders or semi-proletariat
We examined the property relations and also the agricultural labour- 
process pertinent to the peasant landholders, regardless of their 
differentiation. Below we shall consider auxiliary labour-
processes in which the various classes of the peasantry, particularly 
small landholders, are involved.
According to Table XXIII, there are over 1.1 million peasant land 
holders under 2 ha. Here we shall examine this class of landholders in 
relation to the labour-processes in which they are engaged, and try to 
explain why they are semi-prctetcrians.
Table XXIII shows only the number of holders in each category of 
land holding. However, the property relations pertinent to other means 
of production can be discovered by looking at Table XXVI which shows that 
not only do owner/leaseholders of land under 2 ha. control smaller sizes 
of allotments, but they also own fewer means of production than the 
other categories. On the other hand, our small landholders run their 
farms mainly by family labour rather than by the hired labour. Yet in 
some rare cases, they permanently employ wage-labourers; while in other
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cases, they employ a very limited number of wage-labourers in the peak 
season. The peasant small holders thus have a low level of income in 
the overwhelming majority of cases, so low that it does not enable a 
peasant small holder to maintain himself and his family. Generally 
speaking, this situation may be considered as a result of a combination 
of the following three phenomena: a) the agricultural labour-process is 
not a continuous process (see above); b) the forces of production in 
rural Iran (particularly those pertinent to the peasantry) are undeveloped; 
and finally, c) the amount of means of production available to the small 
landholders are limited.
If these peasants cannot obtain a livelihood from their own 
agricultural means of production, they are bound to seek auxiliary 
employment, i.e. to sell their labour-power. This means participation 
in another labour-process. But this time their relationship to the means 
of production is very different from the previous one. They work as 
direct-producers entirely separated from all objective conditions of 
production, in addition to the fact that their labour-power has become a 
commodity at least for a period of the year. That is why we call them 
casual vendors of labour-power.
The technical aspects of the agricultural labour-process, backwardness 
of the productive forces in agriculture as well as the existence of 
various types of climate have enabled the poor peasants to participate in 
the labour-markets of rural as well as urban centres. Although there are 
no study or statistics to mirror the temporary migration of the poor 
peasants (and also wage-labourers), it is possible to conceive that this 
form of migration has taken place on a large scale throughout the country. 
Every year around 2 million poor peasants and agricultural wage-labourers, 
i.e. slightly less than 602 of the rural work force, seek auxiliary 
employment within or outside their home village. Xhe follow'
examples may give an idea of the various forms of auxiliary employment of 
the poor peasants. In Gol-Berenji, a village in the neighbourhood of
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Jahrum, 80 households of the village received 40 ha. land after the L-R
progranane began. Thus now, each household owns half hectare of land.
Accordingly, almost all of these households undertake off-farm jobs,
because they are unable to obtain their livelihood from their allotments.38
In Giga-Sar, a rice producing village in Gilan, there are two labour peaks:
at transplanting and harvesting periods. For this excess demand for
labour, 'the migration to the village of seasonal workers mainly from the
Elburz mountains and the Zanjan area (particularly for the rice harvest
in Gilan which follows the wheat harvest in the south) has been maintained
and is supplemented by some return migration of villagers who have left
39for urban centres.'
As for the rural labour market, there is the role of child labour. 
According to the National Census of Population and Housing, November, 1966, 
out of the total rural male active population, 10Z were under 14 years old 
and another 11.4Z were between 15 and 19. As for the female active
population, around 61Z of them were engaged in rural industries, out of 
which 21Z were under 14 years old and another 19Z were between 15 and 
19.40
The Demand for Rural Labour
So far we have looked at the labour market from the supply side.
There are around two million proletarians and semi-proletarians who sell 
their labour-power. However, on the other hand, there are social classes 
which demand this labour-power, since supply and demand presuppose the 
existence of different social classes.^ The demand for the labour-
power of these agents of production comes from urban and rural centres.
As to the former, the demand comes from different industries but mainly 
from the construction industry. The demand in the rural labour market, 
mainly comes from two different classes: rich peasants and capitalist 
farmers. Ve shall attempt, therefore, to examine the demand of rich 
peasants; but with regard to the capitalist farmers, we shall examine
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their demand for labour when we are studying their economies in the next 
section.
Rich peasants
Here once ggain we make an arbitrary assumption, i.e. we consider 
peasants holding 5 to 50 ha. of land as rich peasants. We make such 
an assumption on the basis of the ownership of other means of production.
That is, as Table XXVI verifies, the peasants holding 5 to 50 ha. of land 
are distinguished from the previous category by the high percentages and 
averages of the ownership of animals as well as the higher percentage 
using tractors. On the other hand, these holders may be distinguished 
from the holders holding over 50 ha. of land mainly by a lower percentage 
of users of tractors. With regard to the ownership of animals (excluding 
oxen), the average ownership of these peasants is lower than the next 
categories, though not remarkably in some cases. But the average 
ownership of oxen (as draught animals) is more or less the same. However, in 
the rural labour market these rich peasants are mainly the buyers of 
labour power. They may employ wage labourers for a period and/or the whole 
of the year. The following cases may throw light on this aspect of the 
economics of rich peasants. In Sheshdangi eight rich peasants (tolomba 
kare) have rented around 232.3 ha. from a landlord; i.e. on average each 
peasant holds 29 ha., one-third of which is fallow in every year. Their 
farms are to a considerable extent mechanised. Although they use family 
labour, during the peak seasons they employ wage-labourers. The labour 
cost, in 1966-67, constituted over 40% their costs per ha.1*2 in Qara- 
Bolagh, a village in the neighbourhood of Darab in Fars province, every 
few persons own a motor-pump by which they irrigate their 35 ha. farm 
Accordingly, the pump owners make no contribution to the labour-process: 
they have employed some poor peasants to undertake the labour-process for
e * %  *
the production of various crops. J
Th.r. «re two phenomena vhich suggest that to consider the site of
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land as the main criterion of classification of the peasantry may be
occasionally misleading. These phenomena are the fertility of land and
the existence of dry-farming. With regard to the former, we should note
that the fertility of land varies from area to area. The more fertile
lands, therefore, involve more labour. Thus in the Gorgan Plain,
. holders of more than four hectares employ wage-labourers at least for a
44period of the year. The second phenomenon is the existence of dry­
farming in Iran. This type involves less labour and its productivity 
is much lower than that of irrigated farming. These characteristics, 
therefore, may effect the demand for labour on these farms. Thus if 
over 5QZ of the members of this category (5-50 ha.) undertake dry-farming,45 
we should not expect them to have the same demand for labour as the holders 
in the above examples.
The Middle Peasantry
According to our classification, holders holding less than two
hectares are considered as poor peasants; while holders holding between 5
to 50 ha. are taken as rich peasants. It follows therefore that those
peasants who own/lease 2 to 5 ha. of land may be considered middle
peasants. These peasants occupy around 22% of the total holdings.46
As table XXVI verifies, the average percentage of ownership of animals in
this category is situated somewhere between the other two
categories. In addition, while the percentage of users of tractors in
this category is substantially higher than the previous category, it is
much lower than the percentage of rich peasant tractor users.
As regards the labour-relations of the middle peasantry, we may say
that they rely heavily on their own family labour, as they used to do
before the L-R. However, they resort to the employment of labourers in
the peak seasons, particularly in the production of labour-intensive
47crops such as beetroot and rice as well as cottonvwi.i.on. Tnese peasants,
.tier the L-B. to some «tent h.v. started using ne„ technology ln their
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cultivations. Since the L-R, they have increased fixed as well as 
fluid capital, including sinking wells, installing motor-pumps on them 
and using improved seeds and chemical fertilizers. Around 47% of them 
hired tractors for different stages of the labour-process. It is 
reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the use of tractors has weakened 
the relationship between the middle peasants and the labour market.
The Peasantry and the Conmodity Market
So far we have explained the relationship of the peasantry to the 
labour market as well as the market of means of production. However, 
there are two other markets with which different strata of the peasantry 
are connected, i.e. the commodity market and money market. In this 
section, we shall, therefore, examine these aspects of the peasant 
economy, first analysing the peasants’ relationship to the commodity 
market and then going on to explain the role of the money market in the 
peasantry's daily life.
Any agent of production who, directly or indirectly, produces 
commodities, may establish a relationship with the market for consumer 
goods either as a buyer or seller and or both. As we shall show below 
all strata of the Iranian peasantry are sellers as well as purchasers of 
different conmodities. We shall therefore, for the sake of simplicity, 
study these two aspects separately.
Table XXIX shows the sale of produce by the peasants according to 
the size of holdings, and the relatively weak integration of the peasants 
into the market. That is, an overwhelming majority of them sold either 
no produce or less than 50% of their produce in the market> However, as
the table shows, different categories have different degrees of integration 
into the market. The weak integration into the market of these may be 
attributed to the following two phenomena. On the one hand, a majority 
of these holders cultivate staples, including wheat, barley and rice, 
which are consumed by peasant families; while on the other hand, a minority
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of them mainly produce perishable products such as various types of 
vegetables, and also tea, tobacco, cotton and the like.
The second category of.holders, holding between 1 and 2 ha., showed 
a very different orientation, although as we explained above, they have 
more or less the same attitude towards the labour market and the employment 
of new technology. As Table XXIX shows, less than 402 of them sold no 
produce on the market (probably the growers of staples); while the 
majority sold at least a portion of their produce on the market.
Contrary to this category are the holdings of between 2 to 5 ha. Over 
51Z of the holders in this category did not supply their produce to the 
market. On the other hand, only 22.32 of them sold over 502 of their 
produce to the market. Thus this category of holders, generally 
speaking, has a tendency towards a "closed economy" not only in terms of 
supplying consumer goods to the market, but also in terms of demanding 
various commodities as inputs.
Formerly, ve considered the two categories of holders 5 to 10 and 10 
to 50 as rich peasants. This is because the peasants in these categories 
have similarities in property relations as well as labour relations. 
However, they have, as Table XXIX shows, very different positions in 
relation to the market for consumer goods. Thus holders of 5 to 10 ha. 
sllotmsntSt m  general, are the least market integrated category; whereas 
the holders of 10 to 50 ha. allotments sell more of their produce in the 
market than all other categories except the holders of 1 to 2 ha.
Table XXIX shows the percentage of produce each category sold in the 
market, but does not show the share of each of them in market output. 
However, according to one estimate, holders, holding over 10 ha., supplied 
around 77Z of the marketed output; whereas the share of holders of less 
than 10 ha. allotments was only 192.48 Comparing the latter’s share with 
the area under their control, i.e. 32.82 of total area, one may also see 
the degree to which the small landholders produce staples for their own
consumption.
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TABLE XXIX
Sale of Produce According to Size of Holdings (%)
Size of Holding No Sale Less than 50% Sold More than 50% Sold
Less than 1 ha. 55.5 25.9 18.6
1 to 2 has. 39.5 28.5 32.0
2 to 5 has. 51.1 26.6 22.3
5 to 10 has. 59.2 26.5 14.3
10 to 50 has. 48.4 28.2 23.4
50 to 100 has. 1.0 1.9 97.1
100 and over has. 3.0 0.2 96.8
Source: The Agricultural Census of Iran, 1975, Table 9.
Generally speaking, Table XXIX shows the relatively weak integration 
of the peasantry into the market according to the size of holdings. 
However, the table does not show how the peasantry is related to the 
market for consumer goods and how this relationship may affect its 
economy. We shall, therefore, examine the nature of this relationship 
and try to explore the effects of it on the peasant economy.
The Marketing and Distribution of Peasant Produce
Broadly speaking, there have been poor marketing and weak food
distribution systems in Iran. The infrastructures are very poor and
therefore many of the 50,000 villages, which are scattered throughout
the country, are isolated from the market centres (in urban centres).
This situation plus the specific form of class structure of the peasantry
have resulted in the almost complete separation of the peasant-producers
from the marketing centres: i.e. the peasants have no -influence on the
mechanisms of markets in the urban centres. Th«c »•.. •xuus, it is in urban
terminal markets where almost all marketing functions 
where major market infrastructures are established • • •
are performed and 
The existing
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marketing and distribution are ineffective mechanisms for transmitting to
agricultural producers either quantitative or qualitative changes in 
49consumer demand.' However, this separation does not mean that the 
peasantry is disconnected to the markets for consumer goods.
As we showed above, the peasantry sends a portion of its produce to the 
market. But, in order for this portion of produce to reach the market 
for consumer goods, it must pass through a chain of middlemen. There are 
two points, therefore, to be explained: first, the relationship between 
the peasantry and these middlemen and secondly,, the difference between 
the price at the farm-gate and that in'the consumer market.
With regard to the relationship between the peasantry and the 
middlemen, we may say that the latter buy the produce at two different 
times: either when the produce is harvested, or during the production 
cycle. In some cases, the peasant-producers sell their produce when it 
is harvested to the middlemen. This may be attributed to two main 
factors: a) in a majority of cases they cannot afford the cost of 
transport and distribution; b) the distribution and marketing system 
are, to a considerable extent, monopolized by the trades in the urban 
centres. Hence, even if a peasant could afford the cost of transport, 
he would find it hard to sell his produce in the market. The case of a 
peasant in Hamidieh, in Khuzistan, who tried by-pass the middlemen but 
failed illustrates this: '... he acted courageously and loaded his 
lettuces on his own truck without any assistance from Ahwaz intermediaries, 
and sent it directly to the Tehran market. But the protectioners of 
Tehran food market raked off most of the proceeds. He told us that if he 
had not suffered losses in this way he would have again sent his produce 
directly to Tehran and tried to find an opening in one of the market-places 
thereby increasing his profit.'^0
The second type of deal between the intermediaries (as buyers) and 
the peasants (as producer/sellers) is the preharvest sale (ealaf-khari).
It has never been made clear by writers on this subject whether or not the
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preharvest sale is the dominant form of the realization of the value of 
produce on the part of the peasantry. However, it appears that a 
substantial quantity of agricultural produce, every year, is sold before 
harvest. Preharvest sales may take place in one of the following forms. 
First, the trader (salaf khar) may make an offer, for fresh fruits, on 
the basis of the past performance of the orchard, prices in the previous 
season, quantity of fruit expected, and also the time lag between the 
advance of loan and the harvest. Secondly, for the grains and dry fruits, 
an advance is usually given on a set quantity and quality of produce; at 
harvest time, the buyer collects the produce. The balance between the 
loan and the price of produce, is recovered immediately or later depending 
upon the type of agreement. Thirdly, in some cases, the price of produce 
is not fixed in advance. The trader advances a loan on the condition that 
the peasant will sell the produce to him at so many rials per kilogram 
less than the prevailing market price. Fourthly, in some other cases, 
loans are granted provided sales will be made to the lenders at current 
prices. However, the absolute separation of the peasant-producer from 
the market and also the non—existence of competition among the traders, 
enable the latter to manipulate the prices to his own advantage. Finally, 
in some other cases, the local shop-keepers accept the provision of loans 
in the form of such goods as tea, sugar, cloth. At harvest time, the 
peasant-producers, in return, have to supply the lenders with their 
products at reduced prices.51 The negotiation between the shop-keeper 
and the peasant usually takes place in late winter when the latter has run 
out of all his food supplies.
Lodi, whose study was carried out only few years after the L-R 
programme began, states that 20 to 70 percent of the total agricultural 
production of many crops was sold before harvest. It appears that this 
form of sale has continued to prevail in the rural markets in spite of 
the establishment of cooperatives which were supposed to help the peasants 
sell their produce in the market.
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The establishment of multi-purpose co-operatives to by pass the 
middlemen has not been successful. According to the L-R laws, membership 
of a co-operative was a necessary condition of receiving land. Thus, all 
peasant landholders are supposedly members of co-operatives. On the other 
hand, one of the main functions of these co-operatives is concerned with 
the production, exchange, storage, transport, and sale of the produce of 
its members.^ The co-operatives were supposed to cut out the inter­
mediaries who imposed low prices on the peasantry. However, so far the 
co-operatives have failed to perform such operations in rural Iran:
'according to the statistics of the Central Organization for Rural Co­
operation, during the eleven months of the year 1348 (March 1969 - February 
1970) the following quantities of major products were marketed through 
the co-operatives: rice 13,000 tons; "grains" 5,300 tons; wheat 3,800 tons. 
These quantities are infinitesimal relative to the national gross production,
i.e. even in the case of rice, the marketed quantity does not account for 1
53percent of the nation’s rice output.'
Thus, owing to the poverty of the majority of peasants, a virtual 
separation between the peasantry and the markets for consumer goods and 
also the weakness of the co-operative network, the peasant landholders 
have had to hand over their produce to intermediaries at post-harvest or 
preharvest time. The category of intermediaries includes the village 
shopkeepers, merchants of the nearby towns, landlowners, rich peasants 
(in some cases), private- firms, flour mill owners. These agents have 
invested large sums in buying and selling agricultural products, due to 
the fact that (as we shall discuss below) it is a profitable business. 
However, dealings between the peasant-producer and a middleman may take 
one of the following three forms. First, the peasant is provided with 
some commodities in return for cash or agricultural produce at harvest 
time (usually from the village shopkeeper); secondly, the peasant is given 
some cash in return for produce, i.e. pre-harvest sale; or thirdly, he 
may borrow some cash in return for cash and not produce. These types of
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dealings involve an outflow of some value in different forms: for 
example, overpricing the commodities and underpricing the agricultural 
produce (in the first type); underpricing the agricultural produce (in 
the second type); and interest on loans (in the third type). We shall, 
therefore, examine all these cases, taking into account the question of 
the outflow of value from the hands of the peasant landholders.
The first case is one of the most widespread forms of provision of 
credit to the peasantry. For example in Kushk Hezar Qal'eh, a village 
in the neighbourhood of Shiraz in Fars province, many peasants are 
provided credit by eight shopkeepers of the village. They obtain
54various commodities in return for which they will pay at harvest time.
The peasants usually buy simple commodities such as tea, sugar and cloth. .
At harvest time, the customers, not only have to pay the price of goods, 
but also pay some money as interest. Both parts are combined in higher 
prices for the goods. For example in the above-cited village, the peasants 
pay 17Z and 66Z more than the people in the nearby town pay for sugar and 
tea respectively."*^
In some other cases, the village shopkeeper provides the peasant 
with credit (to buy goods from him), in return for some produce at harvest 
time. The exchange, in this case, seems to be a barter type of exchange. 
However, the exchange is accompanied at the same time by lending/ 
borrowing money. As in the previous case, he charges his customers an 
arbitrary mark up over and above the price of goods (which they buy) as 
profit and interest; while on the other hand, he buys agricultural 
products below their prices.
It appears that in the villages in the remote areas or those which 
are not connected to the urban centres, the shopkeepers manage to perform 
the functions of traders as well as money-lenders at the same time.
In the villages near towns, the shopkeepers are faced 
with competition from moneylenders in addition to the fact that the 
peasants have access to consumer markets in nearby towns^
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The second method, where the peasant is provided with some cash in
return for produce, works as follows. The negotiation between the
peasant and trader (salaf Jchar) usually takes place in late winter when
the farmer has consumed all his food supplies. Already in debt, he is
offered by the trader immediate cash in return for the promise of
receiving a fixed measure of the crop at harvest time.5^
Preharvest sales prices are generally much lower than the post
harvest prices. Preharvest prices of wheat are 30 to 35 percent and
of cotton 40 to 50 percent below post harvest prices. In Tasooj,
a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz, the trader provides the
peasant-vegetable growers with credit, provided they sell him their
products at harvest time. Accordingly, not only are the prices
manipulated by the trader, but he also takes one tenth of the total
59produce as interest on the credit.
Money Market in Rural Iran.
In the third case, where peasants borrow money in return for money 
and not produce, a clearcut line between the money market and commodity 
market can be observed. Credit is available to the peasants from the 
following five sources: the village moneylenders, the middlemen, the 
banking system (mainly the Agricultural Credit and Rural Development Bank), 
the Agricultural Development Fund, and finally the rural co-operatives.60
The money market in the UDCs is classified into two different 
submarkets: organized and unorganized markets.61 Following this 
classification, we may consider the first two sources, i.e. moneylenders 
and middlemen as being within the category of unorganized money market; 
while the latter three sources, which are state owned financial bodies, 
constitute the organized money market in rural Iran. We shall, therefore, 
base our argument on this classification.
First, there is almost no direct connection between the organized 
*ni U"°r6‘r,iZed “ ,ne)r »*■*«»! there is no transfer of loanable funds from
one market to another. On the other hand, there is virtually no 
competition between these two markets to enable the borrowers to have
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bargaining power vis-a-vis moneylenders and traders. It is one of the
reasons for which we have two different ranges of interest rates. The
interest rates in the organized money market range from 6% (by co-operatives)
to 14% (by commercial banks); whereas this range is between 15 and over
62100% in the unorganized money market. Secondly, according to a study,
in 1963, 17.6% of the credit, acquired by the peasants, was obtained
from co-operatives, and 26.6 from the Agricultural Bank, while the rest
63was obtained from the private sources. Table XXX illustrates
the share of these two markets during 1963-72. Thirdly, borrowing from
TABLE XXX
Share of Credit Sources in the Rural Money Market 
of Iran 1963-72
Source
Amount 
(billion Rs) %
Agricultural Co-operative Bank 9.0 13.6
Rural Co-operatives 6.0 9.0
Agricultural Development Fund 0.4 0.6
Tea Board 4 Other Institutions 5.1 7.8
Commercial Banks 13.2 20.0
Subtotal: Organized Honey Market 33.7 51.0
Non-Institutional Credit 32.3 49.0
TOTAL 66.0 100.0
Source: FAO, 1975.
one source, in one of the markets, does not prevent the peasant from 
borrowing from other sources. In fact, the majority of peasants have
taken out more than one loan. They often borrow from moneylender, or
trader, (preharvest sales) every year in order to repay officialloans
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from co-operatives.
The Unorganized Money Market
Our main criterion for distinguishing the unorganized money market 
from the organized one, is the source of credit. That is, while 
institutionalized organizations act within the organized money market, 
within the unorganized one private persons, such as moneylenders, 
traders, shopkeepers and rich peasants,are the sources of credit.
As in many other UDCs, the unorganized money market plays an 
important role in rural Iran. Thus according to Table XXX, around 50% 
of the amount of credit during 1963-72 was provided by the unorganized 
money market. It appears that in the Iranian unorganized rural money 
market, moneylenders and traders-cum-moneylenders, play the main role; 
while to a lesser extent the peasant borrowers can borrow from rich 
peasant relatives and the like.
All studies agree that all peasants (especially the poor one) are in 
debt to at least more than one institution or person. In almost all 
the villages of Fars and Kirman, visited by the G.O.P.F. groups, the 
peasants were heavily in debt to their co-operatives on the one hand and 
to moneylenders and/or traders on the other.^ Obviously the demand for
loans, by the peasants, is governed by the necessity to keep their farms 
in operation and their families alive. Hooglund attributes the need 
for borrowing mainly to the latter factor and points out that 'some 70% 
of all peasants farm less than five has. of land annually. Except in 
the Caspian sea area, five has. is not sufficient to provide a peasant 
family with more than the barest subsistence livelihood in Iran.'^
The other factor, which pushes the peasants towards moneylenders in rural 
Iran, is the limited amount of credit available to them in the organized 
money market. E.g. in rural Fars, many peasants, while appreciating the 
easy conditions of loans from co-operatives, alleged that these loans 
were insufficient for their cash needs. ^
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In order to take advantage of such a situation, moneylenders offer 
iranediate cash to the peasants. They make advances usually from sowing 
to harvest time, or for some period in between the two. Yet, in some 
cases, peasants may borrow money even before sowing. The moneylender may 
live in the village or run his business in the nearby town. Yet he 
knows, perhaps better than anyone else, what is going on in the village.
In addition, he knows the peasant borrowers personally, that is as Wai 
points out, 'the relationship between borrower and lender is not only 
that of debtor and creditor but also an integral part of a much wider 
socio-economic pattern of village life.'^ Thus, more often than not, 
conventional forms of collateral are not required.
The above situation has enabled particular moneylenders to monopolize
particular villages or areas. However, in cases in which commercial and
usury capitals are combined, we may see more than a single trader in any 
68single village. Furthermore, there are two factors which reinforce 
the monopoly position of the moneylenders. First, according to Bottomley, 
the borrower's personal knowledge of any particular moneylender plays an 
important role in borrowing from that particular moneylender due to the 
illiteracy of the majority of the peasant borrowers. The second factor 
is pertinent to the specific characteristic of the unorganized money 
markets in the UDCs, that is these markets in the UDCs are scattered 
over the rural sector and there is very little contact between the lenders 
and borrowers in different localities.^ Thus a typical moneylender or 
trader is either an imperfect or an outright monopolist.
Generally speaking, the monopoly positions of the moneylender, the 
lack of communication between the different rural money markets, the dire 
needs of the peasantry for credit as well as their illiteracy have 
enabled the moneylenders to demand high rates of interest within a wide 
range. Thus the rates of interest in the Iranian unorganized money 
market range from 15 to over 100%. With regard to the trader-cum-money- 
lenders, the situation is more or less the same. They buy agricultural
252
products, on the basis of preharvest contracts, 30 to 70% below their 
prices at harvest time; while on the other hand, they sell their commodities 
to the peasant consumers up to 66% over the market prices in the nearby 
towns.
The Organized Money Market
We have briefly examined the credit situation in the Iranian 
unorganized rural money market. According to the rough estimates in 
Table XXX, non-institutional bodies provided around 49% of credit during 
1963-72, and the rest was granted by the private as well as state owned 
banks and co-operatives. We shall therefore make an attempt to examine 
the provision of credits by those organized bodies in relation to the 
peasantry.
As Table XXX shows, around 51% of loans were provided by the organized 
money market. Yet the table does not illustrate the share of the 
peasantry out of the total of 33.7 billion rials credit. However, not 
all of these bodies provide the peasantry with loans. That is, out of 
the five categories of organizations within the organized money market, 
it is only the rural co-operative whose main function is to supply the 
peasantry with loans. Some other bodies, such as the Tea Board and 
sugar processing factories, usually make contracts with peasants under 
which they provide the peasant-producers with some cash before harvest 
time. In addition, commercial banks play a limited financial role in 
connection with the peasantry in the organized money market. Table XXX 
does not therefore illustrate the real amount of credit available to the 
peasantry. The other misleading point in the table is that a major 
portion of loans granted by the Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran, 
goes usually to rural co-operatives.^0 It means that a high portion of
9.0 billion rials, which has been granted to the rural co-operatives, is 
counted twice in the table: once under the category of the Agricultural 
Co-operative Bank and next time under the Rural Co-operatives category.
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We should therefore bear in mind that there are rural co-operatives, 
among all other bodies, which are solely concerned with the provision of 
credit to the peasantry, while others such as the Agricultural Development 
Fund and Agricultural Co-operative Bank, have nothing to do with the 
peasantry. It follows also that the non-institutional bodies plày 
a more important role in the peasants» economies than the organized bodies 
to which we now turn.
Rural Co-operatives as the Main Source of Credit
We have already noted that L-R programmes are usually accompanied by
some supplementary measures to reinforce the "newly established"
relations of production. One of the most common of these measures is
the establishment of multi-purpose co-operatives. Thus a note to Article
16 of the Iranian L-R law specifies that »only persons who are members of
the co-operative will be eligible for land under the land distribution
law.' In theory therefore a co-operative was to be set up wherever land
was transferred. Table XXXI, below, illustrates the establishment of
co-operative societies during 1966-75. Up to 1972, 8,361 co-operative
societies were set up which comprised over two million peasants. However,
by that year the State officials decided to merge the small co-operatives;
hence we see a sharp decrease in the number of co-operatives, while the
number of members, the societies» capital and the total amount of loans
have increased. Before examining the advance of loans by co-operatives,
we should draw attention to the following four points:
First, in theory, the co-operatives are supposed to perform various
functions including the following: operations concerned with the production,
exchange, storage, transport, and sale of the produce of the members; the
provision of agricultural implements and machinery, pesticides, and
fertilizers; the provision of primary necessities such as foodstuffs, fuel,
clothing, etc; the purchase of the agricultural produce of the members,
or its storage and sale; the giving of loan a __,e viuS or loans to members to tide them over
TABLE XXXI
Number of Co-operatives, their Capital , Number and Amount of Loans 1967-76
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
1) No. of Societies 8236 8388 8102 8298 8450 8361 2717 2847 2858
2) No. of Members* 1087 1260 1400 1606 1754 2065 2263 2488 2685
3) Capital** 1270 1939 1984 2379 2769 3329 3857 4677 5690
4) No. of Loans* 559 673 739 844 903 876 1174 1251 1646 1771
5) Total Amount of Loans** 5024 4077 5041 5753 6314 6812 10072 12372 19744 24723
6) % of Members Obtained Loans 51 53 52 52 48 42 52 50 61
7) Average Amount of Each Loan 8987 6057 6821 6816 6992 7776 8579 9889 11995
* Thousand
** Million rials
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1976
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the period until they sell their crops and to provide what they need for 
the cultivation of their crops, and where necessary, sums for the 
improvement of the means of production; to accept deposits from the members; 
and finally, to obtain credit. In other words, the Iranian peasants were 
supposed to have multi-purpose co-operatives. But in practice, they have 
become single-purpose co-operatives: they are mainly involved in supplying 
their members with loans.
Secondly, it appears that the data on the numbers<of co-operatives may 
be exaggerated, i.e. some of these societies never really came into 
existence. Thus according to a UN report, ’by December 1963, nearly 2200 
co-operative associations had been formed, but it is certain that many of 
these were co-operatives in name only, their sole function being to enable 
the tenant recipients of redistributed land formally to conform with the 
requirements of the law.'7*
Thirdly, at the administrative level, the co-operatives are under 
the control of a central body called the Central Organization for Rural 
Co-operatives (CORC). The main functions of CORC are the promotion of 
co-operatives, guidance, auditing, training of staff, members’ education 
and the provision of finance, supplies and marketing. This organization 
has thirteen offices at provincial level and ninety—five offices at 
district level. Each district office has four to six area supervisory 
teams whose main function is auditing the accounts of co-operatives. 
Generally a team supervises 10 to 15 co-operatives.
Fourthly, loans are advanced usually for a period of ten months, 
however the maximum period is one year, and rate of interest 6% per 
annum. CORC has laid down that new loans should not be advanced to 
members by a society until all members had repaid their existing loans. 
Lambton considers this regulation as ’an essential principle if thrift and 
responsibility are to be encouraged.’72 However, in practice this 
regulation has directed the members of co-operatives to borrow from other 
sources (mainly moneylenders/traders) to repay their debts to co-operatives.
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It means that the majority of the peasants are in debt, round the year,
either to their co-operatives or to the moneylenders; and borrow from one
73source to pay back their debts to the other one.
The number of co-operatives increased sharply during the 1960s and 
the early 1970s: by 1962 there existed slightly over two thousand 
co-operatives^, while as Table XXXI shows, their number increased
to 8361 in 1972. In accordance with the expansion of the 
C0-0peratives, the number of members also increased: they increased by 
less than 2.5 times during the period 1966-74. The rate of increase in 
the total amount of loans was more or less the same during this period, 
i.e. it increased from over 5 to over 12.3 million rials. This resulted 
in an almost fixed percentage of the receivers of loans in these years.
That is, in three years only around 50% of members managed to obtain 
loans from their co-operatives. It appears that many peasants are unhappy 
with this situation. Many peasants of Fars and Kirman, for example, have 
complained that although the conditions of co-operatives' loans are very 
good, only a limited number of members manage to obtain loans every year.^"*
In addition to the limited numbers of loans, the amount of each loan 
is limited. In the last row of Table XXXI, the average amount for each 
year is computed: there is a decrease in this amount from 1967 to 1968, 
due to an increase in the number of members and a decrease in the total 
amount of loans. However, from 1968 up to 1971, the amount is more or 
less stable; but after this year, we can see a regular increase in the 
average amount of loans every year. We should note that in 1975, not 
only did the average amount of loans increase, but also a higher percentage 
of the members (61%) obtained loans. These changes after 1972-73 may be 
attributed to the changes in the agricultural economic policy of the State. 
With the increasing rate of migration of the peasants from the rural areas, 
due to the "prosperity" in the urban centres, the State undertook measures, 
including increasing the availability of credit, to encourage the peasants 
to stay in their home villages and cultivate. Table XXXI shows the average
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amount of each loan for various years. Yet, these loans are not granted 
among the peasant-members equally. According to CORC's regulations, 
members can receive loans up to ten times their investment shares in the 
society, with an upper limit of 10000 which later on increased to 20000 
rials. In addition, rich peasants are usually elected as members of the 
board of directors. This board has the power of allocating funds to the 
co-operative members. Consequently, not only are the rich peasants 
allowed, legally, to obtain larger loans,,but they also give priority to 
themselves rather than poor peasants in allocating loans among the 
members. This is the reason why many peasants in Fars and Kirman provinces 
have complained about the distribution of loanable funds.7  ^ The
co-operative system in Iran, therefore, has been reinforcing the different­
iation of the peasantry rather than strengthening co-operation among them.
The Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran
The other source of credits for the peasantry, is the Agricultural 
Co-operative Bank of Iran. Table XXXII indicates the bank's activities 
between 1966-75. As can be seen, from 1967 onward current account 
expenditures, and livestock breeding and animal husbandry have constituted 
the main categories of the total loans advanced by the bank. The latter 
category is mainly concerned with agents of production other than the 
peasants. We therefore concentrate on the former.
It appears that the Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran extends 
credits in two different ways: indirectly through the C0RC, and directly 
through its own branches. However, the bank acts mainly through the 
co-operatives, thus for example in 1971, 67Z of the amount of the extended 
loans was advanced through the co-operatives.77 The Bank's direct credit 
activities may be seen mainly in those areas where the co-operatives 
either are very weak or do not exist at all.
The interest rate of the Agricultural Co-operative Bank is 6Z, and the 
bank advances short, medium as well as long term credits. However, as can
TABLE XXXII
Distribution of Credit Extended by the Agricultural Co-■operative Bank of Iran (Z)
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Current Agricultural Expenditures* 33.9 46.5 49.2 44.1 78.0 80.6 63.7 62.3 51.1 54.1
Credit in Current Account 35.1 8.5 7.5 3.4 7.6 1.4 2.3 - 2.5 0.7
Irrigation 12.4 10.4 7.7 4.1 1.0 0.9 2.7 2.3 4.5 4.3
Carden & Nurseries 7.0 8.4 7.1 6.4 1.4 1.6 3.5 5.0 5.1 6.5
Rural Construction 4.2 6.4 6.9 6.8 1.4 3.0 2.9 4.0 4.0 2.6
Livestock breeding and Animal 
Husbandry
2.7 16.0 17.9 28.2 9.8 6.0 20.5 22.0 27.2 18.8
Others 4.7 3.8 3.7 7.0 0.8 6.5 4.4 4.4 5.6 13.0
Total (million rials) 5168 5188 5290 5415 8909 9582 14381 19993 31116 35295
* Including loans granted to the C.O.R.C. every year. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook, 1976, p. 239.
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be seen in Table XXXII, short term loans during 1966-75 have constituted 
a high proportion of the total loans extended by the bank. in order to 
extend these short-term (seasonal) loans directly the bank has maintained 
some mobile units, each of which is composed of an agricultural credit 
specialist, an accountant and a cashier. These seasonal loans are 
advanced against a surety of two persons with good credit.78 However, 
since 1970, according to Rudulph, this bank has tended to give short-term 
loans only to the co-operatives.
As to the commercial banks, their activities have been very limited
in the rural areas. In addition, they advance medium and long term loans
mainly to big agriculturalists, processors, merchants as well as the
exporters of agricultural goods. However, three banks, Bank Melli,
Bank Saderat and Bank Omran, are the most active in extending loans to the 
79peasants.
As Table XXX shows, in addition to the financial institutions, some 
other non-financial institutions advance loans to the agricultural- 
producers. Of the more important of these institutions we mention the 
Tea Board and Sugar Processing Factories. These bodies usually provide 
the small peasant cultivators with some credit before harvest time, 
provided the latter sell their products to them. However, as Table XXX 
shows, their activities are very limited in comparison to the total loans 
advanced in the organized and unorganized money market.
So far we have examined the various sources from which the peasantry 
may obtain credits. However we have no data to show the exact nature of 
their use. Table XXXII illustrates the distribution of credits (of the 
Agricultural Co-operative Bank of Iran) according to their use. Yet 
the main category, i.e. current agricultural expenditures, is unclear in 
the sense that the data do not show the shares of personal and productive 
consumption in this category.
Considering that almost all of the peasants (poor and middle in 
particular) bhrrcv short-term loans from the organized as well as unorganized
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money market, we may not consider these credits as an attempt, on the part 
of the recipients, at investment in the land. This is because, on the one 
hand a high proportion of the loans received are used for non-productive 
consumption. Thus according to an estimate, 'only 48Z of the borrowed 
money was used for agricultural purposes - the rest helped to finance the 
acquisition of domestic consumption goods. In the south, namely in 
Bandar Abbas, similar investigations in (1967) revealed that 30% of credit
obtained by farmers in the sample helped finance their ordinary consumption;
,80
'** The permanent indebtedness of these peasants to
the co-operatives as well as trader/moneylenders, indicates that they are 
short of cash for their current expenditures. Their agricultural economy 
seems to be a type of simple reproduction economy. With regard to the part 
of the year during which they work on their own allotments, they work only 
to pay their debts and provide necessities for their families (for part of 
the year only). This situation, generally speaking, does not leave them 
any surplus to be used for accumulation purposes. However, in some cases, 
some peasants have obtained medium-term loans from banks or co-operatives 
for investment purposes. For example, there are cases in Fars province, 
in which peasants have obtained short or medium loans for sinking wells 
and installing motor-pumps.
To summarise this discussion, we can say that,.after the L-R programme 
began, the State took some measures to reinforce capitalist relations of 
production among the peasantry. One of the main measures was the 
establishment of multi-purpose co-operatives. These co-operatives have, 
to a limited extent, succeeded in taking the place of landlords and 
moneylenders in the provision of credits and that of the traders in 
purchasing the products. The co-operatives’ activities have been limited, 
because most of them 'have been too poorly funded, their credit terms too 
restrictive, and the prices paid to farmers too low to encourage expanded 
production or to relieve the farmer of a traditional dependence on non- 
institutional moneylenders. With only limited marketing facilities and
261
frequently severe shortage of storage and transport, only a small fraction
of Iran'8 agricultural product is presently moved through rural co- 
82operatives.' The direct consequence of the failure in the co-operative 
movements may be seen in Table XXXIII, which illustrates the shares of 
various sources of credits in different parts of Iran. Furthermore, with 
regard to marketing, the co-operatives have still been less successful than 
in the provision of credits. Thus when in the summer 1977, I visited 
Kallaj, Siahpush and Qasem-Abad, three villages near Manjil, I was told that 
almost all peasant landholders had to sell their products to some inter- 
mediaties before harvest time at one-third of the prices in the urban 
markets. According to an official report from Azarbaijan,
almost all peasants had to resort to preharvest sales, due to the shortage 
of money which was not covered by the co-operatives.83
TABLE XXXIII
Sources of Credit to the Peasantry in the Late 1960s (%)
Co-ops. Agri.Bank Others
Land-
Owner
Money-
Lenders
Qasr-e Shirin 43 13 0.5 - 43.5
Sanandaj 39 18 - 0.6 42.4
Colpayegan 19 29 9.0 0.4 42.6
Carmsar 37 3 1.5 - 58.5
Sari 31 6 11.0 0.9 51.1
Ramadan 45 4 7.0 0.1 43.9
Birjand 41 20 - 0.4 38.6
Source: Denman 1973, p. 201.
With the failure of the co-operatives and other State bodies in the 
provision of sufficient credit for the peasantry, we have a situation in 
which a large number of producers, as the owner/possessors of the objective 
conditions of production, confront usury/merchant capital. Usury/merchant
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capital is penned in the sphere of circulation and therefore sets limits 
on industrial capital. In our case, usury/merchant capital has tried to 
maintain its position in the sphere of circulation without altering the 
labour-process. In other words, it has made no attempt to take over 
the labour-process, separate the direct-producers from their conditions 
of production, and therefore subordinate them to capital. Instead, usury/ 
merchant capital, as a general rule, has impoverished the peasantry, 
paralysed the productive forces and consequently has perpetuated the 
miserable conditions in which the social productivity of labour remains 
undeveloped. By doing so, in effect, usury/merchant capital has 
inhibited the development of capitalism along the "American" path.
B. The Economics of Capitalist Farmers
We have so far, examined some aspects of peasant economies in rural 
Iran. However, as has already been explained, the L-R programme induced 
some landlords to shift to capitalist farming. In effect, these two 
processes of development have gone on side by side. According to our 
classification criteria landlords of 50 has. and over are considered as 
capitalist farmers, In terms of numbers, these holdings constitute only 
1Z of the total holdings, but this tiny percentage of holders, have 
occupied over 21Z of the area under cultivation (see Table XXV).
In the majority of cases, these landowners operate their farms 
directly, i.e. they are landlords as well as capitalist farmers. They 
therefore collect profit and rent simultaneously. According to
•The Agricultural CeneuB of Iran, 1 frs, around 16Z of these landowners have 
rented out their farms to other persons. These two categories of land­
holders, not only own much more land than the other categories, but they 
are also distinguished from other categories in terms of the ownership of 
some of the other means of production and subsistence. As can be seen
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in Table XXVI, the average ownership of cows and sheep by these two 
categories is much higher than those of other categories. But they do 
not own more oxen, on average, than other smaller landholders. This is 
because oxen in rural Iran are employed as a source of energy for ploughing, 
winnowing, threshing and the like; while these capitalist farmers mainly 
use machinery as a source of energy. Over 90% of these holdings employed 
machinery for cultivation (see Table XXVI). As a matter of fact, after 
the L-R programme began, many capitalist farmers shifted to mechanized 
farming; hence during 1967-75 as many as 40237 tractors were sold by the 
Organization for Development of Agricultural Machinery.85
We have no data available to show the share of these capitalist 
farmers out of the total 40237 tractors sold by the above mentioned 
organization. Yet, it appears that, leaving aside corporations and 
agribusiness units, a large percentage of the tractors sold belong to 
capitalist farmers. They not only use their machinery for themselves, 
but also, as we have already explained, rent it out to small landholders.86 
For example in Qasem-Abad, a village in the neighbourhood of Manjil, in the 
summer 1977 a capitalist farmer, who cultivated over 200 ha. of irrigated 
land, stated that he used to borrow tractors for ploughing and harvesting 
from an outsider. But in 1974, he bought a tractor and all other 
supplementary implements necessary for cultivation. He did not say 
whether or not he rented out his tractor to the local peasants.87
However, the process of mechanization has affected labour-relations 
in rural Iran. We have already shown that the demand for labour power 
in the rural labour market stems from the capitalist farmers. The 
farmers who run mechanized farms, employ the local peasants and 
TOwshneehin wage-labourers only for a period of the year. The reason for 
such fluctuation in demand has been earlier attributed to the nature of 
the production cycle in agriculture. For example, the ex-landlord of 
Shah-Abad, a village near Tehran, who has become engaged directly in 
agricultural activities, employ, the local peasants (hi. ex-subjects) as
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well as non-local wage-labourers during the peak seasons.88 i„ many 
villages of Fars the peasants stated that they manage to work for a period 
of the year on the (ex)landlords farms, and for the rest of the year had to 
go to other areas to seek jobs.89 it appears that these capitalist 
fanners employ only a few permanent wage-labourers;the capitalist farmer of 
Qasem-Abad, a village near Manjil, for instance, told me that he has 
employed only one permanent wage-labourer. He performs a variety of jobs 
including driving the tractor, irrigating the farm, taking care of plants, 
etc. However, the capitalist farmer employs workers seasonally (local and 
non-local). For example, in August 20, 1977, he stated that he would 
employ some workers within the month to collect potatoes and onions which he 
had in his farm. Yet, he stated that, since the time that he had bought 
his tractors and all relevant implements, he employed fewer labourers than 
he used to do. Finally, the two capitalist farmers of Madavan, a village 
near Darab in Fars province, own a tractor, a combine and seven motor-pumps; 
they cultivate an 82 ha. farm. Despite the large size of their farm, they 
employ only a few permanent wage-labourers particularly for watering the 
farm. At harvest time these two capitalist farmers employ more wage- 
labourers (including some women).90
In the previous chapters, we have stated that one of the main 
characteristics of the agricultural sector in a capitalist social formation, 
is the existence of a large number of small landowners who are semi­
proletarians. In analysing such a situation in Iran, we examined the 
fluctuations on the supply (of labour-power) side; i.e. the semi­
proletarian, ceteris paribus, comes to the labour market when he has 
finished with his cultivation. On the demand (of labour-power)
side we may see some fluctuations, during a year, which coincide with the 
changes in the supply of labour. Thus the capitalist farmer of Qasem- 
Abad stated that there was a shortage of labour, because this was the 
harvest time of the area. Accordingly, in September, namely,when the 
local as well as non-local peasants finish with their cultivation, he 
employs some of them to do harvesting and related activities.
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In the villages, where the ex-landlords have managed to maintain 
their positions as the main landowners after the L-R, they are the main 
buyers of labour-power. Thus at the village level, any given capitalist 
farmer has a monopsony position in the labour market of the village.
It is reasonable therefore to say that, ceteris paribus, they use their 
bargaining power to keep down the level of wages and at the same time to 
prolong the working-day. Thus Hooglund points out that 'working hours 
are usually long, lasting from dawn to sunset with a two-hour lunch and 
rest at noontime. For such a day an experienced man earns between 60
91
to 90 rials, women and children receive from J to two-thirds this amount. 
There is a factor which has reinforced the monopsony of these capitalist 
farmers. That is, the competition on the one hand between the local 
fchoshneshin wage-labourers and local semi-proletariat, and on the other 
hand between local and temporary migrants. We have already examined the 
competition between the khoshneshin wage-labourers and semi-proletariat. 
However, with regard to the latter groups, the following two cases may 
shed light on this question.
In the first case, local wage-labourers of Shah-Abad compete with the
Azarbaijani migrants who go to that village in March and stay the whole
working season there. They are preferred by the capitalist farmer
92because they work harder and are ready to accept lower wages. In the 
second case, the local peasants alleged that the capitalist farmer (ex­
landlord) of Mozafarry (a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz) who owns
1000 ha. of village's land, usually employs non-local wage-labourers,
93while their local counterparts are unemployed.
However, the potential monopsony position of the capitalist farmers 
in the local labour market is weakened by other employment opportunities 
which are available to the labourers in the rural as well as urban labour 
markets. After 1973, the gap between the wage-levels in the rural and 
urban labour markets widened. In prosperous rural areas a farm 
labourer could earn around 300 rials a day as compared with a semi-skilled
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labourer who obtained as much as 1000 rials per day in one of the urban
industrial projects. During the summer of 1977, I saw a similar
difference between the two wage levels: while a labourer was paid 500
rials in Qasem-Abad, his fellow villagers could obtain between 1000-1200
rials in Qazvin or Tehran. This wide gap between wage levels obviously
induced a large number of proletarians and semi-proletarians to seek jobs
in the urban centres. The immediate consequence of this flight was a
shortage of labourers in almost all rural labour markets. For example,
I was told by the local people of Siahpush and Kallaj that almost two-
thirds of the population of these villages had gone to the urban centres.
The migrant population was mainly comprised of men aged between 15 and 55.
These villages as well as Qasem-Abad were therefore at that time short of
labour-power: the capitalist farmer in Qasem-Abad, who was digging a
deep well (in summer 1977) stated that he had to leave the operation
95unfinished, due to the shortage of labourers.
The flight of the vendors of labour-power strongly affected the 
monopsony bargaining power of the capitalist farmers in the rural labour 
market. Nonetheless, it is not economic for the latter to pay as high 
wages as the employers do in the urban centres. Having been faced with 
such a problem, it appears that some capitalist farmers shifted to more 
capital-intensive farming methods and the cultivation of crops which need 
less labour. In my visit in 1977 to the three villages mentioned in the 
neighbourhood of Manjil, I came across two such cases. Thus in the same 
way that the low level of wages could block the process of mechanization, 
the high level of wages accompanied by the shortage of labour may speed 
up this process.
The dominant form of payment of wages is in cash. This holds good 
especially with the non-local vendors of labour-power. However, it 
appears that in some cases, payment m  kind takes place in the same way 
as it used to be paid before L—R. Even m  the Gorgan plane, which
has been the leading region in mechanization, such cases persist. For
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example, the employers (peasants as well as capitalist farmers) employed 
labourers on the basis of a wage-labour system. In some cases, in order 
to reduce the number of labourers, they assigned a certain plot of land 
after sowing, to individual labourers, who were responsible for all work 
up to harvesting and in return were promised a share of the crop as their 
wages. The labourers received usually one-third or one-fifth of the
97produce. In this way the employers increased the productivity of labour. 
Finally, with regard to the Varamin area, in the south of Tehran, 
Gharachedaghi points out that in spite of the fact that the share-cropping 
system is prohibited by the L-R law of January 1963, 'this form is still 
applied among owner-operator farmers and landlords on the one hand and on
the other hand by their share-croppers in the villages distributed, as
98well as in neighbouring villages still owned by landlords.'
In addition to the investment in agricultural machinery and the
employment of wage-labourers, capitalist farmers have been investing in
other fields pertinent to the agricultural labour-process. For example,
in order to provide sufficient water for their farms, they have sunk deep
wells 8nd/or installed motor-pumps on the nearby rivers and it appears
that many of them have been concerned with the provision of water by means 
99of new technology. In the case of the above mentioned Qasem-Abad
capitalist farmer, he used to use the water behind the Sefidrood dam.
He owned three motor-pumps, and had to pay 5000 rials per motor-pump per
year to the State for using the water. However, in the summer of 1977,
since the lake behind the Sefidrood dam had shifted far away from his
farm, it was no longer possible for him to use that source for irrigation.
He was therefore digging a semi-deep well and hoped to have it ready for 
100the next year. Generally speaking, in accordance with the employment
of machinery and new methods of farming, all the agricultural producers 
in general and capitalist farmers in particular have tended to shift from 
the traditional irrigation system, qc&uitt to the modern system including 
wells as well as dams.
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Furthermore, the landholders holding over 50 ha. use chemical 
fertilizers which in 1975 constituted almost 50% of the total fertilizers 
used by the two categories of landlords. While they occupied
over 21% of the cultivated area under their control in 1975, they used 
around 23.2% of the total consumed fertilizers; whereas landholders of 
less than one hectare with 1.6% of the total cultivated area under their 
control, used 14.5% of the total consumed chemical fertilizers.*0*
Finally, with regard to the market for consumer goods, these two 
categories of holders, have the most market oriented economies. Thus 
as Table XXIX shows, only a tiny percentage of these landholders sold 
no produce at all; while over 96% of them sold more than 50% of products,
t  1
nor do many of them resort to preharvest sales, but sell their crops
. 102through traders or middlemen.
To sum up, we may say that capitalist farmers have occupied over 
21% of the total cultivated area (see Table XXVIII). They operate 
their farms by machinery and the employment of wage-labourers. They 
produce mainly for the market and to a lesser extent resort to borrowing 
from the local moneylenders. They invest their capital in machinery, 
digging wells and the like and in the recent years have shifted to more 
capital intensive techniques, due to the shortage and high cost of 
labour.
C. Pauperization of the Peasantry
Above, we examined two trends of development of capitalism in the 
Iranian rural social formation. First we examined the development of 
peasant capitalism and then that of capitalist farmers. Our discussion 
showed that these two trends are not exclusive alternative ways of 
development of the CMP. On the contrary, our explanation of property 
as well as labour relations clearly showed that these two trends are
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articulated. One of the main aspects of this articulation is the 
existence of a large number of dwarf holdings whose owners for a certain 
period of the year sell their labour-power to the large landowners.
In other words, development through the "American" and "Prussian" ways 
has been going on side by side since the implementation of L-R programme 
began.
However, the development of these two trends side by side has been 
accompanied by a form of struggle by each to dominate the other. This 
struggle which stems from the struggle between the peasantry on the one 
hand and the capitalist farmers on the other has taken place in different 
forms since the L-R progranane reinforced the process of capitalist 
development in the rural Iran. In this section we shall therefore examine 
the different forms of the struggle between these two trends.
The Separation of the peasantry from the land
This form of pauperization of the peasantry had been taking place 
during the whole period of 1961-78 in various parts of the country.
We may classify them into two categories. The first embraces 
the evictions of peasants which took place during the implementation of 
the L-R programme; while the second concerns such evictions after the 
completion of land distribution.
We have already considered some of the ways in which landlords 
evicted their subjects from their positions in possession of land.
However, generally speaking, the peasants' separation from the land took 
one of the following forms during the process of the implementation of 
the L-R progranme. First, in some cases, the landlords used a "legal 
loophole" and claimed that the land was mechanized and was run by wage- 
labourers. For example, in Tassooj, a village near Shiraz in Fars 
province, the landlord claimed 200 ha. of his land as a mechanized farm 
and the peasants, due to their ignorance of their rights, affirmed this 
point when the L-R officials went to the village to distribute the land 
between the landlord and peasants.103 Secondly, in other cases, the
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landlords took advantage of the ignorance of their subjects. For example, 
in Darzin, a village in the neighbourhood of Bam in Firman province, the 
landlord asked some 15 peasants to sign a document according to which they 
had no right of ruxsaq in that village. Consequently, none of these
peasants received any land at all.104 Thirdly, it appears that the
ignorance accompanied by poverty of the peasantry played an important role 
in this respect. Thus, for example,:'in Hirbat-e Haydari in 1965 large 
numbers of peasants were selling their rights, some under pressure, but 
many simply out of poverty... because their holdings were too small and 
too poor to afford a living. In some districts, notably Darab, many of 
the landowners persuaded the peasants to sell their rights, making promises 
to them that they would continue to employ them on the land as before.
The expropriation of land from the peasants after L-R, took place in 
two different ways. First, expropriation in order to establish 
agribusiness units and corporations; we shall consider this form in the 
next chapter, and secondly, the expropriation for private persons or 
public institutions. With regard to the latter type, as the
following examples show, the expropriators, backed by the Army, bureaucracy
88 88 royal family, managed to remove the peasants from their
home villages by force.'
In the neighbourhood of Gonbad-e Kavoos, in Turkaman Sahra, the 
peasants used to use a pasture for grazing their animals. However, later 
on, the Ministry of War decided to establish a "stable" for the royal 
family. In doing so, the officials not only occupied the pasture, but 
also took over small plots which belonged to the peasants of "Haji 
Larghola" and "Pooly Haji". In this way, after a short time the officials 
managed to prepare 500 ha. of land for the establishment of a "stable".
But surprisingly, this "stable" turned into one of the Shah’s ’large and 
fully mechanized’ farms! In other cases, in the same area, influential 
people, including army generals, politicians and also merchants, rented 
lands from the local peasant-producers, but never returned them. In 1970
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the building of the Voshmgir Dam was finished. However, not only were
the local peasants living around the dam deprived of using the water, but
they also lost their dwarf allotments. The special force (of the Army)
occupied the area, removed the peasants from the land and established a
large farm for i t s e l f . I n  another case in east Azerbaijan, a large
area was considered as the royal family's hunting area. The people of
"Golkharj", "Meikard", "Shah Mar", "Kolieh Dagha", "Margan", "Siabaz"
and "Shoja 'baz" in this area were forced to move out of their villages.
According to this report, these people totalled around ten thousand.
Finally, in another case, one of the members of the royal family bought
a small plot in "Aresoo", a village near Sirjan in Kirman province.
Later on, he banned the local peasants from irrigating their farms from
the sole water source in the village. In this way the local peasants
were urged to sell their allotments and leave their home village.
Accordingly, the landed property of this member of the royal family has
108been extended to "Boloord" a village nearby to the first one.
In these two cases, the direct-producers were separated from the 
land by force and were thrown onto the labour market. In the
former case, the landlords freed their subjects in a double sense: from 
the old relations of bondage and servitude; while in the latter case, 
direct-producers were separated from the land after they had been freed 
from feudal subordination.
The opportunity for choosing the best lands
As already been indicated, according to the second article of the 
L-R laws, the landlords were given the opportunity to choose their land. 
It is reasonable to conceive therefore that almost all those landlords 
who retained their ownership over part of their estates, chose the best 
and the most fertile lands. In effect, the law gave the landlords an 
opportunity to remove some of their peasants to the "poor lands". The 
following cases support this argument.
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According to the provisions of the second stage of L-Rf Zigard, a 
village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz in Fars province, was divided 
between the landlord on the nne hand and some 27 peasant rasa^-holders 
on the other. Out of the total 180 ha. of land, the landlord received 
111 ha., while the peasants altogether obtained some 69 ha. of land.
Still more, the landlord chose the best and most fertile parts of the 
109village.
In Qasem-Abad, the village's capitalist farmer told me more or less 
the same story about the distribution of his land. It was two years 
after the distribution of his lands that he realized that he could have 
chosen other parts of his village. In order to obtain these parts, he 
stated that, he had to act in two different ways. Firstly, he had to
change the property deeds of land in the village. According to him, by
bribing some L-R official, he managed to change these documents according 
to his own wishes. Secondly, he had to deal with the peasants.
Obviously, some factors such as the ignorance of the peasant «¿zeai?-holders 
of their rights, a long period of domination of the landlord over them, 
as well as some sort of "mutual understanding" between the landlord and 
the village headman, helped him. Thus his former peasant nasaq-holders 
had to occupy the poorer parts of the village land.110
Thus we see that on the one hand the L-R programme gave land to the 
na0i&7-holders and created a large number of small landowners and therefore 
released the forces for the development of peasant capitalism. But on 
the other hand, it took the above cited measure for the capitalist farmers 
to impoverish these peasant landowners.
The nationalization of the forest
Iran's forests during the past centuries have been devastated through 
population pressure by pasture, charcoal—burning and other forms of over- 
utilization. However, one of the 12 points of the Shah's "White 
Revolution" was the nationalization of the country's forests. It was
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supposedly aimed at preventing the further destruction of the forests.
In doing so, the State took over the ownership of 18 million hectares of 
forest lands and 10 million hectares of rangelands; and a state owned 
body, the forest organization, became fully responsible for these lands. 
Furthermore, later on attempts were made to arrest soil erosion and its 
adverse effects especially in the watersheds behind-large dams.*^
This developmental programme has had some side effects on the 
economies of the peasantry. Thus, many peasants, who used to enjoy 
collecting free wood for heating and cooking, were banned from using the 
forests. Instead, for heating and cooking consumptions, they have 
either to buy paraffin from one of the branches of the N.I.O.C. (or 
their cooperatives), or to use more manure. However, it is safe to 
assume the implementation of this programme caused many disputes between 
the special forest guards on the one hand and the different strata of 
the peasantry on the other. It is worth noting that in the late 1960s, 
soto parts of the "nationalized forests" were granted to some army 
general8, members of the royal family, top politicians and the like to 
be used for economic purposes.
On the other hand, the protection and conservation of rangelands and 
pastures, has affected the peasants' economies in a different way.
Banning the peasants from using these lands has made them unable to feed 
their animals. Consequently, many of them lost their sheep and goats. 
Belov we shall illustrate this point with some statistics. The 
following case may shed light on the impact of this measure on the 
peasantry.
In Siahpush, near Manjil, the Ministry of Forest and Natural Resources 
had recently banned the use of all pastures around the Sefidrood dam.
Many peasants, who used to use these pastures to graze their sheep and 
goats, were de facto provided with two options: either to leave the animals 
to die from starvation, or sell them. The latter option was more 
reasonable; hence the majority of them sold their sheep and goats. The
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rush to sell sheep and goats on the part of the peasants gave an
opportunity to the buyers to offer lower prices. Consequently, they
purchased many sheep and goats at a half to a third of the former market 
112prices.
However, the State has not taken over all pastures around the 
country. Yet the peasantry has been faced with the same problem in 
these pastures as well. According to Lambton during the period before 
L-R, one of the rights attaching to a bonehvas that of using the 
village pastures and of collecting scrub for fuel from them.113 But 
after the L-R, some "landlords" forbade the peasants to use pastures; 
and in some cases, they turned these lands into their own farms.114 
The following case is an example of such a change in the peasantry’s 
economy•
In Sheikh-Abood, a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz in Fars 
province, the landowner (ex-landlord) and his rentier (a capitalist 
farmer) cultivate around 800 ha. lands of the village. They own all 
machinery and equipment and their farms are mechanized. However, in 
order to expand their farms, they have recently occupied the village 
pasture and ploughed it, and therefore turned it into their own private 
farm. Since then the peasants have had either to buy fodder for their 
cows and sheep, or lose them.113
Water not divided in accordance to the division of land
In all above cases, the peasantry has been affected through the 
manipulation of the ownership of land. Nonetheless, considering the 
significant role of water in Iranian agriculture, in some other cases, 
our peasantry has been impoverished by losing this element of production. 
Below we examine two main cases.
We have already shown that, according to Article 17 of the L-R laws 
irrigated land was to be transferred to the eligible peasants together 
with its customary water rights from qcmat, river, etc. (see above).
275
However, this right became the subject of some evasion by the landlords, 
as the following examples show.
There are four qanats and two springs in operation in Dosari, a 
village seventy kilometers away from Jiroft in Kirman province. The 
village was affected by the second stage of L-R. However, before the 
distribution began, some landlords changed the custom for the distribution 
of water. Thus they devoted more water to their orchards which were 
exempted from the distribution, and left insufficient water for those 
farms which were to be transferred to the peasants.
The land of Mozaffari, a village in the neighbourhood of Shiraz in 
Fars province, is irrigated by the nearby river. The 168 eligible 
peasants were supposed to obtain two-fifths of the total land in the 
village in the second stage of L-R. But in practice, they received only 
one-fourth of the village land. Still more, they obtained insufficient 
water for their dwarf plots (less than 2 ha. each). Thus they have 
borrowed money from the cooperative to dig shallow wells and install 
motor-pumps on them. However, not all of them have succeeded in doing
so.117
Qanat Drying because of deep wells
We have already pointed out that qanats, i.e. the traditional 
irrigation system, supplied the major part of the agricultural water needs 
of Iran during 1940-1960. . According to an estimate, this traditional
system is still the main source of the agricultural water requirement of 
*the country.
From a technical point of view, almost all qanats are constructed of 
alluvial material where the water table is relatively close to the surface. 
This has meant that the system is affected by the drilling of deep wells. 
That is, the qanats either cease to flow or reduce their yields. Beaumont, 
studying this situation in the Varamin plain, points out that in* this plain, 
•the number of qanats which were dry in 1957 is unknown, but surveys
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carried out by the Ministry of Water and Power since this date, have 
revealed an ever-growing number of dry qanats owing to the falling water- 
table. In the period 1960 to 1963, there were 48 dry qanats. This 
number had risen to 74 in 1964, and to 96 in 1966. A sample survey 
carried out by the author in 1967 revealed that the number of dry qanats 
at the present time is of the order of 120,... A falling water-table, 
besides making qanats dry up, has also had the effect of considerably 
reducing the yields of individual qanats.' According to Beaumont's 
estimate, the water-supply from qanats in this plain has dropped by at 
least 35Z during 1957-1964.119
Qanats have been strongly affected on a national scale by the methods 
of ground-water extraction during the post L-R period, considering that by 
1973, there were 9351 deep and 1295 artisan wells in operation in the 
c o u n t r y . H o w e v e r ,  the following examples show the situation at a 
village level. In some parts of Khurasan province, notably Hayshapour, 
some landlords, who have retained part of their land and also those who 
have had mechanized land, have turned to irrigation by power-operated 
well. They have not violated the laws of L-R. But their modern method 
has affected the economies of the neighbouring peasants, because the 
qanats have either ceased to flow or reduced their yields.
In Ali-Abad Ghadiri, a village in the neighbourhood of Jiruft in
Kirman province, while the implementation of land distribution was
progressing throughout the country, the landlord sank one deep and two
semi-deep wells. This caused the qanat of the village to cease to flow.
The peasant msag-holders complained to the L-R Organization and eventually
they managed to cbtain a semi-deep well in addition to their share of land.
Yet, they alleged that they had insufficient water to irrigate even their 
12230 ha. of land.
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The peasantry and the average ownership of oxen, sheep and goat
In accordance with the increase in the employment of machinery, 
including tractors, combines and the like, the Iranian peasantry has been 
increasingly losing its draught animals. This may be mainly attributed 
to the high efficiency of agricultural machinery in comparison with oxen, 
mules as well as donkeys. As Table XXXIV shows, the average ownership 
of oxen has declined in almost all categories. The most
affected category is the first one, the holders of less than one ha.
Next comes the top category: their average ownership has been reduced to 
one-third of 1960. The other categories are less affected, though their 
average ownership has also drastically declined.
TABLE XXXIV
Average Ownership of Oxen, Sheep and Goats 1960-1974
Size of Oxen Sheep Goats Z Sheep Owning
Holdings 1960 1974 1960 1974 1960 1974 1960 1974
Less than 1 0.30 0.07 3.2 3.3 4.0 2.4 51 29.5
1 to 2 0.67 0.27 4.8 3.9 3.7 2.9 48 30.7
2 to 5 1.03 0.42 4.9 6.0 4.9 4.0 60 42.0
5 to 10 1.31 0.51 9.6 10.4 7.7 5.4 72 55.5
10 to 50 2.05 0.64 16.5 18.6 8.2 6.3 78 63.4
Sources: Tables XVI, XXVI, and 1960 National Census.
One may see more or less .the same trend in the ownership of goats. 
That is, holders of all categories lost some goats during the period of 
1960-74. But with regard to the average ownership of sheep the situation 
is different. As Table XXXIV illustrates, the average ownership of one 
category has dropped, i.e, holders holding between 1 and 2 ha., while that 
of the first category has not changed. But the other categories have 
slightly increased their average ownership of sheep. This does not mean
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that these categories of peasantry have not been impoverished. If we
look at the other two columns which show sheep owners as a percentage
of the total numbers of each category, we shall see that in each category
quite a high percentage of the peasants have lost their sheep. The most
affected category is the holders of less than one hectare; while the
least affected category is the top category (see Table XXXIV).
Thus we may state that, the average ownership of goats and oxen
dropped drastically. Furthermore, the average ownership of sheep in
almost all categories increased, in spite of the fact that the proportion
of those who own sheep has dropped in each category sharply. But
generally speaking, the peasantry has lost over six million head of
sheep; in 1960, it owned 14.2 head of sheep in comparison with 8.1 million
in 1974. The number of oxen owned by our peasants dropped from 1.5 to
0.87 million during the same period. The number of goats owned
by the peasantry, dropped slightly, from 10.4 in 1960 to 10.0 million in 
1231974.
The peasantry and the price of land
We did not examine the technical aspects of the Iranian L~R programme. 
In addition, we have used the term "distribution" of land to designate any 
changes in landed property in Iran. However, we should note that the land 
was not distributed among the peasants free of charge. That is, the 
beneficiaries have had to pay for the allotments they have received.
According to the L-R laws, the beneficiaries have had to pay the 
price of the land which they have received in fifteen instalments.
' The amount of the annuil instalments in the majority of
cases are less than the amount of rent which the peasants used to hand 
over to their landlords.
However, whether or not the prices of land were fair is not our
concern. The important point for us is the impact of these payments on 
capital accumulation by the peasantry.
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Marx*s comments on the price of land in relation to capital accumulation
are helpful. For him, the price of land is nothing but capitalized and 
. . 125therefore anticipated rent. On the other hand, in the case of small
landed property, he considers rent as a deduction from the profit and/or 
wages, and not as an independent category opposed to wages and profit.
This is because, these petty producers, to a large extent, produce for 
their own needs, and therefore their economies are run independent of the 
regulation of the average rate of profit. Thus Marx concludes that: 'the 
expenditure of money capital for the purchase of land, then, is not an 
investment of agricultural capital. It is a decrease pro tan'to in the 
capital which small peasants can employ in their own sphere of production.
It reduces pro tcjito the size of their means of production and thereby 
narrows the economic basis of reproduction.'12^
We have already explained that the peasantry to a large extent, 
produces for its own needs; while on the other hand, it has almost no 
influence on the prices of agricultural products. The peasants' economies 
therefore, to a considerable extent, work independently of the regulation 
of the average rate of profit. Thus if we accept Marx's logic, we may 
consider the instalments/rents paid by the Iranian peasants as burdens on 
their shoulders which have reduced the economic basis for reproduction as 
well as investments in the sphere of production. It was only few years 
after L-R began that some peasants showed their reluctance to pay the 
instalments, due to poverty and tried to abandon them. For example,
Bill explains the situation in the Qazvin area in the following way:
•since that time (beginning of the L-R programme), expenses continued to 
increase as the reform continually expanded and payments to farmer 
landowners kept coming due. The situation was complicated by the fact 
that the peasants were unable to pay their instalments... In spring 1967, 
some 240 peasants in the Qazvin area were arrested and jailed because of 
their refusal to make the annual payments.'127 However, by early 1970, 
it was already obvious that very many peasants throughout the country
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were unable to keep up payment of their instalments. Thus, 'the
Government in March 1970 announced a cabinet decision that farmers finding
themselves in such a position should apply to the Ministry of Land Reform
and Rural Cooperatives for assistance. Special committees were to be
set up in all provinces to identify the farmers in need of such help and
to decide on the merits of their applications to be lodged with local
128land reform offices.
TABLE XXXV
Purchase Cost, Interest and Repayment in First Stage (million Rials)
Cost of 
Property
Down Cash 
Payment
Payment Order 
Falling Due
Interest on 
Payment Order
1962-3 3,339 339 - -
1963-4 1,716 223 333.33 19.99
1964-5 1,178 426 439.99 46.39
1965-6 1,795 1,305 493.36 76.00
1966-7 1,000 547 528.68 107.72
1967-8 231 73 561.03 141.39
1968-9 317 64 ' 572.31 175.74
1969-70 292 60 590.38 211.11
1970-1 - - 606.95 247.54
1971-2 - - 606.95 283.95
Source. Denman 1973, p. 184.
The struggle between the Government on the one hand and the 
peasants on the other around the payment of instalments is illustrated 
in the table above. As Table XXXV shows, the Government did not 
eventually manage to collect the money; and the peasants, having been 
unable to pay, resisted on a large scale any form of pressure by the
Government.
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Peasant versus trader-cum-moneylender
We have explained that almost all peasants are in debt permanently. 
They borrow from cooperatives as well as trader-cum-moneylenders.
However, loans from the former source are insufficient, and they therefore 
have to borrow from the latter with high rates of interest. On the other 
hand, the majority of peasants sell their products before harvest time 
below the. market prices. As in the previous case, this situation has 
obviously reduced the peasantry’s economic basis for investment in the 
sphere of production.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have examined the property relations of the 
peasantry, and shown that not only are peasants differentiated in terms 
of landownership, but also the owners of larger allotments own more animals 
than the small landowners. After L-R, some peasants invested in their 
lands, bought motor-pumps, used chemical fertilizers and also hired 
tractors and combines. However, in the labour-process, mainly rich 
peasants in the peak seasons employed wage-labourers, including khoshneahin 
wage-labourers as well as small landholders. It follows that, around 
two million bread winners of the peasant families in rural Iran contribute 
to more than one labour-process. Obviously, such a situation has caused 
unemployroent/underemployment of labourers. We then considered the 
relationship between peasant-producers and the market, and found that all 
peasants sold a portion of their produce through intermediaries before 
harvest time. Furthermore, since they are always short of cash for their 
livelihood and current agricultural expenditures, they borrow money.
However, since the loans from the cooperatives are insufficient, they have 
to borrow from moneylenders as well, in return for which they pay high 
rates of interest.
The above argument shows the development of peasant capitalism (the
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"American" path), but this process has gone side by side with the 
development of landlord capitalism (the "Prussian" way). Thus we 
examined the landownership of the capitalist farmers, showing the extent 
of employment of wage-labourers, use of machinery and chemical 
fertilizers, and production for the market.
Finally, we examined eight important factors, during the post L-R 
period, which have strongly impoverished peasant capitalism. Some of 
these factors, such as separation from the land, the lack of opportunity 
to choose the best parts of any village as well as unequal division of the 
amount of water, have directly reinforced the process of capital 
accumulation of the capitalist farmers. At the same time, the peasantry's 
economy has been indirectly affected by the process of mechanization: 
hence tractors have forced oxen to leave the labour-process to some extent, 
and deep wells have caused qartats to dry up. Furthermore, the last cited 
factor has reinforced usury/merchant capitalism in rural Iran. On the 
other hand, the peasantry has been resisting these impoverishing factors 
in one way or another. As examples, we may mention the resistance of 
peasants to the Government's demand for the payment of instalments, 
disputes with the capitalist farmers on the question of the division of 
land/water, and also struggles against forest guards who have prevented 
them from using forest/pastures.
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CHAPTER XI
Corporations and Agribusiness Ventures
In the late 1960s, the State initiated two sets of projects for 
developing the agricultural sector, the corporations and the *agribusiness' 
ventures. In this chapter, therefore, we shall examine the impact of 
these on the development of capitalism in rural Iran, including an analysis 
of the formation of these units of production, of property, production 
and exchange and of the labour process.
A. Farming Joint-Stock Companies or Farm Corporations
The model for the farm corporation was the Israeli Kibbut z and the
Soviet collective farms and consequently official visits were made to
Israel, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the preparatory
period.* In 1967, the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperation
'received the Majlis rubber staqp on the legislation of a "five years'
experiment" with farm corporations - professionally managed, collectively
2owned farming units.' However, this was only initiated in 1968, when
14 corporations were founded. Initially, the programme was to establish
a total of 143 corporations, operating on 420,000 hectares, by the end
of the Fifth Plan in 1978. By 1974, 65 farm corporations with 123,882
shareholders had been established throughout the country. These
corporations covered 525 villages and farms with 231,759 hectares of 
3land , something less than 41 of the total harvest area.
Having undertaken the corporation project, the State aimed at the 
following six economic objectives: (1) to end the fragmentation of 
holdings, especially by the process of division at death; (2) to mechanize 
and expand the scale of operations; (3) to acquaint shareholders with 
modern methods of agriculture; (4) to extend the cultivated area to 
previously barren and unused lands; (5) to lower the man-land ratio and
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compensate for the displacement of labour by regional planning of 
resources between agriculture and industry; and (6) to increase the per 
capita income of the shareholders. Below, we shall examine the 
achievement of these objectives.
In order for a farm corporation to be established, the initial step 
had to be taken by the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperation. 
Denman points out that, it was for the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural 
Cooperation to select the villages which would then be given the chance 
to accept or reject. The law permitted proposals to be made by local 
eligible opinion, although the final decision was left with the Ministry.^ 
However, not all peasant-residents were eligible to vote for or against 
the formation of any given farm corporation. Only peasant landholders 
were eligible to vote and later on to become members of corporations.
These peasant-landholders could be from one of the following four 
categories: a) peasants who had received land under the first and/or 
second stage of L-R; b) peasant-cultivators of plantations and orchards 
which had been exempted from distribution; c) small landowners living in 
the villages who had agreed under the second Stage to divide their land; 
and d) farmers, who for one reason or another, had not been affected by 
the L-R progranme. However, according to the law, once at least 51Z of 
these eligible peasant-landholders in a given region voted for the • 
formation of a corporation enterprise, the formation would take place 
irrespective of the wishes of the other 49Z. But in practice things 
happened differently. An overall majority of the peasant members of 
Farah, Garmsar, Dargazin and Samaskandeh corporations stated that they 
did not have any idea about the formation and aims of their corporations 
before their establishment.^
The State not only initiated the formation of corporations, but also 
supervised and assisted them financially (see below). Thus any given 
corporation is run by a manager who is appointed and employed by the 
State. He is, however, recommended by the board of directors which is
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"elected" by the members of the corporation. In addition, the State 
makes available to each corporation the services of at least two agricultural 
experts, two accountants, an assistant accountant and some technicians. 
However, the State appointed manager has full power over the corporation's 
affairs. Richards points out that, 'theoretically, decisions regarding 
the annual budget, basic investment, and so on are made jointly by the 
manager and the shareholder conmittee, but in practice the manager usually 
makes most of the decisions. He determines the most efficient plot 
sizes, assigns shareholders to specific jobs, sets production targets and 
makes the choices of planting and fertilizer techniques. The government- 
appointed manager holds a great deal of power, ...'^
The above is a brief explanation of the formation of corporations.
These corporations have drastically changed relations/forces of production 
within the 525 villages and farms which are covered by this project.
We shall therefore examine the main aspects of relations/forces of 
production in the corporations* social formations.^
One of the main economic aims of the corporation is to end the 
fragmentation of holdings by pooling them for the efficient use of 
agricultural inputs, including water, pesticides, machinery and land.
The members therefore give the corporation complete and permanent use of 
their land, which is operated as a single unit. In return, the corporation 
gives the peasant landholders as many shares in the organization as are 
consistent with the previous rights of ownership. In practice, the 
valuation of the peasants' allotments was very difficult, and in some 
cases, the committees in charge of valuation have had to assess the value 
of lands more than once. This was because the first valuation was 
objected to by some peasants. Despite this technical problem, there 
existed no valuation formula in the law's text, 'but behind the local 
variants was the general principle that value is ten times income ...
Local evidence of land values unfaded from the recent land reform 
transaction was available in most villages,... The directive required
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no more than that the committee identify the lands of the village, 
preferably a map prepared for the purpose, realize that they are the 
primary factor of production in the village farming economy and value 
the right of user over them accordingly; that is to say, with due 
regard to their area and the position of the village, the local 
agricultural custom by which, with the change of the years and seasons, 
land passed from sown to fallow and back again, the extent to which the 
land right was associated with water rights over river, qanats and other
g
sources of water.'
The process of valuation of land and pooling small and fragmented 
allotments of land, however, changed the peasantry's landed property 
drastically. In any given rural social formation, a peasant-producer 
may be in the position of possession/ownership of land. That is, he 
may operate his own allotment, or rent it to another agent of production 
and/or he may rent someone else's land. However, the corporation 
changed these varieties of possession of land which existed in those 
villages, covered by the project. That is, by transferring the 
permanent right to use the land, these peasants have, in effect, lost 
their effective possession of their own land. They have become only 
nominal owners of land, i.e. shareholders. In order to explain this 
point, we should study the relationship between these shareholders on 
the one hand and the corporation apparatus on the other.
According to the law, the board of directors is "elected" by the 
peasant-shareholders. Yet, in the Samaskandeh corporation, 60Z of the 
shareholders did not know how this board was elected; the percentages 
for Farah and Garmsar corporations are 50 and 36Z respectively.^ The 
peasants were asked whether or not they knew anything about the process 
of decision-making in their corporations. Over 80Z of the shareholders 
of all three corporations answered that they had no idea about this 
process.10 Neither did these shareholders know about the internal 
affairs of their respective corporations. Furthermore, around 88Z of
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the members of Samaskandeh corporation stated that they had never been
consulted by the corporation experts on production affairs; the percentages
for Farah and Garmsar corporations are 81.5 and 85% respectively.11 In
the Garmsar corporation the shareholders did not know which body decides
the employment and wage policy of the corporation. Hence, over 72% of
them stated that it is their village representative who decides the wa'ge-
12levels and the number to be employed. In Farah corporation, when the
peasant-members were asked the same question, they answered that it is
the State cadre (including the manager, experts and corps) which makes
13the decisions on the employment and wage policy of the corporation.
The peasant-shareholders are thus entirely alienated from the body which 
controls their lands; and since it is not possible for them to take back 
their lands, we may consider this situation as a specific form of 
"separation".
Such a change in landed property made the affected peasants, who had
just a few years ago received land, feel that they had lost their lands
to the State. Thus 85, 52 and 82% of the peasants in Garmsap, Farah and
Samaskandeh corporations respectively preferred land deeds rather than
14shares (in the corporations). This situation may be considered as a
form of "separation" in which, while the peasants nominally own some
land, they have no control over it. It appears that the State has
imposed this form of "separation/collectivization". For example, the
peasant members of Garmsar, Farah and Samaskandeh corporations were asked
whether or not they preferred to cultivate individually. 64, 80 and 82%
of the members of these corporations respectively answered that they
preferred to work on their own private allotments.1^
In addition to the amount of land according to which the peasants
obtained shares, they might have been given some shares for their ownership
of other means of production. Thus Denman states: ’where a farmer handed
over with rights (of land) oxen and farm machinery, a transaction he was
«
not obliged to make, these items of live and dead stock were valued, and
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the value added to the value of the land rights for the purpose of 
assessing the fanner’s claim to share allocation.'16 Although in the 
law, it is stressed that the peasants were not obliged to hand over their 
means of production other than land/water, it is safe to estimate that in 
almost all cases, the peasants handed over their means of production to 
the corporations or sold them to other peasants outside the area of the 
corporation. This is because these means of production were no use 
without owning/possessing land/water. However, although the peasant 
members cannot own any means of production, they are allowed to own 
animals such as sheep»goats and cows. For example, in Farah corporation, 
each one of the shareholders on average owned 17.3 sheep and goats, 2.3 
cows, 1.8 calves and 7 chickens. For these shareholders, animals 
constituted a major source of income, i.e. they obtained 25.8% of their 
total income from selling their animals and/or their products.1^
The second economic aim of the project for the formation of
corporations is the mechanisation of the farming methods in these areas.
This was to acquaint the peasant members with modern methods of farming
(in fact the third economic aim). So far the corporations have been
under strong State initiative and direction, with heavy initial State
investment. Compared with the co-operatives, a member of a corporation
obtained on average 400 times the amount of loans to a member of a
co-operative. In this way, in 1976, 85 corporations obtained some 2883
18million rials from the State. For example, loans have been provided
by the Ministry of Cooperation and Rural Affairs for the purchase of
livestock and of farm machinery and implements, establishment or
improvement of cottage industries for member families and also for purchase
of chemical fertilirers. The conditions of loans are much easier than
those for the co-operatives. That is, loans are given for a period of
19five years with an interest of 4% per annum.
The heavy initial investment in the corporations in addition to the 
provision of loans on easy terms, have enabled them to speed up the
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process of mechanization. Thus, Farah corporation two years after its 
foundation with 4733 hectares of land, managed to be almost fully 
mechanized. By 1975 it owned 11 tractors, 2 combines, discs, trailors,
sprayers, seeders, grass mowers, plough regulators, as well as fertilizer
. 20 spreaders.
Having such modern farm implements and machines, the corporations 
needed experts to use them. As noted above, one of the aims of the 
formation of corporations is to acquaint the farmers with modern methods 
of agriculture. However, from the surveys, it appears that the peasant- 
shareholders have not been trained to use these modern methods. On the
contrary, the corporations usually employ experts from outside. These
experts are paid by the State. The peasant-shareholders are usually 
employed by the corporation as a form of unskilled labour. (We shall 
examine this point below.)
The fourth aim of the formation of corporations was to extend the 
cultivated area to previously barren and unused land. Although, the 
authors of the monographs of Samaskandeh, Farah, Garmsar and Dargazin 
corporations have not given any data on the extension of lands, the 
explanations quite clearly show that these corporations have succeeded 
in increasing the amount of land under cultivation. Accordingly, these 
corporations have levelled and drained the land around their farms to 
some extent. However, they have been faced with two serious obstacles: 
the bad quality of soil and shortage of water. In effect, these two 
factors have blocked the corporations' further expansion of their lands 
under cultivation.
The fifth economic aim of the formation of corporation was to lower 
the man-land ratio. This measure might have been taken in order to 
sort out the question of underemployment in the Iranian rural social 
formation. We are not going to examine the rationality of this policy 
for the national economy of Iran as a capitalist social formation. But
our main concern is to study the impact of this measure (accompanied by
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the first and second aims listed above) on the labour relations within 
the corporation units. In doing so, we shall make no distinction 
between peasant-members on the one hand and non-members (khoshneskins) 
on the other. This is because, as we shall see below, within the 
labour-process the peasant-members occupy the same position as the 
khoshneshin wage-labourers do.
Generally speaking, the direct producers (members as well as non­
members) are employed by the corporations in two different ways: either 
as share-croppers or as wage-labourers. However, the latter labour 
contract is much more important than the former one. We have already 
explained how the corporation project separated peasant landholders from 
the objective conditions of production. But as shareholders, the 
members receive some money from the profits of the corporations. This 
source of income, however, does not cover all expenditure of the majority 
of peasant shareholders. They are therefore forced to work as wage- 
labourers within or outside the corporation.
As to the corporation, it employs some peasants (members as well as 
non-members) to perform simple agricultural work. These direct-producers 
have no control over the labour-process and are paid in cash. In 
addition, since the demand for labour, on the part of the corporation, 
fluctuates throughout the year, the majority of these agents of production 
manage to get jobs in the corporation only for a period of few months in 
a year. In Farah corporation, for instance, only 40.2Z of the share­
holders managed to work in the corporation; however, over 90Z of them
21worked for less than nine months. Furthermore, owing to the mechani­
sation, the demand for labour has declined, i.e. the man-land ratio is 
lowered (the fifth objective). Thus in the same corporation, 46.4Z of 
shareholders did not work in the corporation at all; and another 13.4Z
of them worked for the corporation as well as for other outside the
22organization.
The corporation organizations have not removed the differentiation
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of the peasantry. In effect, it has maintained the differentiation 
through the distribution of shares according to the amount of means of 
production owned by the peasants. However, the corporations have 
drastically changed the labour process that existed among the peasantry. 
That is, with regard to the agricultural labour process, they have 
established no forms of labour relations among themselves, unlike the 
peasants outside the corporations, as we have seen in Chapter X. Thus, 
although there are poor and rich peasants within the corporation, we do 
not have any directly exploitative relationships among the peasantry. 
Instead, all peasant-members (rich as well as poor) and khoshneshin 
wage-labourers may work for the corporation as direct-producers who are 
alienated from the objective conditions of production. Neither are 
they in a position to conduct the labour process. In this respect, 
there is no difference between peasant-members on the one hand and 
khoehneshin wage-labourers on the other. In short, both of these 
categories on the one hand and the corporation on the other confront 
each other as vendors of commodities. This is the reason why one may 
consider all peasant members as proletarians. Thus, the corporation 
project has not only changed landed property, it has also altered the 
labour relations among the peasantry.
The shareholders as well as the khoshneshin wage-labourers have the 
possibility of working outside the corporation. They may work as wage- 
labourers or undertake other jobs. It appears that these activities 
constitute one of the main sources of the shareholders' income. In 
Samaskandeh corporation, for instance, the shareholders on average earn 
one-third of their income from their activities outside the corporation. 
They are usually engaged in activities such as cattle breeding, trading 
and working as share-croppers, barbers, tailors and bath caretakers. In
addition, many of the peasants work as wage-labourers in the nearby
. 23villages and towns.
in addition to the above .ounces of income, the shareholders and
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khoehneshins may work for the corporation as share-croppers. Contracts 
are made with these peasants, according to which the latter are assigned 
to cultivate a certain crop. According to this type of share-cropping 
contract (nesfeh kari),the produce is divided equally between the share­
cropper and the corporation. It seems that the decision makers of the 
corporation resort to this type of contract for the production of labour- 
intensive crops. For example the corporation of Samaskandeh usually 
makes share-cropping contracts with shareholders and khoshneshins for 
the production of rice. On average, the shareholders earn one third of
their income (from the corporation) by undertaking share-cropping
2 Acontracts with the corporation.
The sixth aim of the formation of corporations was "to increase the 
per capita income of the shareholders". As already pointed out, the 
corporations have been heavily subsidized by the State. It is not 
therefore surprising to see them making a profit. This has directly 
increased the shareholders' earning from the corporations. For example, 
in the second year of the formation of Samaskandeh corporation (1970),
83Z of the shareholders stated that their income from the corporation had 
increased. However, regardless of the absolute quantitative increase in 
income of shareholders, we may note the important impact of the formation 
of corporations on relations of production, i.e. the relationship between 
the peasant direct-producers and the produce.
In the previous chapter, we examined the relationships between the 
peasant landholders (direct-producers) and the produce. We explained 
that the produce belongs to the peasant direct-producers. However, our 
peasant shareholders do not establish the same relationship with their 
produce. That is, the produce belongs to the corporation and the share­
holders cannot have any immediate claim on it. This is similar to the 
position which wage-labourers occupy in relation to produce in a 
capitalist social formation. However, the situation is different in the 
share-cropping contract. In this form of relationship, the direct-
producers who have made such a contract, have access to half of the 
produce.
Marketing and distribution
So far we have examined three changes within the relations of 
production which took place as a result of the implementation of the 
corporation project. However, these changes have caused some alterations 
in the marketing of agricultural products, produced by the peasants 
within the corporation organization. That is to say, since the direct- 
producers (wage-labourers) do not own the products, they do not have to 
make contact with the traders in the urban centres for marketing their 
products. Unlike the case of peasants, therefore, shareholders are not 
involved in pre—harvest sales/or borrowing money from moneylenders for 
current production expenditures.
Marketing is undertaken by the board of directors of each corporation. 
The board sells the products in the local as well as national markets.
In some cases, the board deals with the intermediaries. The board of 
directors of Samaskandeh, for instance, markets a portion of the 
corporation’s produce through middlemen, who are known to the board 
members. The board may deal with private organizations. For example, 
the same corporation, in 1970, sold some wheat to one of the mills.
In other cases, the board may deal with a State owned body: 
for example, in 1969, a major portion of wheat production of Farah 
corporation was sold to the Cereal Organization.25 However, it seems 
that the board of directors and the managers of the corporations prefer 
to sell their products to private persons rather than the State 
organizations. Perhaps, this is because the former are much more flexible 
in adjusting market prices to the supply of and demand for agricultural 
products.
However, if the .hareholder. do not need to borrow from trad.-cum- 
moneylenders for producing end marketing their product., it doe. not mean
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that they never borrow. On the contrary, our peasant shareholders,
like other peasant-producers, borrow money/goods from different sources.
In the villages covered by Garmsar corporation, for instance, some 35
shops supply the peasants with various necessities during the year; while
the latter pay for the goods only at harvest time or when they are paid 
26their wages. It appears that this form of provision of credit has 
been retained in the villages covered by the corporation project, despite 
the fact that the shareholders have reduced their credit supplying 
activities after the formation of corporations. In Samaskandeh 
corporation, for instance, 55Z of shareholders stated that they are 
supplied with credit for goods from their villages’ shops just as they 
used to be before the formation of their corporation. However, they 
alleged that the shopkeepers provide less credit, because they (shop­
keepers) do not consider them as landholders,2^
The second source of credit for the peasant-shareholders is trader- 
cum-moneylender. As we have already stated, corporations make share- 
cropping contracts with peasants. These share-croppers, who usually 
have insufficient money for consumption as well as production expenditures, 
turn to the shopkeepers or traders for credit. Thus in Garmsar 
corporation, for instance, some rich shopkeepers are involved in buying 
the share-croppers* share of produce before harvest time (salaf khari),28 
And in Samaskandeh corporation, the share-croppers resort to preharvest 
sales, though the corporation provides them with some credit. This is
because, the share-croppers spend all the money they receive as credit
• . 2Qfor their current consumption expenditures*
The corporation project is therefore a state sponsored programme to 
develop capitalism in the Iranian rural social formation from above (the 
"Prussian" way). Relations of production established between the agents 
of production are those of the CMP. It is not the rural bourgeoisie, but 
a body of experts (employed by the State) which controls the means of 
production and extracts surplus-value. Almost all peasants (rich and
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poor) therefore confront this body of experts (or corporation organization) 
as vendors of labour-power. The State has taken the initiative to 
implement the project and it has heavily subsidized these organizations.
One may consider the development of the corporation programme as the 
development of "state capitalism". However, whether or not it is "state 
capitalism", the project has removed the peasants from their lands and 
speeded the development of capitalist relations of production between the 
decision making body on the one hand and the peasantry on the other.
B. Agribusiness Joint Ventures
In the previous section, we examined the implementation of farm 
corporations and their impact on relations of production in the affected 
villages. However, in order to reinforce the development of the CMP in 
rural Iran, the State in the late 1960s, in addition to the corporation 
project, launched another project which involved the establishment of 
agribusiness units on lands downstream of dams. In this section we 
shall therefore briefly examine the formation of these enterprises.
But before examining the formation of agribusiness units in Iran, 
let us see what is meant by "agribusiness". According to Feder, 
"agribusiness" stands for modernization of agriculture capitalist-style 
by big business. By the latter 'is meant not only the multinational 
concern engaged directly or indirectly in agricultural activities or in 
agricultural-related industries and services, but also the private 
international bank, the international lending organization, the 
"philanthropic" foundation, and the national development agency - all 
engaged in assisting modernization directly or by providing the infra- 
or superstructure for the activities of multinational concerns.'^0 
Accordingly, the activities of agribusiness include production, processing, 
transport, storage, financing, regulating and marketing of the world's 
food and fibre supplies: 'in effect, agribusiness is a seed-to-consumer 
system composed of a series of closely related activities that together
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enable agricultural produce to flow from the farm to the market place ,31
The ground for the establishment of such agricultural ventures in
32Iran was prepared during the second Seven Year Plan (1955-62). In
this plan great emphasis was laid on agriculture in general, and
construction of huge dams in particular. In 1959, the World Bank
agreed to furnish loans for the completion of the Dez Dam in Khuzistan,
provided a portion of the Dez Irrigation project was devoted to a pilot
irrigation project to demonstrate the benefits of modern farming techniques
33to the local farmers. In 1962, the first modern plantation, i.e. Haft 
Tapeh cane plantation in the north of Ahvaz, was already an operating unit. 
However, apart from this State owned plantation, no attempt was made to 
launch another similar project until 1968. It was only in this year that 
the formation of several agribusiness ventures took place.
According to Feder, agribusiness ventures are of two types in 
relation to the land: they may control the land directly, or they may be 
related to it through direct-producers. Under the latter form, the 
venture makes contracts with the small producers for the delivery of their 
products. Feder points out that, ’one characteristic element is for 
processing or assembly to extend credit and other inputs wherever possible 
to producers on the contractual understanding that the producers must 
deliver their output to the lender/suppliers under pre-arranged terms of 
sales, although firms may increase their supplies through direct purchases 
from other producers securing their own financing, or through their 
production operation.’ In the first type of agribusiness (direct 
control), the venture is involved in the labour-process, hence 'capital 
is sunk into farm land: buying up land or obtaining a concession over an 
agricultural area, be it for agricultural or other purposes.' For 
the establishment of this type of agribusiness ventures, obtaining 
land is therefore the primary task.
With regard to the agribusiness ventures in Iran, we may say that 
the decision makers, for one reason or another, preferred to establish
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the first type of agribusiness unit, one directly involved in the
agricultural labour-process. Thus the first step for the establishment
of these ventures was the provision of land for them. This task was
undertaken by the State. Thus the "Law for the Establishment of
Companies for Utilization of Lands Downstream from Dams" authorized the
State in 1968 to free land for investors:
For the purpose of the maximum utilization of the water 
resources, the land irrigable from the dams and the 
hydraulic power installations of the lands downstream 
of the dams, the Ministry of Water and Power is 
authorized, with due regard to the development 
programme of agriculture-animal husbandry and the 
overall development of the country, to establish 
agro—industry companies with Government capital, or 
with private - local or foreign - or by joint 
companies being subscribed for the Government or by 
private investment, either local or foreign.
By the enactment of this law, some 400,000 hectares of land were 
transferred to the Ministry of Water and Power. However, so far not all 
of this land has been used for agribusiness purposes.
In theory, at least, the agribusiness ventures were to be established 
on virgin land near dams or groundwater projects. However, in practice, 
the affected areas embraced many villages. In Khuzistan province, for 
example, some 100,000 hectares of land were carved up among six agribusiness 
ventures. This area embraced some 58 villages with a population of 40,000 
(around 6,500 families). It is safe to conceive that these peasants, 
who had a few years ago received land, were reluctant to give up their 
lands. The investors, however, had already employed the power of the 
State to remove these peasants from their lands. Thus the law has 
allowed the Ministry of Water and Power forcibly to purchase the land from 
the peasants and move them out of the area. The price of land was 
already fired by the State at 4,000 rials per hectare and that of orchards 
at 250,000 rials per hectare. Rabbani points out that 'this money is
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not really of very much use to a farmer who had one, two or even more 
hectares because, having sold his land to the government he has no 
further interests in the village and must move. to urban centres with
his family.'37
With regard to the formation of the "new landed property" we should
draw attention to the following three points. First, as a result of
the enactment of "The Downstream Land Use Law", some peasants were
separated from land/water by force rather than by economic (market)
mechanisms, although it may be argued that force represents economic 
38power. In addition to force, the existence of different ethnic groups 
of people helped the authorities in the removal of the peasants. Richards 
points out that, 'to obviate any serious resistence to the removal policy, 
the KWPA (Khuzistan Water and Power Authority) took advantage of the 
racial prejudices among the local peasantry and removed the Arab 
population first.' However, the Persians soon received the same
treatment.”'
Secondly, for the removal, force was employed by the State organs. 
Thus if the investors were not able to obtain the required land in the 
market, the State used its own power for the provision of land/water.40 
The intervention of the State in the economic sphere changed the 
conditions of supply of lad in favour of the agribusiness ventures.
Thirdly, the removal of the peasants from their lands in the areas 
below the dams, meant stripping them of all their means of production 
and throwing them onto the labour market. The implementation of "The 
Downstream Land Use Law" actually separated some direct-producers from 
land who were already freed from feudal subordination.
The land expropriated from the peasantry in Khuzistan 
province has been leased to some five agribusiness joint ventures.
They are as follows:
Hashem Naraghi Agro-Industries of Iran and America (20.000 hectares) 
Shareholders (prior to autumn 1974)s
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Hashem Naraghi Development Co., Escalon, California 51%
First National City Bank, New York, N.Y. 30%
Iranians' Bank, Tehran 10%
Three individual stockholders 9%
The Iran-California Corporation (10,000 hectares)
Shareholders (prior to autumn 1974):
Agricultural Development Fund of Iran 15%
Khuzistan Water and Power Authority 5%
Mr. K. Taleghani and Partners 10%
Trans. World Agricultural Development Corp. 30%
Bank of America International Financial Corp. 20%
John Deere Corp. 10%
Dow Chemical Corp. 10%
Iran Shellcott Co. (15,000 hectares)
Shareholders:
Shell International Ltd. 70.5%
Agricultural Development Fund of Iran 15%
Bank Omran 10%
Mitchell Cotts 4.5%
International Agricultural Corp. of Iran (17,000 hectares) 
Shareholders:
Chase Manhattan Bank 15%
Bank Me H i  5%
Mitsui (Japan) 5%
Ahvaz Sugar Beet Factory 15%
Agricultural Development Fund of Iran 15%
Diamond A Cattle (Roswell, New Mexico) 152
Hawaiian Agronomics
Khuzistan Water and Power Authority
15%
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15%
Dezkar (5,000 hectares)
Shareholders:
Former peasant farmers and landowners in the area of the 
Dez Irrigation Project. Managed by the Government.41
The province of Khuzistan is the province most affected by "The
Downstream Land Use Law". However, other provinces were affected by
this law as well. For example, there are agribusiness ventures on
25,000 hectares in Jiroft (in Kirman province), and on 20,000 hectares
in Mahabad (in Kurdistan province). By 1974, there were still some
contracts being signed for new leases between the State and various 
42companies.
In addition to the provision of land, the State undertook to provide 
water and some other facilities. With regard to the provision of water, 
the State has implemented two projects in Khuzistan province. The first 
was the Dez Pilot Irrigation Project which irrigates 22 thousands 
hectares of the lands under the Dez dam. In 1959 the World Bank agreed 
to finance the completion of the Dez dam, provided a portion of the 
budget was devoted to a pilot irrigation project. In the mid 1961, the 
digging of canals and installation of equipment began and was almost 
completed by the summer of 1965. The second project was the Greater 
Irrigation Project which was supposed to irrigate further 90 thousand 
hectares of land below the Dez dam. It is, in fact, the second project 
which is directly related to the foundation of agribusiness ventures in 
Khuzistan province. However, these two projects have cost 15,310 
million rials up to the end of the Fourth Plan (1966/67 - 1972/73).
Yet, it is believed that in order to complete the Greater Irrigation 
Project in 1975/76, the State has had to spend even more money.43
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Thus the State has undertaken all the cost of the dam and canalization;
but secondary canals to the fields have been left to the companies. In
return for the provision of water, the agribusiness companies pay 750
rials per hectare per year. Rabbani, studying the cost-benefit of the
Dez Dam project, states that this sum is so tiny that it is impossible to
consider it as being of any economic significance at all. If it were
mainly villagers using the waters of the Dez dam then perhaps it would
have been justifiable to disregard the question of a return on the capital
invested in the irrigation equipment and channels, but since it is a
number of commercial companies who are using the land, it seems ridiculous
44not to be concerned over the economics of the project.
Moreover, the State has pursued a generous loan policy towards the 
agribusiness companies. According to the report of the Bureau of 
Management Services, by 1976 four of the agribusiness companies had 
borrowed over two billion rials from two State owned banks:
Company
The Iran-Califomia Corporation 
Iran Shellcott Co.
Agro-Industries of Iran and America 
International Agricultural Corp. of
Loans (in million rials) 
A.D.B.I. Bank Melli
500.00
460.00
633.00
Iran 228.75 228.75
In order to understand the generosity of the State towards these companies, 
one may compare these loans with the total amount of loans granted to 
peasant families through cooperatives. Thus, while around 2.7 million 
peasant families all together received slightly over 2.4 billion rials in 
1976,45 only four of these agribusiness companies enjoyed loans of over
2.0 billion rials. The rate of interest on these loans is 9.52 which is 
lower than the average rates that the State owned banks charge ordinary 
borrowers. Yet, the companies did not seem to be happy with it. Thus
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a Mitchell Cotts executive remarked that with that kind of money around 
their neck, it was difficult to make a profit . He believed the company 
deserved soft loans from the Agricultural Development Bank at 3.5Z rather 
than at 9.51 commercial rates which Shellcott paid.^
The agribusiness ventures represent the most mechanized and modern 
agriculture in Iran. For this reason, the companies were offered 
facilities to import machinery. Shellcotts, for instance, imported a 
bulk purchase of equipment including tractors and combines, on the grounds 
that the locally manufactured Rumanian tractors were not suitable.^
These massive imports of the most advanced agricultural equipment have 
enabled the companies to have a fully mechanized operation. Thus 
Zahedani points out that the entire operation from land preparation to 
post-harvest is done with the aid of mechanical power. Land levelling 
is typically the first stage and is a special characteristic of this 
category. The very heavy and expensive equipment for this purpose is 
absent in all other categories. Ploughing is done with the most 
advanced equipment and attachment. Seeding and fertilizing is done by 
mechanical means and using the best seeds available and recommended 
quantities of fertilizers. Cultivation is done by mechanical means and 
at the highest intensity. Chemicals are used heavily and specific 
chemicals not generally available in Iran are imported. Irrigation
water is used at higher quantities than in most other categories.
48Harvesters are used for nearly all crops.
So it seemed that all the objective conditions were prepared for 
successful business. This made the companies’ share-holders optimistic 
about the future of their companies. Thus Naraghi stated that, ’with 
enough water for irrigation, enough power for processing plants, and 
enough insecticides and fertilizers from the petrochemical plants nearby, 
success is almost guaranteed here (i.e. Khuzistan)... Anyone who cannot 
make it on Khuzistan has no business being a farmer.
The above argument shows that some five agribusiness companies with
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the support of the State brought together all means of production, i.e.
land, water, capital as well as the advanced machinery. On the other
hand, we stated that the creation of the "new" landed property for these
companies was accompanied by the separation of some 6,500 peasant families
with 40,000 population from the land. In this way, the necessary
condition of exchange between capital and labour was prepared.^° In fact,
the labour of the local peasants seemed to be a good source of wealth.
Thus, Naraghi pointed out in 1970 that, 'labour cost is a tenth of what it
is in California,*., and almost everything does well. Asparagus grows
faster than in California, and with a better root system. I can get ten
cuts of alfalfa here a year, and the protein content of Khuzistan alfalfa
is higher than any other in the world.'51 But the incorporation of the
objective conditions of production with labour (as the subjective condition
of production) did not take place as easily as the capitalist-investors
expected. By 1976, all agribusiness companies have run into human
problems. That is, not only have the detached peasants 'been reluctant
to move, they have also been reluctant to work for others on land which
historically they regarded as theirs, especially as the majority of work *
52offered has been casual labour.' Having been faced with such labour 
problems, a senior Mitchell Cotts executive stated that, Khuzistan was 
not like Africa,’where manual labour is forthcoming at very low wages. 
Peasants didn't want to work for the agribusinesses,..., because they 
weren't faced with absolute economic necessity.' But it appears that 
he had forgotten that it takes time for capital to make labour.54
Owing to the massive investment in the most modern agricultural 
machinery, one would expect the employment of labour per hectare in the 
agribusiness farms to be the lowest of all the types of farms which we 
have examined. This has resulted in a relatively low level of demand 
for labour. Thus Rabbani, referring to the employment problems of the 
local peasants, states that these fully mechanized farms cannot absorb 
all the former peasant-landholders. This is because they need only a
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small labour force and usually gather this from the youngest and most 
active men.^"* Wage rates for these unskilled labourers were very low 
in Khuzistan, as they were in most of Iran. Thus according to Zahedani
in 1973-74, wage-labourers were paid on average between 60 to 80 rials
56 *for a full working-day. However, during the years after 1973, the
wage rates, for one reason or another, increased. Thus in 1975
Richards reported that an unskilled man was paid 120 rials for a working-
day by Shellcott company. ^  In addition to the male labourers, young
58women are employed as well. And as a general rule they are paid less 
than men. Shellcott*s women wage-labourers in 1973-74, for instance, 
were paid 20Z less than men, i.e. wage rate of a woman wage-labourer was 
95 rials.^
It appears that wages are the sole source of income for the wage- 
labourers on these large farms. It is almost impossible for these wage-
labourers to keep any animals and poultry. The employed labourers are 
settled in the five "modern" villages built in the area by the Ministry 
of Water and Power. But as a KWPA engineer responsible for the design 
of rooms stated, ’the rooms were deliberately made small in order to 
prevent the villagers from living with their animals as they had done in 
their former h o m e s . I n  this sense, these labourers are worse off than 
the khoshneshin wage-labourers, because the latter may raise chickens, 
cows, goats and sheep in order to supplement their meagre income from 
labouring in the fields. On the other hand, these labourers do not 
collect any portion of agribusiness’s profit. This is because, unlike 
the peasant-shareholders in corporations they are not shareholders of 
the ventures which they work for.
As we have already pointed out, the peasants of some 58 villages 
within the project area had to sell their allotments to the State. But 
after the purchase, the peasants had almost no money In their hands. 
George Wilson, once the head of the California Farm Bureau, explained the 
peasants’ situation in the following way: 'all the villagers got progress­
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ively into debt as Khuzistan was modernized. So badly in debt that
when KWPA come to buy their lands, the net gain of the villagers was
almost nothing.'^ The peasants either stayed in the area and started
working for the companies, or left their home lands for urban centres.
These latter, with almost no money in their hands, have had to search in
the urban centres for casual jobs. Since a great many of them are old,
it is difficult for them to be absorbed into the nascent industrial
sector. However, the situation of the former group, i.e those who
stayed to work for the companies, was not better. For those who were
actually paid something soon found out that more or less the same sum of
money was demanded of them to pay for their houses in the "modern
villages". Richards describes the houses in one of these "modern
villages": 'the new town (village) so far constructed are without piped
water, modern plumbing, or waste treatment facilities. Communal taps
serve as the source of drinking water, and for every two units (20
persons) there is an outdoor lavatory. Because KWPA thought the
traditional mud houses uncivilized, the new ones are made of cinder
blocks, which are far less suited to local conditions, being very hot in
62
S lim m e r  and very cold in winter.'
Apparently, the agribusiness project was launched on the ground that
the local farmers of Khuzistan are not capable of using modern methods
63of setting up producers' cooperatives. The project, therefore, aimed 
at the maximum utilization of water resources and land irrigable from 
dams for increasing agricultural production. These ventures' activities 
were supposed to cover a very wide field, including poultry and fish 
farming, fruit and vegetable production and processing, oilseed production 
and processing, forage crop production and processing, production of 
cuttings, seeds and flowers, and food industries. The products of these 
ventures were supposed to be marketed within the country as well as in 
world markets. It was therefore planned to create a source of foreign 
exchange for the country. However, by 1974, it was already well known
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that such large scale agricultural units were not economic.^
Thus in 1974, one year after the crisis began in Iran, the pioneer 
agribusiness venture (Hashem Naraghi Agro-Industries of Iran and 
America) went bankrupt and the American partner pulled out of the 
business. The present crisis of Iran has affected almost all
agribusiness companies in Khuzistan.^ By 1978, out of the seven joint 
ventures which were formed in Khuzistan, only the International 
Agribusiness Corporation of Iran was still afloat with its original owner. 
The other ventures have been bought by the State.
Different writers have mentioned different causes of the bankruptcy 
of the agribusiness ventures in Iran. However, none of them seems to 
be sufficiently detailed to demonstrate the failure of this project.
The summary below supports this view:
Some agribusiness officials expressed dissatisfaction with the 
policies of the Government. One of the Mitchell Cotts executives, for 
instance, referred to 9jZ interest rates on loans from the A.D.B.I., 
and stated: 'with that kind of money around your neck, it's bloody 
difficult to make a profit.' He said his company deserved soft loans 
from the bank at 3|Z. In addition, the same company only a few years 
after its establishment 'found out it could not double-crop; the land 
was in much worse condition than expected, requiring heavy investments 
in fertilizers; more earth than anticipated had to be moved in order to 
level massive tracts of land for precise methods of irrigation; the KWPA 
fell behind the agreed upon timetable for construction of irrigation
. *66 works.■
The land levelling for precise methods of irrigation turned out to 
be far more costly than had been anticipated. In addition, not only 
were the companies repeatedly asked to increase their capital, but the 
Government also declined to give the promised assistance. Many cropping 
decisions were commercially unsound or unrealistic; while from the outset 
these companies 'lacked competent farm managers . ,.'®^
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The agribusiness companies have been faced with excessively high
overhead costs (for land levelling and secondary canals) and a low level
of production. They complained of management problems. But more
important was an acute shortage of Government-promised water for lands
under cultivation. That is, 'the big Dez dam..... has a theoretical
irrigation capacity of 100,000 hectares, but today (1976) it is only
68covering 18,000 hectares.'
In addition, there was misunderstanding over what the Government 
promised and the owners expected, delays in delivery of equipment and 
canal-building, and the salinity of the soil.^ Good agricultural 
planning was missing: the farms were producing but returns were 
insufficient because of costs which rose astronomically after 1973.^
Conclusion
The specific form of relations of production (as examined in the 
previous chapter) plus a high rate of illiteracy have caused problems for 
the employment of "modern" technology in the labour-process. This 
phenomenon plus a fragmented type of landholding have caused a low rate 
of growth in the agricultural sector. That is, the growth rate during 
the 1970s has been no more than 2{Z per annum. This has caused 
shortages of almost all farm commodities, which consequently directed the 
State to increase its food imports.^ The agribusiness project was 
allegedly intended to solve these problems. However, after a few years 
in operation, we can see that these joint-ventures have not only taken 
no steps to these problems, but they have also created other problems 
such as peasant unemployment. In addition, as large bankrupted units,' 
they are a burden on the shoulders of the State.
This chapter has tried to show that both State led experiments to 
increase agricultural production have resulted in an increasing burden on 
the State, while accelerating the development of capitalist relations in
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the countryside. The corporation project created a body of State- 
employed experts and bureaucrats, which controls the peasants' lands; 
while, as we have seen, many of the agribusiness ventures have gone 
bankrupt or have been losing money heavily. Despite their lack of 
financial sources, they have helped to suppress the development of 
peasant-bourgeoisie and introduoe/reinforce the development of 
capitalism from above.
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CONCLUSION
The implementation of the L-R programme may be considered as a 
turning point in the history of rural Iran. We have, therefore, set 
out in this thesis to analyse the immediate impact of this programme 
on relations of production in rural Iran. In order to do so, we 
divided our study into three parts: in the first part we analysed 
relations of production in the period 1940-1960; in the second part, 
we presented an overview of the L-R movement and the implementation and 
laws of the reform itself; and finally in the third part, we analysed 
relations of production in rural Iran after the implementation of L-R.
In examining relations of production in rural Iran prior to L-R, we 
distinguished two sets of relations: these between landlord and peasant 
on the one hand and those among the peasants on the other. The 
relationship between landlord and peasant comprised property relations 
and different forms of rent. The landowning class owned around 83% of 
the total cultivable lands, while the rest belonged to the peasants.
The former also owned almost all water sources of the country. However, 
in order to make their properties (land and water) effective, the owners 
(of land/water) raised the peasants to the position of possession of land, 
naaa^-holding. However, the landlord had the power to suspend his 
subjects from their positions. The ownership of land and water, 
accompanied by the political dominance of landlords over the peasants, 
enabled the former to extract surplus (rent) from the latter.
On the basis of the ownership and possession of land and water and 
the articulation of these two, we distinguished different forms of rent.
The dominant form of rent payment was the share-cropping system.
On the basis of the relationship between direct-producer and non-producer, 
we distinguished two types of share-cropping: share-cropping of the 
winter crops (mozare'e) and share-cropping of the summer crops {nesfeh keen).
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Our analysis of the labour process of the former type showed that it was 
a feudal rent but moved away from its original form in the classical 
feudal mode of production. On the other hand, the share-cropping
for the summer crops was based on the capitalist relations. There was 
therefore no question of the non-economic domination/subordination 
relationship between the non-producers and direct-producers in this 
system. The share-cropping for the summer crops was employed for the 
production of vegetables; hence it was produced on the lands surrounding 
the towns and cities.
The second form of rent was the fixed rent which was dominant only 
in the Caspian sea littoral, though it existed in other parts to some 
extent. Our analysis of the fixed rent showed that this system is very 
close to the capitalist (absolute/differential) ground rent. That is, 
in this system, the «¿zea<7-holders had to hand over a certain amount of 
cash and/or produce to their landlords.
In some arid areas, where the direct-producers actually owned land, 
the rent was paid for the use of water. Each direct-producer had the 
right to use a certain amount of water for his cultivation; in return 
he had to hand over a certain amount of produce and/or cash. In 
addition to these different forms of rent, in some cases the peasants 
were subject to a combination of two or more types of rent.
Almost all these forms of rent were supplemented by labour service 
and dues. In many parts of Iran, peasants had to undertake jobs, such 
as the construction/repairing of qanats, road building, and transportation, 
without any reward. In addition to labour service, the peasants were 
bound to give some products, such as eggs, butter, meat, to their landlords.
Having reviewed all the forms of extraction of surplus, we tried to 
answer the question as to why the peasants undertook these forms of 
exploitation? Were they tied to the land? Thus we briefly analysed 
incentive and disincentive factors which induced the peasants to move 
away from their home villages. Our analysis of these factors showed
316
that some economic factors induced the peasants to remain in their home 
villages; whereas others encouraged them to migrate to the towns and 
cities and/or other villages. Generally speaking, the peasants remained 
in their own home villages, not because of their political subordination 
to their landlords, but because of the economic incentives which they had 
in their villages. This drove them, in effect, to a considerable extent, 
to become subordinate to their landlords.
The imposition of feudal and semi-feudal rents on the peasants drove 
the latter to stand against the exploiting class on different occasions, 
in 1945-46 and 1952. However, in the late 1950s, the peasants' revolts 
started again, particularly in the north and north-west, and we showed 
how this affected the relationship between landlords and peasants: in some 
cases, the share of peasants out of the total produce was increased, in 
others, labour-service and dues were reduced or cancelled, and finally in 
some areas, the dominance of the landowning class was reduced to the 
economic domain only.
The relationships among the peasants were more complicated than the 
relationship between the peasantry and landlords. This is because while 
they were working in bonehs and therefore had some form of cooperation 
with each other, they had already developed capitalist types of relation­
ship among themselves.
Poor peasants not only were subject to feudal exploitation, but also 
were exploited by other agents of production. In a boneh poor peasants 
had nothing to contribute to the labour process but their labour; they 
had to undertake heavy work and had no control over the labour process. 
They worked with the means of production (other than land/water) which 
belonged to the head of the boneh (gavband). The latter collected a 
share for his means of production. However this extraction of surplus- 
value took place through economic mechanisms. The poor peasants also 
borrowed money and or seeds from the rich peasants which they paid back
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with interest. In addition, the poor peasants had to sell their 
labour-power in the urban or rural labour market, because . they were 
unable to reproduce themselves and their families with just their shares 
out of the total produce. One may ask whether or not these poor 
peasants could be considered as wage-labourers? In other words, had 
these agents of production been entirely freed from the objective 
conditions of production as well as from bondage and servitudes? One 
may not consider them as such if one compares their positions with those 
of wage-labourers in a capitalist social formation. As Marx put it, 
in order for an agent of production to become a wage-labourer, he has to 
be free in a "double sense": free from the old relations of servitudes and 
bondage, as well as free of any means of production of his own.* Thus, 
the poor peasants may not be considered as wage-labourers for the following 
reasons: they were in the position of possession of land; they were able to 
produce their subsistence from their possessed/owned lands for a part of 
the year, and therefore they were casual vendors of labour-power. On the 
other hand, although they were free to leave their home villages they had 
narrow opportunities outside their villages which made them become subject 
to the bondage and servitude of their feudal landlords: they were therefore 
subject to feudal exploitation not because of the dominance of the 
landlords at the political level, but because they had almost no other 
economic opportunity in other sectors of the economy to reproduce them­
selves.
Contrary to the poor peasants, rich peasants were only subject to 
feudal exploitation by their landlords. They controlled the labour- 
process and undertook lighter work in this process. They had managed 
to accumulate some wealth and means of production, through which they had 
established exploitative relationships with the poor and middle peasantry. 
They sold a portion of their share of produce in the market.
Finally, the middle peasantry was exploited by feudal landlords as 
well as rich peasants. However, they owned/poasessed more means of
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production than the poor peasants, and therefore they collected a higher 
portion of the total produce. They occasionally resorted to selling 
their labour-power.
The CMP reinforced the process of the reproduction of the conditions
of production of itself as well as of the FMP. As Foster-Carter points
out: '... far from banishing pre-capitalist forms, it (capitalism) not only
coexists with them but buttresses them, and even on occasions devilishly
3conjures them up ex nihilo.' On the other hand, the FMP not only 
provided the conditions for the appearance of the CMP (the point which is 
out of the scope of this study), but also produced and reproduced the 
material conditions of bourgeois relations of production. Paradox­
ically it was only this development which permitted the non-capitalist 
relations of production to continue to dominate the Iranian rural social 
formation.
The following comments on this process of articulation are in order 
here. First, pre-capitalist relations and elements did not play a 
passive role, the role which is attributed to them in Luxemburg's model.
In effect they were as active as those of the capitalist mode. That is 
why we characterized our social formation by analysing the dynamics of 
both feudal and capitalist modes of production.^ As a remarkable example 
of the active role which feudalism played in this articulation we may 
quote Khamsi, who rightly states: '... the rich peasants were not a 
dynamic force in the countryside comparable to the kulaks in Russia at 
the turn of the century, because the existing feudal relations and the 
narrowness of the market allowed them little economic r&in. ' Secondly, 
the articulation of the two modes of production showed that the FMP did 
not allow capitalism to develop as a direct and inevitable process: i.e. 
to undermine the feudal relations of production and replace them with 
those of capitalism; that is, the process which is conceived in the 
M a n i f e s t o Instead, each one of these two modes reproduced conditions
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of production of the whole system. The process of "undermining but at 
the same time perpetuating" was the form of relationship between the two 
modes of production.2
Thirdly, the extraction of surplus-value through economic mechanisms
on the part of the gccobands, accompanied by partial separation of the
poor peasants from the Objective conditions of production indicate that
the process of primitive capital accumulation had already begun, and
therefore, capitaVhad taken root from inside the Iranian rural social 
8formation. Here, by "capital", we do not mean a sum of material and
produced means of production, 'but rather a definite social production
relation, belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which
is manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social 
9character.' It follows that "primitive capital accumulation" is nothing 
else than the historical process of separating direct-producers from the 
means of production as well as the old bondage and servitude.1^
Fourthly, the anti-landlord revolts in our social formation were 
attempts on the part of the peasantry to remove feudal ties and therefore 
release the dynamic forces for the development of capitalism within the 
peasantry, viz. the American way of capitalist development. Thus there 
was no contradiction between these two modes in the sense which has been 
developed in some Studies,11 since the latter were articulated. In
effect, as almost all examples of revolts have shown, the main contradiction 
was between the peasantry as a whole on the one hand and feudal landlords 
(and their agents) on the other. The suppression of these revolts 
obviously resulted in blocking the development of capitalism through the 
American path by blocking the primitive capital accumulation to become a 
capital accumulation on an extended scale.
Fifth, we tried to show that rural Iran prior to L-R was a semi- 
feudal-semi-capitalist social formation, not because of the dominance of 
the share-cropping system, as the main form of exaction of surplus,12 but 
because the capitalist relations of production had already developed in
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rural Iran and thus the relations of production of the two inodes of 
production were articulated.
Sixth, capital accumulation, as the cornerstone of capitalist
13development, was blocked * by the feudal landlords. It was
therefore necessary to break these feudal relations of production in the 
economic sphere by a political actt i,e. L-R, and open the way for 
capital accumulation on an extended scale % Here we can see a direct 
relationship between L-R, as defined in Chapter IX, and economic 
development in the sense of expansion/reinforcement of the capitalist 
relations/forces of production.
In the second part of this study, we set out to review the events 
and laws of L-R during the period 1940-1970. This was to show the attempts 
which were made to reinforce the development of capitalism in rural Iran.
Thus we described the land policy of the Democrats of Azarbaijan, Qavam 
and Dr, Mossadeq. It was stated that owing to the pressure on the part 
of the peasantry, Qavam and Dr. Mossadeq had to take some measures in 
1945-46 and 1952 respectively. But their policies hardly affected the 
peasantry. In 1953, when the Coup government (supported by comprador 
bourgeoisie and feudal landlords) came to power, the landlords managed to 
suppress peasant movements. However, during 1955 to 1960, attempts were 
made to improve the conditions of life of the peasants. But all these 
mild measures were blocked by the feudal landlords, until the crisis of 
1959-61 broke the alliance of comprador bourgeoisie and the feudal landlords. 
Then the political leaders of the former class managed to obtain the 
support of some other groups and launch a reform programme. Although 
different political groups were opposed to the programme, the reform 
government managed to suppress them and carry out its reform.
We ended this section with an argument on the causes of L-R. We 
criticized two different ideas, developed by different studies on this 
point. We argued that the economic crisis of 1959-61 brought about 
deficits m  the budget and balance—of—payments, rural-urban mass migration,
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unemployment in the urban centres, and stagnation in the agricultural 
and industrial sectors. This caused unrest in the urban centres as 
well as in the rural areas. In order to overcome this political and 
economic crisis, the State initiated a full-fledged reform programme 
which included reform in the system of land tenure.
In order to discover the nature of the nation-wide L-R programme, 
we set out to interpret the laws of this reform. Our interpretation of 
the L-R laws showed the following. First, this programme made attempts 
to change landed property in rural Iran. Thus in the first stage of L-R, 
many peasants who possessed land (nasacy-holders) were raised to the 
position of ownership of land; and in the second stage, more nasac7-holders 
became owners and/or leaseholders. The programme also encouraged some 
landlords to participate in the labour-process and therefore the nasaq- 
holders lost possession of land.
Secondly, in the case of irrigated lands, the nasaq-holders received 
land together with the water right from the qanat or river belonging to 
it according to local custom.
Thirdly, the programme gave the permission to the nasaq-holders to 
register their ownership of a ’yani properties. These changes in property 
relations resulted in the disappearance of the share-cropping system, 
labour-service and dues.
Attempts have been made to assess the results of the Iranian L-R
programme according to the number of peasants who received land. For
example, Hooglund states that the answer to the following questions are
crucial for an interpretation and assessment of Iran's L-R programme;
how much land was actually redistributed, and what per-cent of all
14villagers received land? He reduces L-R to land re-distribution.
The effects of any land reform-programme are conditioned by the mechanics 
of the reform process. For example, an extensive redistribution will 
affect the position and influence of landlords far more fundamentally 
than a nominal reform of tenure practice. Likewise, the results of a
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relatively equitable redistribution of land among peasants can be 
expected to differ from those of an unequal redistribution. Also of 
significance is whether or not the reform benefits all villagers. On 
the basis of this general statement, he evaluates the results of the 
Iranian L-R progranane: 'Evaluating Iran's land reform programme 
according to the above consideration, we can conclude that the Iranian 
effort has been, on balance, a fairly moderate one. Although an over­
whelming majority of farmers have acquired some land, absentee ownership 
has not been eliminated and large landlords have been permitted to 
retain substantial holdings in many a r e a s . I t  is implied in this 
quotation that the main aim of any L-R programme is an equitable redistri­
bution of land among the peasants and since the Iranian officials 
fulfilled this aim to some extent, this programme was a fairly moderate 
one. But our argument in this thesis has been that the main object of 
the Iranian L-R programme was to remove the remnants of feudal relations 
of production from the rural scene. In order to fulfil this aim, the 
programme redistributed some lands among a certain number of peasants, 
while at the same time it encouraged some of the landlords to run their 
estates on the basis of the wage-labour system. Furthermore, following 
its main aim, the programme affected neither mechanized farms not the 
share-cropping system of summer crops (nesfeh kari)
Generally speaking, an assessment of the immediate impact of the 
Iranian L-R programme should be made according to the extent to which 
it managed to remove the remnants of the FMP and induce the development 
of capitalism through the "American" and "Prussian" ways, and in this, 
the programme has been successful.
We showed that the L-R programme, in effect, reinforced the 
differentiation of the peasantry. In addition, the supplementary 
measures, taken by the State, helped the rich peasants accumulate capital; 
while the poor peasants remained unaffected by these measures. The 
cooperatives were established to support the peasants in different ways,
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including money lending, marketing the agricultural products, supplying 
peasants with cheap products, etc. However, the cooperatives' 
activities were virtually reduced to money lending. Yet, only half of 
the peasants were able to obtain loans from the cooperatives. Some 
peasants complained about the insufficient amount of each loan., while 
many poor peasants stated that only rich peasants could obtain loans 
from the cooperatives. This forced the peasants to borrow money from 
money-cum-merchants to a considerable extent.
One of the main immediate effects of the Iranian L-R programme was 
a sharp increase in the number of proletarians and semi-proletarians.
Thus in the late 1960s, there were around two million permanent and 
casual vendors of labour power in the rural areas. Apart from the urban 
centres, the demand for their labour power came from the middle and rich 
peasants and also the capitalist farmers. The study of the economy of 
rich peasants showed that they usually employed wage labourers at peak 
seasons, though they used family labour to some extent. The middle 
peasants were found to rely mainly on the family labour; however, they 
occasionally employed wage labourers at peak seasons.
Capitalist farmers employed agricultural machinery and produced mainly 
for the market. Each farm employed a few wage labourers permanently, 
but at peak seasons, it employed a number of casual labourers. The 
capitalist farmers had a monopsony position in the rural markets of 
their villages, they could therefore keep wages low.' However, the
labourers (local and migrant) had the opportunity to find jobs in other 
villages and/or the urban centres. Owing to the "prosperity" in the 
urban centres during 1973-77, many peasants preferred to work in the 
towns and cities; hence there happened to be a shortage of labourers in 
the rural labour market.
The State supported the capitalist farmers in different ways. Thus 
the latter could obtain low interest loans, custom free imports of 
agricultural machinery and also facilities for the exports of cash crops.
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However, the L-R programme induced many landlords to shift to the 
capitalist methods of farming. They, therefore, employed machinery and 
wage labourers and produced mainly for the market.
The State's policy towards the establishment of large capitalist 
farms in the 1960s has caused Sodagar to believe that the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in rural Iran took place through the "Prussian" 
vay.^ In his analysis of the development of capitalism in rural Iran, 
he overlooks the peasant bourgeoisie and looks at the "Prussian" path as 
the absolute dominant way of development of capitalism. However, our 
argument in this thesis showed that the development of capitalism 
through the "Prussian" and "American" paths has gone on side by side.
In fact, the articulation of these two is the main characteristic 
feature of capitalism in rural Iran.
In the late 1960s, the State initiated two major projects to "develop" 
the agricultural sector, corporations and agribusiness units. For the 
establishment of corporations, the peasants in every few villages had to 
pool their fragmented plots. This changed the whole relations of 
production in the affected villages. Thus, the peasant owner/leaseholders 
lost their effective possession of land and other means of production; and 
a body of bureaucrats, experts, and rich peasants, took the control of 
land, water as well as machinery. The peasants became share-holders and 
therefore collected a portion of the total profit according to their 
shares. However, since the share of each family out of the total profit 
was negligible, almost all peasants had to work for the corporations as 
wage labourers and/or as share-croppers. This state of affairs gave 
the impression to the peasant share-holders that the State has taken 
over their land and become the new landlord.
The agribusiness project affected the peasant owner/leaseholders in 
a different way. Under the 'Downstream Land Use Law' the peasant owner/ 
leaseholders were forced to sell their allotments to the State. The 
lands were rented by international companies. Apart from the provision
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of land and water, the State provided the companies with long term 
loans and allowed them to import modern machinery and fertilizers.
Unlike those in the corporations, the peasants in these areas did not 
become share-holders; and moreover, owing to the employment of 
sophisticated agricultural machines, only a small percentage of them 
managed to find jobs (as wage labourers) in the agribusiness companies. 
However, even if not financially successful, both agribusiness units and 
corporations contributed to the further development of capitalist relations, 
carrying on the work began by the State in the 1960s land reform.
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NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION
1. Marx, 1974, p.507
2* According to an estimation, the peasantry was able to market around 
20 to 25 percent of its total produce. See Khamsi, 1968, p.80. On 
the basis of this estimation, one may say that a fairly high amount 
of this marketed produce was supplied by the rich peasants.
3. Foster-Carter, 1978, p.51
4. See Foster-Carter'8 comment on this point, ibid, p.107j and also 
see Bradby, 1975, p.128.
5. Khamsi, 1969, p.22, italics added
6. See Brenner, 1977, p.25
7. This is the term used by Meillasoux, 1972, p.103; Bettleheim talks 
about "conservation/dissolution", see Bettleheim , 1972, p.297.
8. With regard to these two points Bradby poses the following question: 
'If we consider the growth of capitalism on a world scale, do we 
see one primitive accumulation, or many — in other words, does 
capitalism have to "take root" from inside a social formation, or 
is an assimilation from the outside possible ?' See Bradby,
1975, p.130.
9. Plarx, 1971, p.814j see also Plarx, 1976, pp.988-89
10. See Marx, 1974, pp.506—09; and also Plarx, 1976, pp.874—75
11. See Flo'meni and G.O.P.F., 1976
12. Badi, 1959 and Seidov, 1963
13. There .-appear to be two different approaches to the agricultural 
development in the UOCs :the 'improvement* approach and the 
'transformation' approach. The improvement approach aims at the 
development of the agricultural system within the existing mode 
of production and is mainly concerned with the improvement of 
methods of production and animal husbandry. The transformation 
approach is an attempt to establish a "new" set of relations
of production and therefore Increasing production. This classi­
fication is based on Long, 1977, pp.144-45 and pp.158-59.
14. Hooglund, 1975, pp.4—5
15. Ibid, p.117; for a more or less the same type of evaluation, see 
Warriner, 1969, chapter V, pp.1G9-35; .. Keddie, 1968; and also 
Khamsi, 1969.
16. Sodagar criticises the l-R programme by stating that the vegetable- 
orowersfselfl-Karan)dld not receive any land at all; see Sodagar, 
1979, p.46. The reason is to sought in the fact that the relation­
ship between the producers and non-producers in this type of share- 
cropping is of a capitalist type; see our argument in chapter II.
. See Sodagar, 1979, p.8 and p.27.17
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